State v. Fisher

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Fisher STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT L. FISHER (AC 48859) Westbrook, Wilson and Eveleigh, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree as a result of a shooting, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improp- erly denied his motion for a new trial because the judge improperly failed to disclose, prior to presiding over the trial, that he had applied for the position of Inspector General within the Division of Criminal Justice, which created the appearance of a lack of impartiality. Held: The judge’s pending application for the supervisory prosecutorial position of Inspector General while presiding at the defendant’s trial created an appear- ance of a lack of impartiality, as the Division of Criminal Justice was the same agency that prosecuted the defendant through the state’s attorney’s office, and, pursuant to rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to avoid the appearance of partiality, the judge should have disqualified himself or disclosed his application to the parties and obtained their waiver prior to proceeding with the trial; accordingly, as the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. This court rejected the state’s contention that the defendant waived his claim regarding the judge’s appearance of partiality, as it was undisputed that the defendant was not aware of the judge’s prospective employment until a hearing on the defendant’s postverdict motions when the judge disclosed that he had been appointed to the Inspector General position, the defendant at that hearing consented only to the judge’s adjudication of the postverdict motions and his presiding at the defendant’s sentencing, and defense counsel made clear that the defendant was preserving his right to file a motion for a new trial based on an appearance of partiality. The state’s claim that the defendant untimely filed his motion for a new trial based on an appearance of partiality was unavailing, as the record was unclear as to when the defendant became aware that the judge had submitted an application for the Inspector General position prior to presiding at the trial, and, even if this court were to apply a harmless error type analysis, as the state requested, reversal of the defendant’s conviction was appropriate, as there existed a risk of injustice to the parties, a denial of relief would produce injustice in other cases in which judges preside while applying and negotiating for their next jobs, and the public’s confidence in the judicial process would be undermined. Argued May 28—officially released August 25, 2026  State v. Fisher Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield and tried to the jury before Prescott, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; verdict of guilty; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial. Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellant (defendant). Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was David R. Shannon, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Robert L. Fisher, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1). On appeal, the defen- dant claims, inter alia, that the trial judge improperly failed to disclose that he had a pending application for a prosecutorial position within the Division of Criminal Justice at the time of the defendant’s trial, which created an appearance of a lack of impartiality. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.1 The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. At 1 The defendant also claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting a character witness for the defense from testifying that he was a former prosecutor, (2) the trial court committed plain error in its final charge to the jury regarding an eyewitness’ testimony on cross-examination, (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion to set aside the jury’s guilty verdict, and (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument that deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. In light of our conclusion reversing the judgment, we need not reach these claims.  State v. Fisher approximately 4:45 p.m. on June 7, 2021, the seventy- five year old defendant parked his car in the parking lot of Cramer & Anderson LLP, a law firm at 46 West Street in Litchfield. The defendant, who was an attorney, had practiced real estate and probate law as a partner of the law firm for more than four decades. The decedent, Matthew Bromley, had been driving his car behind the defendant’s car. Bromley parked at an angle in the space next to the defendant’s car. He got out and quickly walked around the rear of his car toward the driver’s door of the defendant’s car. He pulled open the door and began punching the defendant in the face. After he punched the defendant several times, the defendant exited his car. The altercation continued and the defendant retrieved a handgun from its holster in his right front pocket.2 He shot Bromley once in the head, killing him.3 Immediately after the shooting, the defendant called 911. The defendant spoke to the police at the scene and indicated that he had shot Bromley, whom he did not know, after Bromley had assaulted him and threatened to kill him. The defendant was not arrested at that time. The defendant also subsequently gave a written statement to the police through his counsel, providing a detailed account of his altercation with Bromley and again indi- cating that he had shot Bromley in self-defense. Almost one year after the shooting, the defendant was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1). The case was tried to a jury over the course of several days in March 2025 with the court, Prescott, J.,4 presid- ing. The state presented testimony from, inter alios, two 2 The defendant possessed a valid pistol permit. 