Full Opinion

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction SHELDON HIGGINS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 48832) Moll, Westbrook and Flynn, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, after a jury trial, of capital felony and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court’s judgment denying in part and dismissing in part his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his prior habeas counsel, A, provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue claims that his trial counsel, I, provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the admission of out-of-court and in-court identifications of the petitioner by a witness, H. Held: The habeas court properly determined that I’s decision to challenge the credibility of H’s identification of the petitioner through cross-examination, rather than moving to suppress the out-of-court identification, did not constitute deficient performance in light of the evidence available to I and the legal standard governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification at the time, and, accordingly, because the petitioner could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim against I, he could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim against A. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner’s due process claim challenging H’s in-court eyewitness identification of the petitioner as pro- cedurally defaulted, as the petitioner had failed to raise the claim at trial, on direct appeal or at an earlier habeas proceeding and, although the petitioner contended that his claim was sufficiently constitutionally novel to excuse the procedural default, he did not demonstrate good cause for the delay in raising the claim to excuse his default. Argued September 3—officially released November 17, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Streeto, J.; judgment denying in part and dismissing in part the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Joy M. Drisdelle, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Erin Stack, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion WESTBROOK, J. The petitioner, Sheldon Higgins, appeals, following the grant of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying in part and dismissing in part his amended peti- tion for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly (1) concluded that there was no ineffective assistance of both his trial counsel and prior habeas counsel and (2) dismissed his due process claim as procedurally defaulted. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court. Our Supreme Court previously set forth the relevant facts pertaining to the petitioner’s arrest and convic- tion. See State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003). “On the afternoon of July 5, 1997, Corey Hite [(Hite)] was standing outside the house owned by his aunt, Brenda Lawrence, at 65 Hartland Street, Hartford, when he saw a burgundy Nissan Pathfinder speeding on the street and endangering the children playing nearby. Hite stepped into the street, waved for the vehicle to stop and asked the driver, later identified as Dennis Smith, to drive more slowly. As he spoke to Smith, Hite placed his hands on the driver’s side window of the vehicle, which was rolled down about four inches. Smith became angry and, without warning, sped off. As he drove away, the window broke. “Later that day, Smith told the [petitioner] that the window had been broken during an attempted robbery. The [petitioner] then drove Smith back to Hartland Street in the [petitioner’s] gold Acura Legend. Smith rode in the Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction backseat of the car and carried a Colt semiautomatic rifle. At approximately 11:30 p.m., they arrived at Hartland Street. At that time, Hite was sitting in front of Brenda Lawrence’s house with his seventeen year old brother, Marcus Hite, their cousins, O’Marie Lawrence and thir- teen year old Tramell Maddox, and O’Marie Lawrence’s girlfriend, seventeen year old Shani Richardson. Smith and the [petitioner] drove slowly past the house, turned right onto Litchfield Street, immediately turned around and then turned left back onto Hartland Street. At that point, the [petitioner] turned off the car’s headlights. As the car passed Brenda Lawrence’s house for the sec- ond time, Smith fired multiple gunshots at the group gathered in front of the house. The car then sped away. Police responding to the incident recovered eleven .223 caliber shell casings from the street and sidewalk near the shooting. “Maddox was killed by a gunshot wound to his pel- vis that severed his right common iliac artery. Marcus Hite received a gunshot wound to his right arm that severed his brachial artery, injured a nerve and ulti- mately resulted in the permanent loss of the use of his right hand. Richardson received a gunshot wound to her right buttock that resulted in permanent disfigurement. O’Marie Lawrence received multiple small puncture wounds to his arm, fingers, hand and chest. [Hite] was not wounded. “Shortly after the shooting, at approximately 11:45 p.m., the [petitioner] drove his Acura to the house of Orrett Currie and his wife, Wanda Currie. He left the car in their garage. The next day, he called the Curries and asked them to wipe down the interior of the car. Later that day, Orrett Currie went to see the [petitioner] at the house of the [petitioner’s] girlfriend. The [petitioner] told him about the shooting at that time. Meanwhile, Wanda Currie saw on the evening news on television that a child had been killed in a drive-by shooting on Hartland Street. The next morning, she told her husband that she wanted the [petitioner’s] car to be removed from their garage. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction Orrett Currie called the [petitioner], and they arranged for the car to be taken away by the [petitioner’s] brother. “During the next several days, Wanda Currie made a series of anonymous telephone calls to the Hartford [P]olice [D]epartment and told them what she knew about the [petitioner’s] involvement in the shooting and the location of the [petitioner’s] car. Ultimately, she gave a written statement to the police. On the basis of the infor- mation provided by Wanda Currie, the police searched the [petitioner’s] apartment and found a Colt semiauto- matic rifle loaded with .223 caliber ammunition hidden under a mattress. The gun was wrapped in a plastic bag on which Smith’s fingerprints were found. Four of the cartridges in the rifle were designed to fragment after impact so as to maximize trauma to a victim. All eleven cartridge casings found at the scene of the shooting and a bullet fragment removed from Maddox’s body had been fired by the gun found in the [petitioner’s] apartment. “In January, 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion’s fugitive task force arrested the [petitioner] in New York City. He was returned to Connecticut in June, 1998. After a jury trial, he was convicted of capital felony in connection with the murder of Maddox (count one), two counts of assault in the first degree in connec- tion with the assaults on Marcus Hite and Richardson (counts two and three) and assault in the first degree in connection with the assault on O’Marie Lawrence (count four). The trial court imposed a sentence of life impris- onment without the possibility of release on the capital felony count; twenty years imprisonment on the count of assault on Marcus Hite, to be served consecutively to the sentence on count one; ten years imprisonment on the count of assault on Richardson, to be served consecu- tively to the sentences on counts one and two; and five years imprisonment on the count of assault on O’Marie Lawrence, to be served consecutively to the sentences on counts one, two and three, for a total effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release to be followed by thirty-five years imprisonment.” Id., Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction 39–42. The petitioner appealed to our Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 78. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (prior habeas action), which the habeas court, Fuger, J., denied on the merits after a trial. In the prior habeas action, the petitioner claimed that his trial counsel, Attorney Michael Isko, provided ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Hite, who testified at the criminal trial on behalf of the state. The petitioner appealed, and this court dismissed the appeal in a memo- randum decision. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction, 166 Conn. App. 901, 137 A.3d 120 (2016). The petitioner commenced the present habeas action in 2016 and filed the operative amended petition through assigned counsel on August 12, 2024. The operative peti- tion contains two counts alleging ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel and a due process violation grounded in certain eyewitness identification evidence admitted at his criminal trial. In count one, the petitioner claimed that prior habeas counsel, Attorney Keith Anthony, provided ineffective assistance for failing to pursue the claims that Isko provided ineffective assistance for (1) failing to raise a third-party culpability defense, and (2) failing to move to suppress Hite’s eyewitness identifica- tion testimony. On or about August 13, 2024, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a return in which he denied the material allegations in the petition and left the petitioner to his proof. The respondent also raised the special defense of procedural default with respect to the due process claim set forth in count two. The petitioner filed a reply alleging that his due process claim was not subject to procedural default by virtue of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction, 349 Conn. 733, 322 A.3d 299 (2024), regarding retroactive application in col- lateral proceedings of the rule announced in State v. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction Dickson, 322 Conn. 410, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, 582 U.S. 922, 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017). The petitioner also alleged that, even if his due process claim was subject to procedural default, he had good cause to excuse such default, namely, the novel nature of the rules expressed in Dickson and Tatum. A habeas trial was held on December 12, 2024. The following witnesses testified for the petitioner: Isko; Anthony; William Brooks, the petitioner’s expert in eyewitness identification procedures; Yolanda Scott, the petitioner’s girlfriend at the time of the crimes; and the petitioner. The respondent called no witnesses. The following relevant items, among others, were admitted into evidence as full exhibits: the criminal trial tran- scripts, various police statements, and a photographic array. Both parties submitted posttrial briefs in lieu of closing argument. The habeas court, Streeto, J., denied count one and dis- missed count two of the petitioner’s operative amended petition. As to count one, the habeas court held that the petitioner failed to prove that Isko provided ineffective assistance in either respect and, thus, the petitioner failed to prove that Anthony provided ineffective assis- tance for failing to pursue those claims against Isko. As to count two, the habeas court dismissed the petitioner’s freestanding due process claim, finding that it was proce- durally defaulted and that the petitioner failed to prove cause to excuse his default. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court granted. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The petitioner first contends that the habeas court improperly denied his claim that Anthony, as prior habeas counsel, provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the claim that Isko provided ineffective assistance Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction by failing to challenge the admission of Hite’s out-of- court and in-court identifications of the petitioner.1 We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to our consideration of the petitioner’s claim. Hite purchased marijuana from the petitioner on several occasions prior to the shooting and, as a result, was familiar with the petitioner’s appearance and what kind of car he drove at that time. On the night of the shooting, Hite was sit- ting in front of Brenda Lawrence’s house on Hartland Street when he recognized the petitioner’s gold Acura drive past the house slowly, turn around on Litchfield Street, and drive back onto Hartland Street. See State v. Higgins, supra, 265 Conn. 39–41. “As the car passed Brenda Lawrence’s house for the second time, Smith fired multiple gunshots at the group gathered in front of the house.” Id., 40. Hite spoke to the police on the night of the shooting but did not identify the perpetrators. Eventually, he did speak with the police and identified the petitioner’s photo from a photographic array as the person who drove the gold Acura involved in the shoot- ing. At the criminal trial, when the state asked Hite if he saw the driver of the Acura in the courtroom, Hite identified the petitioner in the courtroom. During his cross-examination of Hite, Isko called into question Hite’s credibility as an eyewitness by exposing to the jury the issues with his identification. For example, he challenged Hite on his ability to see the petitioner at 11:30 p.m. through the dark tinted windows of the gold Acura, while all other witnesses had testified they could 1 On appeal, the petitioner does not challenge the habeas court’s deci- sion denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on Anthony’s failure to raise in the prior habeas action that Isko provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a third-party culpability defense. Because the petitioner has failed to brief that claim on appeal and expressly abandoned it during oral argument before this court, we do not consider it. See Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 642–43, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (claims not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned). Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction not see through the black windows. He questioned Hite regarding the timeline for identifying the petitioner as the driver, including why he provided numerous state- ments to the police prior to July 29, 1997, that did not implicate the petitioner as the driver, and why it took multiple conversations with the police over the course of twenty-four days for him to identify the petitioner as the driver.2 In the petitioner’s case, there were multiple other forms of circumstantial evidence implicating him in the shooting. The evidence included multiple accounts that the type of car the petitioner drove was the same type of car used in the drive-by shooting, testimony that the petitioner was known to drive that type of car in the neighborhood of Hartland Street, testimony from the Curries that they cleaned the inside of the petitioner’s car the day after the shooting at the petitioner’s request, and testimony that the weapon used in the shooting was found under the mattress in the petitioner’s apartment. The habeas court found that Isko testified credibly, Anthony did not have any independent recollection of either the petitioner’s underlying criminal case or the habeas matter, and, “despite [Brooks’] expertise, expan- sive knowledge and training in the area of eyewitness identification, his testimony was of little to no use to the court, given his acknowledgement that, at the time [Hite] identified the petitioner as the shooter, the scien- tific developments surrounding eyewitness identification that are familiar pillars today, did not yet exist.” 2 As noted by the habeas court, Hite provided conflicting testimony at the criminal trial regarding his identification of the petitioner as the driver to the police. On cross-examination, he testified that the police had told him that the petitioner was the driver, prior to his identifica- tion of the petitioner in the photographic array. On the state’s redirect examination, however, Hite stated that the police did not tell him that the petitioner had been the driver and that he provided the police with this information. In resolving this conflict, the habeas court credited Hite’s testimony on redirect clarifying that the police did not tell him during the phone conversation that the petitioner had been the driver, and that it was he who provided the police with this information. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction Isko testified that the photographic array utilized by the police during Hite’s identification procedure was suggestive in that the background in the photo of the petitioner was different from all the other backgrounds— the petitioner had been photographed against a plain white background while the other individuals had been photographed against a greyish cinder block wall. He also testified that he made the strategic decision not to move to suppress Hite’s identification of the petitioner as the driver of the gold Acura involved in the shooting because Hite knew the petitioner prior to the shooting, and, thus, the two were not strangers. He reasoned that “a person’s personal knowledge of somebody will really supplant any police procedure,” meaning the police procedure was not the source of Hite’s identification and “doesn’t have an effect on it.” Isko instead focused his efforts on impeaching Hite’s credibility during cross-examination. Our standard of review governing challenges to a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. “The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review. . . . “A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Washing- ton, [466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. This right arises under the sixth and four- teenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction assistance of counsel consists of two components: a per- formance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probabil- ity that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . The claim will succeed only if both prongs are satisfied. . . . Consequently, [i]t is well settled that [a] reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier. . . . “With respect [to] the performance prong, the follow- ing legal principles guide our review. [J]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a [petitioner] to second-guess coun- sel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a par- ticular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the diffi- culties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the pre- sumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized that [t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. . . . [A] reviewing court is required not simply to give [the trial attorney] the benefit of the doubt . . . but to Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did . . . . “We note, however, that [a] court need not determine the deficiency of counsel’s performance if consider- ation of the prejudice prong will be dispositive of the ineffectiveness claim. . . . Thus, when a habeas court determine[s] that the petitioner ha[s] not proven that he was prejudiced by the performance of his trial counsel, our focus on review is whether the [habeas] court cor- rectly determined the absence of prejudice. . . . With respect to the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. . . . It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed- ings. . . . Rather, [t]he [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro- fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . . When a [petitioner] challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 241 Conn. App. 725, 732–34, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). “[I]t is not necessary for a reviewing court to resolve what strategic decisions defense counsel actually made, but it is required to presume that the challenged actions were within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct if, under the circumstances, it might have been sound trial strategy.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jordan v. Commissioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App. 822, 862, 234 A.3d 78 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 279, 267 A.3d 120 (2021). “As this court repeatedly has noted, [t]he decision of a trial lawyer not to make an objection is a matter of trial tactics, not evidence Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction of incompetency . . . . [T]here is a strong presumption that the trial strategy employed by a criminal defendant’s counsel is reasonable and is a result of the exercise of professional judgment. . . . It is well established that [a] reviewing court must view counsel’s conduct with a strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that a tactic that appears ineffective in hindsight may have been sound trial strategy at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 241 Conn. App. 739; see also Canady v. Commissioner of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 603, 630, 333 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 901, 334 A.3d 1006 (2025). “The use of a habeas petition to raise an ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim, commonly referred to as a habeas on a habeas, was approved by our Supreme Court in Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 613 A.2d 818 (1992). . . . In Lozada, the court explained that [t]o succeed in his bid for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must prove both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel was inef- fective, and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective. . . . As to each of those inquiries, the petitioner is required to satisfy the familiar two-pronged test set forth in Strick- land v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687]. . . . In other words, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of habeas counsel on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must essentially satisfy Strickland twice . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edward M. v. Commissioner of Correction, 186 Conn. App. 754, 759–60, 201 A.3d 492 (2018). In the present case, the petitioner’s claim rests on whether Isko’s failure to file a motion to suppress amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. The peti- tioner argues that Isko should have filed a motion to sup- press Hite’s out-of-court identification because the police procedures were unnecessarily suggestive in two ways: (1) the police told Hite that the petitioner was the suspected driver in their investigation prior to Hite identifying the petitioner as the driver; and (2) the photographic array Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction used by the police during Hite’s identification procedure was suggestive in that the background in the photo of the petitioner was distinct from all the other backgrounds. First, the petitioner contends that, because the iden- tification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, the trial court would have granted a motion to suppress had Isko filed one. Next, he asserts that, had Hite’s out-of- court identification been suppressed, Isko could have suc- cessfully challenged the admissibility of Hite’s in-court identification as an impermissibly suggestive first-time identification, not preceded by a nonsuggestive out-of- court identification. Finally, the petitioner contends that, because Hite’s testimony was the only testimony placing the petitioner behind the wheel of the vehicle that evening and, thus, the only testimony identifying him as the driver, its exclusion would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Under the first prong in Strickland, the petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under the circum- stances, Isko’s decision not to file a motion to suppress Hite’s out-of-court identification might be considered sound trial strategy. At the habeas trial, Isko explained that he did not challenge Hite’s out-of-court identifica- tion because Hite’s undisputed prior familiarity with the petitioner made it unlikely that the identification was mistaken or rendered unreliable by police procedure and, consequently, that a motion to suppress would not have succeeded.3 Rather than pursuing a motion to sup- press, Isko instead sought to undermine the credibility of Hite’s identification through cross-examination. He stated that he made that decision given his knowledge of the legal standard controlling eyewitness identifica- tion at the time. Whether this was a sound trial strategy requires an inquiry into the controlling eyewitness identification law that existed at the time Isko formulated his trial 3 The habeas court found that Isko’s testimony “and other evidence from the criminal trial, the prior habeas trial, and the instant habeas trial confirmed that Hite knew who the petitioner was prior to the shooting.” Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction strategy. At the time of the petitioner’s trial, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972), set forth the controlling legal standard governing the admission of eyewitness identification evidence. The standard required the fol- lowing analysis. First, the trial court must determine “whether the pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive of the suspect’s guilt. . . . If so, the second inquiry is whether the identification was never- theless reliable based on an examination of the totality of the circumstances. . . . Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 22, 611 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 828 (1992). Manson explained that most cases surrounding eyewitness iden- tification at the time dealt with the concerns related to encounters between total strangers. See Manson v. Braithwaite, supra, 111–12. “Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The wit- ness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police.” Id., 112. The evidence must have some aspect of reliability. Id. “The weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-examination and during counsel’s final arguments to the jury. . . . It [is] a matter for the jury to determine, after cross-examination, what weight to accord [the wit- ness’] testimony.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lago, supra, 20. Given the legal standard governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification at the time of the petitioner’s trial, we conclude that the habeas court correctly deter- mined that Isko’s decision to expose the weaknesses of Hite’s identification through cross-examination, rather than challenge its admissibility through a motion to sup- press, fell within the range of reasonable trial tactics. The state’s case rested largely on mutually corroborat- ing circumstantial and testimonial evidence, of which Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction Hite’s identification testimony was only one component. Although Hite was the only witness whose testimony directly identified the petitioner as the driver of the vehicle that evening, his identification is not properly considered in isolation but alongside the other circum- stantial evidence admitted at trial. Under applicable law, weaknesses in an eyewitness’ identification do not neces- sarily render the identification inadmissible; rather, such weaknesses can be exposed through cross-examination and considered by the jury in assessing the weight of the testimony. Isko, therefore, had a reasonable basis to elect to challenge Hite’s identification before the jury rather than pursue its suppression and made a strategic decision to do so. In assessing the reasonableness of that approach, we must evaluate counsel’s conduct from his perspective at the time, without the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, our appellate courts have recognized that there are numer- ous ways to provide effective assistance of counsel and that a reviewing court need not determine what strategy counsel actually pursued, provided that the challenged conduct might have constituted sound trial strategy. See Canady v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 231 Conn. App. 630. In light of the evidence available to Isko and the governing legal standard, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that his decision to challenge the credibility of Hite’s identification through cross-examination, rather than move to suppress it, did not constitute deficient performance. Because we find that the petitioner has not satisfied the first prong under Strickland, his ineffective assis- tance claim as to trial counsel fails, and, thus, we need not analyze his claim of prejudice. See Johnson v. Com- missioner of Correction, supra, 241 Conn. App. 732–33. Furthermore, because the petitioner has failed to prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim against prior habeas counsel. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction II Next, the petitioner claims that his constitutional due process claim is sufficiently novel to excuse his pro- cedural default. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly dismissed his due process claim in which he asserted that our Supreme Court’s ruling in Tatum, which made retroactive its ruling in Dickson, is applicable to him, thus making his claim novel and an exception to the procedural default bar. See Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 349 Conn. 759–60; State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 415. He asserts that the habeas court should have considered the merits of the due process claim by applying the law set forth in Dickson and Tatum rather than dismissing the claim. We disagree. “As an initial matter, a habeas court’s conclusion that a petitioner’s claim is barred by the procedural default doctrine involves a question of law over which we exer- cise plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Canady v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 231 Conn. App. 627. “The cause and prejudice standard [of reviewability] is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on [direct] appeal for reasons of tactics, [inad- vertence] or ignorance . . . . [T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the [s]tate’s procedural rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 628. “[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable . . . procedures . . . . In so holding, the court noted that the cause requirement may be satisfied under certain circumstances when a procedural failure is not attributable to an intentional decision by counsel made in pursuit of his client’s interests. And the failure Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction of counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the requirement is met.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 172–73, 37 A.3d 811, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903, 44 A.3d 180 (2012); see id., 174 (petitioner’s novel constitutional claim did not excuse his procedural default because there was reasonable basis for claim and claim was available to petitioner at time of default but he failed to raise it). As discussed, the petitioner did not raise his eyewitness identification claim at the criminal trial, on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction,4 or in his prior habeas action. Because the petitioner failed to previously raise his eyewitness identification claim, as the habeas court correctly recognized, “his due process claim, like all free- standing constitutional claims raised for the first time in a habeas proceeding, is subject to procedural default.” 4 On direct appeal, the petitioner made the following seven claims: “(1) the trial court improperly determined that [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) does not require the state to establish that the defendant had the specific intent to kill a person known by him to be under the age of sixteen; (2) even if [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) does not require the state to prove that the defendant knew the age of the victim, the defendant’s conviction of capital felony was improper because the doctrine of transferred intent does not allow the state to charge a defendant with a more serious crime than the crime that he intended to commit; (3) if this court rejects the foregoing claims, it should exercise its supervisory authority to rule that the doctrine of transferred intent cannot be applied under the circumstances of this case; (4) [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) is unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States con- stitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution; (5) [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) is unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions; (6) the conviction was legally inconsistent because the defendant could not simultaneously have had the three separate states of intent required by the various crimes of which he was convicted; and (7) the presence of uniformed correction officers in the courtroom during jury selection and trial deprived the defendant of a fair trial in violation of his due process rights and his right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.” (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Hig- gins, supra, 265 Conn. 38–39; see also id., 37 n.2. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction To overcome procedural default, the petitioner must establish good cause and prejudice for his delay in rais- ing the claim. The petitioner argues that his eyewitness identification claim is novel due to our Supreme Court’s ruling in Tatum and, therefore, good cause exists to excuse his default. He ultimately argues that it was not until our Supreme Court decided Tatum that his eyewit- ness identification claim became available to him. We are not persuaded. The petitioner’s r