Esposito v. Rabin

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Esposito v. Rabin LORRAINE ESPOSITO v. DANIEL U. RABIN ET AL. (AC 47934) Alvord, Seeley and Keller, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defen- dants on her complaint and on two counts of their counterclaim, rejecting her request, inter alia, to quiet title in her favor to a disputed portion of her property on which the defendants, owners of abutting property, had encroached and trespassed. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court, which declined to quiet title for either party, improperly found that the defendants had acquired by adverse possession the encroachments they had placed in portions of the disputed area and that the plaintiff had trespassed on that area. Held: The trial court’s failure to quiet title to the disputed portion of the plaintiff’s property was contrary to law and could not stand, as the court was required pursu- ant to statute (§ 47-31) to make a full determination of the parties’ rights to the disputed area by settling title thereto but, by its decision, allowed a cloud to remain on the plaintiff’s undivested record title that negatively impacted its marketability. The defendants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence all of the necessary elements of their adverse possession claim, as they did not provide the trial court with a description of the entire disputed area of the plaintiff’s property they claimed to have acquired or a property description of their encroachments; accordingly, the trial court, having found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of § 47-31 (b), the judgment as to that count of her complaint seeking to quiet title was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to quiet title in her favor. The trial court improperly rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the defendants’ encroachments on her property constituted a trespass for which she was entitled to injunctive relief, as the defendants intentionally continued to use the disputed area of the property for their encroachments after they learned that they did not own the disputed area. The trial court improperly found that the plaintiff had trespassed on the defen- dants’ encroachments in the disputed area of the property, as the plaintiff could not, as a matter of law or fact, trespass on property of which she had established record ownership. The trial court’s finding that security cameras on the plaintiff’s property that were directed at the defendants’ property constituted a nuisance was clearly erroneous, as the court engaged in no analysis and made no findings that supported its conclu- sion, it did not consider any relevant factors to determine if the use of the security cameras was unreasonable under the circumstances and there was no evidence regarding the alleged interference. Argued January 13—officially released June 16, 2026  Esposito v. Rabin Procedural History Action, inter alia, to quiet title to certain of the plain- tiff’s real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the defendants filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Stewart, J.; judgment in part for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed; further proceedings. Jason A. Buchsbaum, with whom, on the brief, was Jill Vergara, for the appellant (plaintiff). Timothy J. Lee, for the appellees (defendants). Opinion KELLER, J. The plaintiff, Lorraine Esposito, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the defendants, Daniel U. Rabin (Daniel), and his wife, Gritli K. Rabin (Gritli), as to the plaintiff’s three count complaint, and as to two of the defendants’ three counterclaims. In this appeal, which arises out of a dispute between abutting property owners, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to settle title to a portion of her real property, as required by General Statutes § 47-31, despite the fact that she and the defendants had sought a determination of their respective rights therein, and that title to that disputed area should have been quieted in her favor, (2) determined that the defendants had proven their spe- cial defense of adverse possession as to encroachments they had placed on her property, (3) found that she had trespassed on the defendants’ encroachments, (4) found that her use of security cameras and noisemakers on her property constituted a nuisance, (5) enjoined her from taking actions on her property, and (6) failed to find that the defendants had trespassed on her property, failed to enjoin them from continuing to do so and to award damages related to such trespass, and failed to order the defendants to remove their encroachments from,  Esposito v. Rabin and remediate any damages they may have caused to, her property. We reverse the court’s judgment as to the plaintiff’s complaint and with respect to counts two and three of the defendants’ counterclaim.1 The following facts, as found by the trial court in its memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff owns and is in possession of real property at 71 Midwood Road in Branford (plaintiff’s property), which she purchased in August 2021. The defendants own and are in possession of real property at 24 Stone Street in Branford (defendants’ property), which Daniel purchased in 1985.2 The two properties adjoin at the southeastern