Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals LASA EXTRACT, LLC, ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF SUFFIELD (SC 21226) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.* Syllabus The defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the trial court, which had reversed the board’s decision to uphold a town zoning enforcement officer’s determination that the use of the plaintiffs’ property for the cul- tivation and processing of cannabis was not within the scope of the prop- erty’s existing, legal nonconforming use. The property historically had been used to grow and process tobacco, and, because that use predated the enactment of the town’s zoning regulations, such use was permitted as an existing nonconforming use. In 2019, the General Assembly legalized and established a licensing regimen for the cultivation and processing of hemp. The zoning enforcement officer subsequently confirmed that the cultivation and processing of hemp was a valid, nonconforming use of the property, and the plaintiffs proceeded to cultivate and process hemp on the property. In 2021, the General Assembly legalized the recreational use of cannabis for adults and established a licensing regimen for its cultivation and process- ing. Hemp and cannabis are derivatives of the same plant, cannabis sativa L., but cannabis has a higher concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) than does hemp. The plaintiffs thereafter sought a determination from the zoning enforcement officer that the cultivation and processing of cannabis was a legal continuation of the property’s existing nonconforming use, but the zoning enforcement officer, relying on the different legal definitions of hemp and cannabis and the different licensing regimens pertaining to those products, rejected the plaintiffs’ request. In sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal and reversing the board’s decision to uphold the zoning enforcement officer’s determination, the trial court found that, although the fact that hemp and cannabis are subject to different licensing regimens and regula- tory schemes was relevant to the determination of whether a proposed use falls within the scope of an existing nonconforming use, that fact was not dispositive. Instead, the trial court applied the factors set forth in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals (218 Conn. 324) for determining whether a proposed use impermissibly expands the scope of a nonconforming use and concluded that, under the facts of this case, the cultivation and processing of cannabis on the plaintiffs’ property was a lawful continuation of the existing, nonconforming use. On appeal, the board claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly applied this court’s precedent in sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal. Held: The trial court correctly concluded that the proposed use of the plaintiffs’ property for cannabis cultivation and processing constituted a continuation of * The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals the property’s preexisting, legal nonconforming use under the circumstances of this case, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Under this court’s nonconforming use jurisprudence, the determination of whether a proposed use of a property falls within the scope of an exist- ing nonconforming use involves a fact-intensive inquiry that focuses on a comparison of the purpose, nature, kind, character, and effects of the existing and proposed uses of the property, which includes the application of the Zachs factors. This court declined the board’s invitation to recognize a bright-line rule, pur- suant to which the fact that a proposed use and the existing nonconforming use of a property are subject to different state licensing regimens or regula- tory schemes is dispositive evidence that the proposed use will constitute an impermissible change in the character of the use of the property so as to bring the proposed use within the relevant prohibition in the governing zoning regulations, as a difference in such regimens or schemes is relevant to but not determinative of the zoning inquiry. In the present case, the record established that there were two primary distinctions between the existing use and the proposed use of the property, namely, that the final cannabis product would contain a higher concentra- tion of THC than the final hemp product, and the higher THC concentration of the cannabis product would require a different license from the state. There was no evidence, however, that the proposed cultivation and processing of cannabis would require changes to the existing property or to the equip- ment, or process the plaintiffs employed, that there would be any effect on the neighborhood, or that there was opposition from neighboring property owners regarding the proposed change. Although this court recognized that the separate regulatory treatment of hemp and cannabis reflected significant differences in the two products that could be relevant to the nonconforming use analysis, there was no evidence in the record that the proposed use would cause a change in the character of the property, and it was not clear that the regulatory scheme reflected a difference in the end products that was relevant for zoning purposes. Argued April 9—officially released August 25, 2026 Procedural History Appeal from the decision of the defendant uphold- ing the town zoning enforcement officer’s denial of the named plaintiff’s request for a determination that its use of certain real property constituted a lawful continua- tion of an existing nonconforming use of that property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Klau, J.; judgment  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed. Affirmed. Derek E. Donnelly, with whom, on the brief, were Eric Duey and Robert A. Cane, for the appellant (defendant). Scott T. Garosshen, with whom were Brian R. Smith and, on the brief, Ryan D. Hoyler and Jenna M. Scoville, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Opinion D’AURIA, J. This appeal requires us to consider the role of state regulatory and licensing statutes when determining if a proposed use of land falls within the scope of an existing nonconforming use. The defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield (board), upheld a determination by the town’s zoning enforcement officer, James R. Taylor (zoning officer), that the plaintiffs, Lasa Extract, LLC (Lasa), and The Crosswalk, LLC (Crosswalk), could not process cannabis as a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use permitting hemp processing at the property. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal and rejected the board’s determination, concluding that the cultivation and processing of cannabis, under the unique circum- stances of this case, is within the scope of the existing nonconforming use. On appeal, the board argues that the trial court incorrectly applied this court’s precedent, allowing the plaintiffs to circumvent the town’s zoning regulations regarding cannabis establishments. We dis- agree and therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. The record reflects the following facts. Lasa, owned by Ricardo Sotil, operates a hemp cultivation and pro- cessing business at 426 South Grand Street in Suffield.1 The property is a 0.9 acre lot that includes a single, two-story, 23,256 square foot building (building). The property is located in zone R-45, which is a single-family 1 Crosswalk owns the property. Through an agreement with Crosswalk, Lasa owns and operates the hemp cultivation and processing operation at the property. Sotil is the sole member of both Lasa and Crosswalk.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals residential zone under the Suffield Zoning Regulations (regulations). The town assessor has classified the use of the property as “industrial.” The regulations per- mit certain uses, such as farming, in residential zones by right and other uses by special permit. See Suffield Zoning Regs., § IV D. Any use of property not expressly permitted by the regulations is prohibited. See id., § I C. The property was historically used to farm and process tobacco products. This use of the property predates the establishment of zoning regulations in Suffield and was therefore a legal nonconforming use. See, e.g., Adolph- son v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988) (“[a] nonconformity is a use or structure prohibited by the zoning regulations but is permitted because of its existence at the time that the regulations [were] adopted”). In 2001, Sotil, through Crosswalk, purchased half of the property at issue. In 2018, Congress legalized the industrial production of hemp products. See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 10113, 132 Stat. 4490, 4908–14 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639o through 1639s (2018)). The act permits states to regulate hemp by submitting a plan to the United States Depart- ment of Agriculture. See 7 U.S.C. § 1639p (a) (2024). Federal law defines “hemp” as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.” 7 U.S.C. § 1639o (1) (2024). In 2019, the General Assembly passed No. 19-3 of the 2019 Public Acts (P.A. 19-3), legalizing and establishing a licensing regimen for the cultivation and processing of hemp. See General Statutes §§ 22-61l and 22-61m. The legislature in P.A. 19-3 adopted the federal definition of hemp, classifying it according to the concentration of the active ingredient delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol. See General Statutes § 22-61l (a) (5) and (7). In 2019, the  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals Department of Consumer Protection issued Lasa a license under P.A. 19-3, §§ 1 and 2, to grow and process hemp.2 Lasa approached both the zoning officer and the town’s director of planning and development (director), seek- ing a determination that the cultivation and processing of hemp and the extraction of cannabidiol was within the scope of the property’s preexisting, nonconform- ing use. The director confirmed that hemp production was “acceptable from a zoning perspective.” The zoning officer approved hemp production as a valid nonconform- ing use consistent with the prior use of the property for tobacco processing. In 2020, Lasa also received approval from the town for commercial renovations at the prop- erty for a hemp extraction and processing facility. Sotil, who had purchased half of the property in 2001 through Crosswalk, then purchased the other half of the property. Lasa, through Crosswalk, contracts with hemp growers licensed by the state, who grow cannabis sativa L. plants on the second floor of the building. Lasa purchases the hemp from these contractors, as well as from third-party growers. Lasa then processes the hemp using equipment on the first floor of the building. The equipment cost roughly $1 million and occupies approximately 5000 square feet on the first floor. The process includes drying the plants in an oven and processing the dried product using machines that distill the material into hemp oil. Lasa employs a carbon dioxide (CO2) extraction system, which uses pressurized carbon dioxide to extract cannabi- noids from raw hemp material. The extracted oil initially contains more than 0.3 percent of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) by dry weight, defined as cannabis3 by state law. Lasa then adds coconut oil to reduce the THC concen- tration below the 0.3 percent threshold. Lasa ships the 2 The license was originally granted in June 2019 to Happy Hemp, LLC, another company established by Sotil. The license was converted to Lasa in 2021. 3 Relevant law uses the terms “marijuana” and “cannabis” interchange- ably. See General Statutes § 21a-420 (3). For consistency, we use the term “cannabis” to refer to substances with a total THC concentration of 0.3 percent or more.