Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. KATHLEEN CASE, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF SCOTT CASE) v. THE CONNECTICUT INSTITUTE FOR THE BLIND, INC., ET AL. (AC 47664) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.* Syllabus The defendant C Co. appealed from the trial court’s judgment, following a jury trial, for the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of her son, the decedent, in connection with C Co.’s alleged negligence that led to the dece- dent’s wrongful death. C Co. claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Held: This court declined to review C Co.’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency because it failed to properly preserve those claims for appellate review, as it did not file a motion to set aside the verdict asking to have judgment ren- dered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, which, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 16-37), had been deemed denied when the trial court reserved its decision on it and ultimately submitted the case to the jury. C Co.’s claim that the plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness and request for punitive damages should not have been permitted because they were raised beyond the statute of limitations was not properly preserved for this court’s review, as the trial court never addressed the merits of C Co.’s statute of limitations defense because C Co. did not raise it by the proper procedural vehicle in a timely manner. This court declined to review C Co.’s claims that the plaintiff’s claim under the patients’ bill of rights statute (§ 19a-550) was barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute (§ 52-555), that the trial court should have stricken the plaintiff’s claims of recklessness and her associated claim for punitive damages because they constituted an improper claim for vicarious liability, and that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiff to file an amended revised complaint, as C Co.’s claims were inadequately briefed. Argued March 12—officially released September 15, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen- dants’ alleged negligence in connection with the wrongful death of the plaintiff’s decedent, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court, Bellis, J., granted the * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. named defendant’s motion to strike; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., denied the named defendant’s motion to strike; subsequently, the case was transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, where the case was with- drawn as to the defendant Lincare, Inc.; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Pierson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and David G. Hill, for the appellant (named defendant). James J. Healy, with whom were Shivangi Bhatia and, on the brief, John W. Mills and Maria A. Cahill, for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion CRADLE, C. J. In this wrongful death action, the defendant, the Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc., doing business as Oak Hill,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Kathleen Case, the administrator of the estate of her son, Scott Case (decedent). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and (2) “[t]he plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages based on [the defendant’s] alleged recklessness should not have been permitted to stand” because (a) it was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations; (b) it was based on alleged viola- tions of the patients’ bill of rights, General Statutes § 19a-550 et seq., and was barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute, General Statutes § 52-555; (c) the plaintiff’s claim for recklessness “constitute[d] an improper respondeat superior claim”; and (d) the court improperly permitted the plaintiff to file the operative revised amended complaint without seeking the court’s 1 Lincare, Inc., also was named as a defendant in this action. On March 22, 2024, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to Lincare, Inc. Accord- ingly, any reference herein to the defendant is to the Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc., doing business as Oak Hill.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. permission to do so under Practice Book § 10-60. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the claims on appeal. The defendant is a community service provider for individu- als with disabilities and maintains several intermediate care facilities throughout the state, including the facil- ity at which the decedent resided from September 2015 until the date of his death, May 23, 2016. The decedent required nighttime use of a bilevel positive airway pres- sure (BiPAP) noninvasive respiratory breathing machine to manage his sleep apnea. The BiPAP machine was provided and maintained by Lincare, Inc. (Lincare). According to the guidelines established by the defendant for the decedent’s care, dated September 7, 2015, the decedent was to be checked “throughout the night at least every half hour to make sure the [BiPAP] mask is on his face and he is breathing okay [and] also that the tubing is free.” (Emphasis in original.) The decedent was discovered unresponsive in his bed at approximately 4 a.m. on May 23, 2016, and was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. The plaintiff commenced this action and, thereafter, by way of the operative amended revised complaint filed on October 2, 2023, alleged that the defendant’s negli- gence and reckless disregard of the decedent’s rights, under § 19a-550 (e),2 proximately caused his death. In 2 General Statutes § 19a-550 (e) provides: “Any nursing home facil- ity, residential care home or chronic disease hospital that negligently deprives a patient of any right or benefit created or established for the well-being of the patient by the provisions of this section shall be liable to such patient in a private cause of action for injuries suffered as a result of such deprivation. Upon a finding that a patient has