3 An autopsy revealed that Bromley’s blood alcohol content was 0.11 percent at the time of his death. 4 Judge Prescott was a senior judge at the time of the defendant’s trial. “A senior judge is a judge who elects to retire from full-time service prior to reaching the age of seventy. . . . A senior judge continues to retain all of the powers possessed prior to assuming senior status.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Wasko v. Farley, 108 Conn. App. 156, 160,  State v. Fisher eyewitnesses who had seen the shooting.5 Guadalupe Salazar, one of the eyewitnesses, worked at a restau- rant near the defendant’s law office. Salazar had been walking through the parking lot of a Union Savings Bank, which was adjacent to the law office parking lot, as he was returning to work from his car. The parking lots were separated by a median with grass, trees, and asphalt curbing. Salazar testified that he had heard two cars enter the law office parking lot. He stopped and watched as Brom- ley parked next to the defendant and got out of his vehi- cle.6 Salazar testified that Bromley, who he described as aggressive, went “[f]ast” around his car and rapidly opened the defendant’s door. He saw Bromley punch the defendant. He could not remember how many times Bromley punched the defendant. Salazar testified that there was no argument preceding Bromley’s attack on the defendant. When Bromley stopped punching the defendant, Bromley turned around and walked toward his car. It appeared to Salazar, at that point, that the fight was over. Salazar testified that Bromley had stopped walking when he got to the rear of his car. Salazar saw the defen- dant exit his car holding a pistol. Salazar could see that the defendant and Bromley were arguing, but they were not yelling and he could not hear what they were saying. He saw the defendant take two steps toward Bromley and put the gun on Bromley’s stomach. They kept arguing, and the defendant moved the gun toward Bromley’s throat. The defendant then shot Bromley, and Bromley immediately fell to the ground. Salazar testified that, 947 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922, 958 A.2d 155 (2008); see also General Statutes §§ 51-50d and 51-50i. 5 The state also presented testimony from Henry B. Morehouse, a witness who heard the shooting from a nearby residence, observed the scene from a window after the shooting, and called 911. Morehouse did not observe the shooting itself or the events leading up to the shooting. Although he heard the gunshot and a woman’s scream afterward, he did not hear any argument prior to the shooting. 6 Throughout his testimony, Salazar referred to Bromley as the “younger” man and to the defendant as the “older” man.  State v. Fisher when the defendant shot Bromley, they were “[r]ight next to each other” behind their cars and they stood “[f]ace to face.” He believed that the defendant shot Bromley in the neck. Salazar testified that, once the defendant exited his car, he did not see Bromley hit the defendant. In addition, he saw the defendant walk toward Bromley but did not see Bromley walk toward the defendant. Salazar did not see Bromley try to reach for the defendant’s gun but did see that Bromley’s hands were “[d]own” at the time he was shot. Salazar explained that he was “right in front of [the defendant’s] car,” approximately eight to ten yards away from where the shooting took place, when he made the foregoing observations. He also testified, however, that it was “impossible” to hear the argument between Bromley and the defendant because he was “far away . . . .” He believed that he was “the only [witness] who saw the whole thing” because other witnesses were farther away. Nakisha Marrero, the other eyewitness presented by the state, had been sitting in the driver’s seat of her father’s car in the parking lot of the Union Savings Bank.7 The car was parked facing toward the law office parking lot, where the defendant and Bromley were parked. Marrero testified that she had been looking at her phone and, when she looked up, saw the defendant reach into his car and pull out a gun. She could not hear what the defendant and Bromley were saying but assumed they were arguing. She saw the defendant shoot Bromley and watched Bromley fall backward immediately. During direct examination by the state, Marrero tes- tified that, when Bromley was shot, he was standing toward the back of his car, and the defendant was still 7 Marrero, who was eighteen years old at the time of the shooting, testified that she and her mother had driven to the parking lot to meet her father so they could have dinner with him in his car while he was on his break at work. Marrero’s father, who was not in the parking lot at the time of the shooting, worked at the same restaurant as Salazar. Marrero’s mother, who was still in her car at the time of the shooting, was not called as a witness at trial.  