State v. Lewis

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Lewis STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JERMAINE LEWIS (AC 48094) Alvord, Moll and Seeley, Js. Syllabus The defendant, who had been on probation as a result of a prior criminal conviction, appealed from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration. The defendant claimed that he was deprived of his due process right to testify in the violation of probation proceeding because his waiver of that right was not made knowingly, intel- ligently and voluntarily. Held: The defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to testify was made in violation of his right to due process, as the record did not provide this court with sufficient assurance that the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, defense counsel having made no representations to the court about the defendant’s decision not to testify, the court did not so inquire of the defendant or of counsel, and the record was devoid of any indication that counsel had discussions with the defendant regarding his right to testify and the waiver of that right, and, as the state failed to demonstrate that the violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new violation of probation hearing. This court rejected the state’s contention that a defendant’s constitutional right to testify in a violation of probation proceeding is not equivalent to that of a defendant in a criminal trial and concluded that defendants in violation of probation proceedings enjoy a constitutional right to testify that is equal to that of defendants in criminal trials. This court, in concluding that a defendant’s waiver of the constitutional right to testify in a violation of probation proceeding must comport with due process, could discern no compelling reason why the determination in State v. Morel-Vargas (343 Conn. 247) that a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify in a criminal trial must be made knowingly, intelligently and volun- tarily should not apply with equal force in a violation of probation proceeding. This court concluded that a constitutionally valid waiver of a defendant’s right to testify in a violation of probation proceeding requires a showing of sufficient assurance, based on the totality of the record, that the defendant’s waiver was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and, although a court is not required to canvass a defendant or to inquire of defense counsel whether the defendant has been adequately advised prior to the waiver, the most prudent approach for trial courts would be to canvass defendants regarding a waiver of the right to testify. Argued March 16—officially released July 7, 2026  State v. Lewis Procedural History Information charging the defendant with violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and transferred to the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, geographical area number seven, where the case was tried to the court, Zagaja, J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s proba- tion, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Erica A. Barber, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Nichol Peco, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion SEELEY, J. The defendant, Jermaine Lewis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding him in viola- tion of, and revoking, his probation pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 53a-32.1 On appeal, the defen- dant claims, for the first time, that he was deprived of his due process right to testify in the violation of proba- tion proceeding because the record does not show that 1 General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or condi- tional discharge . . . . “(c) Upon notification by the probation officer of the arrest of the defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unneces- sary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant’s probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant’s own behalf. Unless good cause is shown, a charge of violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge shall be disposed of or scheduled for  State v. Lewis his waiver of that right was knowing and voluntary. In support of his claim that his waiver of his right to testify was not constitutionally valid, the defendant relies on the decision from our Supreme Court in State v. Morel- Vargas, 343 Conn. 247, 254, 273 A.3d 661, cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 143 S. Ct. 263, 214 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2022), in which the court addressed the issue of what is consti- tutionally required to demonstrate that a defendant in a criminal trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to testify on his own behalf. Specifically, in Morel-Vargas, the court held that, although “a trial court is not constitutionally required to obtain an on-the- record waiver from the criminal defendant, himself”; (emphasis added) id., 263–64; “the totality of the record [must furnish] sufficient assurance of a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to [testify].” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 260. Our Supreme Court in Morel-Vargas exercised its “supervisory authority pro- spectively to require a trial court, when presiding over a criminal trial, to either canvass the defendant prior to his waiver of his right to testify or, alternatively, to inquire of defense counsel directly to determine whether counsel has adequately advised the defendant regarding the waiver of his right to testify.