F. S. v. J. S.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  F. S. v. J. S. F. S. v. J. S.* (AC 48280) Alvord, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his postjudgment motions for leave to file, inter alia, a motion for modification of an existing order governing his parental access to the parties’ minor child. The defen- dant claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to account properly for the best interest of the child when it denied his motion to modify the existing visitation orders. Held: The trial court properly accounted for the best interest of the child when it denied the defendant’s motion for leave to file a motion to modify the existing visitation orders, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in that manner and, without any evidence to the contrary, this court presumed that the trial court properly considered the best interest standard in assessing whether the defendant had established probable cause for filing a motion to modify the existing visitation orders. Argued February 4—officially released August 25, 2026 Procedural History Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Prestley, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement; thereafter, the case was transferred to the Regional Family Trial Docket; subsequently, the court, Phoenix-Sharpe, J., denied the defendant’s motions for leave to file, inter alia, a motion for modification of paren- tal access orders and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the parties’ full names or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per- son’s identity may be ascertained.  F. S. v. J. S. J. S., self-represented, the appellant (defendant). Dennis Francis O’Toole, for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion PER CURIAM. The defendant, J. S., whose marriage to the plaintiff, F. S., was dissolved in 2018, appeals from postjudgment orders of the trial court denying his motion for leave to file a motion for modification of an existing order governing his parental access to the parties’ minor child; his motion for leave to file a motion seeking the dis- closure of certain medical records; and various additional motions for leave to file motions seeking reargument, reconsideration and clarification of the aforementioned rulings.1 The defendant claims on appeal that (1) the trial court has and continues to violate his due process rights, in particular with respect to rights the defendant asserts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2024); (2) the existing order requiring him to use a supervised visitation agency at his own cost is unconstitutional; (3) the court’s denial of his requests to file motions is unconstitutional and in retaliation for a federal lawsuit that he filed against the Judicial Branch and several judges who have acted in this dissolution action; (4) the requirement that the defen- dant engage in therapy as a condition of visitation with the child is improper given that he has not been found to pose a risk of injury to the child; (5) the court’s refusal to allow him to move for modification of the existing parental access orders violates the best interest of the child in light of the fact that he has not had visitation for more than three years; (6) the court effectively has sealed the defendant’s own medical records from him; and (7) the courts of this state routinely discriminate 1 Early on in this action, due to the sheer volume of repetitive and frivolous motions being filed by the parties—most notably by the defen- dant—the trial court issued an order requiring the parties, with some exceptions, to seek permission of the court before filing additional motions. This court upheld the propriety of that order in the defendant’s previous appeal. See F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 796–98, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024).  F. S. v. J. S. against men.2 Having thoroughly reviewed the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the majority of the claims and arguments raised by the defendant in support thereof are not properly before us, not adequately briefed, or previously have been addressed and rejected by this court in the defendant’s prior appeal. See F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024). Because we are not convinced on the present record that the court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s various motions for leave, we affirm the judgment of the court. The only claim meriting further discussion concerns whether the court, in denying the defendant’s request to file a motion to modify the existing visitation orders, failed to account properly for the best interest of the child. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in this manner. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. The trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion for leave to modify the existing visitation orders on July 18, 2024. The self-represented defendant was permitted to offer testimony and argue why the court should permit him to file his motion to modify. In an effort to help the defendant to provide the court with relevant testimony, the court explained as follows: “[W]hen you file a motion for modification, the court is going to be looking for either a material change in circumstances, or that the modification that you are requesting is in the best interest of the minor child, or that . . . the existing orders are not in the best interest of the minor child.” After giving the defendant an opportunity to make his case for why he should be allowed to pursue modification, the court summarized his arguments. When the court asked the defendant if there was anything else he wanted to tell the court regard- ing why it should grant his request for leave to file his 2 The defendant’s brief, including his statement of the issues, is dif- ficult to follow and repetitious. For clarity, we have combined and restated some of the defendant’s claims.  