Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC WESCO INSURANCE COMPANY v. MARTINS DRYWALL, LLC (AC 48000) Suarez, Westbrook and Bishop, Js. Syllabus The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, following the defendant’s default for failure to plead in an action for breach of contract. The defendant claimed that the court improperly rendered judgment because the plaintiff failed to wait fifteen days from the notice of the defendant’s default to file a motion for judgment as required by the rule of practice (§ 17-32 (b)). Held: The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment in accordance with the rule of practice (§ 17-33 (b)) governing contract actions involving liquidated damages, as, although the plaintiff’s motion was filed seven days after the default had entered, § 17-33 (b) does not contain a wait- ing period to file a motion for judgment following a default, and that rule of practice applied in the present case because the plaintiff’s breach of contract action sought liquidated damages. Argued June 4—officially released September 22, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of con- tract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defendant was defaulted for failure to plead; thereafter, the court, Clark, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. James E. Nealon, for the appellant (defendant). Casey L. McCaffrey, with whom, on the brief, was Scott T. Ober, for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion BISHOP, J. The defendant, Martins Drywall, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Wesco Insurance Company, fol-  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC lowing the defendant’s default for failure to plead. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered judgment because the plaintiff failed to wait fifteen days from the notice of the defendant’s default to file a motion for judgment in violation of Practice Book § 17-32 (b).1 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff commenced the present action on October 7, 2023. In its complaint,2 the plaintiff alleged the following facts: The plaintiff, a New Hampshire corporation, is an insurance carrier authorized to do business in the state of Connecticut. The parties entered into an agreement through which the plaintiff would provide workers’ compensation insur- ance and employer’s liability insurance to the defendant, a Connecticut limited liability company. These policies covered three distinct time periods; first from July 13, 1 The defendant also claims that the court improperly denied his motion to reargue. The purpose of a motion to reargue is well established in our law. See Palkimas v. Quilli, 238 Conn. App. 586, 602, 358 A.3d 1003 (2026) (purpose of motion to reargue is to demonstrate to trial court that there is some decision or principle of law which would have controlling effect that was overlooked, misapprehension of facts, or to ask trial court to address claim of law not ruled on and said motions are reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion); Kuselias v. Zingaro & Cretella, LLC, 224 Conn. App. 192, 222–23, 312 A.3d 118 (motion to reargue not to be used for second bite at apple to raise matters that could have been presented at time of original argument), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024). On the basis of our conclusion that the court properly interpreted our rules of practice and applied Practice Book § 17-33 (b) in this case, we further determine that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reargue, and we need not address this claim further. See Tuite v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, 141 Conn. App. 573, 575, 61 A.3d 1187 (2013); Vogel v. Maimonides Academy of Western Connecticut, Inc., 58 Conn. App. 624, 631, 754 A.2d 824 (2000). 2 We note that “[a] default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action . . . and entry of default, when appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant.” (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Skyler Ltd. Partnership v. S.P. Douthett & Co., 18 Conn. App. 245, 253, 557 A.2d 927, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 802, 560 A.2d 984 (1989); see also Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160, 161 n.1, 475 A.2d 310 (1984) (entry of default operates as confession by defaulted defendant of truth of material facts alleged in complaint which are essential to judgment); Gaynor v. Hi-Tech Homes, 149 Conn. App. 267, 271, 89 A.3d 373 (2014) (when appropriately made, default determines liability of defendant).  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC 2020, to July 13, 2021, second, from July 13, 2021, to July 13, 2022, and third, from July 13, 2022, to April 12, 2023. Pursuant to their agreement, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff amounts due upon a final audit for the periods of coverage in exchange for this insurance coverage. The plaintiff sent the defendant invoices in the amount of $32,881 for the first time period, $19,882 for the second time period, and $12,535 for the third time period. The amount due for these insurance policies totaled $65,298. Despite several demands, the defendant failed to remit payment to the plaintiff. In its complaint, the plaintiff set forth causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. For relief, the plaintiff requested (1) money damages in excess of $2500, (2) postjudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a, (3) and other and further relief as deemed proper by the court. The prayer for relief further stated: “This is an action to recover on an express or implied contract to pay a definite sum of money, seeking money damages only.” (Emphasis added.) The defen- dant’s counsel filed an appearance on October 26, 2023. On November 30, 2023, the defendant’s counsel filed a motion seeking a two week extension to file a responsive pleading to the complaint, which the court granted on December 20, 2023.3 Despite this extension, the defen- dant did not respond to the complaint, and, on February 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for default against the defendant due to its failure to file a pleading.4 This motion was granted on February 16, 2024.5 3 As a general matter, pleadings shall advance within thirty days from the return date, which in this case was October 31, 2023. See Practice Book § 10-8; Kaye v. Housman, 184 Conn. App. 808, 816, 195 A.3d 1168 (2018). 