border of the plaintiff’s prop- erty. Shortly after the plaintiff purchased her property, she commissioned a survey of its boundary lines because she wanted to install fencing to contain her dog, Keno. This survey revealed that 80 percent of a shed owned by the defendants’ and their entire fenced-in compost corral encroached on the plaintiff’s property. The surveyor placed stakes along the boundary line that separated the plaintiff’s property from the defendants’ property. Then, on or about February 11, 2022, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendants informing them about the encroachments but giving them “permission” to “ ‘bor- row’ ” the strip of land on which the encroachments had been placed. The plaintiff explained that this permis- sion was “temporary and [she] reserve[d] the right to 1 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to count one of the defendants’ counterclaim, which sought a judgment quieting title in the defendants’ favor as to an “encroached-upon portion” of the plaintiff’s property. The defendants have not brought a cross appeal to challenge that judgment and, thus, have abandoned any claims they might have raised in this regard. See, e.g., SMDV 1, LLC v. 459-461 Pacific Street, LLC, 233 Conn. App. 599, 606 n.4, 341 A.3d 304 (“[i]f an appellee wishes to change the judgment in any way, the party must file a cross appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 919, 345 A.3d 808 (2025). 2 Daniel quitclaimed an interest in the property to Gritli in 1996.  Esposito v. Rabin revoke permission at any time which would require [the defendants] to remove all encroachments immediately.” Daniel telephoned the plaintiff two days later and suggested that he purchase the encroached-on land from her, but the plaintiff declined. She testified at trial that she “was not yet a year into [her] mortgage and [she] felt that that might be difficult,” and that she “hadn’t yet explored the area in February of 2022 and thought [she] needed to know more about it before [she] could reasonably understand what [she] might or might not [want to] sell.” In December 2022, after finding additional debris and yard waste on her property while she was clearing out the area near the defendants’ encroachments to make it safe for her dog, the plaintiff sent a text message to Daniel asking that he “not use the property that you’re borrow- ing” for debris and yard waste. Daniel responded by text, confirming that “[w]e’ve been composting leaves in the vicinity of the rock but I’ll move them to a different area not on your land.” Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff and Daniel had an impromptu in-person conversation dur- ing which the plaintiff requested the defendants’ help with clearing the debris, advised that it was time for her to install the fence along the property line and that the encroachments would need to be removed within a few weeks. Daniel denied responsibility for all but certain tree branches that had fallen in his yard and stated that Gritli would not like the fence because it would ruin her view from the deck. On January 28, 2023, the plaintiff sent Daniel a text message explaining that, because she had cleared out some of the area adjacent to the property line and her dog had open access to that area, she needed to ensure the dog’s safety by moving forward with the installation of the fence. As such, the plaintiff asked Daniel to “relo- cate your shed, compost station, and all other property currently located on my side of the property line fairly quickly, hopefully within a week or two.” Daniel promptly  Esposito v. Rabin responded with a text message stating that “my lawyer sent you a letter regarding the property line.” The letter from the defendants’ counsel, dated January 26, 2023, referenced “the encroachment on 71 Midwood Road” and stated that the defendants’ “use of the prop- erty has been open, notorious adverse, and continuous for more than [fifteen] years. By law, ownership of this portion of the property has vested in [the defendants] by virtue of adverse possession.” The letter further “oppose[d] any attempt to relocate the shed, compost [corral], and the portion of the property used and main- tained by [the defendants].” On January 28, 2023, after she received the letter, the plaintiff sent a text message to Daniel disputing the defendants’ adverse possession claim and requesting that the defendants “immediately remove all personal property and . . . make all repairs to [her] property so as to return it to its original condition.” She then proceeded to install temporary fencing along the property line, and, while doing so, the defendants came out of their home. Gritli came down from the deck and attempted to engage the plaintiff in a conversation, but the plaintiff refused. Daniel stayed on the deck, and the plaintiff claimed he was staring at her. After that encounter, the plaintiff sent another text message to Daniel to provide “imme- diate notice of no trespassing” and to confirm that she had “installed temporary fencing . . . on [her] property according to the survey stakes.” She also withdrew the permission she had given the defendants to access and use of “any [part] of [her] property including the area into which [they had] been discarding waste.” The defendants’ counsel telephoned the plaintiff on or about