Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketAC48832
JudgeMoll; Westbrook; Flynn
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
SHELDON HIGGINS v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 48832)
Moll, Westbrook and Flynn, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, after a jury trial, of
capital felony and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification,
from the habeas court’s judgment denying in part and dismissing in part his
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his
prior habeas counsel, A, provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue
claims that his trial counsel, I, provided ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the admission of out-of-court and in-court identifications of the
petitioner by a witness, H. Held:
The habeas court properly determined that I’s decision to challenge the
credibility of H’s identification of the petitioner through cross-examination,
rather than moving to suppress the out-of-court identification, did not
constitute deficient performance in light of the evidence available to I and
the legal standard governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification
at the time, and, accordingly, because the petitioner could not prevail on his
ineffective assistance claim against I, he could not prevail on his ineffective
assistance claim against A.
The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner’s due process claim
challenging H’s in-court eyewitness identification of the petitioner as pro-
cedurally defaulted, as the petitioner had failed to raise the claim at trial, on
direct appeal or at an earlier habeas proceeding and, although the petitioner
contended that his claim was sufficiently constitutionally novel to excuse
the procedural default, he did not demonstrate good cause for the delay in
raising the claim to excuse his default.
Argued September 3—officially released November 17, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Streeto, J.; judgment denying in
part and dismissing in part the petition, from which the
petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the
brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (petitioner).
Joy M. Drisdelle, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L.
Walcott, state’s attorney, and Erin Stack, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The petitioner, Sheldon Higgins,
appeals, following the grant of his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court
denying in part and dismissing in part his amended peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner
claims that the habeas court improperly (1) concluded
that there was no ineffective assistance of both his trial
counsel and prior habeas counsel and (2) dismissed his due
process claim as procedurally defaulted. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
Our Supreme Court previously set forth the relevant
facts pertaining to the petitioner’s arrest and convic-
tion. See State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 826 A.2d 1126
(2003). “On the afternoon of July 5, 1997, Corey Hite
[(Hite)] was standing outside the house owned by his
aunt, Brenda Lawrence, at 65 Hartland Street, Hartford,
when he saw a burgundy Nissan Pathfinder speeding on
the street and endangering the children playing nearby.
Hite stepped into the street, waved for the vehicle to stop
and asked the driver, later identified as Dennis Smith, to
drive more slowly. As he spoke to Smith, Hite placed his
hands on the driver’s side window of the vehicle, which
was rolled down about four inches. Smith became angry
and, without warning, sped off. As he drove away, the
window broke.
“Later that day, Smith told the [petitioner] that the
window had been broken during an attempted robbery.
The [petitioner] then drove Smith back to Hartland Street
in the [petitioner’s] gold Acura Legend. Smith rode in the
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
backseat of the car and carried a Colt semiautomatic rifle.
At approximately 11:30 p.m., they arrived at Hartland
Street. At that time, Hite was sitting in front of Brenda
Lawrence’s house with his seventeen year old brother,
Marcus Hite, their cousins, O’Marie Lawrence and thir-
teen year old Tramell Maddox, and O’Marie Lawrence’s
girlfriend, seventeen year old Shani Richardson. Smith
and the [petitioner] drove slowly past the house, turned
right onto Litchfield Street, immediately turned around
and then turned left back onto Hartland Street. At that
point, the [petitioner] turned off the car’s headlights.
As the car passed Brenda Lawrence’s house for the sec-
ond time, Smith fired multiple gunshots at the group
gathered in front of the house. The car then sped away.
Police responding to the incident recovered eleven .223
caliber shell casings from the street and sidewalk near
the shooting.
“Maddox was killed by a gunshot wound to his pel-
vis that severed his right common iliac artery. Marcus
Hite received a gunshot wound to his right arm that
severed his brachial artery, injured a nerve and ulti-
mately resulted in the permanent loss of the use of his
right hand. Richardson received a gunshot wound to her
right buttock that resulted in permanent disfigurement.
O’Marie Lawrence received multiple small puncture
wounds to his arm, fingers, hand and chest. [Hite] was
not wounded.
“Shortly after the shooting, at approximately 11:45
p.m., the [petitioner] drove his Acura to the house of
Orrett Currie and his wife, Wanda Currie. He left the car
in their garage. The next day, he called the Curries and
asked them to wipe down the interior of the car. Later
that day, Orrett Currie went to see the [petitioner] at the
house of the [petitioner’s] girlfriend. The [petitioner] told
him about the shooting at that time. Meanwhile, Wanda
Currie saw on the evening news on television that a child
had been killed in a drive-by shooting on Hartland Street.
