Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction ANTHONY GAROFALO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 48399) Seeley, Wilson and Harper, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judg- ment denying in part and dismissing in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly permit- ted Z, the prosecutor in the petitioner’s underlying criminal proceeding, to sit at the counsel table with counsel for the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for cer- tification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the issues he raised were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. It would not have been an abuse of discretion for the habeas court to have denied the petition for certification to appeal had the petitioner’s unpreserved and uncertified claim that Z was improperly permitted to sit at the counsel table during the habeas trial been included in the petition, as the record was inadequate to review that claim, and the inadequate record also undermined the petitioner’s reliance on the plain error doctrine and his invitation that this court exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to review the claim. Argued September 3—officially released November 3, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Streeto, J.; judgment denying in part and dismissing in part the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed. Samantha A. Conway, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Joy M. Drisdelle, special deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor,  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction state’s attorney, and Donna M. Fusco, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion HARPER, J. The petitioner, Anthony Garofalo, appeals following the denial of his petition for certifi- cation to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying in part and dismissing in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) improperly permitted the prosecutor in the underlying criminal proceeding, who was a fact witness at the habeas trial, to sit next to counsel for the respondent, the Commis- sioner of Correction, for an unspecified “dual purpose.” We dismiss the appeal. The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On March 24, 2015, the petitioner, represented by Attorney John D. Maxwell, pleaded guilty pursu- ant to the Alford doctrine1 to manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53-55 (a) (1) and tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155. These charges stemmed from an incident that occurred in July 2012. At that time, the petitioner reported that the victim, J,2 had left his 1 “Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless. . . . The entry of a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine carries the same consequences as a standard plea of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ortiz v. Commissioner of Correction, 239 Conn. App. 208, 215 n.9, 359 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 355 Conn. 926, ___ A.3d ___ (2026); see also Gusan v. Commissioner of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 429, 430 n.1, 332 A.3d 959, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 931, 334 A.3d 483 (2025). 2 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction residence and that he had not been able to contact her. During an interview with the police, the petitioner stated that he had argued with J on the evening of July 28, 2012. A search ensued, but J was not found for several months. On September 9, 2012, a person walking a dog discovered her body in a remote wooded area. The police arrested the petitioner on January 28, 2013. Under a plea agreement with the state, the petitioner, in exchange for his plea, would receive a sentence of no less than twenty years and no more than twenty-five years of incarcera- tion. After canvassing the petitioner, the trial court, Gold, J., accepted the plea and found him guilty of the two crimes charged. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 16, 2015. During this proceeding, the court heard from R,3 a hearing impaired woman who the petitioner “had violently victimized” on a prior occasion. At the time J disappeared, the petitioner was on parole for the offenses he had committed against R, which included kidnap- ping, sexual assault, and assault of a disabled person. The court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-five years of incarceration, the maximum term permitted under the plea agreement. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced the present habeas action as a self-represented individual. At some point thereafter, counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner. On August 31, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion to remove appointed counsel. At a hearing before the habeas court, Oliver, J., on October 28, 2020, the petitioner indicated that he was “going to proceed on [his] own.” After canvassing the petitioner, the court granted his request to proceed as a self-represented party. 3 See General Statutes § 54-86e (stating that name and other identifying information pertaining to victim of certain crimes shall be confidential); see also State v. Kahn, 355 Conn. 658, 688, ___ A.3d ___ (2026) (Ecker, J., dissenting) (§ 54-86e codifies default rule that names, addresses, and identifying information of victims of sexual assault shall be kept confidential, and its purpose is to protect such victims by reducing unnecessary harassment and embarrassment in court and by encourag- ing disclosure of sexual assaults).  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction Thereafter, on November 12, 2020, the petitioner filed the operative petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged ineffective assistance by his criminal trial coun- sel, Maxwell, and a claim of prosecutorial impropriety. As to the former, the petitioner claimed that Maxwell had provided deficient performance in his representa- tion that prejudiced the petitioner.4 As to the latter, the petitioner claimed that the trial prosecutor, Russell C. Zentner, “used a jailhouse informant, Mark Pascual, who has a history of making false statements, to obtain a guilty plea from the [petitioner].” He further alleged that Zentner “knowingly introduced perjured testimony at the sentencing phase of trial to enhance the length of sentence against the [petitioner]. . . . Zentner called wit- ness [R] who testified falsely at [the] sentencing hearing.” On December 7, 2020, the respondent filed a return to the operative habeas petition leaving the petitioner to his burden of proof as to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As to the petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety, the respondent asserted the defense of procedural default, claiming that (1) the petitioner did not raise such a claim in the trial court or on appeal, (2) he had not and could not show cause for failing to do so and (3) the petitioner was not prejudiced as a result of having failed to raise the claim of prosecutorial impro- priety earlier, even if cause were to exist. 