4 See, e.g., Snowdon v. Grillo, 114 Conn. App. 131, 133, 968 A.2d 984 (2009) (motion for default for failure to plead filed pursuant to Practice Book § 17-31); BBSR, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, Docket No. X03- CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2025 WL 1392276, *11 n.8 (Conn. Super. April 30, 2025) (proper procedure for obtaining default for failure to plead prior to trial is to file motion for default pursuant to Practice Book § 17-31); see also Practice Book § 10-18 (parties failing to plead according to our rules and order of judicial authority may be defaulted). 5 See Practice Book § 17-32 (a) (where defendant is defaulted for fail- ing to plead pursuant to Practice Book § 10-8, plaintiff may file written  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC Seven days after the entry of default, on February 23, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment.6 After summarizing the procedural history of the case, the plaintiff’s motion stated: “As a result of the default, the plaintiff hereby moves for a judgment against the defendant in the amount of $65,298, plus costs and postjudgment interest.” The plaintiff attached to this motion an affidavit of debt signed by James Buller, the vice president of cash operations for the operating com- pany for the plaintiff. In his affidavit, Buller averred that the plaintiff made several demands for payment on the outstanding invoices sent to the defendant, but the outstanding balance was never paid.7 The affidavit further stated: “Therefore, the [p]laintiff seeks judg- ment in the amount of $65,298, plus costs of $426.63 (filing fee of $360 and [m]arshal’s fees of $66.63), for a total of $65,724.63. The [p]laintiff also requests that post-judgment interest at the statutory rate be ordered.” The defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. On March 18, 2024, the court, Clark, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. It ordered the defendant to pay the specific amount requested by the plaintiff, $65,724.63, and postjudgment interest at the rate of 6 percent a year. The court also ordered that “the defendant make weekly payments of $35, to commence twenty-one days following notice of this judgment by the clerk.” motion for default which shall be acted upon by clerk); see also Newtown v. Ostrosky, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 13, 2018) (reprinted at 202 Conn. App. 16, 18, 245 A.3d 492) (language of Practice Book § 17-32 (a) grants authority to clerk to act on motions for default for failure to plead), aff’d, 202 Conn. App. 13, 245 A.3d 490 (2020). 6 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Treglia, 156 Conn. App. 1, 11, 111 A.3d 524 (2015) (plaintiff who files motion for judgment when defendant is in default essentially is asking court to render judgment upon default). 7 “As a general rule, in awarding damages upon a breach of contract, the prevailing party is entitled to compensation which will place [it] in the same position [it] would have been in had the contract been prop- erly performed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc., 212 Conn. App. 30, 81, 274 A.3d 911, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 908, 283 A.3d 506 (2022).  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11, the defendant moved to reargue the court’s granting of the motion for a default judgment on April 15, 2024. It asserted that the plaintiff’s motion for judgment was procedur- ally improper pursuant to Practice Book § 17-32 (b), “which prohibits the filing of any motion for default judgment for failure to plead until fifteen days after the court enters the initial default (i.e., which in this case was granted by the court on February 16, 2024 . . . ). As such, the earliest date that the plaintiff was permitted to file a judgment was March 2, 2024.” (Citation omit- ted.) The defendant’s counsel further claimed that he was unaware of the default or default judgment until early April 2024 due to an issue with his email system. The defendant’s counsel also stated: “Significantly, the defendant does not contest liability but rather is con- cerned that the damages sought may be miscalculated in the plaintiff’s favor so as to potentially result in unjust enrichment.” (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiff objected to this motion on August 7, 2024. The court denied the defendant’s motion to reargue on August 20, 2024. This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improp- erly rendered judgment in light of the plaintiff’s failure to wait fifteen days from the notice of the defendant’s default to file a motion for judgment in violation of Practice Book § 17-32 (b). Specifically, it argues that, pursuant to the plain language of that rule of practice, which applied to this case, the plaintiff was required to wait at least fifteen days from the entry of a default before moving for a default judgment but failed to do so. The plaintiff counters that this case involved a contract action with liquidated damages, and, therefore, Practice Book § 17-33 (b) applied, and that rule does not include a fifteen day waiting period for filing a