The next morning, she told her husband that she wanted
the [petitioner’s] car to be removed from their garage.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
Orrett Currie called the [petitioner], and they arranged
for the car to be taken away by the [petitioner’s] brother.
“During the next several days, Wanda Currie made
a series of anonymous telephone calls to the Hartford
[P]olice [D]epartment and told them what she knew about
the [petitioner’s] involvement in the shooting and the
location of the [petitioner’s] car. Ultimately, she gave a
written statement to the police. On the basis of the infor-
mation provided by Wanda Currie, the police searched
the [petitioner’s] apartment and found a Colt semiauto-
matic rifle loaded with .223 caliber ammunition hidden
under a mattress. The gun was wrapped in a plastic bag
on which Smith’s fingerprints were found. Four of the
cartridges in the rifle were designed to fragment after
impact so as to maximize trauma to a victim. All eleven
cartridge casings found at the scene of the shooting and
a bullet fragment removed from Maddox’s body had been
fired by the gun found in the [petitioner’s] apartment.
“In January, 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’s fugitive task force arrested the [petitioner] in
New York City. He was returned to Connecticut in June,
1998. After a jury trial, he was convicted of capital
felony in connection with the murder of Maddox (count
one), two counts of assault in the first degree in connec-
tion with the assaults on Marcus Hite and Richardson
(counts two and three) and assault in the first degree in
connection with the assault on O’Marie Lawrence (count
four). The trial court imposed a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of release on the capital
felony count; twenty years imprisonment on the count
of assault on Marcus Hite, to be served consecutively to
the sentence on count one; ten years imprisonment on
the count of assault on Richardson, to be served consecu-
tively to the sentences on counts one and two; and five
years imprisonment on the count of assault on O’Marie
Lawrence, to be served consecutively to the sentences on
counts one, two and three, for a total effective sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
to be followed by thirty-five years imprisonment.” Id.,
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
39–42. The petitioner appealed to our Supreme Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 78.
The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus (prior habeas action), which the habeas
court, Fuger, J., denied on the merits after a trial. In the
prior habeas action, the petitioner claimed that his trial
counsel, Attorney Michael Isko, provided ineffective
assistance by failing to impeach Hite, who testified at
the criminal trial on behalf of the state. The petitioner
appealed, and this court dismissed the appeal in a memo-
randum decision. Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction,
166 Conn. App. 901, 137 A.3d 120 (2016).
The petitioner commenced the present habeas action in
2016 and filed the operative amended petition through
assigned counsel on August 12, 2024. The operative peti-
tion contains two counts alleging ineffective assistance of
prior habeas counsel and a due process violation grounded
in certain eyewitness identification evidence admitted
at his criminal trial. In count one, the petitioner claimed
that prior habeas counsel, Attorney Keith Anthony,
provided ineffective assistance for failing to pursue the
claims that Isko provided ineffective assistance for (1)
failing to raise a third-party culpability defense, and (2)
failing to move to suppress Hite’s eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony.
On or about August 13, 2024, the respondent, the
Commissioner of Correction, filed a return in which he
denied the material allegations in the petition and left
the petitioner to his proof. The respondent also raised
the special defense of procedural default with respect
to the due process claim set forth in count two. The
petitioner filed a reply alleging that his due process
claim was not subject to procedural default by virtue
of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tatum v.
Commissioner of Correction, 349 Conn. 733, 322 A.3d
299 (2024), regarding retroactive application in col-
lateral proceedings of the rule announced in State v.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
Dickson, 322 Conn. 410, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert.
denied, 582 U.S. 922, 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d
713 (2017). The petitioner also alleged that, even if his
due process claim was subject to procedural default, he
had good cause to excuse such default, namely, the novel
nature of the rules expressed in Dickson and Tatum.
A habeas trial was held on December 12, 2024. The
following witnesses testified for the petitioner: Isko;
Anthony; William Brooks, the petitioner’s expert in
eyewitness identification procedures; Yolanda Scott,
the petitioner’s girlfriend at the time of the crimes; and
the petitioner. The respondent called no witnesses. The
following relevant items, among others, were admitted
into evidence as full exhibits: the criminal trial tran-
scripts, various police statements, and a photographic
array. Both parties submitted posttrial briefs in lieu of
closing argument.