been deprived of such a right or benefit, and that the patient has been injured as a result of such deprivation, damages shall be assessed in the amount sufficient to compensate such patient for such injury. The rights or ben- efits specified in subsections (b) to (d), inclusive, of this section may not be reduced, rescinded or abrogated by contract. In addition, where the deprivation of any such right or benefit is found to have been wilful or in reckless disregard of the rights of the patient, punitive damages may be assessed. A patient may also maintain an action pursuant to this section  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. support of those claims, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s BiPAP machine had not been functioning properly since April 15, 2016, and, after an inspection on May 19, 2016, Lincare opined that the machine would need to be replaced within the week. The BiPAP machine was not replaced prior to the decedent’s death. The plain- tiff further alleged that, on May 22, 2016, the decedent was equipped, with the assistance of an employee of the defendant, with the BiPAP mask at approximately 9 p.m. The plaintiff asserted that the decedent was not checked every half hour that night, as required by the defendant’s guidelines, and “[a]ny checks that were made between the hours of 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. consisted of looking into the [decedent’s] room from the doorway and did not include checking to ensure that [the decedent] was breathing, that he showed no signs of blue in his face or fingers and [that his] BiPAP mask was secure [and] that the tubing was free.” When the decedent was found unresponsive at 4 a.m. on May 23, 2016, the employee who found him did not initiate cardiopulmonary resus- citation (CPR) or call for an ambulance. Instead, that employee sought the assistance of another employee, who, at 4:21 a.m. removed the decedent’s BiPAP mask and called the police. Between that time and 4:29 a.m., when paramedics arrived, the two employees moved the decedent to the floor and initiated CPR. The decedent was pronounced dead at 4:38 a.m. The plaintiff alleged that, contrary to prior nights, the “chip in the BiPAP machine did not record any data” from the time the decedent went to bed on May 22, 2016, to the time that he was pronounced dead on May 23, 2016, and that indicated that the BiPAP machine was not working properly that night. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had failed to properly train its employees as to the decedent’s need for the BiPAP machine and for any other type of relief, including injunctive and declaratory relief, permitted by law. Exhaustion of any available administrative remedies shall not be required prior to commencement of suit under this section.”  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. “how to operate and understand the functioning of the machine . . . .” Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict, on March 20, 2024, in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defen- dant’s negligence and reckless disregard of the decedent’s rights proximately caused his death. The jury awarded the plaintiff $4 million in noneconomic damages and $6 million in punitive damages. On that same day, the trial court accepted and recorded the verdict. On April 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment asking that the court enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. In support of that motion, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had not filed a motion to set aside or to reduce the verdict and that the ten day time period for filing such motion had expired. The defendant filed its objection on May 3, 2024. On May 8, 2024, on the plaintiff’s motion, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.3 The court awarded offer of compromise interest pursuant to General Stat- utes § 52-192a in the amount of $3,364,383.20. The court also awarded postjudgment interest at a rate of 10 percent per year pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant first claims that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 3 The court explained, inter alia: “In this case, while [the defendant] moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rested, it failed to file with the clerk a written motion to set aside the verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or any other motion listed in Practice Book § 16-35, within the ten day period mandated by § 16-35, which ten day period expired on April 1, 2024 (March 30, 2024, being a Saturday; see Practice Book § 7-17). Moreover, the defendant did not move for an extension of the ten day period, prior to the expiration of that period, for good cause shown. On the present record, and in light of the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for permission to file a late motion and renewed motion for directed verdict . . . the plaintiff is entitled to the entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict in the amount of $10,000,000. See Practice Book § 17-2.” (Citation omitted.)  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. Specifically, the defendant claims that there was insuf- ficient evidence to prove (a) that its negligence caused the decedent’s death, (b) that it acted wilfully or recklessly, and (c) the decedent’s life expectancy.4 In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s claims of eviden- tiary insufficiency were not properly preserved for our review because the defendant failed to file a motion to set aside the verdict in accordance with Practice Book § 16-37.5 We agree with the plaintiff. The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. The plaintiff rested her 4 Specifically, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the death of the decedent because the testimony of the plaintiff’s causation expert was based on speculation and conjecture and was not supported by subordinate facts. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence of wilful or reckless conduct in support of her claim for puni- tive damages under § 19a-550 (e) and failed to prove the decedent’s life expectancy for purposes of her claim for loss of life’s enjoyment. Because we conclude that these issues were not preserved, we do not address them. 5 Practice Book § 16-37 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at any time after the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. After the acceptance of a verdict and within the time stated in Section 16-35 for filing a motion to set a ver- dict aside, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . . If a verdict was returned, the judicial authority may allow the judgment to stand or may set the verdict aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. . . .” Practice Book § 16-35 provides: “Motions in arrest of judgment, whether for extrinsic causes or causes apparent on the record, motions to set aside a verdict, motions for remittitur, motions for additur, motions for new trials, unless brought by petition served on the adverse party or parties, and motions pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225a for reduction of the verdict due to collateral source payments must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted; provided that for good cause the judicial authority may extend this time.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. case on March 12, 2024, after which the defendant’s counsel orally moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the decedent’s death and that it acted “wilfully with the intention of killing or causing [the decedent’s] death.”6 After hearing argument on the defendant’s oral motion for a directed verdict, the court held: “The court is going to reserve decision on all of the legal issues raised in the motions for a directed verdict to a later time in the proceedings pursuant to § 16-37 of the Practice Book. . . . But the court is going to take those issues up after the jury has rendered its verdict.” 7 The trial then proceeded with the defendant’s presentation of evidence. On March 20, 2024, after the court accepted and recorded the jury’s verdict, counsel for the defendant reminded the court, on the record, of its earlier motion for a directed verdict. The court declined to take up the motion at the time and stated that it would “advise [counsel] as to when [it would address it].”8 After the court accepted the jury’s verdict on March 20, 2024, no motions were filed until April 8, 2024, when the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment pursuant The clerk shall notify the trial judge of such filing. Such motions shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies.” 6 The defendant did not file a written motion for a directed verdict. 7 Lincare also orally moved for a directed verdict and filed a written motion. The court’s reference to more than one motion included the motions for a directed verdict by Lincare and the defendant. As noted in footnote 1 of this opinion, the plaintiff withdrew her action as to Lincare. 8 Specifically, the following colloquy occurred after the court accepted the verdict: “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor obviously reserved judgment on several motions and I wasn’t sure if the court wants to take them up at this point in time or wants to. “The Court: I do not. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. I took it as much, I figured every- thing’s a little bit fresh in people’s minds, but I did want to remind the court of something I probably don’t need to but obviously I’ll defer to the court as to when the court may want to take those motions up. “The Court: Attorney Hill, I have not forgotten. . . . And I will advise you as to when.”  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. to Practice Book § 17-2,9 wherein she asked the court to render judgment on the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff, in her motion, also sought statutory interest, offer of compromise interest and statutory costs. In support of her motion, the plaintiff noted the defendant’s March 12, 2024 oral motion for a directed verdict, but recounted that, “[a]t no time after the defendant rested did [the defendant’s] counsel renew his motion for a directed verdict, nor did he do so after final arguments or before the exhibits were submitted to the jury and the jury began its deliberations.” She further recounted that the defendant had not filed any postverdict motions pursu- ant to Practice Book § 16-35 or § 16-37. Although the defendant had not filed any postverdict motions that would have precluded the entry of judg- ment, the plaintiff noted on the request for adjudication of her motion for judgment that the defendant did not consent to the entry of judgment,10 which caused the court to hold a status conference with the parties on April 12, 2024, for the purpose of setting a briefing schedule on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. At that status conference, counsel for the defendant reminded the court that the defendant “still has a pending . . . motion for directed verdict that . . . the court has not ruled on” and 9 Practice Book § 17-2 provides: “The judicial authority shall render judgment on all verdicts of the jury, according to the jury’s finding, subject to statutory adjustments, with costs, unless the verdict is set aside; and in all cases where judgment is rendered otherwise than on a verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall assess the damages which the plaintiff shall recover. If no motions under Section 16-35 or 17-2A are filed, upon the expiration of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accor- dance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. If motions are filed pursuant to Section 16-35 or 17-2A, judgment shall be rendered at the time of and in accordance with the decision on such motions. Whenever a judgment is rendered in a civil jury case, the clerk shall send notice of such judgment to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record. (See General Statutes § 52-225 and annotations.)” 10 The plaintiff filed the request for adjudication on April 9, 2024. The first question on that form is: “May the motion or objection be granted or sustained by agreement or consent?” In response to that question, the plaintiff checked the “[n]o” box.