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 270. The primary question we must decide in this appeal a hearing not later than one hundred twenty days after the defendant is arraigned on such charge. “(d) If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a- 29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.” In this opinion, our references to § 53a-32 are to the 2023 revision of the statute.  State v. Lewis is whether, in light of Morel-Vargas, which was decided in the context of a criminal trial, a defendant’s waiver of his right to testify in a violation of probation proceeding also must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary for the waiver to be constitutionally valid. We answer that ques- tion in the affirmative, and, because the record in this case is not sufficient to establish that the defendant’s waiver of his right to testify was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand the case for a new violation of probation hearing. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 22, 2021, the defendant entered a guilty plea to assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3), for which he subsequently was sentenced to ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after five years, fol- lowed by five years of probation.2 On December 15, 2022, the defendant began serving his probation and signed a conditions of probation form, which included, inter alia, the standard condition that he not violate any criminal laws. Subsequently, on April 30, 2023, the defendant’s probation officer, Charles Santiago, was informed by the Meriden police that the defendant had been arrested for risk of injury to a child.3 The charge stemmed from con- duct of the defendant that took place on April 30, 2023, involving a fifteen year old girl, H.4 The defendant had been visiting the home of V, a close friend, and V’s then fourteen year old son, A, who was dating H at the time. During that visit, at which time the defendant, V, A, and H were all present in V’s home, the defendant allegedly sent sexually explicit text messages to H,5 exposed his 2 The defendant’s conduct underlying the assault charge occurred on or about December 29, 2017, and the defendant was arrested in 2018. 3 The defendant initially had been charged with risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree, but the information subsequently was amended to include only the charge of risk of injury to a child. 4 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. 5 See footnote 8 of this opinion.  State v. Lewis penis to H, and asked H if she would perform fellatio on and “fondle” A’s penis, stating that he would pay H if she did so. As a result of the defendant’s arrest, Santiago submitted a warrant for the defendant’s arrest for viola- tion of the condition of his probation that he not violate any criminal laws. On June 7, 2024, the court, Zagaja, J., held a hearing on the violation of probation charge. The state presented testimony from Santiago and Officer Raeshaun Finney of the Meriden Police Department, who had responded to a 911 call regarding the April 30, 2023, incident and testified regarding the statements made to him by H about what had transpired. The court also admitted into evidence, without objection, exhibits offered by the state, which included a certified copy of the defendant’s 2021 conviction, the defendant’s signed conditions of probation form, and photographs of the text messages sent by the defendant to H. After the state rested its case, defense counsel indi- cated to the court that she intended to call two witnesses to testify, V and A.6 Following the conclusion of A’s testimony, defense counsel stated that she had “[n]oth- ing further” and that the defense rested. At that time, neither the court nor defense counsel made any state- ments regarding the defendant’s decision not to testify, and the defendant, who had remained silent when his counsel stated that the defense had nothing further, did not make any representations to the court indicat- ing that he wanted to testify.7 Subsequently, the court 6 The court admitted into evidence an exhibit offered by the defendant, which was a screenshot taken from video footage from Finney’s body camera that showed a “hickey mark” on A’s neck. 7 Prior to hearing arguments from counsel, the court first addressed a due process claim that previously had been raised by defense counsel regarding Finney’s testimony about the hearsay statements of H and the fact that H did not testify at the hearing, which precluded the defen- dant’s ability to cross-examine H regarding her statements. The defen- dant has not raised any due process claim in this appeal concerning the court’s admission of Finney’s testimony about the hearsay statements of H and the defendant’s inability to cross-examine H. Accordingly, we deem any such claim abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Antwon B., 236  State v. Lewis heard arguments from counsel, after which it stated its decision orally on the record. Specifically, the court found that the state had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed risk of injury to a child through his text communications with H8 and Conn. App. 428, 449 n.14, 348 A.3d 814 (2025) (“claims of error not briefed are considered abandoned” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 910, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026). 