In re Malena S.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  In re Malena S. IN RE MALENA S. ET AL.* (AC 49801) Suarez, Westbrook and Bishop, Js. Syllabus The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgments terminating his parental rights as to his minor children. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts of the Department of Children and Families. Held: There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusions that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with his minor children, that the respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from such efforts, and that the respondent failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that he could assume a responsible position in the lives of the minor children within a reasonable time; accordingly, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The respondent’s unpreserved claim that the statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)) governing a parent’s personal rehabilitation was unconstitutionally vague failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the void for vagueness doctrine applies only to statutes, and the specific steps the trial court ordered the respondent to take to facilitate reunification with his children were not statutes. Argued September 8—officially released October 21, 2026** Procedural History Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami- lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the court, Nadim, J.; judgments * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b- 142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. ** October 21, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.  In re Malena S. terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed. David E. Schneider, Jr., assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father). Andrew M. Ammirati, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Opinion PER CURIAM. The respondent father, Manuel S.,1 appeals from the trial court’s judgments terminating his parental rights as to three of his minor children. The respondent claims that (1) the court improperly concluded that the Department of Children and Fami- lies (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the minor children and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts, (2) the court improperly concluded that he failed to rehabilitate sufficiently, (3) General Statutes § 17a- 112 (j) (3) (B), which concerns personal rehabilitation, is unconstitutionally vague as applied, (4) the court erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate his parental rights, and (5) in assessing the children’s best interests, the court improperly failed to consider the impact that such termination would have on the bonds the minor children had with the siblings who remain in the respondent’s care. We find no merit to any of these claims and affirm the judgments of the trial court. “Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds 1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother with respect to each child. Because she has not appealed from the judg- ments of the trial court, all references in this opinion to the respondent are to the father only.  In re Malena S. for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds. . . . Also, as part of the adjudicatory phase, the [petitioner] is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the department] has made reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds . . . that the parent is unable or unwilling to ben- efit from reunification . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn. App. 827, 837, 246 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 932, 248 A.3d 1 (2021). In the present case, the petitioner alleged the ground of failure to achieve rehabilitation, as set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). “If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [parent’s] parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in . . . § [17a-112 (k)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 838. In the present case, the court issued a memorandum of decision on January 30, 2026, in which it granted the petitioner’s petitions to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. In its memorandum of decision, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the chil- dren with the respondent, offering to him numerous services to aid in attaining reunification, including case management services, supervised visitation, adminis- trative case reviews, referrals to outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment programs, supportive housing, referrals for family therapy, and parenting  In re Malena S. education. The court found by clear and convincing evi- dence that the respondent was unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, highlighting that he delayed engagement in mental health and substance abuse treatment and was discharged for lack of attendance, his involvement in family therapy was inconsistent and unsuccessful, he was discharged from one parenting program for lack of attendance and refused to engage in two other parenting programs that were offered, he was inconsistent with visitation and he had been late to the majority of visits and missed approximately 30 percent of visits offered. The court, while viewing the respondent’s rehabilitative status through the lens of the minor children’s specialized mental health needs, found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate, noting that he lacked insight into his own deficiencies as a parent, had not accepted the children’s disclosures of trauma experienced while in his care, and had not addressed his history of intimate partner violence with the children’s biological mother, which was another source of the children’s trauma. After considering and making findings as to each of the seven statutory factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k), the court determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that ter- mination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children. Our examination of the record and briefs and our con- sideration of the arguments of the parties persuades us that the judgments of the trial court, as set forth in its comprehensive and well reasoned memorandum of deci- sion, should be affirmed. The court’s conclusions that the department made reasonable reunification efforts and that the respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from such efforts are supported by ample evidence in the record.2 See In re Corey C., 198 Conn. App. 41, 59, 2 The petitioner was required to prove either that the department made reasonable reunification efforts or that the respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from such efforts; see In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009); the court’s findings in both regards are sufficiently supported by the record.  In re Malena S. 232 A.3d 1237 (trial court’s ultimate determination that department has made reasonable efforts and that parent is unable to benefit from reunification services is reviewed on appeal for evidentiary sufficiency), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 930, 236 A.3d 217 (2020). There was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the respondent failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that he could assume a responsible position in the lives of the minor children, who have specialized mental health needs, within a reasonable time. See id. (court’s ulti- mate determination that parent has failed to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) is one of evidentiary sufficiency). The respondent’s void for vagueness claim centers on his contention that he was not given sufficiently detailed specific steps that articulated what he needed to do. Because “the void for vagueness doctrine applies only to statutes, and specific steps are not statutes”; In re Aurora H., 222 Conn. App. 307, 325 n.10, 304 A.3d 875, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 931, 306 A.3d 1 (2023); his unpreserved claim fails under the third prong of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).3 Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record to sup- port the court’s finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. See In re S. G., 229 Conn. App. 834, 861–62, 328 A.3d 737 (2024) (appellate tribunal will not disturb trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in 3 Pursuant to Golding, we may review an unpreserved constitutional claim “only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of con- stitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged con- stitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40.  In re Malena S. child’s best interest unless that finding is clearly errone- ous). The court listed each of the seven factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and made written findings as to each factor. See, e.g., In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 818, 274 A.3d 218 (trial court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding each statutory factor enumerated in § 17a-112 (k)), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022). Lastly, the respondent’s argument as to the bonds the minor children have with their siblings concerns an issue that the court is not mandated to consider. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (k). In its decision, the court mentioned the children’s siblings who were still in the respondent’s care, including a brother who had engaged in inappropriate sexual touching of the children, and noted that one of the minor children disclosed in therapy that she did not like talking to her brother at visits and that the brother had asked her to say that she wanted to return home. Nevertheless, to the extent that the court did not consider the bonds the children had with their siblings who were still in the respondent’s care, it was not clearly erroneous for the court not to have done so. “The bond between the children and their siblings . . . is not a consideration in any of the seven statutory factors found in § 17a-112 (k); therefore, [a] court’s failure to consider it [is] not clearly erroneous.” In re G. H., 216 Conn. App. 671, 701 n.12, 286 A.3d 944 (2022). The judgments are affirmed.