Jason P. Brown v. The People of the State of Colorado.

1 2026 CO 51M Jason P. Brown, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado. Respondent No. 24SC492 Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc August 17, 2026 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA405 Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Emily Hessler, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado 2 Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado District Attorneys' Council: Jeff M. Van der Veer, Senior Deputy District Attorney Denver, Colorado 3 Thomas Raynes Denver, Colorado 4 GABRIEL JUSTICE 5 ¶1 We granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether People v. Manzo , 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006), is no longer good law or is distinguishable, and whether the trial court reversibly erred and violated Jason P. Brown's right to due process because it allowed the jury to convict him of a class 3 felony for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death ("LTS (death)") without the prosecution proving that he acted with any culpable mental state; and (2) whether Colorado's prior habitual offender scheme is unconstitutional because it required a judge rather than a jury to make findings of fact that increase a defendant's sentence, and whether Brown's adjudication as a habitual offender must be vacated because he was deprived of his right to a jury trial. ¶2 We now conclude that (1) Manzo remains good law, and therefore, the trial court did not err or violate Brown's right to due process in entering judgment for LTS (death) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury ("LTS (SBI)") against Brown without requiring the prosecution to prove that he acted with any culpable mental state; and (2) the prior Colorado habitual offender scheme was constitutional, and any error in Brown's adjudication as a habitual offender was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (We note that the first issue on which Brown sought certiorari was framed as addressing only LTS (death), but the substantive arguments that he presented in his briefs apply equally to LTS (death) 6 and LTS (SBI). Because, like him, we perceive no reason to treat those offenses differently for purposes of the first issue presented, we address both of those offenses in this opinion.) ¶3 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals division below. I. Facts and Procedural History ¶4 One night in June 2017, Brown turned his truck into an alley and drove over two people who were sleeping under a white blanket in an alcove there. He slowed down, and a witness told him through an open window on the truck that he "just ran those people over." He responded, "No, I didn't," and sped off while the witness ran after him, trying to get his license plate number. ¶5 One of the victims, D.W., survived, although he sustained serious injuries requiring emergency surgical intervention. The other victim, K.M., died that night as a result of her injuries. ¶6 Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers, who were able to determine Brown's home address from the information provided by witnesses, met with Brown at his home. The officers observed that Brown had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol, although Brown told the officers that he did not drink until he arrived home. Later that evening, the witness who had told Brown that he had run over the victims identified him as the person who had done so. 7 ¶7 The People subsequently charged Brown with, among other things, LTS (death) and LTS (SBI), pursuant to section 42-4-1601, C.R.S. (2025). Brown pleaded not guilty to those charges. ¶8 In addition, after filing their initial complaint against Brown, the People filed a motion to amend the complaint to add habitual criminal counts under section 18-1.3-801, C.R.S. (2017). In response, Brown filed a motion to declare the habitual criminal statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. He also filed a motion demanding a jury trial on the habitual criminal counts. ¶9 The trial court ultimately granted the People's motion to amend to add the habitual criminal counts and denied Brown's responsive motions. ¶10 The case proceeded to trial, and at trial, the court instructed the jury as to the elements of LTS (death), in pertinent part, as follows: The elements of the crime of Failure to Fulfill Duties after Involvement in an Accident Involving Death are: 1. That the defendant, 2. in the state of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. drove a vehicle that was directly involved in an accident, 4. resulting in the death of any person, and 5. failed to do the following, without obstructing traffic more than necessary: immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close to the accident scene as possible, and immediately return to the scene of the accident and remain at the scene of the accident until he had fulfilled the legal requirements of giving notice, information, and aid. 8 After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has proven each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of Failure to Fulfill Duties after Involvement in an Accident Involving Death. ¶11 The court instructed the jury on the elements of LTS (SBI) in virtually identical language, with the only difference being the instruction's reference to serious bodily injury rather than death. Neither of these elemental