F. S. v. J. S. motion for modification, the defendant responded, in part, “because, Your Honor . . . it is in the best interest of the child.” On October 10, 2024, the court issued an order deny- ing the defendant’s motion for leave to file a motion seeking modification of the court’s July 15, 2022 orders regarding custody and visitation. After setting forth the relevant provisions of the July 15, 2022 dissolution judgment,3 the court first noted that the defendant had failed to comply with that aspect of the July 15, 2022 judgment that required him to submit with any motion requesting permission to seek modification a signed and sworn affidavit or other representation that he had exercised at least 75 percent of his parenting access or engaged in required treatment for at least one year. 3 The July 15, 2022 judgment provided in relevant part: “The defen- dant’s parenting access shall begin once he has provided proof to the plaintiff and/or her counsel of record that he is engaged with a clinician who has the skills and training to address narcissistic personality disor- der. The defendant shall provide proof of his engagement in treatment to the plaintiff and/or her counsel of record on a quarterly basis. . . . “The defendant’s access shall not be expanded or modified until a motion to modify has been filed to the court with a request for leave and a showing that he has exercised at least 75 percent of his parenting access and engaged in regular and consistent treatment for at least one year, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: a clinician who has the skills and training to address narcissistic personality disorder; consultation with a psychiatrist and neurologist; and group therapy for domestic abuse/trauma. . . . “Any motion to modify the parenting access by the defendant shall include a request for leave and a signed and sworn to affidavit.” In his prior appeal challenging the court’s July 15, 2022 judgment, the defendant did not directly challenge the court’s order limiting the defen- dant’s right to seek modification or expansion of his parenting access. “It is well established that when a party brings a subsequent appeal, [he] cannot raise questions [that] were or could have been answered in [his] former appeals. . . . Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.” (Cita- tion omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266, 880 A.2d 180 (2005). Moreover, once this court has considered a judgment on appeal, any aspect of the judgment that is not reversed “establishes the law of the case,” adherence to which “is equally obliga- tory upon the parties to the action and upon the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 267.  F. S. v. J. S. The court also concluded that many of the arguments relied on by the defendant had been raised in his appeal from the dissolution judgment, which had resulted in an affirmation of the trial court’s July 15, 2022 orders. The court expressly recognized the defendant’s argu- ment that “modification is required in the best interest of the minor child.” The court concluded, however, that the defendant had failed to allege or otherwise provide evidence of his compliance with the July 15, 2022 orders regarding his parental access to the child or regarding modification of his parental access. Although the court recognized that the defendant had not seen the child for more than two years, the court attributed this, at least in part, to the defendant’s failure to comply with the court’s July 15, 2022 orders. The court concluded: “Given all of the foregoing, and based on the court’s review of the file, testimony of the parties, and representations from counsel, the court does not find that the defendant has established probable cause for his underlying motion.” In assessing whether to allow a party to file a motion in a case in which the court has issued a prohibitory order barring the filing of motions without prior authorization of the court, the moving party has the burden of demon- strating that there is probable cause that grounds exist for the motion to be granted. See, e.g., Practice Book § 25-26 (g). It is axiomatic that the touchstone of any determination regarding custody and visitation is what is in the best interest of the child. See F. S. v. J. S., supra, 223 Conn. App. 793; see also Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 541, 429 A.2d 801 (1980) (“in matters involving child custody, and, by implication, visitation rights, [although] the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be considered it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child [that] must control the decision of the court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In making or modifying orders pertaining to the custody and care of minor children in dissolution actions, court are guided by General Statutes § 46b-56, which grants the court broad discretion in crafting such orders. Subsection (a) of § 46b-56 provides in relevant part that “the court may  F. S. v. J. S. assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. . . .” Subsection (b) of § 46b-56 provides in relevant part that, “[i]n making . . . any order as provided in subsection (a) of [§ 46b-56], the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be con- sidered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both par- ents commensurate with their abilities and interests. . . .” (Emphasis added.) “The court may consider many fac- tors in determining whether modification of custody and visitation is in [a child’s] best interests and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court properly weighed all the evidence before it.” D. K. v. D. F., 235 Conn. App. 59, 72, 344 A.3d 564 (2025). Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing on the defendant’s motion, we reasonably may infer from the court’s instructions to the defendant at the hearing about what he would need to show to successfully move for modification of the existing custody and visitation orders that the court understood the significance of the best interest of the child standard in evaluating whether the defendant had met his burden of showing probable cause for filing a motion for modification at that time.4 Moreover, without any evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court properly considered the best interest standard in assessing whether the defendant had established probable cause for filing a motion to modify the current visitation orders. The judgment is affirmed. 4 Nothing precludes the defendant from seeking permission to file a motion for modification of custody and/or visitation in the future, par- ticularly once he has satisfied the conditions set forth in the dissolution judgment, has made reasonable efforts to do so, or has provided some evidence demonstrating that a substantial change in circumstances warrants the court’s revisiting its prior order.