January 30, 2023. During their conversation, the plaintiff reiterated her opposition to the defen- dants’ adverse possession claim and inquired about, and requested a copy of, the evidence the defendants had to support it. In response, the defendants’ counsel sent the plaintiff a letter dated January 30, 2023, along with a copy of an April 22, 2015 survey map on which,  Esposito v. Rabin he stated, “[w]e have highlighted the disputed area.” Specifically, two red lines were drawn from the existing property line that separated the properties. The red lines came to a point, well into the plaintiff’s property, and formed a triangle using the existing property line as its base. The plaintiff testified at trial that this triangular area was approximately 2500 square feet. In May 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants. The plaintiff’s three count com- plaint alleged that the “defendants . . . placed a shed, compost corral, drainpipe, debris and waste and buried wire, over and across the plaintiff’s property, all of which encroach and trespass upon the plaintiff’s property.” In the first count of her complaint, the plaintiff stated a claim for trespass and sought compensatory and punitive damages and costs in relation thereto. In the second count of her complaint, captioned “injunc- tive relief,” the plaintiff alleged that the encroachments “have caused and continue to cause damage to the plain- tiff and her property,” and that, if they are not removed, she “will suffer irreparable injury, in that a continuation of the encroachment may in the future ripen into a pre- scriptive easement or result in the defendants acquiring title to the encroachment area by adverse possession.” Thus, she sought “[a] temporary and permanent injunc- tion enjoining the defendants from encroaching upon [her] property, an order to remove the encroachments and an order to repair the damage caused by the encroach- ments and restore the property to its prior condition . . . .” Finally, in the third count of her complaint, captioned “quiet title,” the plaintiff alleged that she “is the absolute owner and is in possession and control of the real prop- erty located at 71 Midwood Road,” having “acquired her title by warranty deed,” and that the defendants “claim an interest in [her] property or parts thereof which are adverse to” her title. As a result, she expressly sought “[a] judgment determining the rights [of] the parties in and to the land and settling the title thereto . . . .”3 3 “A person who claims title by deed is claiming that [she] has good record title which entitles [her], in an action to quiet title, to a judgment  Esposito v. Rabin (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff attached as exhibits to her complaint (1) a legal description of her property at 71 Midwood Road, (2) a legal description of the defendants’ property at 24 Stone Street and (3) a map detailing the encroachment. On June 12, 2023, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint as well as a special defense and a three count counterclaim. In their special defense, the defendants alleged that “[t]he title to the property described by the plaintiff in her complaint has vested in the defendants by virtue of adverse possession.” Likewise, in the first count of their counterclaim, the defendants sought to quiet title to the “encroached-upon portion” of the plaintiff’s property, alleging that title to that portion of the plaintiff’s property had vested in them by adverse possession.4 In the second count of their counterclaim, the defendants stated a claim for trespass predicated on the plaintiff’s alleged attempt to remove their personal property from and her interference with a garden located within the area of “the disputed prop- erty . . . .” In the third count of their counterclaim, the of ownership.” DeVita v. Esposito, 13 Conn. App. 101, 106, 535 A.2d 364 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 807, 540 A.2d 375 (1988). 4 The defendants do not expressly reference “adverse possession” in the first count of their counterclaim. As support for their claim to title to the “encroached-upon portion” of the plaintiff’s property, however, they set forth the essential elements of adverse possession; see, e.g., Mulvey v. Palo, 226 Conn. App. 495, 500, 319 A.3d 211, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 902, 322 A.3d 1059 (2024); and there is no dispute in this appeal as to the nature of their claim. Indeed, Daniel confirmed during his testimony at trial that, “as part of [the defendants’] counterclaim, [they are] claiming that [they] have acquired a portion of [the plaintiff’s] property by adverse possession . . . .” “[A] person who claims title by adverse possession is claiming that although he does not have record title, his proof of possession which is adverse, open, notorious and continuous for the entire statutory period entitles him, in an action to quiet title, to a judgment of ownership.” DeVita v. Esposito, 13 Conn. App. 101, 106, 535 A.2d 364 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 807, 540 A.2d 375 (1988). Apart from identifying the encroachments themselves, the defendants do not describe in their counterclaim the “encroached-upon portion” of the plaintiff’s property they claimed to have acquired by adverse possession.  