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals final product off site and does not conduct retail sales at the property. In 2021, the legislature passed Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June 2021, No. 21-1, legalizing adult recreational use of cannabis and establishing a regulatory regimen for state licensing of the cultivation of recreational cannabis. See General Statutes §§ 21a-420a, 21a-420c and 21a-420n. The statutes permit municipalities to use zoning laws to determine where cannabis establishments can be located4 and to require a special permit or affirmative approval for a cannabis cultivator seeking to be located within a municipality. See General Statutes § 21a-422f. Accord- ingly, in 2022, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Suffield amended the town’s regulations to regulate cannabis establishments. The regulations do not prohibit cannabis establishments but require them to be located within an industrial zone with a special permit and not within 200 feet of a residential zone. See Suffield Zoning Regs, § V Y 1 (a). In October 2022, Lasa requested a determination from the zoning officer that cannabis microcultivation5 would constitute a legal continuation of a preexisting non- conforming use based on the existing nonconforming hemp cultivation and processing taking place on the property. Lasa explained that the current cultivation and extraction process would remain identical, except that the extract would be diluted with less coconut oil to 4 General Statutes § 21a-422f (b) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny municipality may, by amendment to such municipality’s zoning regu- lations or by local ordinance, (1) prohibit the establishment of a can- nabis establishment, (2) establish reasonable restrictions regarding the hours and signage within the limits of such municipality, or (3) establish restrictions on the proximity of cannabis establishments to any of the establishments listed in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 30-46. . . .” 5 General Statutes § 21a-420 (39) defines “[m]icro-cultivator” as “a person licensed to engage in the cultivation, growing and propagation of the cannabis plant at an establishment containing not less than two thousand square feet and not more than ten thousand square feet of grow space, prior to any expansion authorized” by the commissioner of the Department of Consumer Protection.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals maintain a higher THC concentration. The zoning officer denied Lasa’s request. The zoning officer explained that hemp manufacturing was approved as a nonconforming use because “it was determined that it is somewhat com- patible to the historic use of the property as a tobacco sorting and shipping warehouse and closely related to the agriculture business.” However, the zoning officer explained that, “[i]f cannabis/marijuana, a hallucina- tory processing was to be considered at that time, it would not have been approved by this office.” Relying on the different legal definitions of the product and state licensing programs, the zoning officer determined that processing extract with a higher THC concentration was not permissible. Lasa appealed from the zoning officer’s determination to the board.6 The board held two hearings, during which Lasa established that hemp and cannabis are derivatives of the same plant, cannabis sativa L., which is already grown and cultivated at the property, and that extract with THC concentrations legally categorized as cannabis are produced at the property as a necessary step in the production of hemp products. Lasa explained that the sole differences in producing extract with cannabis level THC concentrations using the current process would be the amount of coconut oil used to dilute the extract and the required use of union workers, to which Sotil already had agreed. Lasa provided details and photos of the interior and exterior of the building, including the current production operation and equipment, which Lasa contended would remain unchanged. The zoning officer reasoned that the regulations pro- hibit cannabis production at the property and that Con- necticut’s nonconforming use jurisprudence supported the prohibition of the continuation of a nonconform- ing use based on a difference in state licensing regi- mens alone. Several members of the public present at 6 The board is a municipal agency authorized to receive, review and decide appeals of decisions and determinations made by the zoning officer in accordance with the regulations and General Statutes § 8-6.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals the hearing spoke in favor of approving Lasa’s request; none opposed it. The board voted four to one to uphold the zoning officer’s decision, with the majority of the board relying primarily on the different legal treatment of cannabis and hemp under both state and federal law. Lasa appealed from the board’s decision to the Superior Court, which disagreed with the board’s interpretation of this court’s nonconforming use jurisprudence and determined that the legal distinctions relied on by the board were relevant, but not dispositive, for purposes of determining whether the use of a property would mark a change in character for zoning purposes. The trial court applied the test established in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 324, 332, 589 A.2d 351 (1991), and determined that, under the unique facts of this case, Lasa’s proposed use was a lawful continuation of the current nonconforming use of the property. The board, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court. We then transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1 to determine if the trial court had incorrectly concluded that Lasa’s proposed cannabis microcultivator facility would constitute a continua- tion of the preexisting, legal nonconforming use of the property. Generally, when “a town or neighboring landowner contends that a particular activity on the property is not within the scope of the original nonconforming use because the activity is inconsistent with the nature and purpose of such use, the burden is on the town or land- owner to prove that an illegal expansion of the noncon- formity has occurred, which is done through application of the Zachs factors.” Pfister v. Madison Beach Hotel, LLC, 341 Conn. 702, 729, 267 A.3d 811 (2022); see also Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 95, 527 A.2d 230 (1987); D. Merriam, 9B Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2026 Ed.) § 52:3, p. 277. “In reviewing a decision of a zoning [commission], a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals rule, according to which . . . [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning] commission must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 342 Conn. 737, 751–52, 271 A.3d 596 (2022). “The substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judi- cial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 752. If a zon- ing board does not articulate a reason for its decision, “the [reviewing] court must search the entire record to find a basis for the [board’s] decision . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 355 Conn. 143, 153, A.3d (2026); see also High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 352 Conn. 1, 21–22, 334 A.3d 972 (2025). “[T]he right of a user to continue the same use of the property as it existed before the date of the adoption of the zoning regulations, or any amendment thereto, is protected by the constitution and the General Stat- utes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 352 Conn. 14; see Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483–84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979) (nonconforming uses are vested rights protected by con- stitution); see also General Statutes § 8-2 (d) (“[z]oning regulations . . . shall not . . . (4) (A) [p]rohibit the continu- ance of any nonconforming use, building or structure existing at the time of the adoption of such regulations”). It is a general principle of zoning law to abolish or reduce nonconforming uses “as quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit—[i]n no case should they be allowed to increase.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adolph- son v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 205 Conn. 710. However, when a nonconforming use exists, it is a vested  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals right that adheres to the land and is entitled to constitu- tional protection, which “in no way contradicts the rec- ognized goal of eliminating nonconformities as quickly as possible, since that policy must be carried out within the limits of permissible governmental action.” Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 484. To decide if a proposed use of a property is within the scope of a preexisting nonconforming use, local authori- ties and courts consider a wide cross section of factors that serve to assess the nature and scope of the use of the property and to determine if there is a change in the char- acter of the use that brings it within the prohibition of zoning regulations. See Pfister v. Madison Beach Hotel, LLC, supra, 341 Conn. 728; Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 332. In Zachs, we articulated the following factors that should be given consideration: “(1) the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the original use; (2) any differences in the character, nature and kind of use involved; and (3) any substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted on the property.” Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 332.7 These factors are intended to guide local authorities 7 Prior to our decision in Zachs, our nonconforming use jurisprudence focused on the character and degree of the change in use at issue. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 379, 383, 311 A.2d 77 (1972) (“[i]t is clear that even a change in the character of a business conducted on a parcel of land constitutes an extension of use”); Salerni v. Scheuy, 140 Conn. 566, 571, 102 A.2d 528 (1954) (“[t]here must be a change in the character of the existing use in order to bring it within the prohibition of the zoning ordinance”). The test we articulated in Zachs drew from decisions by courts in two other jurisdictions and a zoning law treatise. See Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 332; see also 6 P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls (1993) § 41.02 [2], pp. 41-71 through 41-72 (“Several factors must be considered in determining what constitutes a change of a nonconforming use. These factors include: (1) intention and an overt act or failure to act indicating abandonment of the former use; (2) the extent and nature of the use, before and after the change; (3) whether the premises are adapted for only a particular use.” (Footnotes omitted.)). The distinction between each of the Zachs factors is not always clear. However, the factors are aimed at understanding whether the facts of any particular case indicate a change in the use of a property by comparing the character  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals and courts when distinguishing between permissible and impermissible continuations of nonconforming uses, although we have made clear that we intend these factors to supplement—not supplant—our case law regarding impermissible expansions. See High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 352 Conn. 17. The factors are consistent with our general nonconforming use jurisprudence, which focuses on a comparison of the purpose, nature, kind, character and effects of the original and the proposed use of the prop- erty. Id., 18 n.7. Whether an activity falls within the scope of an existing nonconforming use is a fact-intensive inquiry undertaken on a case-by-case basis to determine the degree of impact on the use of the property and its effect on the neighborhood. In particular, we have held that a mere increase in the amount of business transacted pursuant to a nonconform- ing use, or a change in equipment, does not necessarily constitute an impermissible expansion of a nonconform- ing use but that a change in the character of the use brings it within the prohibition of the zoning ordinance. See Salerni v. Scheuy, 140 Conn. 566, 571, 102 A.2d 528 (1954). In Zachs, the plaintiff had maintained a radio communications tower on his property before an amend- ment to the town zoning ordinance requiring a special permit for radio broadcasting rendered that use noncon- forming. Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 326. The court in Zachs considered whether the installation of additional antennae and an emergency electricity generator was a permissible intensification of an existing nonconforming use. See id., 328. Although the changes included additional use and equipment, the court observed that the town zoning board of appeals had not “explain[ed] how th[e] additional equipment [could] reasonably be deemed to have changed the original nature and purpose of the undertaking.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 334. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff succeeded in his challenge to the zoning and purpose of the original use and the proposed use, and any effect on a neighborhood that may result.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals board’s denial of the nonconforming use because there was no evidence that the additional equipment impermis- sibly changed the character of the use of the property or significantly increased the existing nonconforming use of the property. See id., 335. We have, on occasion, considered state regulations and licensing regimens in our nonconforming use jurispru- dence. The board relies primarily on Helicopter Asso- ciates, Inc. v. Stamford, 201 Conn. 700, 519 A.2d 49 (1986), Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 167 Conn. 596, 356 A.2d 885 (1975), and Salerni v. Scheuy, supra, 140 Conn. 566. In Salerni, this court considered whether a restaurant that sold beer could sell liquor under a full liquor restaurant permit without impermissibly expand- ing the existing nonconforming use of the property. See id., 568–69. We held that the addition of liquor sales would lead to more than an increase in business or a change in equipment; rather, it would change the character of the use. See id., 571–72. We considered that the change would require a different permit from the state, which indicated that the legislature believed that a restaurant selling all liquors was a different kind of business that required greater policing. Id., 571. We stated that “[t]he difference between the sale of beer only in a restaurant and the sale of all liquors therein is so great that our law requires a different permit from the liquor control commission for each of the two kinds of business.” Id. We also noted that it was “a matter of common knowledge” that a restaurant selling liquor is a different enterprise that shared “characteristics of a night club, rather than a quiet family eating place.” Id. Similarly, in Macaluso, this court held that a drug store selling liquor under a drug store liquor permit converting to a full package store would impermissibly expand the existing nonconforming use. See Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 600. We concluded that it was common knowledge that the two enterprises were substantially different, noting that the “[s]tatutory regulations concerning sales in both types of establish- ments recognize these distinctions.” Id.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals In Helicopter Associates, Inc., the plaintiffs operated a small heliport where approximately ten takeoffs and landings in total had been performed—a frequency that did not require a state license—as of the date that the applicable zoning regulations prohibiting heliports went into effect. Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 702–703. After the zoning regulations were amended, the plaintiffs received a state license, which was required for heliports expecting more than thirty-six landings and takeoffs per year, and sought to use the property as a commercial heliport for an unlimited number of flights as a continuation of their nonconform- ing use of the property. Id., 703–704. Citing both Salerni and Macaluso, we recognized that differing statutory treatment was evidence of a change in the character of a nonconforming use and concluded that operating a commercial heliport would amount to an impermissible change. Id., 716–18. We noted that, by requiring a license for more than thirty-six annual flights, the legislature had identified two types of heliports—one that required close supervision and licensing by the state, and one that did not. Id., 717. We reasoned that the legislature’s decision to regulate higher volume heliports could rea- sonably reflect the legislature’s conclusion that fewer flights would not have the same “deleterious effect upon the surrounding properties considering such factors as noise, distractions and traffic . . . .” Id. These three cases predate our decision in Zachs, and we have not had occasion since Zachs to consider the role of regulatory schemes and licensing requirements in the Zachs analysis and our nonconforming use juris- prudence. The board argues that Helicopter Associates, Inc., Macaluso and Salerni establish that a difference in state licensing and regulation governing an approved use of property and a proposed use of that property is dispositive evidence that the character of the use of a property has changed and asks us to recognize this bright- line rule. The board argues that the trial court misread and misapplied these precedents in concluding that a regulatory distinction, standing alone, was insufficient  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals to establish a change in character. The board contends that the only way to harmonize the Zachs test with our prior nonconforming use jurisprudence is to hold that a change in the regimen governing the proposed new activ- ity on the property demonstrates a change in the nature, purpose, character, and kind of use of the property as a matter of law. We disagree. We do not read Helicopter Associates, Inc., Macaluso and Salerni to stand for the proposition that differences in licensing requirements are dispositive of a change in character, obviating the need to evaluate the factual and policy considerations reflected in the regulatory scheme to determine if they are relevant to the property use in question. To the contrary, in each of these cases, we con- sidered the regulatory differences that characterized the activities at issue along with other facts in the record, including facts we considered to be “common knowledge”; Salerni v. Scheuy, supra, 