State v. Fisher standing in the doorway of his car. She had seen the defendant “[move] forward a little bit, but [he] was still very close enough to the door.” She noticed that Bromley was “way . . . smaller” and “a little bit . . . skinnier” than the defendant, and that, when Bromley was shot, his hands were “[a]t the side of his body.” She also testified that she had not seen Bromley hit the defendant or reach for the defendant’s gun prior to the shooting. During cross-examination of Marrero, defense counsel offered into evidence a written statement that Marrero had provided to the police on the night of the shooting, which was admitted for impeachment purposes only.8 After reading her statement, Marrero acknowledged that there were inconsistencies between her initial trial testimony and her written statement to the police. For instance, Marrero initially testified that she did not see any kind of fight or commotion prior to seeing the defendant retrieve his gun, as she “wasn’t really paying attention at that time.” On cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that she previously had stated that she saw Bromley approach the defendant’s driver’s door, that he appeared very angry and that he wanted to hit the defendant.9 She testified, in accordance with her writ- 8 At the time of the statement’s admission, the court instructed the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is now a full exhibit, which, my understanding is, it’s her prior statement given to law enforcement. As of right now, all that you can use this document for is to assess her credibility in court. It’s not substantive evidence . . . the things that are in that statement are not substantive evidence of what happened. You have her in-court testimony. That’s going to help you judge whether or not you find it to be credible and consistent.” In addition, during its final charge to the jury, the court provided the following instruction: “[D]uring the testimony of . . . Marrero, I admit- ted evidence that she may have made statements outside of court that may be inconsistent with her trial testimony. You should consider this evidence only as it relates to the credibility of her testimony in court, not as substantive evidence. In other words, consider such evidence as you would any other evidence of inconsistent conduct in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness in court. Any other use of that evidence would be improper.” 9 Specifically, Marrero’s written statement provides in relevant part: “I saw [two] males, one younger and one older, the older male was still in his car . . . . The younger male was approaching the driver’s side door  State v. Fisher ten statement, that the defendant was trying to defend himself against Bromley, as Bromley kept going after him while he was in the car. Marrero further testified that, when the defendant got out of the car, Bromley “tried to swing, but he wasn’t close.” In addition, according to Marrero’s written statement, she had seen Bromley step toward the defendant, while the defendant was outside the car, before the gun was fired.10 Marrero explained that her initial testimony to the contrary was incorrect. As to the reason for her inconsistent testimony, Marrero explained: “It’s hard to remember. It was a couple of years ago.”11 She agreed with defense counsel that the written statement she had provided to the police on the night of the shooting would be more accurate than her initial testimony at trial. The state also presented testimony from several responding police officers. The officers testified regarding of the older [male’s] vehicle. I could not hear anything because the air conditioning in the car was on high and loud. The younger male seemed really mad from his body language as if he wanted to hit the older male. The older [male’s] door was open and the younger male was in the door trying to hit the older male from what I was able to see. The older male was trying to push the younger male away and protect himself from being hit, trying to push the younger male out of the car. The younger male kept coming toward the older male who was still in the car. I was able to see the younger male punching at the older male, the older male was stopping the younger male from punching him using his hands to block.” 10 Specifically, Marrero’s written statement provides in relevant part: “I don’t remember seeing the older male exit the car, I don’t know if I looked away or blanked out, but I remember seeing the older male out of the car with a gun pointed at the younger male. . . . The older male had the gun pointed at the younger [male’s] neck area backing the younger male toward the rear of the vehicle. The older male lowered the gun slightly towards the chest area of the younger male. It looked like they were yelling at each other but I could not be sure what they were saying. I assume that the older male was telling the younger male to back away or something along those lines. Both males took a few more steps back- ward towards the rear of the car. The younger male took a step or two towards the older male. I heard a ‘Pop’ and saw the gun rise up towards the younger [male’s] neck, the younger male fell towards the ground.” 