Esposito v. Rabin defendants alleged nuisance predicated on the plaintiff’s alleged removal of “personal property from the disputed property,” placement of stones on the defendants’ garden “located in the disputed property,” and placement of “a surveillance camera on the property line facing into the [defendants’] property and home.” The defendants sought a judgment, pursuant to § 47-31, that they “are the owners of the encroached-upon property,” “[a] tem- porary and permanent injunction prohibiting the plain- tiff . . . from altering, damaging, or taking any action within the encroached-upon property,” and monetary damages and costs. The defendants did not attach any exhibits to their counterclaim. On June 27, 2023, the plaintiff filed a reply to the special defense and an answer to the counterclaim, in which she denied, inter alia, the defendants’ adverse possession special defense and their claim that title to the “encroached-upon property” had vested in them. This case was tried to the court, Stewart, J., on May 23 and 30, 2024.5 The plaintiff testified as the only witness on her behalf and introduced exhibits into evidence that included a copy of the warranty deed that was conveyed to her when she purchased her property, correspon- dence, survey maps, field cards, Branford zoning board documents, and photographs and videos. The defendants presented testimony from Daniel as the only witness on their behalf and introduced exhibits into evidence that included a copy of the 1996 quitclaim deed described in footnote 2 of this opinion, receipts, a marked-up 2015 survey map, and photographs. The plaintiff testified that, at the time she commis- sioned the initial survey of her property, the staking revealed what she had considered to be minor encroach- ments by the defendants. She explained that “roughly 80 percent of a shed and a 100 percent of an open but corralled . . . compost station” belonging to the defen- dants were located on her property. She described, and 5 The court heard evidence on May 23, 2024, and closing arguments on May 30, 2024.  Esposito v. Rabin photographs and videos revealed, that the back portion of her property has “an upper area and big cliff . . . and then another extended lower area . . . .” It is the “extended lower area” that abuts the defendants’ property, and this is where the encroachments she identified are located. This area was “very overgrown and unkempt.” The plaintiff further testified that she did not have any knowledge regarding what portion of her property the defendants were claiming to have acquired by adverse possession until she received from their counsel the copy of the 2015 survey map with the “[h]and drawn . . . red triangle that encloses the entire length of . . . our abutting property line and goes approximately eighty feet into the property line for a total of about twenty-five hundred square feet.” According to the plaintiff, the area enclosed by the red triangle “was beyond the encroachments [she] had previously identified.” She further explained that “the only encroachment that’s shown on [the survey map she received from the defendants’ counsel is] part of the shed. The compost structure thing is not here. So, it’s just this shed partially encroaching, but yet this [2500 square feet] is all of what they wanted.”6 The plaintiff testified that, after she received the marked-up survey map from the defendants’ counsel, she conducted some research in the town of Branford’s (town) records and learned that the defendants had sought a variance, in 2014 or 2015, to reduce the setback from the same property line they were disputing in their special defense and first count of their counterclaim, in order 6 The 2015 survey map with the “red triangle” was admitted into evidence as an exhibit at trial. It depicts a box, identified as “SHED,” that straddles the existing boundary line between the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ properties, with the majority of the box located on the plaintiff’s side of the property line. Also depicted within the triangular area is a series of “little circles” that the plaintiff testified represented a “stone wall” that she described as “a crumbling stone gathering of rocks on [her] property.” She also testified about, and presented photographs of, a PVC drainage pipe that extended from the defendants’ property, underneath the “stone gathering of rocks” and discharged into a pond on her property. She considered the PVC pipe to be an encroachment but not the remains of the crumbling stone wall.  Esposito v. Rabin to enlarge the rear deck on their home. The plaintiff also located field cards for the defendants’ property that the town used for taxing purposes, which she submitted into evidence. She explained that the field card dated 2013 identified a fireplace as an “outbuilding [and] yard item” but did not identify a shed. A later field card dated 2018, however, identified both a fireplace and a shed frame, from 2015, as “outbuilding[s] [and] yard items.” As part of further research that she had conducted, the plaintiff also located two aerial photographs from 2008 that depicted her property and the defendants’ property. She testified that there was not a shed or compost corral reflected in either photograph. In addition, the plaintiff explained that, once she became aware of the defendants’ claim to her land, she had her original