The habeas court, Streeto, J., denied count one and dis-
missed count two of the petitioner’s operative amended
petition. As to count one, the habeas court held that the
petitioner failed to prove that Isko provided ineffective
assistance in either respect and, thus, the petitioner
failed to prove that Anthony provided ineffective assis-
tance for failing to pursue those claims against Isko. As
to count two, the habeas court dismissed the petitioner’s
freestanding due process claim, finding that it was proce-
durally defaulted and that the petitioner failed to prove
cause to excuse his default.
The petitioner filed a petition for certification to
appeal, which the court granted. This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The petitioner first contends that the habeas court
improperly denied his claim that Anthony, as prior
habeas counsel, provided ineffective assistance by failing
to raise the claim that Isko provided ineffective assistance
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
by failing to challenge the admission of Hite’s out-of-
court and in-court identifications of the petitioner.1 We
disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to our
consideration of the petitioner’s claim. Hite purchased
marijuana from the petitioner on several occasions prior
to the shooting and, as a result, was familiar with the
petitioner’s appearance and what kind of car he drove
at that time. On the night of the shooting, Hite was sit-
ting in front of Brenda Lawrence’s house on Hartland
Street when he recognized the petitioner’s gold Acura
drive past the house slowly, turn around on Litchfield
Street, and drive back onto Hartland Street. See State
v. Higgins, supra, 265 Conn. 39–41. “As the car passed
Brenda Lawrence’s house for the second time, Smith
fired multiple gunshots at the group gathered in front of
the house.” Id., 40. Hite spoke to the police on the night
of the shooting but did not identify the perpetrators.
Eventually, he did speak with the police and identified
the petitioner’s photo from a photographic array as the
person who drove the gold Acura involved in the shoot-
ing. At the criminal trial, when the state asked Hite if
he saw the driver of the Acura in the courtroom, Hite
identified the petitioner in the courtroom.
During his cross-examination of Hite, Isko called into
question Hite’s credibility as an eyewitness by exposing
to the jury the issues with his identification. For example,
he challenged Hite on his ability to see the petitioner at
11:30 p.m. through the dark tinted windows of the gold
Acura, while all other witnesses had testified they could
1
On appeal, the petitioner does not challenge the habeas court’s deci-
sion denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on
Anthony’s failure to raise in the prior habeas action that Isko provided
ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a third-party culpability
defense. Because the petitioner has failed to brief that claim on appeal
and expressly abandoned it during oral argument before this court, we
do not consider it. See Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269
Conn. 613, 642–43, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (claims not briefed on appeal
are considered abandoned).
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
not see through the black windows. He questioned Hite
regarding the timeline for identifying the petitioner as
the driver, including why he provided numerous state-
ments to the police prior to July 29, 1997, that did not
implicate the petitioner as the driver, and why it took
multiple conversations with the police over the course
of twenty-four days for him to identify the petitioner
as the driver.2
In the petitioner’s case, there were multiple other
forms of circumstantial evidence implicating him in
the shooting. The evidence included multiple accounts
that the type of car the petitioner drove was the same
type of car used in the drive-by shooting, testimony that
the petitioner was known to drive that type of car in the
neighborhood of Hartland Street, testimony from the
Curries that they cleaned the inside of the petitioner’s
car the day after the shooting at the petitioner’s request,
and testimony that the weapon used in the shooting was
found under the mattress in the petitioner’s apartment.
The habeas court found that Isko testified credibly,
Anthony did not have any independent recollection of
either the petitioner’s underlying criminal case or the
habeas matter, and, “despite [Brooks’] expertise, expan-
sive knowledge and training in the area of eyewitness
identification, his testimony was of little to no use to
the court, given his acknowledgement that, at the time
[Hite] identified the petitioner as the shooter, the scien-
tific developments surrounding eyewitness identification
that are familiar pillars today, did not yet exist.”
2
As noted by the habeas court, Hite provided conflicting testimony at
the criminal trial regarding his identification of the petitioner as the
driver to the police. On cross-examination, he testified that the police
had told him that the petitioner was the driver, prior to his identifica-
tion of the petitioner in the photographic array. On the state’s redirect
examination, however, Hite stated that the police did not tell him that
the petitioner had been the driver and that he provided the police with
this information. In resolving this conflict, the habeas court credited
Hite’s testimony on redirect clarifying that the police did not tell him
during the phone conversation that the petitioner had been the driver,
and that it was he who provided the police with this information.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
Isko testified that the photographic array utilized by
the police during Hite’s identification procedure was
suggestive in that the background in the photo of the
petitioner was different from all the other backgrounds—
the petitioner had been photographed against a plain
white background while the other individuals had been
photographed against a greyish cinder block wall. He also
testified that he made the strategic decision not to move
to suppress Hite’s identification of the petitioner as the
driver of the gold Acura involved in the shooting because
Hite knew the petitioner prior to the shooting, and, thus,
the two were not strangers. He reasoned that “a person’s
personal knowledge of somebody will really supplant
any police procedure,” meaning the police procedure
was not the source of Hite’s identification and “doesn’t
have an effect on it.” Isko instead focused his efforts on
impeaching Hite’s credibility during cross-examination.