8 Specifically, the court stated: “I do find that the defendant has committed risk of injury to a [child]. Specifically, with the full exhibit 3, the text messages that were presented by the state, and they were photographed copies of screenshots that were on the telephone, the cell telephone of [H]. I want to point out certain things I observed by that conversation. It first starts off by indicating, ‘[h]ow bad are you,’ with a response from the person purported to be [H], the phone holder, saying, ‘[w]ho is this?’ And then followed up with a ‘[h]ello.’ Then the person, and, again, I’m going to complement this by the testimony I heard, I heard that through questioning from [Finney, the defendant] did acknowledge that he was involved in a text conversation with [H]. [The defendant] then indicates, ‘[w]hen do you turn 16.’ She says, ‘[n]ext March.’ And he says, ‘[a]nd stop acting surprised . . . keep a secret . . . shhh.’ [H] then texts, ‘[t]f’ [and] ‘[w]ho is this,’ to which [the defendant] says, ‘[i]t’s me . . . look up.’ Now, that sequence, and this is what I was presented with, this sequence of conversation on [H’s] phone entirely contradicts the testimony of the defense witnesses that [H] actually initiated this conversation. To the court’s understand- ing, this is a conversation initiated by [the defendant]. [H] then says, ‘[w]hy do u want to no when I turn 16.’ [The defendant] says, ‘[h]ow bad are you was the original question.’ [H] says, ‘[l]ike sexual?’ [The defendant] says, ‘[c]an you keep a secret?’ [H] responds, ‘[o]k, [y]es.’ [The defendant] then says, ‘[y]ou’re bad, I’m sorry.’ [H] says, ‘[d]o u like me.’ [The defendant] says, ‘[y]ou’re cute, but young. I didn’t want to scare you just now.’ [H] says, ‘[i]t’s ok.’ [The defendant] then says, ‘[y]ou sure, ok . . . I guess delete this since I made you feel awkward. . . . Please don’t say anything.’ [H] responds, ‘[o]k.’ [The defendant] then says, ‘[s]ure you ok?’ [H] then responds, ‘[y]eah,’ to which [the defendant] writes, ‘[h]ow bad are you was the original question that you never answered. . . . [N]ot bad enough to do something wild with someone older? is that too much for you beautiful?’ [H] then responds, ‘I’ve never done something.’ And then [the defendant] says, ‘[y]ou told us you weren’t a virgin . . . that you did give oral sex before.’ Now, in that context, considering this text message sequence alone, the court finds that the defendant, unsolicited, committed risk of injury to a [child]. By his own words, he does acknowledge that the recipient of this message is under sixteen years of age. He acknowledges the awkward nature of this communication, either the awkward nature of the communication or the hearsay testimony that this was a sequence of communications in the middle of him exposing himself. The court, however, finds that  State v. Lewis thereby violated his probation.9 Subsequently, after hearing arguments from counsel and a statement from the defendant, in which he stated that he “appreciated the court’s fairness in this matter,” the court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to four years of incarceration. This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that his due process right to testify on his own behalf was violated because the record does not demonstrate that he knowingly and voluntarily waived that right at the violation of proba- tion hearing.10 At the outset, the defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this due process claim at trial and seeks review of it pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 the content alone of the communications [is] enough and sufficient to establish that he has committed risk of injury to a [child]. I don’t believe that there is any mystery. There is no double meaning as to what he could be intending when he asks about her age and doing something wild with someone older.” 9 With respect to the state’s allegations that the defendant also violated his probation by exposing his penis to H and making sexual comments to her in which he offered to pay her money if she performed oral sex on A, the court stated: “I’m not indicating that those other allegations fall short of preponderance of the evidence. I’m indicating to you [counsel] that, based on my finding of facts and considering the entirety of the evidence, I believe that the defendant has committed risk of injury to a [child], specifically, based on the allegations of the text messages sent to [H] . . . [that] are contained in state’s exhibit 3.” 10 We note that, throughout much of his appellate briefs, the defen- dant, in asserting his due process claim, focuses on the court’s failure to “conduct an on-the-record colloquy at any stage in the proceedings regarding whether [the defendant] understood his right to testify and his waiver of that right.” He also contends that the court was required, pursuant to Morel-Vargas, to canvass him or to inquire of defense counsel directly to determine whether counsel adequately had advised the defendant regarding his right to testify and the waiver of that right. For reasons explained in part III of this opinion, we reject these claims. The defendant’s contention that his right to testify was violated, however, is also premised on his claim that his waiver of his constitutional right to testify had to be knowing and voluntary, and that the totality of the record fails to provide sufficient assurance of a constitutionally valid waiver. Our analysis in this opinion focuses on that aspect of his claim of a constitutional violation.  State v. Lewis (2015).11 “Under Golding, ‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola- tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’ . . . State v. Golding, supra, 239–40; see In re Yasiel R., supra, 781 (modifying third prong of Gold- ing).” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Morel-Vargas, supra, 343 Conn. 253. We conclude that the record is adequate for review of this claim12 and that the claim is of constitutional magnitude. See id., 253–54; see also State v. Christopher R., 222 Conn. App. 763, 771, 306 A.3d 1117 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 946, 308 A.3d 34 (2024); State v. Frazier, 181 Conn. App. 1, 35, 185 A.3d 11 The defendant also seeks review of his unpreserved due process claim under the plain error doctrine and claims that the due process violation constituted structural error. See footnotes 21 and 25 of this opinion. 12 We disagree with the state’s contention that the record is inadequate for review of this claim. In making that assertion, the state relies on State v. Taveras, 219 Conn. App. 252, 256, 295 A.3d 421, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 903, 301 A.3d 527 (2023), which involved an unpreserved claim that the trial court’s admission of testimony containing hearsay during a violation of probation hearing violated the defendant’s due process right to cross-examine the declarant of the hearsay statements. Specifically, the defendant in Taveras claimed that the trial court improperly had failed to conduct the balancing test set forth in State v. Shakir, 130 Conn. App. 458, 467–68, 22 A.3d 1285, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 931, 28 A.3d 345 (2011), and “to determine whether good cause existed for his inability to confront and cross-examine [the declarant] at the probation revocation hearing . . . .” State v. Taveras, supra, 265. This court concluded that the record was inadequate to review the alleged due process violation under Golding because the defendant did not distinctly raise the balancing issue with the court at the violation of probation proceeding, such that “the court had no occasion to consider whether there was good cause not to allow confrontation.” Id., 268; see id. (“[t]his court has determined . . . that where the defendant does not request that the court conduct the Shakir balancing test, or make a good cause finding, the record is inadequate for review of a due pro- cess claim under the first prong of Golding” (internal quotation marks  State v. Lewis 621, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 938, 184 A.3d 268 (2018). Accordingly, we first focus our inquiry on whether the claimed constitutional violation exists. In support of his due process claim, the defendant asserts that the right to testify in a violation of probation proceeding is a fundamental constitutional right and that, therefore, for a waiver of that right to be effective, it must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Relying on Morel-Vargas, he further contends that it was not necessary that he “take affirmative action to invoke the due process right to testify on his behalf” and that the record in this case “does not [furnish] sufficient assur- ance of a constitutionally valid waiver of [his] right to testify,” as “the trial court never canvassed [him] about his constitutional right to testify,” defense counsel “did not make any statements or representations to the court that [the defendant] was waiving his right to testify,” and a “waiver [could not] be inferred from a silent record . . . .” In response, the state highlights the differences between criminal trials and violation of probation proceedings, which “implicate fewer rights because revocation is not new punishment for a new crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recognizing that “probationers are entitled to certain minimum procedural safeguards under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,” which are detailed in § 53a-32; see footnote 1 of this opin- ion; the state, nonetheless, emphasizes that a violation of probation proceeding is informal in nature, should not be equated with a criminal trial, and requires only omitted)); see also State v. Crespo, 190 Conn. App. 639, 647, 211 A.3d 1027 (2019). We conclude that the state’s reliance on Taveras for the proposition that there is no factual record to review the defendant’s unpreserved due process claim is misplaced, as the present case does not involve a claimed violation of the right of confrontation in a violation of probation proceeding, which implicates the Shakir balancing test and requires a good cause finding by the trial court. Rather, the defen- dant’s unpreserved due process claim in the present case requires us to determine what is constitutionally required in a violation of probation proceeding for a defendant to make a valid waiver of his right to testify  State v. Lewis limited due process protections. As a result, the state con- tends that courts are not required to canvass a defendant regarding a waiver of the right to testify at a violation of probation proceeding. The state further contends that, because a defendant’s due process right to testify at a violation of probation proceeding is not “equivalent to a criminal defendant’s right to testify at a criminal trial,” a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify at a violation of probation proceeding need not be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, according to the state, the defendant’s reliance on Morel-Vargas, which pertains to defendants in criminal trials, is misplaced. In support of its claim that a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify at a violation of probation hearing need not be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the