Perez v. Carusillo

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Perez v. Carusillo IVAN PEREZ v. NINA CARUSILLO (SC 21085) Mullins, C. J., and D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.* Syllabus The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and denying her petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of E and C, the plaintiff’s two biological children from a prior marriage. The parties started dating following the death of the plaintiff’s former wife and married about eighteen months later, when E and C were nine and seven years old, respectively. During the marriage, the defendant formed a close relationship with the children, held them out as her own children, and assisted the plaintiff with their upbringing. The plaintiff encouraged and permitted the children to develop their relationships with the defendant and allowed them to call her “mom.” He claimed, however, that he had no intention of making the defendant the children’s legal mother and he had declined the defendant’s numerous requests to adopt them. After approximately five and one-half years of marriage, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action. In evaluating the defendant’s petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of E and C, the trial court found that she had estab- lished the first six statutory (§ 46b-490 (a)) criteria for de facto parentage by clear and convincing evidence but determined that she had failed to prove the seventh criterion, namely, that continuing the relationship between the defendant and the children was in their best interests. Because § 46b-490 does not enumerate specific factors for courts to consider when determin- ing whether it is in the best interests of a child to continue a relationship, the trial court looked to the factors set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56 (c)) governing custody and visitation determinations to guide its analysis. The court determined that the factor set forth in § 46b-56 (c) (5), the wishes of the children’s parents as to custody, was the factor that should be assigned the most weight in that context. Insofar as the plaintiff opposed the defen- dant’s petition, the court denied it and granted the plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the children. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had misapplied the provisions of the Connecticut Parentage Act (§ 46b-450 et seq.) in various ways when it denied her petition, including by importing into the de facto parentage analysis the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c). Held: The defendant’s appeal was not moot as to E, even though she had reached the age of majority during the pendency of the appeal, because the defendant timely filed her petition seeking de facto parentage pursuant to statute (§ 46b-491 (b)) before E had reached the age of eighteen, and a favorable * The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Perez v. Carusillo appellate determination could afford the defendant meaningful and practical relief through legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, which gives rise to multiple, cognizable legal interests that survive a child’s attainment of majority age. The trial court misapplied the statutory criterion set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (7) in denying the defendant’s petition for adjudication as a de facto parent, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment only with respect to the denial of her petition and remanded the case for the trial court to evaluate the petition in accordance with the proper legal framework. Section 46b-490 (a) (7), by its plain terms, focuses on the relationship between the person seeking de facto parentage and the child, and asks whether con- tinuing that relationship is in the child’s best interest, but it does not define the phrase “best interest of the child,” set forth any factors that should be considered in determining a child’s best interest, or refer to any other statute that might supply such factors. Although it was not improper for the trial court to look beyond § 46b-490 (a) (7) for guidance concerning what factors might bear on the best interest of a child in the de factor parentage context, the court, by importing wholesale the factors for custody and visitation determinations set forth in § 46b-56 (c) into the de facto parentage best interest analysis, improperly focused on the plaintiff’s wishes as to custody rather than on the children’s best interests. This court concluded that the factors for determining the best interest of a child enumerated in the provision (§ 46b-475 (a)) of the Connecticut Parentage Act, which addresses competing claims of parentage among multiple claim- ants, provide useful and appropriate guidance for trial courts undertaking the best interest inquiry analysis under § 46b-490 (a) (7), even if resort to those factors may not be required in every case. Moreover, the best interest determination under § 46b-490 (a) (7) is neces- sarily fact intensive and holistic, and the factors enumerated in § 46b-475 (a) or any relevant factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) do not encompass all relevant considerations for purposes of the best interest analysis under § 46b-490 (a) (7), as the age of the child at the time of adjudication, the length of time during which the petitioner assumed a parental role, the nature and depth of that relationship, the harm that would result from nonrecognition of de facto parentage, and other factors bearing on the disruption of the relationship or the likelihood of other harm to the child can also inform the best interest analysis. The trial court, in concluding pursuant to § 46b-490 (a) (7), that it was not in the children’s best interests for the defendant to be adjudicated their de facto parent, improperly and unnecessarily focused on the heterosexual nature of the parties’ marriage and, in effect, precluded the defendant from prevailing on her petition merely because of the nature of the parties’ relationship, as the Connecticut Parentage Act does not condition eligibility for de facto parentage on a petitioner’s sexual orientation, marital status, or family structure.  