Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction LUIS M. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 48342) Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, E, rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to advise him to accept a plea offer from the state that called for three and one-half years of incarceration when he was exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration had he been convicted after trial. Held: The habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s habeas petition, as the court’s factual finding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by E’s advice regarding the state’s plea offers was not clearly erroneous in that it was based on the court’s rejection of the petitioner’s self-serving testimony and its decision to credit E’s testimony that he had advised the petitioner about the plea offers and the amount of prison time he could face if convicted, and the court’s finding that the petitioner had always maintained his innocence, did not want to accept a plea offer and was adamant on taking his case to trial was supported by E’s testimony and the transcripts of the petitioner’s plea proceedings. Argued April 20—officially released September 1, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; thereafter, the peti- tion was withdrawn in part; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. David B. Bachman, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, with whom were Jessica Dellaratta, certified legal intern, and, on the brief, Christian M. Watson,  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction state’s attorney, and Silvina Bejleri, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion SEELEY, J. On the granting of his petition for cer- tification to appeal, the petitioner, Luis M. Rodriguez, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of various charges in connection with a sexual assault and sentenced to thirty years of incarceration, appeals from the judg- ment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that his criminal trial counsel, Attorney Christopher Eddy, pro- vided ineffective assistance. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly determined that (1) the advice provided by Attorney Eddy with respect to two plea offers presented to the petitioner was adequate and satisfied the constitutional requirement for effec- tive assistance of counsel, (2) Attorney Eddy’s failure to advise the petitioner to accept a plea offer of three and one-half years of incarceration, when the petitioner was exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration, constituted effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency of Attorney Eddy. We agree with the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner did not prove that he was prejudiced by any ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the habeas court. Our Supreme Court set forth the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history of the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial in his direct appeal.1 “In the early morning, the victim2 was walking from her residence on Martin Luther King 1 The petitioner initially filed his direct appeal with this court, and the appeal subsequently was transferred to our Supreme Court. 2 “In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 178 n.1, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction Drive in New Britain to a nearby convenience store. Near Lafayette and Beaver Streets, a gold, four door sedan with two male occupants stopped and asked the victim if she knew where they could buy cocaine. The victim told the men that she did not know, and they drove away. Less than five minutes later, the men returned, and one of them pulled the victim into the backseat with him. After driving for between ten and fifteen minutes, the vehicle stopped at an abandoned housing complex. The driver got into the backseat, and the victim sat between the two men. The victim testified that both men were Hispanic, one man ‘was kind of thin and the other one was kind of heavy,’ and both spoke Spanish to each other during the attack. “After the men removed, or had the victim remove, her clothing, ‘[t]hey started putting their fingers . . . [i]nto [her] vagina’ against her will. The thin man engaged in forcible penile-vaginal intercourse with the victim, made her perform oral sex on him, and ‘was pretty much done with [her] within probably about five minutes . . . .’ The heavier man could not maintain an erection, and he forced the victim to perform oral sex and forcibly digitally penetrated her vagina. Thereafter, the heavier man pulled the victim out of the car by her hair and ejaculated while ‘rubbing his penis up against the inside of [the victim’s] thigh.’ “After the assault, the two men drove away, and the victim ‘walked quite a ways’ and came upon a house. The occupant of the house, Juanita Isaacs, testified that the victim banged on her door and asked Isaacs for help, tell- ing her that she had been raped. Isaacs called the police, Officer Alan Vincent Raynis, Jr., of the New Britain Police Department responded, and the victim told him what happened. Raynis took the victim back to the scene of the crime, where he took several photographs and seized a pair of jeans, a sports brassiere, and panties. “The victim was transported to New Britain General Hospital, where she was examined, and a sexual assault evidence kit was processed. The examining nurse swabbed  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction the victim’s vaginal and oral cavities, the exterior sur- face of her genitalia, and her inner thigh to collect any biological material that could be used to identify the perpetrators. Raynis collected the kit and submitted it to the state forensic laboratory [laboratory] for analysis. Thereafter, the victim provided the police with a sworn, written statement regarding the incident. “The laboratory staff found sperm in the vaginal smear and genital swabs. The staff did not find