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. asked if the court intended “to do anything relative to that motion.” In response, the court explained to counsel that the motion for a directed verdict was deemed to have been denied when the court initially reserved judgment on it and thereafter submitted the action to the jury and accepted the jury’s verdict.11 The court further explained that the only way for the defendant to have resurrected its arguments on the motion for a directed verdict was 11 The following colloquy ensued: “The Court: I’m aware that you made a motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case. I’m fully aware of that, and as I believe I said to you, I know that you made that motion. . . . But that motion is . . . as a matter of law . . . that motion’s deemed—if I reserved judg- ment on a motion for directed verdict, for purposes of all subsequent proceeding[s], that motion is deemed denied. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: You’re correct, Your Honor. . . . “The Court: The only way to revive a motion for directed verdict is to file a motion to set aside or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with the Practice Book. And I assume [that counsel for the plaintiff] are going to say, ‘well, that wasn’t done here, so they’re entitled to judgment.’ “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, Your Honor . . . I understand what Your Honor is saying about the motion for directed verdict, but typi- cally, what happens is even when the decision is reserved, the parties are allowed to brief that motion. That’s all I’m looking to do. So, I mention this because Your Honor asked a question about the objection to the motion for judgment. I do want to file an objection, but what I was looking for was some kind of briefing schedule on the motion for directed verdict. “The Court: In my view . . . there will be no briefing schedule for the motion for directed verdict because it’s deemed denied. It’s deemed denied, so if a motion to set aside where for [a judgment notwithstand- ing the verdict] had been filed [within] the ten day period, obviously I would set a briefing schedule for that motion. But that wasn’t done, and there will be no briefing schedule on a motion to set aside, but I am going to allow [you], obviously, to oppose the motion for judgment if you wish to do so. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yeah, no. I appreciate that Your Honor. I could tell you. If the court recalls, at the close of the case, shortly after the jury verdict—and I understand what Your Honor’s saying about the motion being denied, but at the close of evidence, I asked the court and I renewed the motion, and the court said, ‘we’re going to get to that at some point.’ I don’t know exactly what the court’s verbiage was, but ‘we’ll deal with that at some point.’ All I’m doing at this point, Your Honor, is asking the court to allow me to brief that motion, so that we can preserve—the issues are already before the court, such that I think they’re preserved for the Appellate Court, but I just want to be  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. to have filed a motion to set aside the verdict or for judg- ment notwithstanding the verdict within the ten day period prescribed by Practice Book §16-35, which the defendant failed to do. The court then ordered the parties to file briefs with respect to the motion for judgment by May 3, 2024.12 On May 3, 2024, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, a motion for permis- sion to file a late motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Practice Book §§ 16-35 and 16-37, and a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to § 16-37. In its motion for permission to file a late motion for a directed verdict, the defendant argued, inter alia, that, “[r]egardless of the able to brief it just so we make sure the record is clean before we take this verdict up. “The Court: “Right, but see, in my view, absent a filing of a motion to set aside and/or a motion for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict], there’s nothing for the court to take up. That’s the court’s view. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I respect that. I don’t know that I neces- sarily agree, so what I may do if I may, Your Honor . . . because certainly, I don’t want to do anything in violation of the court’s wishes. I would like a chance to brief that very issue, um, because— “The Court: In connection with your objection to the motion for judg- ment, you could raise that issue in there because the issue of the ten days is squarely raised by [the plaintiff’s counsel] in their motion for judgment. So, in my view . . . you have carte blanche to address that issue in the context of an objection to the motion for judgment. . . . [B]ut I’m not going to set a briefing schedule on a motion for direct[ed] verdict when there’s been no motion to set aside filed. . . . I just don’t see how procedurally I can do that. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, I mean, as the court knows, that ten days is not jurisdictional, and so, I do think the direct[ed] verdict needs to be amplified for the court’s sake. I do think it need[s] to be amplified and clarified for purposes of the record, so I’ll probably be filing—[it] sounds like the plaintiff will be objecting to it—is an extension to file a motion [to] set aside [the verdict] if the court thinks that’s the pre- requisite to renewing the issue in the directed verdict. I don’t know. My initial position is that it should not be necessary, but in light of the court’s comments . . . I feel like I should just notify the court that we’re probably going to file that request for an extension. “The Court: [Y]ou [file] whatever you feel is necessary to be filed. I’m just saying, on the current record, that’s my view of where we are.” 12 Following that status conference, on the same day, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for judgment on the basis of the court’s explanation of its position on the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. court’s intent on March 20, 2024, the defendant reason- ably and in good faith believed that the court considered the motion for directed verdict to be renewed and would subsequently enter a briefing and/or hearing schedule in order to address the issues raised in that motion.” By written order dated May 8, 2024, the court denied the defendant’s request to file a late motion for a directed verdict. In so doing, the court first noted that the ten day time period for filing postverdict motions set forth in Practice Book § 16-35 is mandatory and the plaintiff had not waived it. The court next noted that any request for an extension of time to file such a motion should have been filed within the ten day time period as pro- vided by § 16-35. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that good cause existed to allow it to file an untimely motion because it “believe[d] that its motion for directed verdict was properly renewed following the jury verdict on March 20, 2024,” because, after accept- ing the verdict, the court told counsel for the defendant that it would “advise [counsel] as to when” it would take up his motion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court explained: “To begin, postverdict motions governed by § 16-35 cannot be made orally. Even if the court considered the defendant’s verbal ‘reminder’ that the court had reserved judgment on ‘several motions’ as a renewal of those motions—which is a generous inter- pretation of counsel’s statement, to say the least—the renewal was made orally. This fails to comply with the express requirement of Practice Book § 16-35 that the postverdict motions encompassed by the rule ‘MUST BE FILED WITH THE CLERK within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted . . . .’ . . . To be filed with the clerk, such motions must be written, and the rule does not contemplate the making of oral motions. Given the language of the rule, the defendant’s belief that it had renewed the motion by means of an oral ‘reminder,’ following the acceptance of the jury’s verdict, does not amount to good cause.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. “Moreover, as to the court’s statement at the end of proceedings on March 20, 2024—‘I will advise you as to when’—the remark does not suggest, either directly or by implication, that the court was excusing the defendant from its obligation to file a written postverdict motion within the time limits provided by Practice Book § 16-35. Courts do not take up previously denied motions for directed verdict, suo motu, following the acceptance of a verdict. Rather, it is the moving party’s obligation to renew the motion for directed verdict by filing a timely motion to set aside and/or for judgment notwithstand- ing the verdict, as provided by Practice Book § 16-37, in accordance with the time limitation established by . . . § 16-35. See, e.g., Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 400–401, 766 A.2d 416 (2001) (observing that ‘a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a new motion, but the renewal of a motion for directed verdict’). As observed by our Supreme Court, ‘[i]n the event that the jury . . . returns a verdict for the plaintiff, [§ 16-37] provides what steps the unsuccessful defendant may take to renew any legal claim previously raised in its motion for a directed verdict . . . .’ (Citation omitted.) Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., [333 Conn. 60, 72–73, 214 A.3d 345 (2019)]. “[The defendant] did not take these steps. As noted by the court during [the] status conference held with the parties on April 12, 2024, [because] the defendant failed to file a postverdict motion within the required time period [set forth in Practice Book § 16-35], there was nothing remaining for the court to consider or take up . . . . Good cause for allowing the untimely submission of the defendant’s motion has not been demonstrated.” (Citation omitted.) The plaintiff argues that the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency are not properly preserved because the defendant failed to revive its motion for a directed verdict by filing a motion to set aside the ver- dict. Our rules of practice and our case law support the plaintiff’s argument. Our Supreme Court has explained:  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. “Practice Book § 16-37 expressly provides the proce- dure to be followed by a trial court when a motion for a directed verdict is not granted. If such a motion ‘is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal ques- tions raised by the motion.’ Practice Book § 16-37. The trial court, therefore, may grant the motion, deny the motion, or reserve decision on the motion. See Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Pagano, 79 Conn. App. 458, 466, 830 A.2d 359 (2003) (recognizing that trial court may ‘delay its decision on a motion for a directed verdict’ and need not ‘immediately deny or immediately grant the motion’); 2 R. Bollier & S. Busby, Stephenson’s Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 195 (d), p. 399 (‘[u]nder [§] 16-37 . . . the trial judge can refuse to rule on the motion for a directed verdict and submit the case to the jury’). “Practice Book § 16-37 treats the trial court’s election to reserve decision as the equivalent of a denial of the motion for purposes of subsequent proceedings, which is why the rule states that the case is deemed to have been submitted to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion if, for any reason, ‘the motion is not granted . . . .’ Practice Book § 16-37. In the event that the jury thereafter returns a verdict for the plaintiff, the rule provides what steps the unsuccessful defendant may take to renew any legal claim previously raised in its motion for a directed verdict: ‘After the acceptance of a verdict and within the time stated in Section 16-35 for filing a motion to set a verdict aside, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accor- dance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . .’ Practice Book § 16-37.