Perez v. Carusillo Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that, even if this court concluded that the trial court had misapplied § 46b-490 (a) (7), a remand was unnecessary on the ground that this court could uphold the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition on the alternative ground that she had failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff had fostered or supported a bonded and dependent relationship between the defendant and the children that was parental in nature, as § 46b-490 (a) (6) requires. Although a parent’s opposition to the adoption of his or her child is unques- tionably relevant evidence bearing on whether that parent fostered or sup- ported a bonded and dependent relationship that is parental in nature, nothing in the text of § 46b-490 (a) (6) suggested that a fit parent’s refusal to consent to adoption is dispositive of whether an individual seeking an adjudication of de facto parentage has established the statutory criterion. Rather, the inquiry under § 46b-490 (a) (6) is a broad and fact intensive one that looks at the parent’s conduct throughout the course of the relationship between the petitioner and the children. In addition, this court declined to resolve the plaintiff’s sufficiency challenge with respect to § 46b-490 (a) (6) before the trial court, on remand, has an opportunity to consider all of the evidence under the proper legal framework, as the trial court’s misapplication of § 46b-490 (a) (7) may have affected the manner in which it evaluated evidence relevant to § 46b-490 (a) (6). Argued April 13—officially released September 8, 2026 Procedural History Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the defendant filed a cross complaint and a petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of the plaintiff’s children; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J.; judgment dis- solving the marriage, denying the defendant’s petition for de facto parenthood, and granting certain other relief, from which the defendant appealed. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Leslie I. Jennings-Lax, for the appellant (defendant). Stacie L. Provencher, with whom were Dana M. Hrelic and, on the brief, Campbell D. Barrett, for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion DANNEHY, J. The Connecticut Parentage Act (CPA), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq., establishes  Perez v. Carusillo a comprehensive framework for establishing legal parent- child relationships in Connecticut. Among the multiple statutory avenues through which a person may establish legal parent status, one permits a court to adjudicate a person a child’s de facto parent upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-490 (a). This appeal requires us to consider the meaning and proper application of certain criteria in that section. The defendant, Nina Carusillo, appeals from the judg- ment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Ivan Perez, and denying her petition to be adjudicated the de facto parent of the plaintiff’s two biological daughters from his previous marriage. The defendant claims that the trial court misapplied the CPA in various respects including, for example, by importing into the de facto parentage analysis the best interest factors governing custody and parenting plan determi- nations. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. I BACKGROUND The plaintiff and the defendant were married on December 19, 2016. On January 18, 2022, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The defendant filed an answer and cross complaint, seeking, among other relief, an adjudication pursuant to § 46b-490 that she is the de facto parent of E, born in September 2007, and C, born in April 2009. Following a multiday trial on the plaintiff’s dissolu- tion complaint and the defendant’s de facto parentage petition, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and denying the defendant’s petition. In denying the defendant’s petition, the court made extensive findings regarding the parties’ relationship, the defendant’s relationship with the children, and the  Perez v. Carusillo circumstances surrounding the children’s upbringing. We begin with a summary of those findings. A At the time of trial, the plaintiff was fifty-four years old and employed as a mental health counselor at a Con- necticut mental health center. He had previously worked as a fire captain for a municipal fire department for twenty-six years and retired from that position in 2016. The defendant was forty-nine years old and worked as a physician assistant in the gynecological oncology depart- ment at a New Haven hospital. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the plaintiff had been married to a woman named Rose, who is the biological mother of E and C. Rose was diagnosed with stage four cancer in 2013 and died in January 2015. Rose’s illness and death were hard on the plaintiff. He managed, at least initially, with the help of his mother and sister. His mother moved into the family home to assist with the care of the children. With their support, the plaintiff was able to balance his two careers, spend some overnights with Rose at the hospital, and maintain a semblance of normalcy for his children. The plaintiff and the defendant first met during Rose’s treatment. The defendant worked on Rose’s treatment team and, through that role, became well acquainted with the plaintiff, the children, and Rose’s extended family. During the period of Rose’s illness, the children knew the defendant as “mommy’s doctor.” The defendant was very fond of the children, having interacted informally with them during that time. Following Rose’s death, the plaintiff and the defen- dant remained in contact. The defendant had helped the children sell Girl Scout cookies, taking orders from many of her coworkers, which resulted in a need to deliver hundreds of boxes of cookies. Although the plaintiff had vowed never to return to the hospital where Rose had been treated following Rose’s death, he found himself obligated to deliver the cookies there in late March or  Perez v. Carusillo early April 2015. During that visit, the parties spoke briefly, and the defendant asked whether the plaintiff would return to share photographs of E’s upcoming recitals or first communion celebration. He did so the following month. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff encountered the defen- dant again. Because his place of employment is located across the street from the hospital where the defendant works, the plaintiff frequently dined at its cafeteria and happened to see the defendant there during one such visit. They exchanged small talk about the children, and the defendant again asked him to share photographs of an upcoming event. A few weeks later, in May 2015, the plaintiff returned to the hospital to share photographs of E’s first communion. Following that visit, the plaintiff asked the defendant to join him for appetizers. Although the defendant was initially reluctant, believing the plain- tiff was still grieving, she ultimately agreed. The parties began dating in June 2015. As the relationship developed, the defendant became increasingly involved in the children’s lives. During 2015 and 2016, she regularly participated in family activities with the plaintiff and the children, including trips to the beach, attendance at community events, holiday celebra- tions, and a family trip to Cape Cod. She also began visit- ing the plaintiff’s home more frequently, spending time with both the plaintiff and the children there. Members of Rose’s extended family also included the defendant in family gatherings and activities involving the children. The defendant developed an intimate and affectionate relationship with the girls.1 The parties’ relationship became more serious in 2016, and the plaintiff proposed to the defendant in November 1 The trial court found that the children “clearly enjoyed” their time together with the defendant, “as the evidence shows that, during the Durham Fair, the girls were holding the parties’ hands. During the par- ties’ trip to Cape Cod in October 2015, the parties and the girls stayed in a hotel, shared a room and each of the parties shared a twin-size bed with one of the girls. During Thanksgiving of 2015, the testimony showed that the plaintiff was having emotional difficulty around the  Perez v. Carusillo of that year. The children reacted to the engagement with great excitement, and the parties married the following month.2 Although the defendant initially continued to maintain her separate residence in a nearby town, she spent substantial time at the plaintiff’s home with the children and eventually sold her home and moved into the plaintiff’s home on a full-time basis in May 2018. After moving in full-time, the defendant resided in the plaintiff’s home until late January or early February 2020, when, following a disagreement, the plaintiff asked her to leave. The defendant returned to the plaintiff’s home in June 2020, when both parties decided to work on the marriage. The defendant continued to live there until August 2022, when, after the dissolution action was commenced, the court ordered that the plaintiff have exclusive possession of the property. While the parties lived together, they jointly partici- pated in caring for the children and shared the day-to-day parenting responsibilities, including preparing meals and transporting them to various activities and medical appointments. Although the defendant regularly assisted with the children’s daily care, these responsibilities were not hers solely, and she was not the primary deci- sion maker for the children. The plaintiff was the sole first holidays after Rose’s passing, and Thanksgiving dinner was held at the defendant’s home . . . . During the Christmas holiday in 2015, the parties and the girls celebrated together in the [plaintiff’s] home. The credible testimony from the parties and the witnesses revealed that the defendant began to have increased contact with the girls and developed a more intimate relationship with them.” 2 Around this time, the plaintiff had made the decision to retire from the fire department, where he had worked for the past twenty-six years. The department’s human resources office informed him that, “if he were to marry prior to his retirement, the spousal benefits of 60 percent of his pension would be preserved.” The trial court found that the parties, after discussions, agreed to expedite their wedding date prior to his retirement. The court found that the plaintiff “wanted the defendant to have this benefit, hoping also that he would be the first to die as he did not want to experience a similar loss again.” The court also found that the defendant agreed to the expedited marriage in order to secure the financial benefits she believed would help the children if something were to happen to the plaintiff.  