Our standard of review governing challenges to a habeas
court’s judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims is well settled. “The habeas court is afforded
broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those
findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of
external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . .
Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is
the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. . . . The application
of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent
legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of
law and fact, which is subject to plenary review. . . .
“A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to
adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical
stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Washing-
ton, [466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984)]. This right arises under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States constitution
and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . .
It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
assistance of counsel consists of two components: a per-
formance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the
performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate
that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably
competent or within the range of competence displayed
by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal
law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, [the petitioner]
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. . . .
The claim will succeed only if both prongs are satisfied. . . .
Consequently, [i]t is well settled that [a] reviewing court
can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever
is easier. . . .
“With respect [to] the performance prong, the follow-
ing legal principles guide our review. [J]udicial scrutiny
of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is
all too tempting for a [petitioner] to second-guess coun-
sel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and
it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense
after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a par-
ticular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . .
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the diffi-
culties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the pre-
sumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . .
Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized that [t]here
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys
would not defend a particular client in the same way. . . .
[A] reviewing court is required not simply to give
[the trial attorney] the benefit of the doubt . . . but to
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . .
counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did . . . .
“We note, however, that [a] court need not determine
the deficiency of counsel’s performance if consider-
ation of the prejudice prong will be dispositive of the
ineffectiveness claim. . . . Thus, when a habeas court
determine[s] that the petitioner ha[s] not proven that he
was prejudiced by the performance of his trial counsel,
our focus on review is whether the [habeas] court cor-
rectly determined the absence of prejudice. . . . With
respect to the prejudice component of the Strickland
test, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. . . . It is not
enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed-
ings. . . . Rather, [t]he [petitioner] must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . .
When a [petitioner] challenges a conviction, the question
is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt.” (Citations omitted; emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson
v. Commissioner of Correction, 241 Conn. App. 725,
732–34, ___ A.3d ___ (2026).
“[I]t is not necessary for a reviewing court to resolve
what strategic decisions defense counsel actually made,
but it is required to presume that the challenged actions
were within the wide range of reasonable professional
conduct if, under the circumstances, it might have been
sound trial strategy.” (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Jordan v. Commissioner of
Correction, 197 Conn. App. 822, 862, 234 A.3d 78 (2020),
aff’d, 341 Conn. 279, 267 A.3d 120 (2021). “As this court
repeatedly has noted, [t]he decision of a trial lawyer not to
make an objection is a matter of trial tactics, not evidence
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
of incompetency . . . . [T]here is a strong presumption
that the trial strategy employed by a criminal defendant’s
counsel is reasonable and is a result of the exercise of
professional judgment. . . . It is well established that
[a] reviewing court must view counsel’s conduct with a
strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance and that a tactic that
appears ineffective in hindsight may have been sound
trial strategy at the time.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
241 Conn. App. 739; see also Canady v. Commissioner
of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 603, 630, 333 A.3d 797,
cert. denied, 352 Conn. 901, 334 A.3d 1006 (2025).
“The use of a habeas petition to raise an ineffective
assistance of habeas counsel claim, commonly referred
to as a habeas on a habeas, was approved by our Supreme
Court in Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 613 A.2d 818
(1992). . . . In Lozada, the court explained that [t]o succeed
in his bid for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must
prove both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel was inef-
fective, and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective. . . .
As to each of those inquiries, the petitioner is required to
satisfy the familiar two-pronged test set forth in Strick-
land v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687]. . . . In other
words, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of
habeas counsel on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel must essentially satisfy Strickland twice . . . .”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Edward M. v. Commissioner of Correction, 186 Conn.
App. 754, 759–60, 201 A.3d 492 (2018).