motion for default judgment. In its reply brief, the defendant clarified its arguments and asserted that § 17-33 (b) applies only to foreclosure and summary process actions, or cases involv- ing “simple instruments” such as promissory notes. Dis- tilled to its essence, this appeal requires us to determine  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC whether § 17-32 (b) or § 17-33 (b) applies under these facts and circumstances. We conclude that § 17-33 (b) applies in the present case because the plaintiff’s complaint set forth a breach of contract action seeking liquidated damages. Accordingly, the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment despite the fact that the motion was filed seven days after the clerk granted the motion for default. As noted in our recitation of the procedural history of this case, the defendant did not file an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for default or motion for judgment. The defendant did not file any response to the complaint or make any arguments until it filed its motion to rear- gue. Although the defendant raised its claim that the plaintiff’s motion for judgment was premature for the first time in the motion to reargue, we nevertheless will consider it. See Wethington v. Wethington, 223 Conn. App. 715, 726 n.10, 309 A.3d 356 (2024) (where record demonstrated (1) defendant raised claim in motion to reargue; (2) plaintiff objected to motion to reargue and responded to defendant’s claim; (3) court denied motion to reargue; and (4) defendant claimed on appeal that court abused its discretion in denying motion to reargue, said claim, although raised for first time in motion to reargue, was preserved for appellate review); see also Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 220 Conn. App. 732, 745–55, 299 A.3d 1133 (although claim raised for first time in motion to reargue generally is not preserved for appellate review, circumstances can justify deviation from this rule), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023); cf. United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., 225 Conn. App. 702, 714–15, 317 A.3d 2 (2024) (this court declined to review claim that was raised for first time in motion to reargue and party did not challenge denial of motion to reargue on appeal). This appeal requires us to interpret our rules of prac- tice. In doing so, we apply the plenary standard of review. Compass Bank v. Dunn, 196 Conn. App. 43, 46, 228 A.3d 663 (2020); see also Myshkina v. Gusinski, 217 Conn.  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC App. 376, 379, 289 A.3d 250 (2023). In Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff, 324 Conn. 505, 152 A.3d 1222 (2016), our Supreme Court explained that the interpretation of the rules of practice is governed by the same principles as those regarding statutory interpretation. Id., 514. “Our fundamental objective in interpreting a rule of practice is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory lan- guage as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Weinbaum, 219 Conn. App. 597, 603, 295 A.3d 1045 (2023). As an initial matter, it is helpful to review the prin- ciples regarding the procedural posture of this case. As we noted, the plaintiff moved for a default as a result of the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. The clerk granted that motion. “Our statutes and rules of practice provide penalties for fail- ing to comply with the timely pleading requirements of Practice Book § 10-8. General Statutes § 52-119 provides that [p]arties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the court may be . . . defaulted . . . . Section 10-18 of our rules of practice essentially mirrors that language. We read the plain and unambiguous language of both § 52-119 and Practice Book § 10-18 as empower- ing the court with the discretionary authority to impose a default as a penalty whenever a defendant has failed to comply with our rules regarding pleadings, including the timely advancement of such pleadings. Such authority is in accord with the court’s broad, general authority to act to maintain the orderly procedure of the court docket, and to prevent any interference with the fair administration of justice. . . . “A default is an interlocutory ruling that establishes that a plaintiff is entitled to judgment, but requires further proceedings to determine the amount of money due to the plaintiff if the action is one for monetary  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC damages. . . . [A] default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action . . . and entry of a default, when appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaye v. Housman, 184 Conn. App. 808, 814–15, 195 A.3d 1168 (2018); see also Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bertrand, 140 Conn. App. 646, 657, 59 A.3d 864 (where defendant fails to timely advance pleadings, clerk of court, without input from judicial authority, may act on motion for default filed by plaintiff), cert. dismissed, 309 Conn. 905, 68 A.3d 661 (2013). Stated differently, “[a] default is not a judgment. It is an order of the court the effect of which is to preclude the defendant from mak- ing any further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned.” Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein, 138 Conn. 28, 33, 82 A.2d 146 (1951); see also Moran v. Morneau, 140 Conn. App. 219, 225, 57 A.3d 872 (2013) (default does not automatically trigger judgment for, or relief requested by, pleader). Both Practice Book §§ 17-32 (b) and 17-33 (b) address the time frame for filing a motion for judgment following the entry of a default. Accordingly, we consider the spe- cific language of each of these rules of practice. Section 17-32 (b), which sets forth the general rule8 regarding the filing of a motion for judgment after a default has been entered, provides in relevant part: “A claim for a hearing in damages or motion for judgment shall not be filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the date of notice of issuance of the default under this subsection.” (Emphasis added.) 