140 Conn. 571; to determine if the character of the activity had changed so as to bring it within the prohibition of the zoning regulations. In Salerni and Macaluso, we deemed the difference in the proposed sale of liquor at the property compared to the prior use of the property to be so obvious that it was “common knowledge”8 that the proposed use would effect a change in character. Id.; see also Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 167 Conn. 600. We held that the legislature’s decision to license the sale of liquor to patrons at a restaurant, and the sale of liquor at a package store as opposed to a drug store, reflected a legislative acknowledgment of those differences. See Salerni v. Scheuy, supra, 140 Conn. 571; see also 8 The board also argues that “common knowledge” is an inappropriate and impractical consideration for zoning boards. We disagree. Determin- ing if a property use is within the scope of a preexisting nonconformity has always been a fact-specific inquiry. Zoning boards are permitted to exercise common sense, and doing so does not permit unreasonable or arbitrary action. See, e.g., Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 464, 600 A.2d 310 (1991) (“[c]ommon sense must be used in con- struing [a] regulation, and we assume that a rational and reasonable result was intended by the local legislative body” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 600. In Helicopter Associates, Inc., we did not decline to con- sider facts supporting the conclusion that operating a commercial heliport would change the character of the existing nonconforming use simply because the legisla- ture required a license for commercial heliports. See id., 717–18. Rather, we considered the legislature’s decision to license higher volume heliports as evidence that the volume of flights resulted in a change in character of the use and determined that the effects on the property’s use and neighboring community could have reasonably prompted the legislature’s licensing requirements. See id. Although we have often stated that a quantitative increase in the use of a property is not by itself neces- sarily an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use, in Helicopter Associates, Inc., the legislature’s licensing regimen helped to determine when an increase in the amount of business pursuant to a nonconforming use in fact changes the character of the use because of the potential impact on the surrounding community. See id., 716–18. When considering the proposed activities in each of the foregoing cases—a change in the products sold directly to consumers at retail establishments and the use a commercial heliport—the differing regulatory schemes corresponded to meaningful differences in the character, nature, kind, purpose or effect of the uses of the properties. We did not consider a difference in regu- latory or licensing regimens alone sufficient evidence of a change in character divorced from any factual nexus to the change in character of the property relevant for zoning. Rather, we considered the reasons the legisla- ture decided to license the activities separately and the extent to which those reasons reflected a change in the use of the property for purposes of the analysis applied in our nonconforming use jurisprudence, which focuses on the potential effect the use has on the property and the surrounding community. The legislature’s licens- ing schemes do not replace the need for a fact-specific inquiry to that end.  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals Although analyzing a separate licensing scheme was not required in Zachs or explicitly included in the factors we articulated, engaging in such analysis is not incompat- ible with the existing Zachs test and does not compel use of the bright-line rule the defendant proposes. Again, the Zachs test did not supersede our existing nonconforming use jurisprudence but, rather, synthesized the factors local authorities and courts should use to distinguish between permissible and impermissible changes in use. See High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 352 Conn. 17–18 n.7. The Zachs test is consistent with our prior case law that seeks to determine whether the administrative record supports a finding that a proposed use of property is within the scope of a valid nonconforming use by “focus[ing] on a comparison of the purpose, nature, kind, character, and effects of the original use and the proposed changes.” Id., 18 n.7. It is axiomatic that, when the legislature chooses to regulate two activities or products differently, it does so because it believes that the activities or products differ in some way. However, the question in a nonconforming use case is not whether the character of the use of the property differs in some way, but whether the difference is one that matters for purposes of the nonconformity analysis under Zachs and its associated forbears and progeny. A difference in state licensing regimens or statutory treatment may be evidence of any one of the Zachs factors, but it is not determinative of the zoning inquiry. In Helicopter Associates, Inc., for example, we concluded that the legislature’s decision to require licenses for heliports operating more than thirty-six flights per year was evidence that a higher volume of flights would have a different impact on the surrounding properties—an analysis that would now fall under the third factor of the Zachs test. See Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 717; see also Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 332. Nevertheless, it is certainly conceivable that the leg- islature may choose to license two activities differently  Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals for reasons unrelated to the considerations bearing on our nonconforming use analysis. For example, a license issued by the Insurance Department is a prerequisite to becoming an insurance adjuster, consultant or bro- ker. See General Statutes § 38a-769. A license from the Department of Consumer Protection is required to prac- tice public accountancy. See General Statutes § 20-280e. It is unlikely, however, that thi