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., supra, 333 Conn. 72–73. It is also well settled that it is necessary for a party to move to set aside a verdict to obtain appellate review  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. of a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 205 Conn. 751, 758–59, 535 A.2d 1292 (1988); Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510, 513, 441 A.2d 163 (1981); Goral v. Kenney, 26 Conn. App. 231, 235, 600 A.2d 1031 (1991). Our Supreme Court has explained that this principle is grounded on the notion that we do not address claims on appeal that were not distinctly raised in the trial court.13 Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, supra, 515. This serves “to afford the trial court a full opportunity to redress any errors which may have occurred at trial before the appellate process is begun.” Id. The defendant argues that Pietrorazio has been over- ruled by our Supreme Court’s decision in Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 682 A.2d 106 (1996), and “that a postverdict motion is no longer required in order to preserve appellate review of issues raised at trial.” In Pietrorazio, the plaintiff claimed that “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that sev- eral rulings of the court pertaining to the admissibility of testimony were erroneous.” Pietrorazio v. Santopi- etro, supra, 185 Conn. 511. The plaintiff failed to file a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict rendered in favor of the defendants. Id., 512. The court held that claims of insufficient evidence and claims of error that occur during trial, such as those relating to the admissibility of evidence, must be asserted in a motion to set aside the verdict in order to properly preserve such claims for appellate review. Id., 515. In Santopietro, the court addressed the issue of whether “a motion to set aside the verdict [w]as a prerequisite for full appellate review of rulings other than those involving the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.” Santopietro v. New Haven, supra, 239 Conn. 214. The court thus focused on rulings made by the trial court and expressly noted: “We need not decide in this case 13 The court also noted that “trial counsel often file such motions as a matter of course immediately following the rendition of an adverse verdict.” Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, supra, 185 Conn. 515.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. whether that understanding, namely, that a motion to set a verdict aside is essential to full appellate review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a civil verdict, is correct.” Id., 213 n.9. More recently, in Wil- low Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 717 A.2d 77 (1998), our Supreme Court, citing Santopietro, noted: “We note that it is no longer generally necessary for litigants to preserve a claim both during trial and posttrial in a motion to set aside the verdict in order to obtain appel- late review. . . . In Santopietro, however, we specifically reserved the question of whether, in a civil action for money damages, it would be necessary to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence both during the trial and in a motion to set aside the verdict.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 49 n.43. Our case law requir- ing that a motion to set aside a verdict be filed in order to revive claims of insufficient evidence that are raised in a motion for a directed verdict therefore controls our disposition of the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency in this case. Here, pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37, the defen- dant’s motion for a directed verdict was deemed to have been denied when the court reserved its decision on it and ultimately submitted the case to the jury. Counsel for the defendant conceded that at the April 12, 2024 status conference. See footnote 11 of this opinion. Section 16-37 clearly sets forth the steps that a party must take in order for the court to consider the issues raised in that motion for a directed verdict after the jury renders a verdict, namely, file a motion to set aside the verdict within ten days.14 It is uncontested that the defendant failed to 14 With respect to the relatively short period within which parties may file postverdict motions, our Supreme Court has noted: “[A]lthough the time is short, [it] is found by experience to be on the whole for the inter- est of the public. We no more feel at liberty to disregard it on account of the hardship of a particular case than we do to disregard an ordinary statute of limitations for a similar reason.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, supra, 205 Conn. 758.  Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc. do so.15 Because the defendant did not file a motion to set aside the verdict asking to have judgment rendered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict in accordance with § 16-37, which had been deemed denied by the court, it failed to properly preserve for our review its claims of evidentiary insufficiency.16 We therefore decline to review them. II The defendant also claims that “[t]he plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages based on [the defendant’s] alleged 15 In fact, it is uncontested that the defendant did not file any motions with the court following the court’s acceptance of the verdict on March 20, 2024, until May 3, 2024. Even if the defendant’s claim of a “good faith misunderstanding” could have excused its failure to comply with Practice Book § 16-37, the defendant’s failure to file any motions with the court until May 3, 2024, when it became aware of the court’s position on the oral motion for directed verdict on April 12, 2024, is inexplicable. Although the court scheduled the filing of briefs on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment to be filed by that date, it is unclear why the defendant would not immediately have filed a motion for permission to file a late motion to set aside. It is also noteworthy that the twenty