Rubin v. Brodie

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Rubin v. Brodie EITAN RUBIN ET AL. v. BARNETT BRODIE ET AL. (AC 48009) Moll, Pierson and Sheldon, Js. Syllabus Pursuant to statute (§ 52-420 (b)), no motion to vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion. The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s application to confirm an arbitration award. Held: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the arbitration award as the plaintiffs did not make a motion to vacate, modify or correct the award within thirty days from the notice of the award as required by § 52-420 (b). Argued September 10—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, and for other relief, brought to the Supe- rior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Ozalis, J., granted the named defendant’s application to confirm an arbitration award, and the named plaintiff et al. appealed to this court. Affirmed. Ridgely Whitmore Brown, for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.). Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). Opinion PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs Eitan Rubin, in his individual capacity, and Reuven Gidanian1 appeal from the trial court’s granting of the application to confirm 1 The following parties were also named as plaintiffs in the present action: (1) Eitan Rubin by power of attorney and by proxy for George Rohr; (2) E.R. Holdings, LLC; (3) Whalley Group, LLC; and (4) L.E. Ventures, LLC. Although it appears that these additional plaintiffs joined in the filing of this appeal, we do not treat them as pursuing this appeal because the arbitration agreement at issue was executed among Rubin, in his individual capacity, Gidanian, and the defendant  Rubin v. Brodie an arbitration award filed by the defendant Barnett Brodie.2 The fatal flaw in this appeal is that, as the trial court concluded correctly, the plaintiffs did not make a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the challenged award within thirty days from the notice of the award, as required by General Statutes § 52-420 (b).3 Our Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that § 52-420 (b) unambigu- ously implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 338 Conn. 651, 659, 258 A.3d 1244 (2021); see also Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 307, 309–10, 313–14, 823 A.2d 1197 (2003) (holding that expiration of thirty day period set forth in § 52-420 (b) deprives trial court of subject mat- ter jurisdiction over any ground to vacate arbitration award, even if that ground is raised by way of opposition to timely filed application to confirm arbitration award). The judgment is affirmed. Barnett Brodie. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Rubin, in his individual capacity, and Gidanian as the plaintiffs. 2 The following parties were also named as defendants in the present action: (1) Reichman Brodie Real Estate, LLC; (2) Lawrence Levinson; (3) RBC DE2, LLC; (4) Sperry Group DE2, LLC; (5) Riley Group DE2, LLC; (6) TZ DE2, LLC; (7) CoreVest American Finance Lender, LLC; and (8) 5 Arch Funding Corp. Levinson, CoreVest American Finance Lender, LLC, and 5 Arch Funding Corp. are not participating in this appeal. Although it appears that Reichman Brodie Real Estate, LLC, RBC DE2, LLC, Sperry Group DE2, LLC, Riley Group DE2, LLC, and TZ DE2, LLC, joined Brodie in filing an appellate brief, we do not treat those additional defendants as participating in this appeal because Bro- die, alone, filed the application to confirm the arbitration award. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Brodie as the defendant. 3 Because the arbitration agreement at issue was made prior to October 1, 2018, it is governed by General Statutes §§ 52-408 to 52-424, rather than the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, General Statutes § 52-407aa et seq., which governs agreements to arbitrate made on or after October 1, 2018. See General Statutes §§ 52-407cc and 52-407eee.