sperm on the oral sample, but other tests revealed the presence of human seminal fluid protein. The laboratory staff extracted DNA from the evidentiary materials and searched it against DNA contained in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).3 No matching profiles were found. “Approximately ten years later, the [petitioner] became a person of interest in the sexual assault based on a CODIS match between the evidentiary DNA sample that had been extracted from the victim’s sexual assault evi- dence kit and a sample of the [petitioner’s] DNA that had been placed into CODIS at some point after the victim’s assault. In August, 2016, a detective from the New Brit- ain Police Department interviewed the [petitioner]. The detective informed the [petitioner] that he was a suspect in a sexual assault involving two men and a woman. The [petitioner] denied having had sex in a threesome, which he described as disgusting, and said he did not allow women in his car. The [petitioner] also described to the police vehicles that he previously owned, which did not include a gold, four door sedan, and informed the police that he currently did not have any car registered in his name. The [petitioner] then consented to the taking of a buccal swab, which the police submitted to the labora- tory for analysis. 3 “CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added to the database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53 n.3, 19 A.3d 678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction “Several months later, the laboratory reported a match between the DNA from the [petitioner’s] buccal swab and that taken from the victim’s sexual assault evidence kit. In December, 2016, the police again spoke with the [petitioner]. The detective informed the [petitioner] that his DNA was found in the vaginal sample from the victim. Contrary to his previous statement to the police, the [petitioner] admitted that he did have a threesome on two occasions in hotels in Plainville and on the Berlin Turnpike. He stated that one incident involved a ‘skinny, Puerto Rican’ girl and occurred when he picked up a man and a woman near an AutoZone store and dropped them off at a store on Broad Street in New Britain. The detective also informed the [petitioner] that, in addition to the assault, the victim complained of being robbed of several hundred dollars, and the [petitioner] replied with words to the effect of: ‘That’s not me. It’s the other guy.’ ” (Footnotes in original.) State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 178–81, 252 A.3d 811 (2020). The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was arrested on February 6, 2017, and charged in an information dated February 7, 2017, with one count of sexual assault in the first degree, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. In a pretrial proceeding before the court, Keegan, J., on August 1, 2017, Attorney Eddy indicated that there had been pretrial discussions pertaining to the case that morning and that he had discussed plea offers with the petitioner, and he requested a continuance for the petitioner to have time to consider the offers. The matter was continued to August 29, 2017, at which time Attorney Eddy indicated to the court that the petitioner was rejecting the plea offers, and the court canvassed the petitioner, who maintained his innocence.4 4 Specifically, the following discussion took place on the record before the court, Keegan, J.: “[Attorney Eddy]: Your Honor, [the petitioner] would like to reject the state’s offer and place the case on the firm jury list. “The Court: Okay, can we just go over what the offer is and [what’s] being rejected?  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction Subsequent to the August 29, 2017 pretrial proceed- ing and prior to trial, the state amended the information (operative information) to charge the petitioner with three counts: in counts one and two, the petitioner was charged with sexual assault in the first degree in violation “[The Prosecutor]: The offer contemplated, Your Honor, a plea to sexual assault in the first degree under subsection (a) (1), three and [one-half] years to serve, followed by seven years of special parole. It was Judge Alexander’s offer. That offer did not contemplate a two year minimum/ mandatory based on the age of the alleged victim. He would face a twenty year maximum with the same two year minimum/mandatory. “The Court: Okay, [petitioner] I understand that you’re rejecting the offer today that Judge Alexander made. I just want to go over with you what that offer was and to make sure you understand at trial what you potentially face as a maximum penalty, okay? “[The Petitioner]: Yup. “The Court: All right, so, you’re charged with sexual assault in the first degree, and the state . . . rather, Judge Alexander, made an offer of three and [one-half] years to serve, which includes a two year mandatory minimum followed by seven years of special parole. Are you familiar with special parole? “[The Petitioner]: No. . . . “[Attorney Eddy]: Well, Your Honor, I did discuss the parameters of the agreement. My notes also reflect there was an alternative offer of twelve years suspended after three and [one-half] followed by ten years of probation, but our position is he is factually innocent of this crime. “The Court: Okay, so, you understand now that the charge of sexual assault in the first degree under [§] 53a-70 (a) (1), which is the actual statute number that you’re charged with, carries a potential of twenty years’ incarceration, two years of which is a mandatory minimum, and it carries a potential maximum of thirty-five years of probation. Okay? “[The Petitioner]: All right. “The Court: So, I understand that you’re telling me you’re pursuing that you are factually innocent of [the charge], but I have a duty to inform you about the risks of conviction after trial, okay? “[The Petitioner]: Yup. “The Court: Have you discussed those with [Attorney] Eddy? “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: And, even after discussing those, you still wish to pursue your trial right? “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: All right, you wish me to inquire any further? “[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor, thank you. “The Court: All right, I will place this matter then on the firm jury list, and we won’t see you back here in court on a date until we get to that trial, okay? . . . “[The Petitioner]: Yes . . . .”  