11 Marrero also explained: “[T]his happened back in 2021. I don’t have memory problems, but all the details can get foggy over the years.” She agreed with defense counsel that her testimony during direct examina- tion “was a bit foggy because of the time elapsed.”  State v. Fisher their observations of the scene and initial interactions with the defendant. James Holm, the resident state trooper in Litchfield, arrived within minutes of being dispatched. Holm recognized the defendant,12 and saw that he was bleeding from his upper lip and that he had redness to the side of his face. According to Holm, the defendant looked “upset” and “distraught.” Holm testi- fied that, although the defendant appeared to be stressed and breathing heavily, he refused medical treatment. In addition to testimonial evidence, the state presented numerous exhibits that were admitted into evidence, including photographs of the scene from the night of the shooting, autopsy photographs, body camera footage from the responding officers, and a surveillance video of the Union Savings Bank parking lot, where the eyewit- nesses had been parked, showing those witnesses before and after the shooting. The defendant testified at trial and maintained that he had shot Bromley in self-defense.13 The defendant had noticed a car driving behind him before he entered the law office parking lot14 and saw that car park next to his car. Bromley got out of his car, ran to the driver’s door of the defendant’s car, and pulled the door open. The defendant did not know who Bromley was. He had never seen Bromley before. The defendant testified that Bromley reached into his car and punched him several times on the left side of his face, near his jaw. According to the defendant, Bromley 12 At trial, Holm described the defendant as “an acquaintance from a local restaurant in Goshen.” 13 The defendant’s testimony was consistent with his prior statements to the police. 14 The defendant had been driving from the Washington Depot office of his law firm to the Litchfield office. He noticed Bromley’s car behind him somewhere between Bantam and Litchfield. The defendant explained that he had noticed the car because it “had its headlights on, and one of them was either dim or misaimed so that one was bright, and the other one was not. It just seemed a little bit odd at the time, but I didn’t really think too much about it.” The defendant testified that the driver did not show any signs of aggression, was not trying to pass him, and was not sounding the car’s horn.  State v. Fisher repeatedly yelled at him: “You’re a cocksucker, you’re a motherfucker, I’m going to kill you, you ruined my life, you’ll burn in hell forever.” Bromley spit in the defendant’s face. The defendant described Bromley as being “so impossibly angry. I’ve never seen anything like it before. . . . His face was contorted with rage.” At that point, the defendant was “extremely worried” and thought his life was in danger, as he believed that Bromley was trying to kill him. The defendant testified that he did not believe he could safely escape from Bromley. He explained that it would have been impossible for him to run away due to his vari- ous health issues and physical limitations. The defendant had undergone, inter alia, a knee replacement, a hip replacement, and three back surgeries. His left leg was “totally numb” due to nerve damage. He presented medi- cal records and testimony from one of his surgeons to corroborate his testimony about his physical condition. The defendant further testified that he did not believe he could safely escape from Bromley by driving away. According to the defendant, he could not close his car door because Bromley was in the way, and he did not know if his car could clear the asphalt curbing of the median in front of the car.15 The defendant also believed that he “had a better chance of staying alive if [he] was outside” the car. The defendant explained: “I felt that if I was trapped in the car that [Bromley] would be able to do whatever he wanted. And he had already shown that he could reach into the car and hit me in the face. So, I was definitely afraid he was going to hurt me badly or kill me.”16 15 The defendant explained: “[I]n theory, I could have started the car and moved forward, but we had the asphalt curbing and the grassy median. And my car has only a few inches of ground clearance. I honestly felt that if I tried to go that way, I would have been hung up and then I’d really be in deep trouble.” The defendant also testified on cross-examination that if he had put his car in reverse, he “probably would have dragged [Bromley] . . . with [the] open car door.” When the prosecutor suggested that would have been “[b]etter than shooting him,” the defendant explained that, “at that point in time, I wasn’t thinking of shooting anybody . . . .” 16 The defendant similarly testified on cross-examination: “I basically felt that as long as I was in my car, I would be trapped. [Bromley] would be able to do whatever he wanted to do.”  