In re Noah A.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  In re Noah A. IN RE NOAH A.* (AC 49116) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.** Syllabus The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicat- ing a third party, D, a presumed parent of her minor child, N, pursuant to the Connecticut Parentage Act (§ 46b-450 et seq.). The mother claimed that the court failed to determine that D jointly with the mother openly held out N as his own child from the time of N’s birth for a period of at least two years thereafter as required to be adjudicated a presumed parent pursuant to statute (§ 46b-488 (a) (3)). Held: The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated D to be a presumed parent of N because he unilaterally held N out as his own child, as the clear and unambiguous language of § 46b-488 (a) (3) requires that the presumed parent hold the child out as his or her own child jointly with another parent and the court did not make any determination of whether D held N out to be his child jointly with the respondent mother. Argued April 23—officially released September 1, 2026*** Procedural History Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Juvenile Matters, where the minor child was adjudicated neglected; thereafter, the court, Esperance- Smith, J., granted the motion to intervene filed by David O. and the petitioner’s motion to amend its neglect petition to name David O. a presumed parent of the minor child; * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b- 142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. ** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. *** September 1, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.  In re Noah A. subsequently, the court, Esperance-Smith, J., rendered judgment adjudicating David O. a presumptive parent of the minor child, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, for the appellant (respon- dent mother). Stephen G. Vitelli, deputy associate attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Judith Chicoine, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellee (intervenor). Opinion CRADLE, C. J. The respondent, Carol A., appeals from the judgment of the trial court adjudicating a third party, David O., a presumed parent of her minor child, Noah A., pursuant to the Connecticut Parentage Act (act), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court failed to determine that David O. jointly with the respondent openly held out Noah as his own child from the time of Noah’s birth for a period of at least two years thereafter as required to be adjudicated a presumed parent pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-488 1 The Connecticut Parentage Act, which was enacted by our legislature in 2022; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-15, §§ 1 through 86; is modeled on the 2017 revision of the Uniform Parentage Act. The model law was approved by the Uniform Law Commission, also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which is com- prised of “practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state governments . . . to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and practical.” Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Parentage Act (2017), available at https://www. uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-96 (last visited August 25, 2026).  In re Noah A. (a) (3).2 We agree with the respondent and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.3 2 The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the briefs of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, and David O. “insofar as those briefs urge affirmance of the trial court’s judgment and rely on its factual findings regarding the child’s relationships and the detriment of nonrecognition of parentage.” The attorney for the minor child further argued that affirming the judgment of the trial court “promotes continuity, finality and stability, and reduces the risk of future disruption [of Noah]” and that this court need not reach the constitutional claim raised by the respondent, discussed in footnote 3 of this opinion, to affirm the judgment. 3 The respondent also claims that the court erred in concluding that David O. resided in the same household with Noah from the time of Noah’s birth for a period of at least two years thereafter, failing to determine that adjudicating David O. as a presumed parent of Noah was in Noah’s best interest, and finding that it would be detrimental to Noah if David O. was not adjudicated to be his presumed parent. Because we agree with the respondent’s claim that the court failed to determine that David O. jointly with the respondent openly held out Noah as his own child from the time of Noah’s birth for a period of at least two years thereafter, we do not reach these additional claims of error. Additionally, the respondent claims that the court violated her funda- mental right to the custody and care of Noah by using the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, instead of the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence, to adjudicate David O. as Noah’s presumed parent. Specifically, she argues that due process requires the application of a clear and convincing standard of proof to adjudication of a presumed parentage petition. In the alternative, she asks that this court exercise its supervisory authority to apply the clear and convincing standard of proof. Conversely, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, argues that the respondent’s claim is unpreserved. We conclude that we need not decide which standard of proof applies to the adjudication of a presumed parent petition because, even under the lower standard of a fair preponderance of the evidence, the petition in this case fails. We further recognize that, “[a]s a jurisprudential mat- ter, Connecticut courts follow the recognized policy of self-restraint and the basic judicial duty to eschew unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 828 n.5, 296 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023). In accordance with that policy, we decline to review this claim. We note that the Connecticut Parentage Act expressly states that the clear and convincing standard applies when determining whether a per- son is a de facto parent of a child but is silent as to a person seeking to be adjudicated a presumed parent. See General Statutes § 46b-490 (a). We urge our legislature to clarify the standard of proof to be employed in adjudicating presumed parentage petitions.  