state relies on federal case law holding that the inquiries mandated to assure the knowing and intelligent entry of a guilty plea set forth in rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure13 and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. and whether a constitutional violation exists, which can be determined on the basis of the record before us. 13 Rule 11 (b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defen- dant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: “(A) the government’s right, in a prosecution for perjury or false statement, to use against the defendant any statement that the defen- dant gives under oath; “(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist in that plea; “(C) the right to a jury trial; “(D) the right to be represented by counsel—and if necessary have the court appoint counsel—at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding; “(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses; “(F) the defendant’s waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; “(G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading; “(H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release;  State v. Lewis 238, 242–44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969),14 are not required when a court accepts a defendant’s admission to a violation of probation. Finally, the state contends that the record in this case nevertheless dem- onstrates that the defendant was afforded his minimum procedural due process protections, including the oppor- tunity to be heard in person, as he was present when his attorney indicated to the court that the defendant had no additional witnesses and rested the defendant’s case, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the defen- dant wanted to testify and was prevented from doing so. Before we address the merits of the arguments raised by the parties, we first set forth the legal principles governing probation in general and violation of proba- tion proceedings, as well as the standards governing our review of a judgment revoking a defendant’s probation. “[P]robation is, first and foremost, a penal alternative to incarceration . . . . [Its] purpose . . . is to provide a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender; to take advantage of an opportunity for reformation which actual service of the suspended sentence might make less probable. . . . [P]robationers . . . do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly “(I) any mandatory minimum penalty; “(J) any applicable forfeiture; “(K) the court’s authority to order restitution; “(L) the court’s obligation to impose a special assessment; “(M) in determining a sentence, the court’s obligation to calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, possible departures under the [United States] Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a); “(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence; and “(O) that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the future.” 14 In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held that “[i]t was error . . . for the trial judge to accept [the] petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary,” that waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record, and that a court must canvass an accused to make sure he has a full understanding of the consequences of his plea. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. 242–44.  State v. Lewis dependent on observance of special [probation] restric- tions. . . . These restrictions are meant to [ensure] that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 180, 842 A.2d 567 (2004). “The success of probation as a correctional tool is in large part tied to the flexibility within which it is permit- ted to operate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Nevertheless, “the privilege of probation, once granted, is a constitutionally protected interest.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 294, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); see also State v. Orr, 199 Conn. App. 427, 434–35, 237 A.3d 15 (2020). To that end, “[t]he due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution requires that certain minimum procedural safeguards be observed in the process of revoking the conditional liberty created by probation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, supra, 268 Conn. 182. The United States Supreme Court delineated those procedural safeguards in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), in the context of a revo- cation of parole proceeding. Specifically, the court held that the minimum requirements of due process include “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.” Id. Those requirements have been deemed to apply to violation of probation proceedings; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) (“ ‘[Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss  State v. Lewis of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, [482].’ ” (Footnote omitted.)); and are embodied in § 53a-32. “Whether a party was deprived of his due process rights is a question of law to which appellate courts grant plenary review.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Houghtaling v. Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 246, 279, 248 A.3d 4 (2021). Even though a violation of probation “proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. . . . It therefore does not require all of the procedural components associated with an adver- sary criminal proceeding.