Mack v. Pinero

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Mack v. Pinero DEMETRIUS MACK v. ELIA PINERO (AC 49179) Suarez, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff father appealed from the trial court’s judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody of their minor child with primary physical custody and final decision-making authority awarded to the defendant mother. The plaintiff, who had sought sole legal and physical custody of the child, claimed, inter alia, that the court relied on false and materially inaccurate facts. Held: The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the subordinate facts relied on by the trial court were clearly erroneous or that its decision was either legally or logically flawed, as the court’s orders were reasonably supported and did not disclose any clear abuse of its discretion. Argued September 17—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Application for custody of the parties’ minor child, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J.; judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody of the minor child with primary physi- cal custody and final decision-making authority awarded to the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Demetrius Mack, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff). Elia Pinero, self-represented, the appellee (defendant). Opinion PER CURIAM. In this custody action, the self-rep- resented plaintiff, Demetrius Mack, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding him and the self- represented defendant, Elia Pinero, joint legal custody of their fifteen and one-half year old child, D, with primary residence and final decision-making authority awarded to the defendant. The plaintiff, who had sought sole legal and physical custody of D, claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) rejected the recommendations of a  Mack v. Pinero family relations counselor that the parties have shared physical custody of D, (2) relied on false and materially inaccurate facts, (3) failed to apply the factors in General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) for determining the best interest of the child, and (4) violated his fundamental rights as a parent in the care, custody and companionship of his child. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court. The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our review. The parties are the parents of D, who was born in March 2011. Prior to and during this action, D primarily resided with the defendant. In December 2024, the defendant initiated a separate support action against the plaintiff pursu- ant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.1 On January 14, 2025, the plaintiff initiated the underlying custody action. The custody matter was tried to the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., on August 6, 2025. The court subsequently issued a decision setting forth its findings of fact and detailed orders regarding custody and parenting time. In reaching its decision, the court considered the testi- mony of the parties as well as other evidence, including a report by a family relations counselor who did an evalua- tion of the family and made recommendations to the court regarding custody. The court found both parents to be credible witnesses who were trying to do their best for D. Nevertheless, according to the court, “[i]t became evident during the trial that there continues to exist between the parties a high level of conflict with an apparent lack of ability to communicate with each other. Although the family relations counselor recommends shared joint legal custody, this court disagrees. It is clear to the court that the minor child has been directly subjected to the animos- ity that exists between his parents and is in continued 1 General Statutes § 46b-231 (b) (13) defines “ ‘IV-D support cases’ ” in relevant part as those “in which the IV-D agency is providing child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act . . . .”  Mack v. Pinero need of engaging in counseling. The child has also been involved in his parents’ adult issues and conflicts. Given the level of conflict between the parties and the lack of communication, an order of shared custody would not be in the child’s best interests under these circumstances, even if the parties were requesting it.” In determining the appropriate custodial orders to enter, the court indicated that it considered the best interest of the child under the factors set forth in § 46b- 56 (b), which directs the court to enter custody orders “that serve the best interest of the child and provide the child with active and consistent involvement of both par- ents commensurate with their abilities and interests.”2 The court ultimately concluded that it was in D’s best interest to award joint legal custody to the parties but to award primary physical custody and final decision- making authority to the defendant. The plaintiff filed the present appeal. “[Our Supreme Court] has consistently held in mat- ters involving child custody . . . that while the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be considered it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child [that] must control the decision of the court. . . . In making this determination, the trial court is vested with broad discretion which can . . . be interfered with [only] upon a clear showing that that discretion was abused. . . . Thus, a trial court’s decision regarding child custody must be allowed to stand if it is reasonably supported by the relevant subordinate facts found and does not violate law, logic or reason. . . . Under § 46b-56 (c), the court, in determining custody, must consider the best interests 2 The court noted that certain of the seventeen separate factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) for the court to consider in devising its orders seemed especially pertinent in this case, namely, “ ‘the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child . . . the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent . . . any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute . . . [and] the mental . . . health of all individuals involved . . . .’ ” See Gen- eral Statutes § 46b-56 (c).  Mack v. Pinero of the child and, in doing so, may consider, among other factors [those enumerated in the statute]. . . . [T]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion [autho- rized by § 46b-56] . . . is not conferred [on our appellate courts], but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are not privi- leged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a clear abuse of direction can warrant our interference.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang, 334 Conn. 601, 632–33, 223 A.3d 775 (2020); see also Briggs v. Briggs, 227 Conn. App. 531, 548, 322 A.3d 475 (2024) (“[T]rial courts have a distinct advantage over an appellate court in dealing with domestic relations, where all of the surrounding circumstances and the appearance and attitude of the parties are so significant. . . . It is a rare case in which a disappointed litigant will be able to demonstrate abuse of a trial court’s broad discretion in . . . matters [concerning the care and custody of children].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). We have thoroughly reviewed the underlying record and the briefs and arguments of the parties. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the subordinate facts relied on by the trial court are clearly erroneous, nor has he met the high burden of demonstrating that the decision reached by the court is either legally or logi- cally flawed. “[I]t is not the role of this court on appeal to reweigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses.” Whelan v. Brestelli, 230 Conn. App. 683, 702, 331 A.3d 1220 (2025). After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the court’s orders are reasonably supported and do not disclose any clear abuse of its dis- cretion. We reject the plaintiff’s claims to the contrary. The judgment is affirmed.