State v. Fisher The defendant explained that he was able to kick Brom- ley backward and get out of the car. Bromley charged at the defendant and hit him in the chest. The defendant was able to push Bromley backward a couple of feet. The defendant shouted at Bromley, asking, “who are you and what did I do to you to ruin your life?” Bromley charged at the defendant a second time, and the defendant again pushed him backward. According to the defendant, every time he pushed Bromley away, Bromley “would back up . . . two or three feet and then come back.” Bromley spit on the defendant again and continued to yell, among other things, that he was going to kill the defendant and that the defendant was going to “burn in hell forever.” Once the defendant believed that Bromley “was not going to go away,” he pulled his gun out of his pocket and aimed it at Bromley’s chest. He did not want to shoot Bromley but wanted Bromley to know that he “wanted to defend [him]self” and “certainly didn’t want to die.” According to the defendant, Bromley charged at him again, so he pulled the gun down to the area of his right hip in “more of a defensive position,” making it “harder for somebody who is trying to take your gun away from getting it.” The defendant testified that Bromley reached for him, bent forward, and grabbed his right forearm. At that point, the defendant believed that Bromley was going to get the gun, which he was holding in his right hand, and kill him. As they were “basically tangled up with each other,” the defendant pulled the trigger and shot Bromley. He testified that his “intent was to stop [Bromley] from killing [him].” The entire incident took place in less than one minute.17 In addition to the defendant’s testimony, the defense presented testimony from five character witnesses, 17 Surveillance video of the Union Savings Bank parking lot appears to corroborate the defendant’s testimony regarding how quickly the altercation took place. Salazar is shown on the video walking through the bank parking lot at approximately 4:45 p.m., which, according to his testimony, was before the shooting took place. In addition, at 4:46 p.m., Salazar is shown returning to the bank parking lot, which, according to Marrero’s testimony, was after the shooting took place.  State v. Fisher including the defendant’s daughter and four attorneys who had known the defendant for more than four decades throughout his legal career. They described the defendant as being very calm and levelheaded, and explained that he did not have a propensity for anger or aggression. Finally, the defense presented testimony from several witnesses regarding physical evidence that corroborated the defendant’s version of events. Mark Davison, a lieu- tenant colonel with the Connecticut State Police, had conducted a “distance determination”18 to determine the distance between the muzzle of the defendant’s gun and the “target” area, i.e., the location of Bromley’s gunshot wound, at the time of the shooting. Davison concluded that the defendant’s weapon was fired when it was six to eighteen inches away from Bromley. In addition, a state forensic science examiner testified that a swab of the exterior lenses of the defendant’s glasses had tested positive for amylase, a component of saliva. A different state forensic science examiner testified that Bromley was included as a contributor to a DNA profile that had been generated from a swab of the exterior lenses of the defendant’s glasses.19 According to Brooke W. Kammrath, the defendant’s criminalist expert, the physical evidence supported the defendant’s version of events, rather than the accounts initially provided by Salazar and Marrero. To obtain a conviction, the state was required to dis- prove the defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a 18 The distance determination was conducted at the request of a pros- ecutor from the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office. Davison’s report of experimental findings associated with the distance determination was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. 19 Specifically, the forensic science examiner testified that “the DNA [profile is] consistent with being a mixture of three contributors with at least one of them being male. . . . [The defendant] is assumed to be a contributor to that DNA profile. Assuming three contributors, where [the defendant] is one of the contributors, the DNA profile . . . is at least a hundred billion times more likely to occur if it originated from . . . Bromley and [the defendant] and one unknown individual than if it originated from [the defendant] and two unknown individuals.”  