instructions included any culpable mental state. ¶12 The jury ultimately convicted Brown of both LTS charges, and the trial court thereafter adjudicated Brown a habitual offender without submitting questions of fact as to the habitual criminal counts to the jury. The court then sentenced Brown to a total of sixty years in the Department of Corrections. ¶13 Brown appealed both his LTS convictions and his habitual criminal sentence. ¶14 As to the LTS convictions, Brown argued that the trial court had erred by not including any culpable mental state in the elemental instructions regarding those counts, thereby effectively instructing the jury that the LTS crimes were strict liability offenses. Brown acknowledged that we had concluded in Manzo that LTS crimes were strict liability offenses that did not require a culpable mental state, but he contended that this determination was erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Rehaif v. United States , 588 U.S. 225 (2019). 9 ¶15 As to the habitual criminal sentence, Brown argued that the trial judge's finding that Brown was a habitual offender must be vacated because the then-existing habitual offender scheme was facially unconstitutional under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions, given that it permitted a judge rather than a jury to make predicate findings of fact. ¶16 In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, a division of our court of appeals affirmed the LTS (death) conviction and habitual offender sentence. People v. Brown , No. 21CA405, ¶¶ 100-01, 105-07 (May 9, 2024). ¶17 With regard to Brown's challenge to the LTS instructions, the division concluded that it was bound to follow Manzo . Id. at ¶¶ 96-100. Even if Rehaif could be said to have effectively overruled Manzo , however, the division concluded that any error in the omission of the knowingly mental state from the elemental instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record established that element through substantial evidence, including the visibility of the white blanket in the alley, Brown's pausing after running over the victims, and his speeding away after being confronted by witnesses. Id. at ¶ 100. ¶18 With regard to Brown's constitutional challenge to the habitual offender statute, the division concluded that Brown's position was foreclosed by this court's precedent and settled case law from other divisions of the court of appeals. Id. at ¶¶ 106-07. 10 ¶19 Brown then petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted his petition. II. Analysis ¶20 We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review. We then consider whether Manzo remains good law and is applicable to this case. Finally, we address whether the prior habitual offender scheme was facially unconstitutional and if Brown's adjudication by the trial court as a habitual offender must be vacated. A. Standard of Review ¶21 We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law. Roberts v. People , 2017 CO 76, ¶ 18 , 399 P.3d 702, 705 . ¶22 We likewise review a statute's constitutionality, both facially and as applied, de novo. See Dean v. People , 2016 CO 14, ¶ 8 , 366 P.3d 593, 596 . ¶23 We review trial errors of constitutional dimension that were preserved, like those at issue here, for constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11 , 288 P.3d 116, 119 . Such errors require reversal unless they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Accordingly, we will reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that such an error might have contributed to the conviction. 11 Id. For this type of error, the People bear the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. B. The LTS Jury Instructions ¶24 Brown first contends that Manzo is no longer good law or is distinguishable and therefore, the trial court reversibly erred in entering judgment on the LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) counts without proof of a culpable mental state (here, "knowingly"). We are not persuaded. ¶25 We begin, as we must, with settled principles of stare decisis. ¶26 "Stare decisis is a judge-made doctrine that requires courts to follow preexisting rules of law." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 . Although courts are hesitant to undo settled law, they may depart from or overrule prior precedent when sound reasons exist to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15, 413 P.3d at 1270 . Specifically, we will depart from our existing law when we are clearly convinced that "(1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Id. at ¶ 15, 413 P.3d at 1270 . ¶27 Here, Brown contends that subsequent events have shown that Manzo is no longer good law. In particular, he asserts that the Supreme Court's ruling in Rehaif effectively overruled Manzo and that, in any event, the increased penalties for 12 LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) that were adopted after Manzo was decided rendered our decision in that case inapplicable. We disagree. ¶28 In Rehaif , 588 U.S. at 227 , the Supreme Court considered a federal statute that made it unlawful for certain categories of individuals to possess firearms. A separate statute added that anyone who "knowingly violates" the first statute shall be fined or imprisoned for up to ten years. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2)). The question presented required the Court to decide whether the government had the burden of proving both that the defendant engaged in the relevant conduct (i.e., possession of a firearm) and that the defendant fell within one of the categories of individuals to whom the statute was directed. Id. The Court concluded that the word "knowingly" applied "both to the defendant's conduct and to the defendant's status." Id. ¶29 In so concluding, the Court began by noting that whether a statute requires the government to prove that the defendant had acted knowingly is a question of legislative intent. Id. at 228 . To determine this intent, the Court observed that courts apply a longstanding presumption that Congress intends to require a defendant to have a culpable mental state as to each statutory element. Id. at 228-29 . This presumption in favor of scienter applies, the Court said, even when Congress does not include any scienter in the statutory text. Id. at 229 . And the court added that the presumption applies with equal or greater force when the 13 statute at issue includes a general scienter provision. Id. (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(4), at 226 (A.L.I. 1985) for the proposition that when a statute prescribes a requisite culpability, without distinguishing among the material elements of that statute, the culpability provision will apply to all material elements of the offense unless a contrary purpose plainly appears). The Court noted, however, that it has " typically declined to apply the presumption in favor of scienter in cases involving statutory provisions that form part of a 'regulatory' or 'public welfare' program and carry only minor penalties." Id. at 232 (emphasis added). ¶30 For several reasons, we reject Brown's premise that the foregoing language in Rehaif effectively overruled Manzo . ¶31 First, as noted above, Rehaif concerned a statutory scheme that explicitly included a "knowingly" mental state. Id. at 227 . The question before the Court involved the elements to which that mens rea applied. Id. The opinion thus has no bearing on a statute like the one at issue here that has no express mens rea requirement and thus tasks us with determining whether to imply such an element. ¶32 Second, although the Rehaif Court made comments about the presumption of scienter "typically" not applying to public welfare offenses and offenses carrying only minor penalties, in light of the foregoing, those comments were 14 dicta, as they had no direct bearing on the statute that the Court was construing, which did include a culpable mental state. ¶33 Third, the Rehaif Court's comments on these issues did not establish immutable principles of black letter law. As noted above, the Court prefaced the comments on which Brown relies with the word "typically," id. at 232 , thus signaling that the principle on which the Court was commenting was a general one, and not one of uniform application. ¶34 Finally, even if the comments in Rehaif on which Brown relies were not dicta, we perceive nothing in Rehaif purporting to make the severity of an offense's penalty a sole determinant of whether a crime may be a strict liability offense. To the contrary, Rehaif relied on long-settled principles suggesting that the nature of an offense and the severity of its penalty may be considered in determining whether a crime may properly be construed to be a strict liability offense. See id. We see nothing in Rehaif suggesting an intent to depart from or alter that long-established law. ¶35 For all of these reasons, we discern nothing in Rehaif that can be read as effectively overruling Manzo . ¶36 Our conclusion that Manzo remains good law finds further support in the applicable statutory and legislative history of section 42-4-1601. Specifically, we note that in the many years since Manzo was decided, the General Assembly has 15 amended that statute four times and, among other things, increased the penalties for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI). See Ch. 225, sec. 1, § 42-4-1601(2)(c), 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 850 , 850 (elevating LTS (death) from a class 4 to a class 3 felony); Ch. 261, sec. 1, § 42-4-1601(2)(b), 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 1354 , 1354 (elevating LTS (SBI) from a class 5 to a class 4 felony); Ch. 337, sec. 2, § 42-4-1601(3), 2017 Colo. Sess. Laws 1797 , 1803 (providing that the revocation of a person's driver's license due to an LTS conviction runs concurrently with any suspension imposed pursuant to section 42-2-127.9, C.R.S. (2025), if imposed as a result of the same driving episode); Ch. 331, sec. 3, § 42-4-1601(4), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 3070 , 3072 (modifying the sections to which certain definitions apply). ¶37 Despite these several amendments, the General Assembly has never indicated an intent to overrule Manzo or to add a mens rea requirement to section 42-4-1601. To the contrary, the General Assembly appears to have acted to ensure that drivers involved in accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury will remain at the scene of an accident or otherwise face strict liability charges. Thus, the legislative history reveals the General Assembly's intent to place LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) on equal footing with driving under the influence ("DUI") vehicular homicide and assault, both of which are strict liability offenses that carry a higher felony classification level than that which was prescribed for LTS before 2008. In