4 The habeas court summarized the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: The petitioner alleged that Maxwell had “failed to conduct adequate pretrial investigation and discovery regard- ing Mark Pascual [a jailhouse informant]; he waived the petitioner’s probable cause hearing without consulting the petitioner; he failed to properly prepare a defense by retaining an expert to rebut the state’s cell phone location data and by failing to retain the services of a lock- smith; he failed to investigate alibi witnesses; he failed to file a Franks [v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978)] motion challenging alleged false statements in the arrest warrant; he failed to object to the ‘perjured testimony’ of [R] during sentencing; and he inadequately advised and coerced the petitioner to plead guilty, resulting in a plea that was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent. The petitioner averred that, if Maxwell had not performed deficiently, the petitioner would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have gone to trial.”  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction A trial commenced before the habeas court, Streeto, J., on October 15, 2024. At the outset of this proceeding, the prosecutor stated: “Good morning, Your Honor. Donna Fusco here on behalf of the respondent. I have Attorney . . . Zentner appearing to my right. He is a witness in this matter, but he is also a new member of the civil litigation bureau. So, I’d ask for permission for him to sit here [at counsel table] for both—for a dual purpose, Your Honor.” (Emphasis added.) The court responded that it had “no problem with that. It’s completely fine, so ordered.” The prosecutor also informed the court that R was present in the courtroom, along with a sign language interpreter. During the two day habeas trial, Zentner, Maxwell, and the petitioner testified. On November 14, 2024, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision. Citing to Finney v. Commissioner of Correction, 207 Conn. App. 133, 143, 261 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 339 Conn. 915, 262 A.3d 134 (2021), and Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 796–98, 189 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186 A.3d 707 (2018), the court reasoned that most of the allegations of inef- fective assistance against Maxwell had been waived due to the petitioner’s guilty plea. As to the allegation that Maxwell had coerced the petitioner to plead guilty, the court determined that the petitioner had not satisfied his burden to show that ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a constitutionally invalid plea and denied this claim as well. The court further concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that, “absent any alleged errors, the petitioner would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” In short, the court explained that “[a]ll claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been waived or fail on the merits. All such claims are, therefore, denied.” Additionally, the habeas court determined that the petitioner’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was proce- durally defaulted. Specifically, it stated that the inde- pendent constitutional claim involving prosecutorial impropriety should have been raised at trial or on appeal  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction but was not. Furthermore, the petitioner did not plead any facts in his habeas petition alleging good cause to excuse this procedural default. The court, therefore, dismissed this claim as procedurally defaulted. The peti- tioner subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the court, which the court denied on December 2, 2024. This appeal followed.5 On appeal, the petitioner first claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal from the denial and dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He next claims that the habeas court permitted Zentner, the prosecutor in the underly- ing criminal proceeding and a fact witness at the habeas trial, to sit with the respondent’s counsel and to act in a “dual purpose,” that is, as both a witness and an advocate during the habeas proceeding. Specifically, the petitioner argues that a general prohibition exists “against a state’s attorney acting as both attorney and witness in the same habeas corpus proceeding due to ethical restrictions” and cites to rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.6 5 The habeas court granted the petitioner’s request for the appoint- ment of appellate counsel. 6 Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, titled “Lawyer as Witness,” provides in relevant part: “(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: “(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; “(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or “(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client . . . .” In State v. Thompson, 20 Conn. App. 290, 567 A.2d 837 (1989), this court observed that rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct “codi- fies what is commonly called the advocate-witness rule, and many cases have considered the application of this rule to determine whether a client may seek testimony from his own lawyer at trial. The rule permits an attorney actively participating in the case to be a witness as to merely formal matters but discourages testimony as to other matters on behalf of his client except when essential to the ends of justice. . . . The rule does not render the attorney incompetent as a witness or disqualify him from testifying, although it may be a serious impropriety for him both to testify and to continue active participation in the case. . . . To have an advocate-witness, the party must demonstrate the necessity  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction Finally, the petitioner asserts that “[t]he habeas court very clearly erred by ordering that . . . Zentner could appear for [a] ‘dual purpose’ without at the very least canvassing the [self-represented] petitioner or clarify- ing what the dual purpose might