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), and, in count three, he was charged with attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-70 (a) (1). Specifically, count one charged that the petitioner had compelled sexual inter- course with the victim by the use of force by “using his superior physical strength to engage in non-consensual digital penetration of her vagina”; count two charged that the petitioner had compelled sexual intercourse with the victim by the use of force by “using his superior physical strength to force her to perform fellatio to get him aroused”; and count three charged that he had acted “with the intent to commit [s]exual [a]ssault in the first degree” by “forcibly rubbing his flaccid penis against [the victim’s] vagina while trying to penetrate her, until he ejaculated . . . .” On March 5, 2018, counsel and the petitioner appeared before the court, Alexander, J., at which time Attorney Eddy stated: “We’re scheduled for jury selection tomor- row, and he would still like to have his trial.” Thereafter, the following discussion took place: “The Court: Okay. So, [petitioner], your charge was on the sole count of sexual assault in the first degree, and the person was not a minor. Is that correct? “[The Prosecutor]: That is correct. [The victim was] an adult, Your Honor. “The Court: So, the sentencing range if you’re con- victed after trial is not less than two years, up to twenty years to serve. Do you understand that’s the sentencing range? “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Your plea agreement was alternative offers. You could have three and [one-half] years to serve, with that two year mandatory minimum, followed by seven years of special parole, or twelve years, suspended after three and [one-half] years, with a ten year period of probation. Was that your understanding of the offers?  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Do you want to take either one of those offers? “[The Petitioner]: No. “The Court: You want to have your trial. “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Okay. So . . . [y]ou’ll start picking a jury tomorrow. . . . “[The Prosecutor]: Judge, I do want the court’s canvass to be clear. The state has charged three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in its long form information for trial. They were separate and distinct acts that were alleged as part of the whole package, so his total exposure at the maximum end would actually be sixty years if he were convicted on all three. “The Court: Okay. Because the state has alleged distinct conduct, our law recognizes the different manners in which a sexual assault can happen, even if it arises out of a single incident. And, with respect to it, as the state has now corrected, if you’re convicted of all counts after trial, your maximum penalty is sixty years with six years being mandatory minimum. Are you clear on that? “[The Petitioner]: I have to talk to my attorney. “The Court: Do you want a second? “[The Petitioner]: Yeah. . . . “The Court: Okay. . . . Here, [the state has] three counts, and your maximum penalty would be up to sixty years to serve and six year mandatory minimum, and that would be if the court imposed the maximum on each and added each count to each other, so that’s how you get to the maximum penalty. You let me know what you want to do, okay? “[The Petitioner]: All right.”  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction At that time, the court passed on the petitioner’s case, which provided the petitioner with an opportunity to discuss the amended charges and maximum penalties for those charges with Attorney Eddy. When the matter was recalled by the court, the court stated: “We passed the matter because the state did indicate today that it was charging three distinct forms of sexual assault in the first degree, so, the court had to advise [the petitioner] that if he is convicted after trial, a court could impose up to sixty years.” The court then asked if the petitioner had “enough time to talk to Attorney Eddy,” to which the petitioner replied, “[y]es, I did.” The court asked if the petitioner understood that he was facing sixty years if convicted, and the petitioner stated, “[y]es, I understand.” Finally, the court asked the petitioner if he wanted a plea agreement or a trial, and the petitioner responded that he wanted a trial. Jury selection began the next day, and the trial commenced on March 14, 2018. At trial, through the testimony of Angela Przech, a forensic science examiner with the laboratory, the state introduced a laboratory report dated December 16, 2016, which indicated that vaginal swabs taken from the victim “had been separated into sperm-rich and epithelial-rich fractions. The report concluded that the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs was a mixture, and the [petitioner] ‘is included as a potential contributor to the DNA profile . . . .’ [That report also] . . . concluded that the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs] is . . . approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ The report was . . . signed by Przech, as the analyst, and a technical reviewer. “At trial, Przech testified regarding the procedures used to test the DNA evidence and the results contained in her three reports. . . . Przech further testified that, in 2016, the New Britain Police Department submit- ted a known buccal swab of a suspect in the case to the laboratory for comparison with the evidentiary DNA that had been extracted in 2007. She explained that,  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction rather than having an analyst physically process the [petitioner’s] buccal swab, the laboratory processed it via ‘an automated procedure’ in which ‘a robot’ extracts and processes DNA from the known buccal sample. Przech compared the [petitioner’s] DNA profile to the profiles that had been extracted from the evidentiary swabs in 2007 and concluded that the [petitioner] was a ‘potential contributor’ to the DNA mixture that had been extracted from the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs. “Przech testified that the December, 2016 report set forth her conclusions regarding the comparison of the [petitioner’s] buccal swab and the DNA taken from the sexual assault evidence kit. . . . Following the trial, the jury found the [petitioner] guilty on all counts. The [petitioner] was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty years [of] incarceration.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, supra, 337 Conn. 182–84. On October 28, 2020, the petitioner, in a self-repre- sented capacity, filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor- pus. Subsequently, in May 2023, with the assistance of counsel, he filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). In his operative petition, the petitioner alleged the denial of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In particular, he alleged that Attorney Eddy had rendered ineffec- tive assistance in failing, inter alia, (1) to meaningfully convey to the petitioner a plea offer of three and one- half years, followed by seven years of special parole, and an alternative plea offer of twelve years, execution suspended after three and one-half years, followed by ten years of probation, (2) to adequately explain to the petitioner the relative strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case and of the theories of defense pursued at trial, the maximum exposure on each charge, the prob- ability of success at trial, the nature and strength of the forensic evidence, the likely witnesses for the state and their probable testimony, and the significant probability of a far greater sentence resulting from a conviction following a trial, and (3) to provide the petitioner with  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction affirmative advice regarding whether the petitioner should accept one of the plea offers.5 A habeas trial was held on June 17, 2024, at which the court heard testimony from Przech; Eric Carita, a foren- sic consultant; Attorney Eddy; and the petitioner. The court also admitted into evidence a number of exhibits offered by the petitioner, including his criminal court file, DNA reports, a statement from the victim, a police report and transcripts from the underlying criminal trial. The testimony before the habeas court can be sum- marized as follows. Przech testified consistently with her testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial. She also testified that, in her final report dated December 16, 2016, the peti- tioner “was included as a potential contributor to the DNA profile” generated from the sample taken from the vaginal swabs of the victim, which was designated as sample 1CB. Przech testified further that she had met with Attorney Eddy on February 26, 2018, during which time they discussed statistics, details of the DNA profiles, the amount of DNA present in sample 1CB, and the fact that she had to process that sample further in 2016 in accordance with new procedures and auditing guidelines so that she could “interpret the data in a proper manner” and “get a more thorough profile.” Carita testified that he did not find any issues with the protocols that were used in the DNA testing in this case and that the results of the DNA testing were reliable. 5 The petitioner also alleged in the operative petition that Attorney Eddy had rendered deficient performance in failing to employ a Spanish- speaking interpreter, “to employ the assistance of a mental health pro- fessional to ensure that the petitioner could understand and retain the information and advice provided by counsel,” to utilize a DNA expert, and to investigate and “advise the petitioner concerning the possibility of presenting evidence [pertaining to the victim’s] sexual history at trial . . . .” The petitioner’s counsel withdrew the allegation regarding the mental health professional during his closing argument at the habeas trial. The habeas court denied the operative petition as to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the petitioner does not challenge the court’s decision as to those claims. Accordingly, they are not at issue in this appeal.  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction In his testimony, Attorney Eddy confirmed that he had engaged in pretrial discussions about the plea offers con- cerning the petitioner. He recalled the petitioner having been given alternative offers from the trial court, both of which involved a period of incarceration and would have required sex offender treatment and lifetime registration as a sex offender. When asked if the court, during the pretrial discussions, had expressed an indication that it would accept either disposition, he responded, “I believe so.” He stated his belief that “the state and the court made those offers as a way of inducing [the petitioner] to plead guilty to eliminate the need for [the victim] to have to testify.” According to Attorney Eddy, he “com- municated [the offers] to [the petitioner] on more than one occasion and did so in person with [his] investigator present . . . .”6 At the time he did so, Attorney Eddy “displayed the audio/video interview or interviews that [the petitioner had] provided to New Britain police. And then, in addition . . . [he] met with [the petitioner] with Attorney Joe Lopez, who speaks Spanish . . . .” Attorney Eddy clarified that the offers, which were originally made and rejected in August 2017, were held open and that the petitioner could have pleaded guilty after that time if he had wanted to do so. He qualified that statement, however, noting