State v. Fisher reasonable doubt.20 The state argued, inter alia, that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the degree of force used by the defendant was not necessary under either a subjective or an objective perspective.21 In addition, the state raised the duty to retreat as a statutory disqualification to the defendant’s claim of self-defense pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-19 (b) (1).22 The state suggested that the defendant could have, inter alia, driven away from Bromley. The state presented testimony from Mark Puglielli, an inspector within the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office, who had test-driven the defendant’s car. Puglielli testified, among other things, that the defendant would have been able to start his car and drive forward even with the door open. He explained that it took him less than two seconds to engage the ignition and put the car in drive. He also testified, 20 “The state bears the burden of disproving the defendant’s justifica- tion defense of self-defense. . . . To sustain its burden, the state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the components of [the defense] or establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the statutory exceptions . . . applied.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baez, 354 Conn. 564, 570, 354 A.3d 698 (2026). 21 “The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense . . . is a subjective-objective one. The jury must view the situation from the perspective of the defendant. [General Statutes §] 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hargett, 343 Conn. 604, 620, 275 A.3d 601 (2022). “The components that must exist for an act of violence to be justified on the [ground] of self-defense . . . [are] (1) the defendant must actually have believed that the victim was using or was about to use physical force against him . . . (2) a reasonable person, viewing all the circumstances from the defendant’s point of view, would have shared that belief, (3) the defendant must actually have believed that the degree of force he used was necessary for defending himself . . . and (4) a reasonable person, viewing all the circumstances from the defendant’s point of view, also would have shared that belief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Matheney, 354 Conn. 212, 218, 350 A.3d 516 (2026). 22 “Under § 53a-19 (b), a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating . . . . The underlying policy of the duty to retreat is that the protection of human life has a higher place in the scheme of social values than the value that inheres in standing up to an aggression.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baez, 354 Conn. 564, 570, 354 A.3d 698 (2026).  State v. Fisher from looking at a photograph of the scene, that nothing prevented the defendant from driving in reverse. Pug- lielli, however, acknowledged that there was no barrier in front of the car while he conducted his testing, and he did not know whether the defendant’s car could clear the asphalt curb in the law office parking lot.23 At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the defen- dant guilty as charged. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of seven years of incarceration, execu- tion suspended after two and one-half years, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Prescott improperly failed to disclose to the parties, prior to presiding over the defendant’s criminal trial, that he had applied for the role of Inspector General, which is designated as a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney position within the Division of Criminal Justice. He argues that Judge Prescott’s application for a senior prosecutorial role within the Division of Criminal Justice—the same agency that comprised the state’s attorney’s office that prosecuted the defendant’s case—presented a situation in which Judge Prescott’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. We agree with the defendant. The following additional undisputed facts and pro- cedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. On April 29, 2025, after the jury had returned its verdict and prior to sentencing, Judge Prescott was appointed by the Criminal Justice Commis- sion to serve as Inspector General.24 As Inspector General, 23 Although the prosecutor pointed out that the front of the defendant’s car already had cleared the asphalt curbing in photographs from the scene, Puglielli acknowledged that he did not know whether the back area of the car, where the muffler was located, would clear the curb. 24 Judge Prescott presumably did not begin serving as Inspector General until July 1, 2025. See General Statutes § 51-277e (b) (“[t]he Inspector General shall serve a term of four years from July first in the year of the appointment”). Although the legislature has amended § 51-277e several times since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2026, No. 26-14, § 5; those  State v. Fisher Judge Prescott was tasked with, inter alia, investigating certain incidents in which police officers used physical force and determining whether to file criminal charges and prosecute matters in which the use of force was not justified, in accordance with General Statutes § 51-277a.25 Judge Prescott disclosed his appointment as Inspector General to the parties prior to considering the defen- dant’s postverdict motions,26 specifically, a motion to set aside the verdict filed on April 4, 2025, and a motion for a new trial filed on April 29, 2025. On May 16, 2025, at the hearing on the defendant’s postverdict motions, the following discussion took place on the record regarding Judge Prescott’s appointment: “The Court: We have a couple of substantive posttrial motions to adjudicate this morning. But, before we do that, I need to put something on the record. . . . Last week . . . counsel and I met via [Microsoft Teams]27 where I disclosed to the extent that counsel did not know, but I believe they already did know, that I had recently been appointed by the Criminal Justice Commission to the role amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute, which was in effect at the time that Judge Prescott applied for the position of Inspector General. 