survey revised to include the visible encroachments she was claiming.7 She then sent cor- respondence to the defendants, through their counsel, demanding that they remove the encroaching “shed, compost corral, drainpipe and buried wire” from her property, and also filed a notice of interruption and dis- pute of claim with the town clerk. After the defendants refused to remove the encroachments, the plaintiff filed this action. Daniel testified that he had been title owner of the defendants’ property since 1985. He identified the disputed area that he and Gritli were claiming to have acquired by adverse possession as a 1202 square foot area near the existing property line, as reflected on a second marked-up version of the 2015 survey map the defen- dants introduced into evidence as an exhibit at trial. This second version of the 2015 survey map identifies both the original “property line to be removed” and the 1202 square foot area as the “proposed parcel to be merged 7 The plaintiff testified that, while she was clearing out the lower area of her property, she uncovered a buried green wire on her property that ran to the defendants’ property. She “had it checked [through] call before you dig kind of thing. And they said it was live and it originated from [the defendants’ property].” The buried green wire, although one of the encroachments she is claiming, is not depicted on her revised survey map.  Esposito v. Rabin with #24 Stone Street.” A “shed” is shown straddling the existing property line, but no other encroachments are depicted on that survey map.8 Daniel confirmed that the surveyor did not return to the defendants’ prop- erty to re-walk the land before identifying the disputed area on the second version of the 2015 survey map. He explained that the surveyor, instead, drew the proposed new boundary line based solely on Daniel’s directive as to where it should be. With respect to the duration of the defendants’ alleged adverse possession of the disputed area of the plaintiff’s property, Daniel testified that he and his family began utilizing it in 1985. He explained that his children had a sandbox and climbing structure that were located in the disputed area, which they had maintained for about five years until the children outgrew them. Daniel also constructed a stone wall and planted a garden in the disputed area in 1985. Daniel testified that a doghouse, which had been con- structed by previous owners of the defendants’ property, was located within the disputed area when he purchased the property in 1985. The defendants replaced the dog- house with their first shed in approximately 1998. In early 2015, the defendants replaced that shed with one they had purchased from The Home Depot at the end of 2014.9 It is the second shed that is currently encroaching on the plaintiff’s property. 8 During cross-examination, the plaintiff confirmed that she had learned “through the course of the litigation” that the defendants were not, in fact, claiming that they had adversely possessed the 2500 square foot “triangle area” reflected on the first marked-up version of the 2015 survey map. She later explained that this came to light during pretrial discovery when the defendants provided, with their responses to her interrogatories and production requests, the second marked-up version of the survey map. 9 Daniel testified that the doghouse was “[m]aybe three feet by five feet” in size, that the first shed was “about eight by ten feet, approxi- mately,” and that the “new shed” was “approximately” the same size and dimension as the prior shed. Moreover, although Daniel also testi- fied that the “new shed” was placed in the same location as the prior shed, the plaintiff testified, and the court found, that Daniel had told her that he “didn’t tell them to put [the shed] there. I came home one day, and it was just there.” Daniel did not testify, however, as to when  Esposito v. Rabin To rebut the plaintiff’s testimony that suggested that there was no shed on the defendants’ property in 2008 or at the time that the 2013 field card was created, Dan- iel introduced into evidence a photograph taken of the defendants’ yard in 2011.10 He explained that the shed was “the white structure on the left side of the photo- graph” and that “you have to look through the bushes to see it.” Daniel also testified that two aerial photographs from 2008, which the court admitted into evidence as exhibits during the plaintiff’s testimony, did show what he “believe[s] is the shed.” According to Daniel, the defendants constructed their compost corral in 1985. Although they had made vari- ous improvements to that structure over time, it existed more or less in the same location, completely within the disputed area, since then. He offered an April 2023 photograph of the defendants’ compost corral at trial, which the court admitted into evidence and “show[ed] all the garbage . . . [the plaintiff] dumped” there. Although Daniel explained that he did not actually see the plaintiff put anything into the compost corral, it was “[his] infer- ence that she did since nobody else has access to the area.” He also testified that the plaintiff “destroyed” a flower bed within the disputed area “by cutting all the bushes out and digging up the flowers. She then proceeded to spray-paint it with red spray paint.” Daniel acknowledged that he had installed an electric dog fence on their property in approximately 1998 and confirmed that the green wire that the plaintiff had uncovered within the disputed area was a wire from that fence. According to Daniel, the drainpipe existed when he purchased the property in 1985. Daniel testified that the defendants never requested permission to use the disputed area from the prior owners or by whom the prior shed was removed, and there is no documentary evidence in this regard. 