In re Noah A. The following procedural history is relevant to this appeal. On September 23, 2024, the petitioner, the Com- missioner of Children and Families, filed a neglect peti- tion as to Noah, identifying the respondent as Noah’s mother and Olex R.4 as Noah’s alleged biological father. The petitioner also filed a neglect petition as to Noah’s older brother, Adrian, identifying the respondent as Adrian’s mother and David O. as his biological father. On October 24, 2024, the respondent appeared in court for an initial plea hearing as to the neglect petitions for both children. David O. also appeared. Olex R. did not appear. On December 19, 2024, both children were adju- dicated neglected. A dispositional order of six months of protective supervision entered as to Adrian only. Because Olex R.’s parentage of Noah had not yet been adjudicated, the disposition of the neglect petition as to Noah was continued to a later date.5 The petitioner and the respondent thereafter filed motions requesting that temporary custody of Noah be vested with his maternal grandmother. The court granted those motions. On January 23, 2025, David O. filed a motion to inter- vene in the neglect proceeding as to Noah, alleging that he is a presumed parent of Noah pursuant to § 46b-488. On February 26, 2025, the petitioner filed a motion to cite in David O. and to amend the neglect petition “for the purpose of allowing the court to determine if [David O.] has a parent-child relationship [with Noah] under the Connecticut General Statutes.” On May 9, 2025, the court granted the petitioner’s motion to cite in David O. and to amend the neglect petition. On June 26, 2025, the court held a hearing as to David O.’s claim of presumed parentage, at which David O., the respondent and Yelda Amiri, a social worker employed by the Department of Children and Families, testified. 4 The petition incorrectly identifies Noah’s biological father as Alex R. It is undisputed that his correct name is Olex R. 5 On January 24, 2025, the court noted that the family support mag- istrate had adjudicated Olex R. to be the biological father of Noah on August 7, 2024.  In re Noah A. The court thereafter issued a memorandum of decision concluding that David O. is a presumed parent of Noah. In its memorandum of decision, the court explained: “[The respondent] and [David O.] were in a romantic relationship and began to reside together as a couple in the year 2016. They were never married. In 2018, [the respondent] and [David O.] conceived a child together, their eldest born, Adrian. In 2019, [the respondent] and [David O.] separated. [The respondent] then conceived Noah with [O]lex R., [Noah’s] genetic parent. [David O.] was present at the hospital when Noah was born [in October 2019] and cut [Noah’s] umbilical cord. “In balancing the credibility of the witnesses, the court gives greater weight to the testimony of [David O.] regarding where he resided from the time that Noah was born. The court finds that [David O.] did come home from the hospital with [the respondent] and [Noah]. Further, [David O.] shared parenting duties when he resided in the home with [the respondent], his son Adrian, and Noah. While he was not consistent with the care he provided, he assisted in the daily care of Noah, attended some medical appointments, and provided some financial support. [David O.] maintained a separate room that he rented throughout the duration of his relationship with [the respondent]. He resided in this space when he had disagreements with [the respondent] and as needed. Oth- erwise, he slept in and resided in [the respondent’s] home when they were getting along. [David O.] was unable to sign a lease with [the respondent] because she was receiv- ing a [federal housing] subsidy and did not list him as a member of the household. “[David O.] held Noah out to be his son and Noah refers to him as ‘daddy.’ Noah does not refer to anyone else as ‘daddy.’ Noah was removed from [the respondent’s] care by order of the court in August of 2024. [David O.’s] oldest child was placed in his care, and Noah was placed in the care of his maternal grandmother. Noah  In re Noah A. has expressed that he would like to live with [David O.] and his brother.6 [David O.] also intends to continue his relationship as a parent to Noah. “Noah has no relationship with his genetic father, [Olex R.], and has never met him. There is an ongoing bond between Noah and [David O.]. Noah visits with [David O.] and his brother every two weeks. [David O.] speaks highly of Noah and treats him like his son. Noah goes to [David O.] for affection and interacts with him playfully. The court credits the testimony of the social worker who testified that during the scheduled visitation time, she observed a parentlike relationship between [David O.] and Noah.”7 (Footnote added.) On the basis of the foregoing, the court concluded: “[T]here is sufficient evidence to conclude that . . . [David O.] is Noah’s presumed parent. [The respondent] con- tested the consistency of [David O.’s] periods of residing in the home with her and Noah. [David O.] had periods of temporary absence from Noah’s residence but not to the degree where those periods of absence deteriorated the bond between [Noah] and [David O.]