8 See, e.g., United States Bank, National Assn. v. Gonzales, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2012 WL 5278673, *2 (Conn. Super. October 4, 2012) (Practice Book § 17-32 (b) sets forth general rule of fifteen day waiting period and Practice Book § 17-33 (b) eliminates this waiting period in certain circumstances); see generally GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Glenn, 103 Conn. App. 264, 266 n.3, 931 A.2d 290 (2007) (plaintiff was not required to follow general rule of § 17-32 (b) when § 17-33 (b) controlled “[the] situation”).  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC Practice Book § 17-33 (b) provides: “Since the effect of a default is to preclude the defendant from making any further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned, the judicial authority, at or after the time it renders the default, notwithstanding Section 17-32 (b), may also render judgment in foreclosure cases, in actions simi- lar thereto and in summary process actions, provided the plaintiff has also made a motion for judgment and provided further that any necessary affidavits of debt or accounts or statements verified by oath, in proper form, are submitted to the judicial authority. The judicial authority may render judgment in any contract action where the damages are liquidated provided that the plaintiff has made a motion for judgment and submitted the affidavits and attachments specified in Section 17-25 (b) (1).” Thus, the plain language of this rule of practice provides, inter alia, that the court may render judgment in any contract action with liquidated damages, provided that the plaintiff had moved for judgment and complied with the requirement of Practice Book § 17-25 (b) (1).9 This court discussed Practice Book § 17-33 (b), and its relationship with Practice Book § 17-32 (b), in Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Burton, 81 Conn. App. 662, 841 A.2d 248, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 919, 847 A.2d 313 (2004). In that case, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure five days after the clerk had granted the motion for default. Id., 663. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that title to the subject property did not vest in the plaintiff due to a procedural error that caused the improper entry of the 9 Practice Book § 17-25 (b) provides in relevant part: “The motion shall have attached to it the following affidavits: (1) An affidavit of debt signed by the plaintiff or by an authorized representative of the plaintiff who is not the plaintiff’s attorney. The affidavit shall state the amount due or the principal owed and contain an itemization of interest, attorney’s fees and other lawful charges claimed. The affidavit shall contain a statement that any documents attached to it are true copies of the originals. Any plaintiff claiming interest shall separately state the interest and shall specify the dates from which and to which interest is computed, the rate of interest, the manner in which it was calculated and the authority upon which the claim for interest is based. . . .”  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC default judgment. Id., 665. “Specifically, the defendant argues that the court did not wait the required fifteen days after entering the default to render the judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to Practice Book § 17-32 (b).” Id. At the outset of our analysis, this court observed that, although Practice Book § 17-32 (b) contains an explicit requirement that a motion for judgment shall not be filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the date of notice of issuance of the default, Practice Book § 17-33 (b) lacks such a waiting period under certain circum- stances, including foreclosure cases. Id., 666–67. We further reasoned that, “[b]ecause this is a foreclosure proceeding, Practice Book § 17-33 (b), which allows a court to render judgment at or after the time it renders the default, is applicable. As a result, under . . . § 17-33 (b), the court properly rendered the judgment even though it did so only five days after the default was entered.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 667; see also U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Weinbaum, supra, 219 Conn. App. 609–10; Branford v. Van Eck, 86 Conn. App. 441, 446 n.3, 861 A.2d 560 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922, 867 A.2d 839 (2005); see gener- ally U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Gonzales, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2012 WL 5278673, *2 (Conn. Super. October 4, 2012) (plain language of § 17-33 (b) specifically allows party to move for judgment in spite of waiting period usually required by § 17-32). Having explained the relationship between Practice Book §§ 17-32 (b) and 17-33 (b), we next determine the proper rule to apply in the present case. As noted, the plaintiff’s motion for default was filed on February 8, 2024, and was granted on February 16, 2024. The motion for judgment was filed on February 23, 2024, seven days after the default had entered. The defendant contends that, because the general rule of § 17-32 (b) applies, the plaintiff’s motion for judgment was filed prematurely, and therefore the court improperly granted the motion for judgment. The plaintiff maintains that § 17-33 (b),  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC which does not contain a waiting period to file a motion for judgment following a default, applies in this case