10 This photograph was admitted into evidence over the objection of the plaintiff’s counsel. As support for its admission, the defendants’ counsel explained that “[w]e are offering it in rebuttal to the testimony that there was an insinuation that there was no shed in 2011.”  Esposito v. Rabin of the plaintiff’s property and that the prior owners of the plaintiff’s property never asked the defendants to remove their shed or compost corral therefrom. He explained that, at least initially, the defendants thought they owned the disputed area. Moreover, he confirmed that, even after surveys that the defendants had com- missioned in or about 2014 or 2015 revealed the true property line, which Daniel testified went “through our shed and cut off the portion that included the disputed area,” the defendants continued to use the disputed area of the plaintiff’s property as if it was their own. He fur- ther testified that they “groomed the area, cut the grass, tended to the flowers, [and] used compost. We used the shed. We continued to tend the garden within the stone wall.” Daniel confirmed, however, that the defendants did not notify the town of their adverse possession claim when they sought their variance. With respect to the defendants’ nuisance claim, Daniel testified that the plaintiff had installed “surveillance cameras,” which she pointed at the defendants’ prop- erty.11 He “assume[d]” that, by doing so, the plaintiff “want[ed] to keep an eye on us.” Daniel also testified, without objection, that the plaintiff had installed several motion activated noisemakers that made dog-barking and gunshot sounds. The plaintiff confirmed during her testimony that she had installed cameras to monitor the situation with respect to the placement of debris onto her property.12 She also explained that she had installed 11 The defendants had photographs of the “surveillance cameras pointed at [their] yard/house” photocopied together and introduced as one exhibit at trial. Daniel testified that one of the cameras “is pointed at [the defendants’] land and [the defendants’] house,” and that the other “enjoys a view of [the defendants’] house and [the defendants’] porch.” The photographs, however, depict the cameras themselves and not the area or areas captured in their respective views. 12 More specifically, the plaintiff testified that she had installed the two cameras at issue because she “was concerned that [she] had not seen what was happening coming” and wanted “to maintain a record of the property while we went through this process.” She explained that one of the cameras was “pointed toward the compost area or the shed” and offered into evidence a photograph that shows “what is captured by [that] camera . . . .” That photograph depicts, inter alia, trees and  Esposito v. Rabin noisemakers as an animal deterrent because there was an increase in coyotes, deer, fox and raccoons, and she was concerned about the safety of her dog. She removed the noisemakers at some point prior to the trial, however, because the animal activity had decreased. On August 1, 2024, the trial court issued a memo- randum of decision in which it found in favor of the defendants on all counts of the plaintiff’s complaint and with respect to counts two and three of the defendants’ counterclaim, which sounded in trespass and nuisance, respectively. The court determined, however, that the defendants could not prevail on count one of their coun- terclaim, which sought to quiet title in their favor to “the encroached-upon property . . . .” See footnote 1 of this opinion. The predicate for the trial court’s conclusions as to all but the defendants’ nuisance claim was its resolution of the defendants’ adverse possession special defense, which it addressed “first because it is directed to all three of the plaintiff’s claims, and the outcome of that analysis affects those claims and the first two of the defendants’ claims.” After reciting the elements of adverse possession and acknowledging the “exacting standard” by which the defendants had to sustain their burden of proving those elements, which included overcoming the presumption “in favor of possession in subordination to the title of the true owner,” the court explained that, although the defendants had established that “they ousted the plain- tiff’s predecessors from possession and kept them out land covered by leaves and ground cover in the foreground, the shed and compost corral in the mid-ground and part of the defendants’ home in the background. The plaintiff further testified that the other camera “was up on the cliff . . . about forty feet from the property line” and “was pointed in the same area so [she] could see what might be happen- ing on the other side of [the] shed a little.” She described that camera, itself, as “useless because there’s so much vegetation, so it was taken down within a few weeks.” Nonetheless, she offered another photograph into evidence that “is the image captured by the camera that was on the cliff.” That photograph depicts part of the cliff, trees and heavy vegetation in the foreground, and what looks like one side of a shed and part of the defendants’ house, obscured by leaves, in the background.  