that, “through [his] meetings with the petitioner as well as the statements [the petitioner had] provided to the New Britain Police Department, [the petitioner] always denied his involvement in this incident.” Attorney Eddy also stated that, at times, he did utilize the services of an interpreter but that the peti- tioner was bilingual and spoke English and Spanish, and that he never had difficulties communicating with the petitioner. He testified, however, that the petitioner had a poor memory and later was evaluated and determined to be “of borderline intelligence.” When asked whether it seemed that the petitioner understood “the gravity of 6 Specifically, Attorney Eddy testified that he “would have met with [the petitioner] on each and every court date that he attended,” and that he also had “evidence of at least two professional visits that would have taken place” at either the courthouse or the correctional institution in which the petitioner was incarcerated at that time.  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction the situation that he was in,” Attorney Eddy responded: “Well, thinking back now, I don’t think he did. At the time, nothing stuck out to me.” Attorney Eddy testified that he had reviewed the evi- dence with the petitioner, including the victim’s state- ment, that he had explained to the petitioner his opinion that her allegations supported multiple charges of sexual assault, and that he went over the amended charges against the petitioner with him. When asked what, if anything, he related to the petitioner about the DNA evidence in this case prior to proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I would have indicated that his DNA was a mixture in the vaginal swab[s] and that he was elimi- nated from being the [contributor] of the sperm that was located on the inner thigh . . . .” Attorney Eddy testified that the petitioner had “never indicated a willingness to plead guilty. I mean, I’m not going to force someone to go to trial, but, you know, I can’t make him plead guilty either.” Attorney Eddy stated further: “[T]he nature of our [pretrial] discussions focused primarily on the DNA because there was no evidence other than the DNA to establish identity. And, maybe I evaluated this wrongly, but there was DNA that excluded [the petitioner]. So, I believe the jury disregarded that argument because there was evidence in terms of DNA that would have eliminated [the petitioner] from doing what [the victim] said he did. . . . So, [the victim] claims to have been sexu- ally assaulted by two males, one thin male, one heavyset male. The state was very specific in [its] charging that [the petitioner] . . . was the heavyset male. . . . And, the heavyset male was alleged to have deposited semen where the sperm is located on her inner thigh. . . . That testing was done on that sample from the inner thigh, and [the petitioner] was eliminated. So, it was a single source profile from that semen stain, and [the petitioner] was eliminated.” With respect to the statements made by the petitioner during his police interviews, Attorney Eddy testified that he had advised the petitioner that  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction those statements could be or would be introduced into evidence against him at trial. Attorney Eddy testified that he had told the petitioner that, “if he was found guilty, he would get north of the three [and] one-half [years],” and he provided a ballpark of “something in the teens.” Attorney Eddy confirmed that, in their discussions, the petitioner was not amenable to pleading guilty and that the petitioner’s “perspective was that he was innocent.” Attorney Eddy also was asked what, if anything, he had advised the petitioner about his assessment of the strength of the state’s case, to which he replied: “Well, again, hindsight is 20/20, but I thought the fact that he was eliminated from depositing the DNA where she maintains he would have—[where] his DNA would have been found—okay. So, the scientific evidence would have indicated that some other heavyset Hispanic male ejaculated on her inner thigh. He was eliminated from that person.” When asked whether he had “provide[d] the petitioner with any advice” concern- ing the advisability of proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I left the decision up to him.” He also testified that he could not recall having a discussion with the petitioner regarding his chances of success at a trial, in terms of percentages. On cross-examination, Attorney Eddy was questioned regarding the plea offers and his discussions with the petitioner relating to those offers, and he indicated that he had communicated the offers to the petitioner mul- tiple times, that he went over the pros and cons of tak- ing an offer versus going to trial, that he explained the evidence against the petitioner that the state would be offering, including the videos of the petitioner’s police interviews, the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s DNA evidence, the witnesses against him, the state’s burden of proof, the maximum exposure for each charge against the petitioner, and the petitioner’s probability of success at trial. Attorney Eddy also gave the peti- tioner time to think about the offers, but, ultimately, the petitioner did not want to plead guilty. As a result, the  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction petitioner decided to proceed to trial and maintained his innocence throughout. In fact, Attorney Eddy met with the petitioner on the eve of trial and confirmed, again, that the petitioner still wanted to go to trial. On redirect examination, Attorney Eddy could not recall whether he had had any discussion with the petitioner concern- ing the statistic in the December 2016 DNA report that “the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs] [to which the petitioner was found to be a contributor was] . . . approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ ” In his testimony, the petitioner stated that he did not