Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction EUGENE EDWARDS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 47821) Suarez, Clark and Westbrook, Js.* Syllabus The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of various crimes in con- nection with a robbery, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his habeas petition. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his trial counsel, E, did not render ineffective assistance. Held: The habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to the petitioner’s claims that E rendered ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented at trial and in failing to adequately investigate whether there were vehicles in the area of the robbery, other than the petitioner’s vehicle, that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle, as the petitioner failed to prove that E performed deficiently or that E’s allegedly deficient performance resulted in any prejudice to the defense. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining, on relevancy grounds, the objection of counsel for the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, to the petitioner’s testimony concerning his knowledge of finger- print evidence at the time that he rejected a plea offer, as the claim was not raised in the petitioner’s amended habeas petition, and the petitioner did not argue before the habeas court, or on appeal, that his proffered testimony was relevant to his claim that E had failed to conduct an adequate investigation. Argued April 20—officially released September 8, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. J. Patten Brown III, for the appellant (petitioner). Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Wal- cott, state’s attorney, and Susan M. Campbell, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction Opinion CLARK, J. The petitioner, Eugene Edwards, appeals, following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ for habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that his trial counsel, Christopher Eddy,1 did not render ineffective assistance, and (2) precluded him from testifying regarding “plea negotiations and an undisclosed fingerprint report.” We affirm the judgment of the habeas court. The following facts, as set forth by our Supreme Court in its decision on the petitioner’s direct appeal, are rel- evant to our disposition of the present appeal. “On June 22, 2012, the victim, Lieslotte Worysz, went grocery shopping at a Stop and Shop grocery store in Rocky Hill. After completing her shopping, she returned to her home in Wethersfield. While driving home, the victim noticed a motor vehicle driving behind her. The victim testified that the vehicle was a Chrysler 300 and that she was able to identify its make and model because she and her husband previously owned Chryslers and ‘were into cars.’ The victim further stated that the vehicle was ‘fairly new’ and a ‘light color,’ explaining as follows: ‘[It] follow[ed] me [at] a distance . . . and I admired [it]. I figured gee, the grill, everything is beautiful. I like it.’ “Upon returning home, the victim used a remote to open the door to her attached garage and parked her vehicle inside. The victim noticed that the vehicle that had been following her home was parked behind her in the driveway. As the victim was about to exit her vehicle, the [petitioner], who was the driver of the vehicle that had followed her, approached her in the garage, held a black gun to her stomach and demanded money. The victim said to the [petitioner], ‘why are you doing this to me? I didn’t do nothing to you,’ and tried to exit her 1 Although the petitioner was also represented by Damian Tucker at his criminal trial, the petitioner’s claims relate only to Eddy’s perfor- mance at trial.  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction vehicle, but the [petitioner] pushed her back down into the driver’s seat and said, ‘[Y]ou shut up. If you’re going to scream. I’m going to hurt you. I’m going to shoot you.’ The [petitioner] then took the victim’s remote and closed the garage door with both of them inside. The [petitioner] grabbed the victim’s pocketbook and took the money that was inside. He also took the victim’s diamond ring, wed- ding band, watch, and keys. Afterward, the [petitioner] opened the garage, threw the victim’s keys and remote on the driveway, and left the scene. The victim picked up the items that the [petitioner] had discarded, went into her house, and called the police. “When the police arrived, they took several photo- graphs of the scene. The victim told [the] police about the Chrysler 300 and provided a description of the driver, but she could not identify him in a photographic array. Detectives Christopher Morris and James Darby of the Wethersfield Police Department processed the scene and the victim’s belongings for fingerprints and DNA analysis. They obtained several latent fingerprints from the driver’s door of the victim’s vehicle and swabbed the victim’s vehicle, remote, and wallet for DNA analysis. “Darby processed the driver’s side of the victim’s vehi- cle for fingerprints because the victim ‘had reported that as she was exiting [her vehicle], she was robbed and made by the suspect to sit back down inside [her vehicle].’ Darby took six ‘hinge lifters’ and marked the locations for each lift. Morris sent the lifts to the Hartford Police Depart- ment, which found no matches. Morris then took the lifts to the state forensic laboratory. John Brunetti from the state forensic laboratory testified regarding his analysis of two latent partial prints obtained from the victim’s vehicle. He concluded that they matched, respectively, the [petitioner’s] left middle and index fingers. “Thereafter, Morris went to the grocery store where the victim had been shopping and obtained the security video from the parking lot. Upon reviewing the video, Morris noted a white vehicle following the victim out of the parking lot. Upon further review of the video, Morris  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction and the other officers noted several characteristics about that vehicle, namely, a black scuff mark on the rear bumper, an E-ZPass or some other form of transponder device on the front windshield, and a third brake light in the center of the vehicle’s trunk that did not appear to be functioning properly. The vehicle had a Connecti- cut license plate on the front bumper, but officers were unable to obtain the plate number from the security video. Morris later showed the video to employees of a Chrysler dealership, who confirmed that the vehicle in the video was a Chrysler 300. “On June 25, 2012, Morris shared information about the case with other police departments and the media in order to obtain investigative leads from members of the public. The report released by the media described the perpetrator of the crime as a [B]lack male between thirty and forty years old, approximately five feet ten inches to six feet tall, medium build and short black hair. The report also described the vehicle allegedly used in the robbery, including that it may have had an E-ZPass or other form of transponder device on the front windshield. “The New Britain Police Department provided Morris with information on three white Chrysler 300 vehicles that had some contact with the police, including one that belonged to the [petitioner]. On June 25 [2012], the same day that the media released information about the robbery, Morris drove to the [petitioner’s] address in New Britain and photographed his white Chrysler 300. Morris noticed that the [petitioner’s] vehicle had a black scuff mark on its rear bumper, which was consistent with the mark on the vehicle in the surveillance video. Morris then ran the vehicle’s plate number through the license plate reader database and discovered that the Newington police had photographed the [petitioner’s] front license plate on June 1, 2012. Morris also discov- ered that the [petitioner’s] father, Eugene Edwards, Sr., had an E-ZPass account and that the transponders can easily be transferred between vehicles.  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction “On June 27, 2012, two days after the media released the report of the robbery, Morris asked Officer Ronald Floyd of the Wethersfield Police Department to conduct further surveillance on the [petitioner’s] vehicle. Floyd drove to the [petitioner’s] house in New Britain and took several photographs of the [petitioner’s] vehicle, which was parked approximately 200 yards from the house in a school parking lot. Floyd’s photograph of the front of the [petitioner’s] vehicle showed that it no longer had a front license plate and that material from the front bum- per where the license plate screws had been placed was protruding, which indicated that the plate had recently been removed. Floyd observed two vertical marks on the front windshield, just below the rearview mirror, which were consistent with leftover adhesive from an E-ZPass or other similar transponder device. In Floyd’s photograph, there was a New York Giants bumper sticker on the rear bumper, which was not in the photograph of the [petitioner’s] vehicle taken two days earlier. In addition, the photograph taken by Floyd showed that white paint had been applied to the black scuff mark on the rear bumper. “On June 28, 2012, officers drove to the [petitioner’s] home in New Britain to execute a search warrant. Inside the [petitioner’s] house, the officers found the front license plate to the [petitioner’s] Chrysler 300, which had been hidden underneath the seat cushion of a sofa. The officers also discovered a black handheld BB gun in a bedroom closet. “The [petitioner] remained outside while the police searched his home. The [petitioner] also volunteered information about his vehicle to Detective Michael Pat- koske of the Wethersfield Police Department. The [peti- tioner] said that the scratches on his rear bumper had been there since he had purchased the vehicle, that the New York Giants bumper sticker had been on his rear bumper since 2011, and that he never had an E-ZPass account. The [petitioner] also told Patkoske that his front license plate was under the couch and that it had been  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction knocked off the car as a result of a motor vehicle accident in New York in 2011. The officers did not, however, observe any damage to the front of the [petitioner’s] car or on the license plate found in the home. The police seized the [petitioner’s] vehicle as evidence, and, after further inspection, they determined that the third brake light on the vehicle was functioning properly. The [petitioner’s] nephew, Justin Collins, testified that the [petitioner] had told Collins to tell the police that the BB gun was his if the police asked. “On July 3, 2012, Patkoske called the [petitioner] and asked him if he would be willing to speak with him about his vehicle and his whereabouts in June, 2012. Although they had not discussed the dates of the [robbery] . . . the [petitioner] told Patkoske ‘I wasn’t even here . . . when all that stuff was going on, whenever that happened.’ He said that he was in North Carolina from June 19 to June 22 for his aunt’s funeral and that he was with his girlfriend, Caryn Prince, in Virginia from June 1 to June 9, but he was not confident of the dates. The [petitioner] gave Prince’s cell phone number to Patkoske and told him to check with her on the dates of the Virginia trip. Patkoske then called Prince twice on that same day to confirm the [petitioner’s] whereabouts. In between those two telephone calls, the [petitioner] called Prince and told her that the police ‘were trying to frame him’ and that, if the police called her, she should say that ‘he was with [her].’ Prince told Patkoske that she was with the [petitioner] in Virginia in May, not in June. Patkoske later learned that the [petitioner] was in Connecticut on June 22, 2012, because he had obtained a receipt from a retail store showing that the [petitioner] had transacted business in Connecticut on that date. “On September 19, 2012, the [petitioner] appeared at the Wethersfield police station and was placed under arrest. The [petitioner] maintained that he was not the perpetrator of the robberies, and he told Morris that he had ‘the wrong tall, thin [B]lack male,’ and that ‘no one picked him out of a lineup . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted.)  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 101–106, 156 A.3d 506 (2017). The petitioner was subsequently charged with and, following a five day jury trial, convicted of home inva- sion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a- 123 (a) (3), and assault of an elderly person in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61a (a) (1).2 Id., 106. The petitioner was represented at trial by Eddy and Damian Tucker. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id., 101. Thereafter, the peti- tioner initiated the present habeas action. On July 11, 2022, the petitioner filed the operative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the amended petition, the petitioner alleged that Eddy provided ineffective assistance in failing (1) to adequately investigate and challenge the fingerprint and DNA evidence presented against the petitioner at trial, and (2) to adequately investigate whether vehicles other than the petitioner’s matched the description of the vehicle used in the crimes for which he was convicted.3 The respondent, the Com- missioner of Correction, filed a response on July 22, 2022, leaving the petitioner to his proof. The habeas court, Wagner, J., conducted a trial on October 4, 2023, 2 In a case arising out of a separate incident that occurred in Berlin, the petitioner was also charged with home invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2), robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (2) and larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-123 (a) (3). State v. Edwards, supra, 325 Conn. 101 n.1. The state filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, which the trial court granted. Accordingly, “[t]he trial court consolidated the two cases for trial. After trial, the jury acquitted the [petitioner] of all charges arising out of the incident in Berlin.” Id. 3 In count three of the amended petition, the petitioner also alleged that Eddy was ineffective for failing to challenge the joinder of the case underlying the present habeas case with the case arising from the Berlin incident. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The petitioner withdrew this claim at the habeas trial and, thus, it is not relevant to this appeal.  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction at which the petitioner’s counsel called Eddy, Tucker, Attorney Brian Carlow, the petitioner’s expert witness, and the petitioner as witnesses. The petitioner submitted the underlying criminal transcripts into evidence. The parties also filed posttrial briefs. On May 20, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas cor- pus. With regard to both of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove his claims because he failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. Thereafter, the court granted the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying the petitioner’s habeas peti- tion. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The petitioner first claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that Eddy did not render ineffec- tive assistance for having failed (1) to adequately inves- tigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented against the petitioner at trial and (2) to adequately investigate a list of other vehicles that Eddy received during discovery that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. Before analyzing the petitioner’s claims, we set forth the applicable law and the standard of review governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. “The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review. . . . “Furthermore, it is well established that [a] criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. . . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Wash- ington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordi- nary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . In addition, in order to demon- strate that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, the petitioner must establish that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 313 Conn. 360, 375–76, 98 A.3d 23 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Semple, 574 U.S. 1176, 135 S. Ct. 1453, 191 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2015). “A court can find against a petitioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brian S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 172 Conn. App. 535, 539, 160 A.3d 1110, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 904, 163 A.3d 1204 (2017). “With respect to the performance prong of Strickland, we are mindful that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s per- formance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omis- sion of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inher- ent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchal- lengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 540. “In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the ques- tion is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s per- formance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently. . . . Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably likely the result would have been different. . . . This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions more likely than not altered the out- come, but the difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case. . . . The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceiv- able.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 313 Conn. 376. A We first address the petitioner’s claim that the court improperly concluded that Eddy did not render inef- fective assistance in failing to adequately investigate  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction and challenge the DNA evidence presented against the petitioner.4 The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the petitioner’s claim. At the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial, the prosecutor presented testi- mony from Daniel Renstrom, a forensic science examiner in the DNA division of the state forensic laboratory, relating to DNA testing conducted on samples collected from the victim’s garage door opener and wallet. Ren- strom testified on direct examination that he performed DNA testing on the samples collected from the crime scene and then prepared reports of his findings. Specifi- cally, he testified that he was able to develop DNA profiles from the samples collected from the garage opener and wallet and compared those profiles against the known DNA profile of the petitioner, and that the petitioner was eliminated as a contributor to the DNA profiles developed from the samples collected from the crime scene. On cross-examination by Eddy, Renstrom testified that the sample collected from the garage door opener was a mixture of DNA, meaning there were “two or more persons’ DNA included in [the] sample,” and that the petitioner was eliminated as a contributor to that mixture. Renstrom further testified that the petitioner was eliminated as a contributor to the DNA sample col- lected from the victim’s wallet. He then clarified that 4 In the heading of a separate section of his principal appellate brief, the petitioner also asserts that Eddy provided ineffective assistance in failing to “meaningfully investigate and challenge the DNA and fingerprint evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Neither the body of the peti- tioner’s principal brief nor his reply brief, however, addresses any claim regarding Eddy’s investigation of the fingerprint evidence. As a result, to the extent the petitioner intended to pursue a claim that Eddy was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and counter the fingerprint evidence presented by the state at trial, we deem such a claim to be abandoned. “We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558, 706 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829 (1998).  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction “[t]he elimination statement means that their DNA is not present or it’s not present to a detectable level for our testing.” Ultimately, the results of the state forensic laboratory’s analysis were that the DNA sample from the garage door opener was a mixture and that the DNA samples from the opener and the wallet “lacked detec- tion of a Y chromosome,” which means that they did not contain male DNA, “thereby excluding the petitioner as a source of the DNA.” Thus, there was no DNA evidence presented at trial connecting the petitioner to the crime scene. The defense did not present an independent DNA expert at the underlying criminal trial. During the habeas trial, both Eddy and Tucker testi- fied. Eddy testified that, in preparation for the trial, he retained a DNA expert, William Wallace, who “went to the Connecticut state lab, and . . . observed the testing to ensure the . . . accuracy of the [DNA] sample.” He testi- fied that Wallace’s findings were that the DNA that the state was able to obtain from the crime scene “was only female DNA” and “exclude[d] male DNA . . . .” When asked whether Wallace presented this evidence at trial, Eddy testified that “the report that was authored by the Connecticut state lab” also “excluded [the petitioner] from his DNA being on the item seized relative to the Wethersfield case” and that the fact that the petitioner was excluded “was helpful to us.” Accordingly, Eddy tes- tified that he did not present an independent DNA expert. Instead, he elected to cross-examine and elicit testimony from Renstrom that the petitioner was excluded as a contributor to the DNA collected from the crime scene. At the habeas trial, Tucker testified that he did not consult with a DNA expert for the petitioner’s case, as he was brought on right before trial, and that most of the “investigation was done prior to [him] coming on since the case had been pending for quite some time.” He fur- ther testified that, if a DNA expert had been consulted, it is possible that he might not have been aware of that. The petitioner also presented expert testimony from Carlow, a