In the present case, the petitioner’s claim rests on
whether Isko’s failure to file a motion to suppress
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. The peti-
tioner argues that Isko should have filed a motion to sup-
press Hite’s out-of-court identification because the police
procedures were unnecessarily suggestive in two ways: (1)
the police told Hite that the petitioner was the suspected
driver in their investigation prior to Hite identifying the
petitioner as the driver; and (2) the photographic array
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
used by the police during Hite’s identification procedure
was suggestive in that the background in the photo of the
petitioner was distinct from all the other backgrounds.
First, the petitioner contends that, because the iden-
tification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, the
trial court would have granted a motion to suppress had
Isko filed one. Next, he asserts that, had Hite’s out-of-
court identification been suppressed, Isko could have suc-
cessfully challenged the admissibility of Hite’s in-court
identification as an impermissibly suggestive first-time
identification, not preceded by a nonsuggestive out-of-
court identification. Finally, the petitioner contends
that, because Hite’s testimony was the only testimony
placing the petitioner behind the wheel of the vehicle
that evening and, thus, the only testimony identifying
him as the driver, its exclusion would have resulted in a
different outcome at trial.
Under the first prong in Strickland, the petitioner
must overcome the presumption that, under the circum-
stances, Isko’s decision not to file a motion to suppress
Hite’s out-of-court identification might be considered
sound trial strategy. At the habeas trial, Isko explained
that he did not challenge Hite’s out-of-court identifica-
tion because Hite’s undisputed prior familiarity with
the petitioner made it unlikely that the identification
was mistaken or rendered unreliable by police procedure
and, consequently, that a motion to suppress would not
have succeeded.3 Rather than pursuing a motion to sup-
press, Isko instead sought to undermine the credibility
of Hite’s identification through cross-examination. He
stated that he made that decision given his knowledge
of the legal standard controlling eyewitness identifica-
tion at the time.
Whether this was a sound trial strategy requires an
inquiry into the controlling eyewitness identification
law that existed at the time Isko formulated his trial
3
The habeas court found that Isko’s testimony “and other evidence from
the criminal trial, the prior habeas trial, and the instant habeas trial
confirmed that Hite knew who the petitioner was prior to the shooting.”
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
strategy. At the time of the petitioner’s trial, Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d
140 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct.
375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972), set forth the controlling
legal standard governing the admission of eyewitness
identification evidence. The standard required the fol-
lowing analysis. First, the trial court must determine
“whether the pretrial identification procedures were
unduly suggestive of the suspect’s guilt. . . . If so, the
second inquiry is whether the identification was never-
theless reliable based on an examination of the totality
of the circumstances. . . . Reliability is the linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification evidence.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 22, 611 A.2d 866, cert.
denied, 223 Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 828 (1992). Manson
explained that most cases surrounding eyewitness iden-
tification at the time dealt with the concerns related
to encounters between total strangers. See Manson v.
Braithwaite, supra, 111–12. “Usually the witness must
testify about an encounter with a total stranger under
circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The wit-
ness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily
by the circumstances or by later actions of the police.” Id.,
112. The evidence must have some aspect of reliability.
Id. “The weaknesses of identifications can be explored on
cross-examination and during counsel’s final arguments
to the jury. . . . It [is] a matter for the jury to determine,
after cross-examination, what weight to accord [the wit-
ness’] testimony.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Lago, supra, 20.
Given the legal standard governing the admissibility of
eyewitness identification at the time of the petitioner’s
trial, we conclude that the habeas court correctly deter-
mined that Isko’s decision to expose the weaknesses of
Hite’s identification through cross-examination, rather
than challenge its admissibility through a motion to sup-
press, fell within the range of reasonable trial tactics.
The state’s case rested largely on mutually corroborat-
ing circumstantial and testimonial evidence, of which
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
Hite’s identification testimony was only one component.
Although Hite was the only witness whose testimony
directly identified the petitioner as the driver of the
vehicle that evening, his identification is not properly
considered in isolation but alongside the other circum-
stantial evidence admitted at trial. Under applicable law,
weaknesses in an eyewitness’ identification do not neces-
sarily render the identification inadmissible; rather, such
weaknesses can be exposed through cross-examination
and considered by the jury in assessing the weight of
the testimony. Isko, therefore, had a reasonable basis
to elect to challenge Hite’s identification before the jury
rather than pursue its suppression and made a strategic
decision to do so.
In assessing the reasonableness of that approach, we
must evaluate counsel’s conduct from his perspective at
the time, without the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, our
appellate courts have recognized that there are numer-
ous ways to provide effective assistance of counsel and
that a reviewing court need not determine what strategy
counsel actually pursued, provided that the challenged
conduct might have constituted sound trial strategy.