be.” The petitioner did not raise this claim or make these arguments regarding Zentner at the habeas trial or in his petition for certifica- tion to appeal. He contends, nevertheless, that this claim is subject to review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), and to consideration by this court under the plain error doctrine. See Practice Book § 60-5. He also asserts that we should employ our supervisory authority over the administration of justice to review this unpreserved claim. The respondent counters that the petitioner cannot meet the threshold burden of demonstrating that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, inter alia, due to an inadequate record. Specifically, he asserts that an adequate record is necessary for this court to engage in Golding review, to determine if the actions of the habeas court amounted to plain error, or to exercise our supervisory authority. In the absence of an adequate record, the respondent contends that we cannot determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. We agree with respondent, and, accordingly, dismiss the petitioner’s appeal. As an initial matter, we set forth the standard of review and procedural requirements that a petitioner must meet to obtain appellate review following a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal. “General Statutes § 52-470 (g) provides: No appeal from the judg- ment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought for the testimony, such as an emergency the likelihood of which could not reasonably have been anticipated in time for [the attorney] to with- draw from the case before trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 294–95; see also Ullman v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 716 n.13, 647 A.2d 324 (1994).  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person’s release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies. “In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that . . . § 52-470 [g] prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. In Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), [our Supreme Court] incorporated the factors adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), as the appropriate standard for determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to dem- onstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . A petitioner who establishes an abuse of discretion through one of the factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, 237 Conn. App. 372, 379–80, 352 A.3d 654 (2026); see also Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 234, 242, 314 A.3d 1052, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 922, 321 A.3d 1130 (2024). In Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 297 A.3d 541 (2023), our Supreme Court “held that § 52-470 (g) does not restrict [a reviewing court’s]  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction authority to review unpreserved claims under the plain error doctrine or Golding following a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal, so long as the appellant’s claims challenge the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceeding itself and the appel- lant fulfills his or her burden of establishing that the unpreserved claims involve issues that are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . In other words, the appellant must demonstrate that the unpreserved and uncertified claims are nonfrivolous, which we define as raising a colorable claim of plain error or the violation of a constitutional right due to the actions or omissions of the habeas court. Only if the appellant succeeds in surmounting that hurdle will the appellate court review the appellant’s unpreserved claims on the merits. . . . [S]ee also Bosque v. Commissioner of Cor- rection, 347 Conn. 377, 379, 297 A.3d 981 (2023) . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Commis- sioner of Correction, supra, 237 Conn. App. 383–84; see also Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 23, 33–35, 347 A.3d 984 (2025), cert. granted, 354 Conn. 911, 350 A.3d 1141 (2026); Daniel W. E. v. Com- missioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 124, 133–34, 344 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 930, 346 A.3d 515 (2025); Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 241. Our Supreme Court has explained that, in a situa- tion in which the issue raised in a habeas appeal was not included in the petition for certification, “[t]he more accurate inquiry . . . is whether it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny the petition for certification to appeal if the unpreserved issue had been included in the petition for certification.” (Emphasis in original.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 358 n.13; see also Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction,  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction supra, 237 Conn. App. 384 n.8; Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 242–43. Because the petitioner’s claim concerns the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceeding itself, we may consider under Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 335, whether the court would have abused its discretion in denying certification had the issue been included in the petition for certification to appeal. The claim was not included in the petition for certification but was also not preserved at the habeas trial, and, thus, the petitioner seeks review under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. “In Golding, our Supreme Court held that a [petitioner] can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola- tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the [petitioner] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the [respondent] has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the [petitioner’s] claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the [petitioner’s] claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances. . . . [T]o obtain Golding review, the petitioner must present a record that is [adequate] for review and affirmatively [demonstrate] that his claim is indeed a violation of a fundamental constitutional right.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 237 Conn. App. 385. It is well estab- lished that “[t]he first two [prongs of Golding] involve a determination of whether the claim is reviewable . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 816, 838, 346 A.3d 1011, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 935, 347 A.3d 877 (2025); see also Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction, 230  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction Conn. App. 741, 771, 331 A.3d 739, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 926, 333 A.3d 1109 (2025). Our Supreme Court has espoused “the fundamental point that [i]t is incumbent upon the [petitioner] to take the necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing an adequate record for appellate review. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision made by us respecting [the petitioner’s claims] would be entirely speculative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 63, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007); see also State v. Dukes, 239 Conn. App. 572, 596, 360 A.3d 1191, cert. denied, 355 Conn. 927, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). In this court’s decision in Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 234, we stated: “With respect to the reviewability prong of Golding . . . [t]he [petitioner] bears the responsibility for providing a record that is adequate for review of his claim of constitu- tional error. If the facts revealed by the record are insuffi- cient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we will not attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or to make factual determi- nations, in order to decide the defendant’s claim. . . . [I]t is axiomatic that this court will not resort to spec- ulation and conjecture in avoidance of an inadequate record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 249. We further reasoned that, “[i]n the absence of a sufficient record, there is no way to know whether a violation of constitutional magnitude in fact has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 251. The respondent contends that, because the record is inadequate to determine the meaning of Fusco’s “dual purpose” request and the factual predicate of whether Zentner acted as counsel for the respondent in the pres- ent matter, this court cannot proceed under Golding to  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction determine if the denial of certification to appeal would have been an abuse of discretion had such a claim been included in the petition for certification. First, the respondent correctly argues that the request for Zent- ner to sit next to Fusco for a “dual purpose” due to his status as a “new member to the civil litigation bureau” is ambiguous. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, the respondent disagrees with the petitioner’s contention that the only reasonable inference that could follow from that request would be to allow Zentner to act as cocounsel during the habeas trial. The respondent proffers that “it is equally plausible that Zentner was seated at counsel table simply to observe how the habeas court conducts its proceedings in a case he already knew well, as part of his training for his new role . . . .” The respondent also accu- rately points out that Zentner did not file an appearance in this habeas action in accordance with Practice Book §§ 3-3 and 3-8, and the record reveals that only Fusco is listed as counsel for the respondent. Moreover, Zentner did not receive any of the notices required to be given by the parties. See Practice Book § 3-7 (b). Additionally, a review of the trial transcript establishes Zentner’s presence only on the first day of the habeas trial, when he testified as a fact witness, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was present on the second day of the habeas trial, when R sat at the counsel table with Fusco. Finally, nothing in the record supports the claim that Zentner acted as an advocate representing the respondent during the proceedings. In sum, we cannot conclude that the record supports the assertion that Zentner acted as cocounsel for the respondent in this matter without engaging in speculation. In the present case, the inadequacy of the record pre- vents this court from considering whether a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights occurred as a result of the habeas court’s acquiescence to Zentner’s sitting at the counsel table for a “dual purpose” at the outset of the trial. See, e.g., Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 254. Simply stated, the record does not establish that Zentner did anything  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction other than testify as a fact witness at the habeas trial. In accordance with our settled law, we decline to speculate or assume any facts regarding his “dual purpose” and his role, if any, as an advocate for the respondent in the present matter. The petitioner next seeks relief under the plain error doctrine. “[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. . . . It is axiomatic that . . . [t]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. . . . Put another way, plain error review is reserved for only the most egregious errors. When an error of such mag- nitude exists, it necessitates reversal. . . . [I]t is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate that his position is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error review must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal. . . . “An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily discernable on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . Although a complete record and an obvious error are prerequisites for plain error review, they are not, of themselves, sufficient for its application. . . . [I]n addition to examining the patent nature of the error, the reviewing court must examine that error for the grievousness of its consequences in order to determine whether reversal under the plain error doctrine is appropriate. . . . Thus, we employ a two-pronged test to determine whether plain error has occurred: the defendant must establish that (1) there was an obvious and readily discernable error, and (2) that error was so harmful or prejudicial that it resulted in manifest injustice.