Perez v. Carusillo decision maker for the children’s schedules, appoint- ments, transportation, and overall care, coordinating any assistance provided by the defendant or others. As to finances, the plaintiff was the sole financial provider for the children’s medical, educational, and religious needs, and paid the household expenses, including the defendant’s health insurance and the children’s expenses. The defendant contributed by purchasing groceries and financially supporting some of the children’s activities. The plaintiff likewise continued to make decisions regarding the children’s religious upbringing in the Roman Catholic faith, including arranging for their receipt of the holy sacraments, religious education, and confirmation preparation. The defendant supported those efforts by assisting them with learning their prayers, transporting them to Confraternity of Christian Doc- trine (CCD) classes and church activities, and helping them complete confirmation requirements. Although not Catholic herself, the defendant supported the plaintiff’s decision to raise the children in that faith and became increasingly involved in helping them through their religious milestones. The defendant filled various gaps in the children’s upbringing. She assisted with personal care and puberty related matters, including helping them style their hair in ways that the plaintiff found difficult, and helped them learn to use feminine hygiene products. She also helped them complete homework, proofread papers, write poetry, and served as an additional source of emotional and physical support. The children developed a close and loving bond with the defendant, and the defendant held them out as her own children. The children consider the defendant’s parents their additional grandparents and the defendant’s sister their aunt. The plaintiff acknowl- edged that the defendant and the children have a good relationship and that the defendant is nurturing and compassionate; he encouraged and supported their bond and welcomed the defendant’s contributions.3 3 The guardian ad litem for the children testified that the defendant “did things as a mother would do” and “acted as a parent in every way.”  Perez v. Carusillo At some point, the children asked the plaintiff to allow them to call the defendant “mom,” explaining that it would be easier for them in public and would allow them to fit in with their peers. Although the plaintiff was initially hesitant, he recognized that, having lost their mother, they wished to be like other children, and he approved their request. He testified that he had no intention of making the defendant the children’s legal mother and that he had declined the defendant’s numer- ous requests to adopt them; nonetheless, he encouraged and permitted the children to develop their relation- ships with her. The plaintiff himself gave the defendant Mother’s Day cards from 2017 through 2022. Although the defendant left the plaintiff’s home for periods of time, particularly from January or February through June 2020, and again in August 2022 through the time of the dissolution hearing, that separation did not affect the relationship between the defendant and the children. The defendant maintained access to the children during those times, and she still slept at the plaintiff’s home at certain times during the 2020 separation. B After making extensive findings, the trial court then evaluated the criteria for establishing de facto parent- age under § 46b-490 (a). That provision, which will be discussed in greater detail in part II of this opinion, requires that the person seeking to be adjudicated the de facto parent satisfy seven statutory criteria by clear and convincing evidence. See General Statutes § 46b-490 (a) (1) through (7). The court found that the first six statu- tory criteria for de facto parentage had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but concluded that the defendant failed to prove the seventh criterion—that “[c]ontinuing the relationship between the person and According to the guardian ad litem, the children “already refer to [the defendant] as mom” and “want [the defendant] to be mom.” The guard- ian ad litem further testified that she reviewed text messages between the defendant and the children, which appeared loving, appropriate, and indicative of the relationship that had developed between them.  Perez v. Carusillo the child is in the best interest of the child.” General Statutes § 46b-490 (a) (7). As to that seventh criterion, the trial court observed that § 46b-490 (a) (7) does not enumerate specific factors for courts to consider in determining whether continu- ing the relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child. The court reasoned, however, that the legislature’s use of the phrase “best interest” was significant because courts are regularly required to make best interest determinations when resolving custody and visitation disputes. The court therefore concluded that the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56 (c),4 governing custody and visitation 4 General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides: “In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b- 1, has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child  Perez v. Carusillo determinations, should be considered in making its best interest determination in the de facto parentage context. The trial court proceeded to explain that “the wishes of the [children’s] parents as to custody,” as contem- plated in § 46b-56 (c) (5) of the custody statute, was the factor that “should be assigned the most weight in this context.