. Further, the statute provides that periods of absence are included in the court’s determination of whether the alleged parent resided in the home with the child for a period of at least two years from birth. [David O.] never disavowed being Noah’s father, despite there being occasions where he 6 We note that, although David O. testified that Noah has expressed that he would like to live with him, Amiri testified that Noah wants “to go back home to mom.” When asked if Noah has stated that he wants to sleep over at David O.’s residence, Amiri responded, “No. . . . Usually he wants to be at mom’s.” 7 When asked if Noah is “bonded” to David O., Amiri testified that she did not know because she had only seen them together “a handful of times.” When she was asked whether she would describe the relation- ship between Noah and David O. as parentlike, Amiri testified that her observations of them together had been “very limited” and that David O. is attentive to Noah, “but [she had] not seen him do specific duties, like putting clothes on him, feeding him, brushing his teeth, anything like that.”  In re Noah A. took his biological child to certain family events and not Noah or purchased different gifts for the children. “Therefore, the court finds that [David O.] resided in the same household as Noah and openly held out Noah as his own from the time Noah was born and for a period of at least two years thereafter. [The respondent] failed to establish her burden of proof and failed to establish that [David O.] never resided with [Noah] and never held out [Noah] as his own. Lastly, the court finds that the failure to recognize [David O.] as a presumed parent would be detrimental to [Noah] considering their bond and the length of time during which [David O.] assumed the role of parent of [Noah].” This appeal followed. The act includes several provisions that govern pro- ceedings to adjudicate parentage. See General Statutes §§ 46b-458 through 46b-491. This case involves § 46b-488 (a), which sets forth certain circumstances in which a presumption of parentage arises. Section 46b-488 states in relevant part that “(a) . . . a person is presumed to be a parent of a child if . . . (3) The person, jointly with another parent, resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the person’s own child from the time the child was born . . . and for a period of at least two years thereafter, including any period of temporary absence. . . .” On appeal, the respondent claims that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated David O. to be a presumed parent of Noah because, inter alia, he held Noah out as his own child rather than because he did so jointly with her, as required by § 46b-488 (a) (3). “[O]ur analysis of whether the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Public Ser- vice Employees Union, Cops Local 062 v. Hamden, 209 Conn. App. 116, 123, 267 A.3d 239 (2021). Here, the court found that David O. “openly held out Noah as his own from the time Noah was born and for a period of at least two years thereafter.” In so finding,  In re Noah A. the court applied an incorrect legal standard. The clear and unambiguous language of § 46b-488 (a) (3) requires that the presumed parent hold the child out as his or her own jointly with another parent. This interpretation is supported by § 46b-489 (e), which permits a nonmoving parent to overcome a finding under § 46b-488 (a) (3) that he or she jointly with the presumed parent held the child out as their own if the nonmoving parent did so due to duress, coercion or threat of harm.8 If § 46b-488 (a) (3) permitted a determination of presumed parentage based on a finding that the moving party unilaterally held a child out to be his own, the opportunity afforded by § 46b-489 (e) to overcome a finding that he did so jointly with another parent if that parent was coerced would be meaningless. Here, the court did not make any determina- tion of whether David O. held Noah out to be his jointly with the respondent. David O. acknowledges that the court’s determination that he openly held out Noah as his son did not satisfy § 46b-488 (a) (3), which requires a determination that he did so jointly with the respondent. He asks this court to weigh the parties’ testimony and make the determina- tion that he held Noah out as his son jointly with the respondent.9 It is axiomatic, however, that it is not the role of this court to weigh the evidence that was presented to the trial court. State v. Dennis, 237 Conn. App. 649, 658, 352 A.3d 204, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 932, 354 A.3d 728 (2026). On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court improperly relied on the finding that David O. 8 General Statutes § 46b-489 (e) provides in relevant part: “A pre- sumption of parentage under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488, can be challenged if such other parent openly held out the child as the presumed parent’s child due to duress, coercion or threat of harm. . . .” 9 We note that the respondent contested the notion that David O. held Noah out as his son jointly with her.  In re Noah A. unilaterally held Noah out as his own child to satisfy § 46b-488 (a) (3). The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new hearing to adjudicate whether David O. is a presumed parent of Noah. In this opinion the other judges concurred.