Full Opinion

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney SACHEM CAPITAL CORP. v. GERALD J. YONEY ET AL. (AC 47614) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.* Syllabus The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the substitute plaintiff. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion to open the default judgment. Held: This court could provide no practical relief to the defendants, as, due to intervening circumstances, a controversy between the parties no longer existed; accordingly, this court dismissed the defendants’ appeal as moot. Argued April 16, 2025—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Summary process action, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Session at Bridgeport, where the court, Spader, J., granted the motion to substitute Bros, Mgmt., LLC, as the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Cirello, J., granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of default and rendered judgment of possession for the substitute plaintiff; sub- sequently, the court, Cirello, J., denied the defendants’ motions to open the default judgment, from which the defendants appealed to this court; thereafter, the appeal was withdrawn as to the named defendant. Appeal dis- missed. Joseph L. Rini, for the appellants (defendants Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney) Christopher J. Picard, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff). Opinion ELGO, J. In this summary process action, the defen- dants Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their respective * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney motions to open a default judgment rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Bros, Mgmt., LLC.1 We conclude that the defendants’ appeal is moot due to intervening circumstances and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. The relevant facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff com- menced this summary process action in November 2019. The action was held in abeyance for several years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which temporarily stayed all executions on evictions and ejectments, as well as Gerald J. Yoney’s chapter 13 bankruptcy protection filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Con- necticut, which invoked an automatic bankruptcy stay. On March 9, 2023, the substitute plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment against the defendants due to their failure to appear. On March 15, 2023, the court granted that motion and rendered judgment of possession for the substitute plaintiff. The defendants thereafter filed separate motions to open that default judgment. The court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to open on April 29, 2024. It subsequently denied their respective motions to open, and this appeal followed. After oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action as to the defendants. On February 17, 2026, the parties filed a joint motion for an extension of time to comply with that directive, in which they stated: “The parties represent [that] this matter is incorporated into an arbitration arising out of [Yoney Realty Corp. v. Sachem Capital Corp., Superior 1 Gerald J. Yoney also was named as a defendant in this action. Although he initially joined Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney in this appeal, he was removed as a party by order of this court on June 20, 2024. For clarity, we refer to Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney as the defen- dants and Gerald J. Yoney by name in this opinion. In addition, we note that, although Sachem Capital Corp. commenced this summary process action, Bros, Mgmt., LLC, was substituted as the plaintiff in July 2022. We therefore refer to Sachem Capital Corp. as the plaintiff and Bros, Mgmt., LLC, as the substitute plaintiff in this opinion. Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-20- 6099254-S].” In addition, the parties averred in relevant part: “[Subsequent to oral argument before the Appellate Court] the parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration is scheduled to occur . . . beginning on March 4, 2026, and set to conclude on March 6, 2026. Depending on the outcome of the arbitration, this [appeal] will either be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.” This court granted that extension request. On March 31, 2026, the parties filed a second motion for an extension of time. In that filing, the parties again represented in relevant part: “[T]he parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration commenced [in March 2026] and has been continued to April 2026. Depending on the outcome of the arbitration, this matter will either be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.” This court granted that second extension request. On June 18, 2026, the parties filed a third motion for an extension of time, averring in relevant part: “[T]he parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorpo- rate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration commenced [in March 2026] and is now in the briefing stages. The outcome of the arbitration directly affects this appeal as to whether this matter will be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.” This court once again granted that extension request. On August 6, 2026, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing “whether this court can provide the parties any practical relief or whether the appeal must be dismissed as moot in light of the parties’ joint representation to this court, as averred in three motions for extension, that the parties have ‘entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorpo- rate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney [appeal]’ and that, ‘[d]epending on the outcome of the arbitration, this [appeal] will either be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.’ ” The defendants filed a supplemental brief in accordance with that order on September 11, 2026. In that brief, the defendants averred in relevant part that “[t]he arbitra- tion agreement referenced in the motions for extensions of time . . . provides that the outcome of the arbitration decision will determine, in part relative to this action, whether the eviction of [the defendants] will proceed without any interference of the parties to the summary process action. The arbitration agreement further pro- vides [that the substitute plaintiff] shall not proceed with any efforts to remove [the defendants] from pos- session of the subject property by virtue of an execution or otherwise. . . . The arbitration agreement was entered into after the argument of the appeal in this matter . . . and expressly provides that, after the Appellate Court would render its decision, the summary process action would be stayed until the decision was rendered in the arbitration.” With respect to the mootness issue raised in this court’s August 6, 2026 supplemental brief order, the defendants stated in relevant part: “As a decision of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court or a decision sustaining the appeal will not control the ultimate ques- tion of whether an eviction will take place, the Appellate Court cannot give any practical relief and the Appellate Court can dismiss the appeal as moot . . . .”2 It is well established that “[m]ootness presents a legal question and implicates this court's subject matter juris- diction, a threshold matter to resolve. . . . This court has a duty to dismiss cases over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties.” (Citation omitted.) Gladstein v. Goldfield, 325 Conn. 418, 424, 159 A.3d 661 (2017). “[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be 2 The substitute plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief with this court. Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9, 20, 312 A.3d 1040 (2024). Our review of the question of mootness is plenary. See State v. Rodriguez, 320 Conn. 694, 699, 132 A.3d 731 (2016). “Because courts are established to resolve actual con- troversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justi- ciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by the judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a success- ful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 754–55, 183 A.3d 611 (2018). “Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its sig- nificance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties. . . . A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 88 Conn. App. 523, 529, 871 A.2d 380 (2005), aff'd, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 966 (2007). That is the case here. During the pendency of this appeal, the parties entered into binding arbitration to resolve several cases, including the one giving rise to this appeal. As a result of that arbitration, this appeal ultimately will “either be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants,” as the parties repeatedly averred in motions they jointly Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney filed with this court. Moreover, the defendants affir- matively represented to this court in their September 11, 2026 supplemental brief that the arbitration agree- ment between the parties “expressly provides that [if] the Appellate Court [issues] its decision [in the present appeal], the summary process action would be stayed until the decision was rendered in the arbitration.” For that reason, the defendants concede that this court can- not provide them with any practical relief. In light of those intervening circumstances, we con- clude that the present appeal has become moot, as this court can provide no practical relief to the defendants. See Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242, 255, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009) (“[a] case is considered moot if an appellate court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal. The appeal is dismissed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.