criminal defense attorney with a private  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction practice specializing in postconviction work who previ- ously served as a public defender for the state of Con- necticut for twenty-one years and then as Deputy Chief Public Defender for eleven years. Carlow was called to testify “on how . . . trial [counsel] failed to properly utilize the DNA evidence and failed to adequately cross-examine the state’s DNA expert.” Carlow testified that he had reviewed the records in this case, including the reports relating to the DNA evidence. His testimony focused on how DNA testing can establish whether a contributor to a DNA sample is male or female. He then testified that he would not rely on the conclusions of the state’s expert witness that the DNA samples collected from the crime scene did not contain male DNA because it is possible for evidentiary samples to degrade and “[t]here is a lot of support in [the state’s] results, which support that the Y chromosome very easily could have dropped out and, therefore, would not be detectible.” He further testi- fied that it is possible for male DNA to be present in an evidentiary sample even if DNA testing does not detect a Y chromosome. Thus, he testified that the DNA report prepared by Renstrom “does not exclude the possibility that there was a male contributor to the DNA sample[s].” In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court con- cluded that the petitioner failed to prove that Eddy ren- dered ineffective assistance in connection with the DNA evidence. The court found that Eddy retained Wallace as a DNA expert and that Wallace “analyzed the evidence and confirmed the state lab’s findings that the sample did not contain male DNA. Defense counsel used this information in conjunction with the state lab’s findings to support the petitioner’s defense at trial.” The court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove how Eddy’s performance in that regard was objectively unreasonable. The court further concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by Eddy’s decisions not to conduct additional investigation or to call an independent DNA expert because “[t]he petitioner did not present testimony from . . . [a] DNA [expert] that would have effectively countered the state’s evidence at trial . . .  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction [and, therefore] has failed to make a showing as to how this evidence would have been helpful in his defense.” “The right to the effective assistance of counsel applies no less to the investigative stage of a criminal case than it does to the trial phase.” Skakel v. Commissioner of Cor- rection, 329 Conn. 1, 32, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Connecticut v. Skakel, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). “[E]ffective assistance of counsel imposes an obligation [on] the attorney to investigate all surrounding circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues that may potentially lead to facts relevant to the defense of the case. . . . In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular inves- tigations unnecessary. . . . If counsel makes strategic decisions after thorough investigation, those decisions are virtually unchallengeable . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 537, 547, 124 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015). “In the same vein, when counsel’s failure to proceed with an investigation is due not to professional or strategic judg- ment but, instead, results from oversight, inattention or lack of thoroughness and preparation, no deference or presumption of reasonableness is warranted.” Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 35. “[T]he reasonableness of any particular investigation necessarily depends on the unique facts of any given case . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Id., 33. “The reasonableness of an investigation must be evaluated not through hind- sight but from the perspective of the attorney when he was conducting it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norton v. Commissioner of Correction, 132 Conn. App. 850, 858–59, 33 A.3d 819, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 936, 36 A.3d 695 (2012). In the present case, the habeas court properly deter- mined that the petitioner failed to prove that Eddy’s deci- sions not to conduct further investigation into the DNA evidence or to present testimony from an independent  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction DNA expert were objectively unreasonable. The habeas court found that Eddy retained the services of Wallace, a DNA expert who concurred with the state forensic laboratory’s findings that the DNA samples taken from the evidence at the scene did not contain male DNA and that the petitioner was excluded as a contributor to the samples. The habeas court further found that, after learning that Wallace concurred with Renstrom’s find- ings and that those findings were beneficial to the peti- tioner, Eddy elicited testimony from Renstrom that the DNA samples collected from the crime scene excluded the petitioner as a contributor. Thus, in preparation for the petitioner’s criminal trial, Eddy did consult with an inde- pendent DNA expert and then reasonably decided not to call that expert as a witness but, rather, to cross-examine the state’s witness in order to elicit testimony helpful to the petitioner’s defense. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the habeas court erred in conclud- ing that Eddy’s decisions not to conduct further inves- tigation into the DNA evidence or to present testimony from an independent DNA expert were not deficient. See Stephen S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 801, 816–17, 40 A.3d 796 (“[w]e cannot conclude that [trial counsel’s] performance was deficient when he consulted with an expert witness regarding the victim’s physical examination, yet reasonably concluded not to use the expert witness at trial after determining that such testimony would not benefit the petitioner’s defense”), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012). Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Eddy performed deficiently, the petitioner cannot prevail because the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Eddy’s allegedly deficient performance resulted in any prejudice to the defense. We reiterate that the petitioner has the burden of showing what benefit additional investigation or the presentation of an expert witness would have revealed. See Eastwood v. Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn. App. 471, 481, 969 A.2d 860 (decision not to call any witness, including expert witness, “does not constitute  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction ineffective assistance unless there is some showing that the testimony would have been helpful in establishing the asserted defense” (internal quotation marks omit- ted)), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 918, 973 A.2d 1275 (2009); Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 170, 175, 774 A.2d 148 (2001) (“[t]he burden to demon- strate what benefit additional investigation would have revealed is on the petitioner”). Here, the petitioner did not present any evidence to show how further investiga- tion of the DNA evidence or the presentation of a DNA expert witness would have been beneficial to the peti- tioner’s defense. Therefore, the habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Eddy’s decisions not to conduct additional investigation or to present testimony from an independent DNA expert. Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the petitioner’s claim that Eddy rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented at trial. B The petitioner next claims that the court incorrectly concluded that Eddy did not render ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate whether there were other vehicles in the area that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. Specifically, he argues that Eddy’s performance was deficient because, although Eddy’s investigation “established that the [petitioner’s] vehicle was not a complete match to the suspect’s vehicle,” Eddy failed to adequately investigate a list disclosed by the state in discovery of other vehicles that were registered in Connecticut and matched the general description of the suspect’s vehicle. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to our reso- lution of the petitioner’s claim. At the habeas trial, Eddy testified that the petitioner was identified as a suspect in the case because the petitioner possessed a “white Chrysler 300,” which was “the same car or a similar  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction car [to] the one . . . described by the . . . [victim].” Eddy testified that, “because the motor vehicle in question that was captured on surveillance cameras . . . did not have a brake light that was illuminated,” he “tasked [an] investigator with taking photographs of the vehicles that had been seized by the Wethersfield Police Department.” Eddy further testified that he went with the investigator who “took photographs of the vehicle in question as it was when it was at the impound lot of the Wethersfield Police Department . . . [a]nd . . . made a point of docu- menting that the brake light was illuminated” because, in the surveillance videos of the suspect’s vehicle, “the brake light was not functioning . . . .” Eddy also testified that the police provided him with a list of other Chrysler 300s registered in the state, but that he could not recall whether he asked the investigator to investigate any of the vehicles on that list. Tucker testified that, by the time he joined the petitioner’s case, most of the investigation had been completed, that he “specifically didn’t do an investigation into the car,” and that he “believe[d] that it was done prior to [him] coming on.” The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that he was identified as a suspect because of his vehicle and that Eddy showed him the list of other Chrysler 300s that the police had provided. The petitioner further testified that the list contained “over 300” Chrysler 300s and that he asked Eddy to investigate the other vehicles’ owners but, to his knowledge, only one additional owner was investigated. In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court con- cluded that the petitioner failed to establish that Eddy rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his investigation into other vehicles in the area that may have matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. The court found that Eddy had “hired an investigator in the petitioner’s case and tasked her with photographing an illuminated brake light on the petitioner’s vehicle for purposes of highlighting a difference between the petitioner’s car and the car seen on the surveillance  Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction footage.” The court further found that Eddy “received a list of matching vehicles, and at least one owner from the list was investigated.” The court concluded that, “[i]n light of the requirement that this court indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within