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added;  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 445–46, 307 A.3d 249 (2024); see also Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 236 Conn. App. 35. In Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 234, we recognized that an adequate record is necessary for an appellate court to consider a claim made under the plain error doctrine. Id., 250. We specifically cited to Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 69 n.3, 967 A.2d 41 (2009), and State v. Cane, 193 Conn. App. 95, 120 n.23, 218 A.3d 1073, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019), both of which stated that, if the record is inadequate to engage in Golding review, it also is inadequate for consideration under the plain error doctrine. See Banks v. Commissioner of Cor- rection, supra, 250. Given our conclusion that the record is not adequate to consider the petitioner’s claim under Golding, his claim of plain error fails for the same reason. Finally, the petitioner contends that we may afford him relief by exercising our supervisory authority. This court has stated: “It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . Under our supervi- sory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process. . . . The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephanie U., 206 Conn. App. 754, 786, 261 A.3d 748 (2021), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 903, 272 A.3d 1126 (2022), and cert. denied, 343 Conn. 904, 272 A.3d 1127 (2022). Our Supreme Court has cautioned that, “[a]lthough [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent super- visory authority over the administration of justice . . .  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction [that] authority . . . is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . Our supervisory pow- ers are not a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal. . . . Constitutional, statutory and procedural limitations are generally adequate to protect the rights of the [litigant] and the integrity of the judicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare cir- cumstance [in which] these traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Keaton, 355 Conn. 220, 233–34, 363 A.3d 559 (2026). In Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 236 Conn. App. 23, we recognized that our Supreme Court in Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 335, did not address whether a reviewing court may utilize this doctrine to consider claims not included in a petition for certification to appeal in the habeas con- text. Nevertheless, we indicated that “we have rejected any arbitrary and categorical limitations on our use of our supervisory authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 37. This court then assumed “that we may exercise our supervisory authority in these circumstances . . . .” Id. Our Supreme Court has stated that an adequate record is one of the criteria that must be met before an appellate court will consider invoking its supervisory authority. See In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 725, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022); see also State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 687, 224 A.3d 129 (2020) (Supreme Court was not “inclined” to reverse defendant’s conviction under supervisory author- ity in absence of adequate record); Brehm v. Brehm, 65 Conn. App. 698, 707, 783 A.2d 1068 (2001) (Landau, J., concurring) (“[w]here . . . appellant fails to follow the most basic rules established to guarantee the presenta- tion of an adequate record, this court should not exercise its supervisory authority to afford the appellant review of his claim”). For the reasons previously set forth in this opinion, the record is insufficient for this court to exercise our supervisory authority to consider whether  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 296 Conn. 397, 414, 994 A.2d 1248 (2010). We conclude that the inadequacy of the record prevents this court from reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s claim and related arguments under Golding. The inad- equate record undermines the petitioner’s reliance on the plain error doctrine and his invitation that we exercise our supervisory authority over the administration of jus- tice.7 As a result, pursuant to the framework set forth in 7 The respondent also argues that, even if the record were adequate to support the argument that Zentner acted as cocounsel during the habeas trial, the petitioner has failed to adequately brief his entitlement to relief under Golding, the plain error doctrine, and our supervisory authority over the administration of justice. Specifically, the respondent contends: “Although the petitioner’s brief contains a general cursory statement for each ground, the petitioner does not meaningfully assert, much less adequately brief, any claim that the ‘habeas court’s actions violated the petitioner’s state and federal constitutional rights to due process, habeas corpus, and access to the court,’ nor that the issue ‘deserves encouragement to proceed further.’ ” After a careful review of the petitioner’s principal appellate brief, we agree that he has inadequately briefed the issues of whether his unpreserved claim should be considered and addressed under Golding, the plain error doctrine, or our supervisory authority. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discus- sion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Balbuena v. Commissioner of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 289, 306–307, 332 A.3d 1008, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 905, 335 A.3d 845 (2025); accord State v. Danielle P., 238 Conn. App. 73, 93, 355 A.3d 69 (2026); see, e.g., State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 129 n.9, 335 A.3d 848 (declin- ing to review inadequately briefed claim for review under supervisory authority), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025); State v. Williams, 202 Conn. App. 355, 383 n.22, 245 A.3d 830 (aside from cursory reference to Golding, defendant failed to engage in analysis of four prongs of Golding test and, therefore, on basis of inadequate briefing, such claim was deemed abandoned), cert. denied, 336 Conn.  Garofalo v. Commissioner of Correction Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 335, we further conclude that the petitioner’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, does not “involve issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, could be resolved in a different manner, or deserve encourage- ment to proceed further.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 254. Accordingly, it would not have been an abuse of discretion by the habeas court to deny the petition for certification to appeal had the unpreserved issue been included therein. See id. The appeal is dismissed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 917, 245 A.3d 802 (2021); State v. Brown, 182 Conn. App. 112, 122 n.8, 189 A.3d 127 (defendant inadequately briefed claim of plain error, which provided additional reason to affirm judgment of trial court), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 913, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018).