doing so, the General Assembly sought to eliminate any incentive for intoxicated 16 drivers to flee the scene so that they would face a lesser penalty than they would have faced had they remained and been found to be intoxicated. See, e.g. , Hearing on S.B. 239 before the S. Judiciary Comm., 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 23, 2008) (statement of now-Judge Ted Tow, then a representative from the Colorado District Attorneys' Council) ("[LTS (death)] currently [is] a class 4 felony. The problem is if [an intoxicated driver] stick[s] around and they find out they're drunk, it's a class 3 felony. So, there's an incentive for someone to flee the scene, and that doesn't seem to make a lot of sense."); Second Reading of S.B. 239 before the Senate, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 28, 2008) (statement of bill sponsor Sen. Bob Bacon) (noting that the bill's goal is to increase the penalty for an accident that results in death because, under then-existing law, if an individual flees the accident, that individual "is subject to a level 4 [felony], and one who stays there and has an aggravating factor like a DUI then gets the more severe penalty"; and further noting that "what this does is to make sure that the person stays there . . . if a death is involved"); Hearing on S.B. 239 before the H. Judiciary Comm., 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 30, 2008) (statement of now-Judge Ted Tow) (noting that under then-existing law, an individual's flight has forced the People into a position where they can prove only a low-level crime involving death, and thus, "what this bill will do is essentially put the individual at the same level as if he had committed the worst of these [vehicular crimes resulting in death]," in order 17 to disincentivize flight and allow the People to determine the correct level of the individual's culpability and to bring appropriate charges); Hearing on H.B. 1084 before the H. Judiciary Comm., 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Feb. 16, 2012) (statement of bill sponsor Rep. Kathleen Conti) (noting that under then-existing law, persons involved in alcohol-involved hit-and-run accidents resulting in serious bodily injury were incentivized to run home and sober up before coming back and admitting to the accident, at which point they faced a lesser charge, thus resulting in a "miscarriage of justice that we are seeing . . . right now in the law and a loophole that we feel needs to be repaired, and that's . . . the basis of this bill [which increased the penalty for such hit-and-run accidents]"). ¶38 In light of the absence of any reference to a culpable mental state or disapproval of Manzo in the foregoing statutory and legislative history, we presume that the legislature accepted our conclusion in Manzo that LTS offenses are strict liability offenses. See Griego v. People , 19 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. 2001) ("We must presume that, when the General Assembly legislates in a certain area of law, it does so with awareness of the judicial precedent in that area."); People v. Swain , 959 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Colo. 1998) ("Under an established rule of statutory construction, the legislature is presumed, by virtue of its action in amending a previously construed statute without changing the portion that was construed, to have accepted and ratified the prior judicial construction."). Ruling now that 18 LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) include a mens rea of "knowingly," as Brown asks us to do, would incentivize drivers to flee the scene of an accident, contrary to the General Assembly's expressed intent. ¶39 Finally, although Brown contends that Manzo is inapplicable because LTS (death) is now a class 3 felony, whereas Manzo involved LTS (SBI) when it was still categorized as a class 5 felony, this argument merely reiterates Brown's suggestion that under Rehaif , the severity of a sentence is essentially dispositive of whether an offense may be construed to be a strict liability offense. Again, however, we are unpersuaded by this contention. Moreover, Rehaif , 588 U.S. at 228 , itself observed that whether a culpable mental state applies to a criminal statute "is a question of congressional intent." For the reasons discussed above, we perceive nothing in the statute requiring a culpable mental state and nothing in the legislative history suggesting an intent to adopt such an element. ¶40 Accordingly, we conclude that Manzo remains good law and that therefore, the trial court did not err in entering judgment against Brown for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) without a jury finding on culpability. ¶41 In so concluding, we are not persuaded by Brown's contention that in enacting section 42-4-1601, the legislature intended for drivers to have, at the very least, knowledge of their involvement in an accident because without such knowledge, a driver would be unaware of their duty to remain at the scene. 