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Relying on the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s peti- tion, the court concluded “that it is in the best inter- ests of the children for the plaintiff to have sole legal and physical custody of them.” Although finding that the defendant had developed a loving, trusting, and parental bond with the children, and acknowledging both the children’s stated preference and the recom- mendation of the guardian ad litem (GAL) in favor of de facto parentage, the court stated that “the wishes of a child’s fit and sole parent as to custody carry as much if not greater weight than the recommendation of a GAL in a situation like this [in which] the nature of the relationship did not go beyond that of a typical het- erosexual relationship.” The court stated that, “[when] a fit single parent opposes a third party’s claim of de facto parentage over a child in the context of a typical heterosexual relationship that began after the parent’s status as a legal parent over the child was established, a GAL’s recommendation may not be enough to over- power the wishes of a fit parent.” (Emphasis omitted.) The trial court further reasoned that granting de facto parentage under these circumstances would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the CPA. Examining the CPA’s legislative history, the court concluded that it was enacted principally to address inequities affecting same-sex couples, unmarried couples, and families formed through assisted reproduction, not to elevate a stepparent in a traditional heterosexual has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate the basis for its decision.”  Perez v. Carusillo marriage to legal parent status over the objection of a fit parent. Although the court acknowledged that the CPA does not categorically prohibit a stepparent in a heterosexual marriage from obtaining de facto parent status, it expressed the view that the CPA’s provisions “are generally not appropriately applied to situations concerning parentage in married heterosexual relation- ships.” The court viewed the defendant as a soon to be former stepparent whose claim to legal parentage lacked clear support within the intended scope of the CPA. The trial court also identified practical concerns coun- seling against shared parentage, including the parties’ inability to communicate effectively or jointly make parenting decisions. Although the court acknowledged the children’s maturity and their stated desire that the petition be granted, it concluded that those preferences were not dispositive and carried less weight than the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as a fit parent. Finally, the trial court observed that the children, who were already sixteen and fifteen years old, respectively, would soon reach adulthood and would thereafter be capable of maintaining their relationship with the defendant independently. Accordingly, the court denied the defen- dant’s petition for de facto parentage. At the same time, however, recognizing the significance of the defendant’s long-standing relationship with the children, the court awarded her third-party visitation. This appeal followed.5 II DISCUSSION The defendant advances numerous arguments in sup- port of her claim that the trial court misconstrued the provisions of § 46b-490 in adjudicating her de facto par- entage petition. Before we can reach the merits of those arguments, however, we must first address a threshold jurisdictional issue. 5 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.  Perez v. Carusillo A General Statutes § 46b-491 (b) provides in relevant part that “[a] person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file a petition with the court before the child reaches eighteen years of age. . . .” Although there is no dispute that the defendant timely filed her petition before either child reached the age of eighteen, the defendant has informed us that, during the pendency of this appeal, E turned eighteen. There is some sugges- tion in the briefing that E’s attainment of age eighteen may render this appeal moot with respect to E. “Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 366, 957 A.2d 821 (2008). “It is a [well settled] general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emma F., 315 Conn. 414, 423, 107 A.3d 947 (2015). “[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pen- dency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 225, 802 A.2d 778 (2002). The defendant contends that E’s attainment of major- ity age does not render the appeal moot. She argues that the CPA requires only that a petition be com- menced before the child reaches eighteen years of age and that nothing in the statutory scheme requires that the proceedings be fully adjudicated before that time. The defendant further contends that practical relief remains available to her because an adjudication of de facto parentage carries significant legal consequences  Perez v. Carusillo that extend beyond a child’s minority. Specifically, she argues that recognition of a legal parent-child relation- ship establishes enduring kinship rights and obligations affecting, among other things, probate and inheritance matters, conservatorship and guardianship proceedings, the administration of estates, medical decision-making, disposition of remains, and other incidents of familial status. The plaintiff does not take a definitive position on the issue of mootness. He acknowledges that the plain language of § 46b-491 (b) requires only that the petition be filed before the child reaches eighteen years of age, but he notes that no Connecticut appellate court has yet addressed whether a de facto parentage action remains justiciable after a child attains majority age during the pendency of the proceedings. The plaintiff is correct that no court of this state has addressed whether a child’s attainment of age eighteen renders moot a timely filed petition to establish de facto parentage of that child under the CPA. The Appellate Court has, however, addressed the effect of a child’s attaining age eighteen during the pendency of other family law appeals—specifically, appeals challenging a trial court’s custody or visitation orders. See, e.