because it filed a breach of contract action seeking liqui- dated damages. See U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Wein- baum, supra, 219 Conn. App. 609 (§ 17-33 (b) expressly exempts judicial authority from complying with § 17-32 (b) and fifteen day filing limitation). We agree with the plaintiff. Practice Book § 17-33 (b) details the types of cases in which it applies, namely, foreclosures, actions similar thereto, summary process, and “any contract action where the damages are liquidated, provided that the plaintiff has made a motion for judgment and submitted the affidavits and attachments specified in Section 17-25 (b) (1).” In Skyler Ltd. Partnership v. S.P. Douthett & Co., 18 Conn. App. 245, 557 A.2d 927, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 802, 560 A.2d 984 (1989), this court expressly stated that, in “contract actions in which the damages are liquidated . . . the court may render judgment at the time it renders the default provided the plaintiff has also filed, among other documents, a motion for judgment. See Practice Book § 364 (b) [now § 17-33 (b)].” Skyler Ltd. Partnership v. S.P. Douthett & Co., supra, 250;10 cf. Mer- rill Lynch Equity Access v. Cooper, Docket No. 228981, 1996 WL 88088, *2 (Conn. Super. February 2, 1996) (cross claim was not foreclosure claim, summary process claim, or claim for liquidated damages and therefore it was improper to grant motion for default and simultane- ously enter judgment on such default). The remaining question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff’s action involves liquidated damages. We conclude that it does. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., 193 Conn. 160, 475 A.2d 310 (1984), guides our analysis. In that case, the plain- tiff, over the course of several years, provided various services at property owned by the defendant, such as 10 On the basis of this precedent, and the plain language of Practice Book 17-33 (b), we conclude that the defendant’s contention that this rule of practice applies only to foreclosure and summary process actions or to breach of contract claims involving promissory notes is without merit.  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC roof repairs, painting, plumbing, carpentry, electrical, and overall maintenance. Id., 161–62. The plaintiff sub- mitted more than twenty bills to the defendant for this work; only two were paid. Id., 162. At some point, the plaintiff, with the assistance of counsel, sent an itemized accounting of the completed work to the defendant. Id. The plaintiff subsequently sent an additional copy of its invoices to the defendant, which were neither contested nor paid. Id. The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit and, after the defendant failed to appear, moved for default. Id. The court granted the default and, several months later, also granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. Id., 162–63. Nearly four months later, the defendant attempted to open the judgment. Id., 163. The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to open the judgment and the subsequent motion to reargue. Id., 164. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that, pursuant to the then existing rules of practice, a hearing in damages was required because the amount sought by the plaintiff exceeded $15,000. Id., 164–65. The defendant further argued that then Practice Book § 364 (b), which is now Practice Book § 17-33 (b), did not apply because the case did not involve liquidated damages. Id., 165. The trial court had explained that the damages were liquidated because they “were ascertainable by compu- tation of [the] plaintiff’s billings which [the] defendant was aware of and did not contest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In agreeing with the reasoning of the trial court, our Supreme Court set forth the following: “When a debtor knows precisely how much he is to pay and to whom he is to pay it, his debt is a liquidated one. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages §§ 180, 184 (1965). An amount claimed to be due is a liquidated sum when it is suscep- tible of being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in the possession or knowledge of the party to be charged. . . . It is sufficient for this purpose if the debt is measurable by a fixed or established external standard, or by a standard  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC apparent from the documents upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. . . . Unliquidated damages, on the other hand, are those which are not yet reduced to a certainty in respect to amount, nothing more being established than the plaintiff’s right to recover; or such as cannot be fixed by a mere mathematical calculation from ascertainable data in the case.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 165–66. The court then explained that the defendant had learned of the fixed amount of claimed damages during the course of the parties’ dealings. Id., 166. Specifically, on three occasions, the plaintiff provided the precise amount of financial obligation to the defendant. Id. “We hold that the defendant’s failure to respond to repeated, exact billings and accountings cause their content, in due course, to become liquidated within the meaning of [Practice Book § 17-33 (b)], notwithstanding the parties’ failure during their initial discussion to agree on the precise amount of compensation for the services to be rendered.” Id., 166; see also A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco, 19 Conn. App. 8, 10–12, 561 A.3d 142 (1989) (in foreclosure of mechanic’s lien, damages are liquidated where defendant is made aware of amount claimed by virtue of recitation of lien and in complaint, as well as detailed breakdown of itemized costs and expenses in response to interrogatory). This court’s opinion in Forster v. Gianopoulos, 105 Conn. App. 702, 939 A.2d 1242 (2008), provides addi- tional guidance. The plaintiff in that case commenced an action seeking to collect on a series of unpaid promissory notes. Id., 703. After the defendant failed to comply with certain discovery orders over an extended time period, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment in an amount exceeding $1.1 million. Id., 703–706. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the court lacked the authority to render a default judg- ment as a sanction for violating a discovery order. Id., 706. We disagreed and explained that the authority for such an action derived from Practice Book § 17-33 (b).  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC Id. First, this court recited the definition of liquidated damages set forth by our Supreme Court in Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. 165. Id., 707. We then reasoned as follows: “The plaintiff’s complaint set forth a breach of contract action to collect unpaid principal, interest and penalties on a series of promissory notes. The determination of the total amount due on each promissory note involved a simple mathematical calculation of the outstanding principal balance multiplied by the predetermined interest rate as specified in each note. The court engaged in such a calcu- lation at the prejudgment remedy hearing, determined that amount to be $1,135,359.91, and subsequently informed the defendants of that precise amount.” Id. We then concluded that the case involved liquidated damages and therefore was governed by § 17-33 (b) and the court had the authority to render judgment at the same time as the entry of default. Id., 707–708. In the present case, the plaintiff set forth a count of breach of contract in its complaint. Therein, it claimed damages in the amount $32,881 for the first time period, $19,882 for the second time period, and $12,535 for the third time period, for a total of $65,298. The plaintiff made several demands for payment of these amounts without success.11 The plaintiff attached copies of the invoices to the complaint. Following the entry of default, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment. As part of that filing, it attached an affidavit of debt from Buller, the vice president of cash operations for the operating company for the plaintiff. After reviewing the plain- tiff’s books and records, Buller stated that the defendant 11 To the extent that the defendant argues that it should be afforded the opportunity to contest the specific amount in the invoices, we offer the following responses. First, in our view, the facts of this case are similar to those in Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. 161–62, and we are, of course, bound by that control- ling precedent from our Supreme Court. See 65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God, 240 Conn. App. 442, 453, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). Additionally, the defendant forfeited the opportunity to dispute these amounts by not responding to the plaintiff’s complaint in a timely fashion.  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC owed the plaintiff the amounts claimed in the complaint, attached copies of said invoices, and asserted that the defendant had failed to pay such sums due. The record demonstrates that the defendant, on the basis of its dealings with the plaintiff, was aware of the specific amount it owed the plaintiff and, therefore, this was liquated debt. Costello v. Hartford Institute of Accounting, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. 165–66; see also Rifkin v. Safenovitz, 131 Conn. 411, 414, 40 A.2d 188 (1944) (amount claimed is liquidated sum because “it is susceptible of being made certain in amount by math- ematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in the possession or knowledge of the party to be charged” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the case involves liquated damages, Practice Book § 17-33 (b) applies, and the plaintiff was not required to wait fifteen days following the entry of the default before fil- ing a motion for judgment. See Forster v. Gianopoulos, supra, 105 Conn. App. 707–708. As a final matter, we note that the defendant raises certain policy reasons as to why Practice Book § 17-32 (b) should apply in this matter. Specifically, it contends that “by enforcing the fifteen day waiting period before a party may proceed to seek a default judgment on a con- tract/collections matter, this court would be protecting a defendant’s right to cure any previously entered default during the fifteen day period or, longer, if the plaintiff waits longer than fifteen days.” This waiting period secures a defendant’s right to automatically set aside a default without the need to seek permission from the trial court or a plaintiff. See Practice Book § 17-32 (b). This argument, however, ignores the competing inter- est in resolving cases where the damages are established without the need for further proceedings where a party has been defaulted. See Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 178 Conn. App. 727, 738–39, 176 A.3d 1210 (2017). In this case, the defendant made no effort to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint aside from counsel entering an appearance and successfully obtaining an  Wesco Ins. Co. v. Martins Drywall, LLC extension of time to plead. Additionally, we note that elimination of the fifteen day waiting period for filing for judgment after the entry of default is restricted to a limited subset of type of actions. For these reasons, we conclude that the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment in accordance with Practice Book § 17-33 (b). The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.