understand the plea offers. When asked if he had any dis- cussions with Attorney Eddy regarding the plea offers, the petitioner testified: “What he told me was to choose the jury because it was possible that he could win the case, for me to not worry. What I was able to understand was that I would not be guilty; it was possible for him to win the case.” The petitioner acknowledged that Attorney Eddy had discussed the accusations with him, as well as the DNA evidence and potential defenses, and that Attorney Eddy had advised him that there was “a great possibility” of the petitioner succeeding at trial. When asked, however, what advice, if any, Attorney Eddy had given him regarding the likely sentence he would receive if he lost at trial, the petitioner stated, “[n]o advice at all.” The petitioner responded, “[y]es,” when asked whether it would have changed his decision about going to trial if he had been advised that the state could bring additional charges against him. The petitioner also testified that Attorney Eddy did not discuss with him the maximum amount of prison time that he could receive if he were convicted of the charges, stating that Attorney Eddy “was focused on winning the case . . . .” He testified further that, when he returned to court in March 2018 and rejected the plea offers, he did not know that the state had brought additional charges against him and did not find out about those charges until “[a]fter he lost the jury.” According to the petitioner, Attorney Eddy  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction never discussed the additional charges with him and, if he had, it would have impacted the petitioner’s decision to go to trial. He testified: “I wouldn’t have gone to trial because I know I would have lost . . . [b]ecause it’s more charges.” The petitioner testified further that Attorney Eddy never gave him advice about what plea offer he should take or whether he should go to trial, and that if Attorney Eddy had advised him to consider taking the three and one-half year offer, he would have taken it. On cross-examination, the petitioner testified that he had told Attorney Eddy that he was innocent all through- out the trial. The petitioner acknowledged that he had lied to the police when, in his first statement, he stated that he did not take part in threesomes. When the peti- tioner was asked, “[d]id you tell your attorney that it was you,” he replied: “What I told the attorney was that I didn’t remember who the lady was. I didn’t say to the attorney that it was not me.” The prosecutor then asked, “[s]o, it could have been you,” and the petitioner replied, “[y]es,” but that he didn’t remember and that “[m]aybe [he] was drunk . . . .” When the prosecutor asked the petitioner whether Attorney Eddy had told him “that the judge made an offer of three and one-half years,” the petitioner replied, “[y]es,” but that he did not want to take the offer and wanted to go to trial in light of Attorney Eddy’s advice about the “high chance” of winning at trial. In its memorandum of decision filed October 1, 2024, the habeas court denied the petitioner’s ineffective assis- tance of counsel claim, finding that the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of establishing either defi- cient performance or prejudice. Specifically, the court found “that the petitioner failed to prove that Attorney Eddy’s performance in advising the petitioner as to the plea offers was deficient. Attorney Eddy testified cred- ibly that he advised the petitioner regarding the param- eters of the plea offers in addition to the state’s evidence against him, the charges and the exposure the petitioner faced, and the probability of the petitioner’s success at  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction trial so that the petitioner could make his own informed decision. The record also reveals that the petitioner was granted ample time to consider the plea offers, and the trial court fully canvassed the petitioner on his decision to reject them. This court does not credit the petitioner’s testimony that he did not understand the plea offers but failed to ask for further explanation. Under the facts of this case, the court cannot find Attorney Eddy’s perfor- mance to be deficient. “Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove prejudice by demonstrating that a reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would have accepted one of the plea offers had Attorney Eddy explained the offers further. The credible evidence indicates that the petitioner main- tained his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to trial. The petitioner’s testimony indicates that, with the benefit of hindsight, he regrets not accepting a plea offer because he would now be close to finishing his sentence. Such evidence fails to sustain the petitioner’s burden of proving prejudice. As a result, these claims must also be denied.” Subsequently, the court granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, and this appeal followed. Before we address the merits of the claims raised by the petitioner on appeal, we set forth relevant legal prin- ciples that guide our analysis and the applicable standard of review. “ ‘Under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 29, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). ‘Given the centrality of plea bargaining to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the [s]ixth [a]mendment [to the United States constitu- tion] requires in the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours is for the most part a system of pleas, not  Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction a system of trials . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. . . . In today’s crimi- nal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.’ . . . Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330, 339–40, 258 A.3d 40 (2021). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] by ‘demonstrating that (1) counsel’s representa- tion fell below an objective standard of r