See Canady v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 231
Conn. App. 630. In light of the evidence available to Isko
and the governing legal standard, we conclude that the
habeas court properly determined that his decision to
challenge the credibility of Hite’s identification through
cross-examination, rather than move to suppress it, did
not constitute deficient performance.
Because we find that the petitioner has not satisfied
the first prong under Strickland, his ineffective assis-
tance claim as to trial counsel fails, and, thus, we need
not analyze his claim of prejudice. See Johnson v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 241 Conn. App. 732–33.
Furthermore, because the petitioner has failed to prove
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he cannot prevail
on his ineffective assistance claim against prior habeas
counsel.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
II
Next, the petitioner claims that his constitutional
due process claim is sufficiently novel to excuse his pro-
cedural default. Specifically, the petitioner claims that
the habeas court improperly dismissed his due process
claim in which he asserted that our Supreme Court’s
ruling in Tatum, which made retroactive its ruling in
Dickson, is applicable to him, thus making his claim
novel and an exception to the procedural default bar.
See Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 349
Conn. 759–60; State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 415.
He asserts that the habeas court should have considered
the merits of the due process claim by applying the law
set forth in Dickson and Tatum rather than dismissing
the claim. We disagree.
“As an initial matter, a habeas court’s conclusion that
a petitioner’s claim is barred by the procedural default
doctrine involves a question of law over which we exer-
cise plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Canady v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 231
Conn. App. 627. “The cause and prejudice standard [of
reviewability] is designed to prevent full review of issues
in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise
at trial or on [direct] appeal for reasons of tactics, [inad-
vertence] or ignorance . . . . [T]he existence of cause for a
procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the
[petitioner] can show that some objective factor external
to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with
the [s]tate’s procedural rule.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 628.
“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that
where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal
basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant
has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance
with applicable . . . procedures . . . . In so holding, the
court noted that the cause requirement may be satisfied
under certain circumstances when a procedural failure
is not attributable to an intentional decision by counsel
made in pursuit of his client’s interests. And the failure
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
of counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably
unknown to him is one situation in which the requirement
is met.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134
Conn. App. 160, 172–73, 37 A.3d 811, cert. denied, 305
Conn. 903, 44 A.3d 180 (2012); see id., 174 (petitioner’s
novel constitutional claim did not excuse his procedural
default because there was reasonable basis for claim and
claim was available to petitioner at time of default but
he failed to raise it).
As discussed, the petitioner did not raise his eyewitness
identification claim at the criminal trial, on direct appeal
from the judgment of conviction,4 or in his prior habeas
action. Because the petitioner failed to previously raise
his eyewitness identification claim, as the habeas court
correctly recognized, “his due process claim, like all free-
standing constitutional claims raised for the first time
in a habeas proceeding, is subject to procedural default.”
4
On direct appeal, the petitioner made the following seven claims:
“(1) the trial court improperly determined that [General Statutes (Rev.
to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) does not require the state to establish that the
defendant had the specific intent to kill a person known by him to be
under the age of sixteen; (2) even if [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)]
§ 53a-54b (8) does not require the state to prove that the defendant knew
the age of the victim, the defendant’s conviction of capital felony was
improper because the doctrine of transferred intent does not allow the
state to charge a defendant with a more serious crime than the crime
that he intended to commit; (3) if this court rejects the foregoing claims,
it should exercise its supervisory authority to rule that the doctrine of
transferred intent cannot be applied under the circumstances of this case;
(4) [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) is unconstitutional
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States con-
stitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution;
(5) [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)] § 53a-54b (8) is unconstitutional
under the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions;
(6) the conviction was legally inconsistent because the defendant could
not simultaneously have had the three separate states of intent required
by the various crimes of which he was convicted; and (7) the presence
of uniformed correction officers in the courtroom during jury selection
and trial deprived the defendant of a fair trial in violation of his due
process rights and his right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment
to the United States constitution.” (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Hig-
gins, supra, 265 Conn. 38–39; see also id., 37 n.2.
Higgins v. Commissioner of Correction
To overcome procedural default, the petitioner must
establish good cause and prejudice for his delay in rais-
ing the claim. The petitioner argues that his eyewitness
identification claim is novel due to our Supreme Court’s
ruling in Tatum and, therefore, good cause exists to
excuse his default. He ultimately argues that it was not
until our Supreme Court decided Tatum that his eyewit-
ness identification claim became available to him. We
are not persuaded.
The petitioner’s r