Esposito v. Rabin uninterruptedly under a claim of right by an open, vis- ible and exclusive possession by the defendants without license or consent of the plaintiff’s predecessors” for a period of ten years, they “did not provide clear and con- vincing evidence that they ousted the plaintiff and [her predecessors] from possession of all of the disputed area for fifteen years.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court explained that, “[b]ased on the 2022 and 2023 photographs and videotapes introduced by both parties, most of the land appears to have been covered in leaves year-round. The defendants’ garden does not appear to [have been] actively maintained, and their play areas for their children appear to be long gone. There is no evidence after the first ten years that the defendants openly and visibly use[d] them, nor is there an ouster in those areas.” The trial court determined, however, that “[t]he stone wall and a compost structure have been present since 1985, the drainpipe predates 1985, and the shed and its predecessor have been on the property since 1998, and the dog fence was installed in 1998.” Even so, the court acknowledged, with respect to the shed, that “[n]o shed appears on the 2013 assessor’s card” and that it could not determine whether there was a shed depicted in the 2011 photograph the defendants had offered into evidence as an exhibit or in the 2008 aerial photographs that the plaintiff offered into evidence as exhibits. Moreover, the court noted, one of the defendants’ April 2023 pho- tographs “depicts the shed and the compost corral, but there are no other recognizable objects.” The trial court found that the defendants had “estab- lished that it is highly probably true that the stone wall, the shed and its predecessors, the compost corral and its predecessors, the drainpipe and the dog fence were openly and visibly present on the plaintiff’s property continuously for at least fifteen years.” As such, the court concluded that the defendants had established “their special defense of adverse possession as to the . . . encroachments . . . .” The court expressly stated,  Esposito v. Rabin however, that the defendants had “not established that defense as to any other part of the disputed area.” The trial court then addressed the plaintiff’s three claims in her complaint and relied on its conclusion that the defendants had “established their special defense of adverse possession as to the encroachments” to reject each of the plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, with respect to the plaintiff’s trespass claim, the court explained that, “[b]ecause the defendants have established their special defense as to the encroachments, they had ousted the plaintiff of possession of the property in question, and therefore she cannot establish the first two elements” of her trespass claim. With respect to the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief, the court simply stated that, “[b]ecause the defendants have established their special defense as to the encroachments, she cannot prevail on this claim.” Finally, with respect to the plaintiff’s quiet title claim, the court determined that the plaintiff had complied with § 47-31 (b), “which sets forth the require- ments for a complaint in a quiet title action,” specifically, that “[t]he complaint in such action shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff’s claim, interest or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim the adverse estate or interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court found, nonetheless, that, “because the defendants have established their special defense as to the encroachments, the court cannot quiet title consistent with the legal description from the plaintiff’s warranty deed that she has attached to the complaint.” The trial court, however, also declined to quiet title to the disputed area of the plaintiff’s property in the defendants’ favor. In addressing the first count of the defendants’ counterclaim, in which they expressly sought “a judgment declaring that the title of the property is quieted and settled” in their favor, the court explained that the defendants had “not complied with the require- ment in [§] 47-31 (b) that they ‘describe the property in  Esposito v. Rabin question.’ Their counterclaim does not include a prop- erty description. Although they introduced a survey as an exhibit at trial, that survey includes the entire 1202 square feet of the so-called disputed area. The court has determined that the defendants did not meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they have title by adverse possession of that entire area.” Moreover, the court further specified that the defendants had “not provided [it] with a property description of the encroachments that the court did find that the defendants had acquired by adverse possession.” For these collective reasons, the court concluded that the defendants could not prevail on the quiet title count of their counterclaim. See footnote 1 of