25 Although the legislature has amended § 51-277a several times since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2026, No. 26-14, § 3; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. Except as noted, all references in this opinion to § 51-277a are to the current revi- sion of the statute, which was in effect at the time that Judge Prescott applied for the position of Inspector General. See also General Statutes § 51-277e. A more comprehensive discussion of the Inspector General position is set forth subsequently in this opinion. 26 We believe that Judge Prescott properly disclosed his hiring at this hearing due to the position’s connection with the state. It is our opinion, however, that the same disclosure should have been made while the application was pending at the start of trial. 27 Microsoft Teams is “collaborative meeting [computer software] with video, audio, and screen sharing features.” Connecticut Judicial Branch, Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings for Attorneys and Self-Represented Parties (January 17, 2024), p. 5, available at https:// jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/ConnecticutGuideRemoteHearings.pdf (last visited August 19, 2026).  State v. Fisher of Deputy Chief State’s Attorney, the Inspector General. I felt that it was appropriate to notify counsel of my appointment by the Criminal Justice Commission and indicate that I would be interested in knowing their posi- tion regarding whether or not they think that I should be disqualified from this case, from further involvement in this case, or whether I should recuse myself. . . . I do not use those terms interchangeably. . . . “[A]nd I asked counsel to report back on their positions with respect to my further involvement in this case, which would involve both adjudicating these posttrial motions and, ultimately, conducting the sentencing pro- ceeding, which is scheduled for early June. Counsel and I met in chambers this morning, and [defense counsel] reported to me that he has met with his client, discussed these issues with his client, and that his client . . . believes that I should continue to preside over this matter. Is that accurate, [defense counsel]? “[Defense Counsel]: That is accurate, Your Honor. “The Court: And just let me put a couple other things on the record about that. As I said, I was appointed by the Criminal Justice Commission. I was not appointed by the Division of Criminal Justice. And, in fact, the Chief State’s Attorney, who is the [head] of the Division of Criminal Justice by statute, had no involvement in my selection as the Inspector General. And that’s because of the statutory independence that the Office of Inspector General has with respect to its regulatory mission. The office isn’t even allowed to be housed in the same building as other prosecutors, and it is only within the Division of Criminal Justice for administrative purposes. “So, I certainly don’t feel like . . . there would be a basis to disqualify me. I believe that . . . my impartiality cannot reasonably be called into question under these circumstances. But, having said all of that, I certainly wanted to know what the party’s position[s] were and [give] them an opportunity to discuss the issue with [the  State v. Fisher defendant]. So, [defendant], you’ve had those discussions with your counsel? “[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: All right. And . . . I don’t want to get into the substance of that because it’s attorney-client privi- leged. But is what I’ve just put on the record consistent with what you understood the facts to be? “[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And they informed me that you don’t have any concerns about me conducting the further proceedings in this case. Is that accurate? “[The Defendant]: . . . [Y]es, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And that means I will both adju- dicate these posttrial motions that your lawyers have filed, and I’ll conduct the sentencing later in June. Is that your understanding? “[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And, to the extent that your consent is necessary for me to do this, and I’m not saying it is, but to the extent that it is, you consent to me doing this? “[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: And you don’t have concerns about my impartiality at this point? “[The Defendant]: No, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And you’re not under the influence of anything today that would interfere with you exercis- ing good judgment? “[The Defendant]: I am under no influence . . . . “The Court: Okay. “[The Defendant]: . . . of anything, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And you’re making this decision voluntarily? “[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.