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, supra, 229 Conn. 295; see also State v. Randy G., 195 Conn. App. 467, 477, 225 A.3d 702 (“[r]evocation of [probation] is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full pano- ply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to [probation] revocations” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 911, 229 A.3d 472 (2020). For example, “the state must prove each alleged violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence at a revocation proceeding, in accordance with . . . § 53a-32 . . . .” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, supra, 268 Conn. 183–84; see also State v. Wade, 351 Conn. 745, 759–60, 333 A.3d 90 (2025) (right to confront witnesses at viola- tion of probation hearing is not absolute and is subject to balancing of defendant’s interest in confrontation against government’s reasons for not producing witness and reliability of proffered hearsay); State v. Altajir, 303 Conn. 304, 319 n.6, 33 A.3d 193 (2012) (“ ‘Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the require- ments of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. . . . Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against com- pelled self-incrimination available to a probationer.’ ”); State v. Taveras, 219 Conn. App. 252, 270, 295 A.3d 421 (“[t]he rules of evidence do not apply to probation  State v. Lewis revocation hearings and, thus, relevant hearsay evidence is admissible at the discretion of the trial court” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 903, 301 A.3d 527 (2023). “A revocation of probation hearing has two distinct components and two purposes. A factual determination by a trial court as to whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation must first be made. If a violation is found, a court must next determine whether probation should be revoked because the beneficial aspects of pro- bation are no longer being served.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dunbar, 233 Conn. App. 297, 310, 339 A.3d 642, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 913, 344 A.3d 155 (2025). “A revocation proceeding is held to determine whether the goals of rehabilitation thought to be served by probation have faltered, requiring an end to the conditional freedom obtained by a defendant at a sentencing that allowed him or her to serve less than a full sentence. . . . [T]he ultimate question [in the probation process is] whether the probationer is still a good risk . . . . This determination involves the consideration of the goals of probation, including whether the probationer’s behavior is inimical to his own rehabilitation, as well as to the safety of the public.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, supra, 268 Conn. 182–83. “On the basis of its consideration of the whole record, the trial court may continue or revoke the sentence of probation . . . and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. . . . In making this second determi- nation, the trial court is vested with broad discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orr, supra, 199 Conn. App. 436.15 15 In the present case, the defendant has not challenged the court’s finding that he violated his probation, or its dispositional determination revoking his probation and imposing a four year sentence of incarcera- tion. Therefore, any issues pertaining to the violation of probation find- ing and the court’s revocation of the defendant’s probation and sentence are not before us in this appeal. See, e.g., State v. Antwon B., 236 Conn. App. 428, 449 n.14, 348 A.3d 814 (2025) (“claims of error not briefed  State v. Lewis With these principles in mind, we turn next to a dis- cussion of the constitutional right to testify and our Supreme Court’s decision in Morel-Vargas. I In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court, in addressing the constitutional right of defendants in criminal cases to testify, stated: “The right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the [c]onstitution. It is one of the rights that ‘are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.’ . . . The necessary ingredients of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment’s guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law include a right to be heard and to offer testimony: ‘A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.’ . . . “The right to testify is also found in the [c]ompulsory [p]rocess [c]lause of the [s]ixth [a]mendment, which grants a defendant the right to call ‘witnesses in his favor,’ a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts of the [s]tates by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. Washing- ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 [87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019] (1967). Logically included in the accused’s right to call witnesses whose testimony is ‘material and favorable to his defense,’ United States v. Valenzuela- Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 [102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193] (1982), is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his favor to do so. In fact, the most impor- tant witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. There is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to offer his own testimony.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in are considered abandoned” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 910, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026).  State v. Lewis ori