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., 225 Conn. App. 46, 54–55, 313 A.3d 1288 (2024); Nowacki v. Nowacki, 144 Conn. App. 503, 508–509, 72 A.3d 1245, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 939, 79 A.3d 891 (2013). The Appellate Court has held that a child’s attainment of age eighteen renders moot an appeal challenging a custody or visitation order because no practical relief remains available to the appellant in those circumstances. E.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., supra, 54–55; Nowacki v. Nowacki, supra, 508–509. Those decisions appear to rest on the premise that existing custody and visitation orders terminate by operation of law when a child turns eighteen and that a court lacks jurisdiction to issue such orders with respect to a person of that age. See, e.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., supra, 54–55; Nowacki v. Nowacki, supra, 508–509.  Perez v. Carusillo The relief sought by the defendant in the present appeal, however, is materially different from the relief sought in cases solely involving custody and visitation orders. The defendant seeks an adjudication of legal parentage itself—a determination that, unlike a chal- lenge to custody or visitation orders, is not dependent on the child’s status as a minor. Indeed, recognition of a legal parent-child relationship gives rise to a constel- lation of cognizable legal interests that survive a child’s attainment of majority age. See, e.g., General Statutes § 7-294mm (notification of death); General Statutes § 19a-571 (removal of life support); General Statutes § 45a- 437 (intestate succession); General Statutes § 45a-438b (inheritance). Thus, even though E has now turned eigh- teen years of age, a favorable appellate determination could still afford the defendant meaningful and practical relief through legal recognition of that relationship. We therefore conclude that the present appeal is not moot as it pertains to E.6 B Turning to the merits of the defendant’s claim, we address her contention that, although the trial court 6 Our conclusion that the present appeal is not moot as to E is buttressed by the plain language of § 46b-491 (b). As the parties aptly recognize, that statute requires that a person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child “file a petition with the court before the child reaches eighteen years of age”; it does not, however, require that the litigation be completed, or that judgment be rendered, before the child reaches that age. General Statutes § 46b-491 (b). This strongly suggests that a petition to be adjudicated a child’s de facto parent can be adjudicated after the child turns eighteen, so long as the petition is timely filed before the child turns eighteen. Notably, the CPA defines “ ‘[c]hild’ ” as “a person of any age whose parentage may be determined under [§§] 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive.” General Statutes § 46b-451 (6). This further suggests that a de facto parentage petition can be adjudicated after a child turns eighteen. The plaintiff points out, however, that E’s attainment of majority age could have practical consequences if the case is remanded for further proceedings concerning the de facto parentage claim, most notably, that adjudication of parentage at that time would affect the rights of a person who is now a legal adult. The plaintiff’s concern warrants attention. Significantly, the CPA is silent as to the effect of a child’s  Perez v. Carusillo correctly determined that she had proven by clear and convincing evidence the first six criteria for de facto parentage under the CPA; see General Statutes § 46b- 490 (a) (1) through (6); it erred in concluding that she had failed to prove the seventh criterion set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (7)—that continuation of the relationship between her and the children was in the children’s best interests. In support of her claim, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly imported the custodial best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) into its de facto parentage analysis and accorded dispositive weight to the plaintiff’s wishes based on that provision and the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as a fit parent, effectively giving the plaintiff unilateral veto power over her parentage claim. She also argues that the trial court improperly and inappropriately focused on the heterosexual nature of the parties’ marriage, suggesting that the CPA was primarily meant to apply to same-sex couples and not to a stepparent under the circumstances presented in this case. The defendant argues that the trial court’s construction and application of the CPA are inconsistent with both its text and purpose. The plaintiff in response argues that the trial court did not misapply § 46b-490 (a) (7) in concluding that the defendant had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that granting her de facto parentage petition is in the children’s best interests. Although he provides little explanation for why it was appropriate for the trial court to import the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) in assessing the defendant’s de facto parent- age claim, or why the heterosexual nature of the parties’ relationship was relevant to the inquiry, he contends that the concept of best interes