19 Although we are not unsympathetic to this argument and acknowledge that some states with LTS statutes similar to ours have concluded that knowledge is required as to the accident element of the offense, see, e.g. , State v. Al - Naseer , 734 N.W.2d 679, 680-81 (Minn. 2007); Clancy v. State , 313 P.3d 226, 230 (Nev. 2013), we are constrained to follow the plain language of our own section 42-4-1601 and to effectuate our legislature's intent. Any effort to remedy perceived inequity that might result from the application of the statute's plain language is more appropriately directed to our General Assembly. ¶42 Moreover, requiring knowledge only as to the accident element of the offenses before us (i.e., concluding that a defendant must know of the accident but not of the resulting death or injury) would be inconsistent with the settled principle that the level of culpability generally applies to all elements of an offense unless the statute clearly indicates otherwise. See § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. (2025) ("When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears."); People v. Coleby , 34 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. 2001) (applying section 18-1-503(4) to conclude that the mens rea of "knowingly" applied to all elements of the offense at issue, even though that mens rea appeared in only one part of the statute, when the legislative history revealed no intent on the part of the General Assembly to limit the 20 application of the culpable mental state to just one element of the offense); People v. Trevino , 826 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo.App. 1991) ("If a statute defining an offense contains a specific mens rea requirement, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense," and this same rule applies when the statute merely implies a mens rea.). We perceive no basis for applying an implied mens rea to only certain elements of the offenses at issue when, as here, neither the statutory text nor its statutory and legislative history supports our doing so. ¶43 Lastly, we are unpersuaded by Brown's assertion that allowing a judgment of conviction for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) without a jury finding of knowledge of involvement in an accident violates due process. In making this argument, Brown essentially reiterates his view that Rehaif mandates such a result and effectively overruled Manzo . For the reasons set forth above, we do not agree. ¶44 Accordingly, we conclude that Manzo remains good law and that therefore, the trial court did not err in entering judgment against Brown for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) without a jury finding of any culpable mental state attributable to him. C. The Habitual Offender Statute ¶45 Brown next contends that the prior version of Colorado's habitual offender scheme, sections 18-1.3-801 to -804, C.R.S. (2017), under which the trial court found Brown to be a habitual offender, is facially unconstitutional because it purports to mandate that a judge rather than a jury make the requisite fact-finding. Brown 21 further contends that his adjudication as a habitual offender must be vacated because he was deprived of his right to a jury trial and even if such an error was not structural, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Our precedent and the record undermine each of these arguments. ¶46 In People v. Gregg , 2025 CO 57, ¶ 3, 576 P.3d 725 , 727-28, we concluded that the version of the habitual offender scheme at issue there (which is substantively the same as the version at issue in the present case) was not facially unconstitutional. In so concluding, we first observed, "A defendant is a habitual offender, and thus implicated in this sentencing scheme, if they have been convicted of a felony and 'three times previously convicted, upon charges separately brought and tried, and arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes.'" Id. at ¶ 16 , 576 P.3d at 729 (quoting section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2024)). We went on to note that although the plain language of section 18-1.3-803(4), C.R.S. (2024), required the trial judge to determine whether the defendant had been convicted as alleged, the statute "did not explicitly prohibit the jury from finding that those prior convictions stemmed from separate and distinct criminal episodes." Id. at ¶ 24, 576 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, we concluded that under the version of the habitual sentencing statute at issue there (which, again, is also at issue here): [A] jury should first determine whether the defendant's prior convictions were based on charges arising out of separate and distinct 22 criminal episodes. If the jury so finds, then the trial judge should review the jury's findings for sufficiency of the evidence, regarding whether the defendant "has been previously convicted as alleged." If the court determines that the jury's findings are supported by sufficient evidence, then it will enter the judgment and thereby satisfy the sentencing statute. Conversely, if the jury does not find that the defendant's prior convictions were based on charges arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, then the court must acquit the defendant of the habitual criminal counts. Id. at ¶ 25, 576 P.3d at 731 (quoting § 18-1.3-803(4)(b); other citation omitted). ¶47 For these same reasons, we conclude that the habitual offender statute under which Brown was adjudicated is not facially unconstitutional. The question thus becomes whether (1) Brown's habitual offender adjudication must nonetheless be vacated because the trial court adjudicated Brown a habitual offender without permitting a jury to decide whether his prior felonies were based on charges arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes and such an error was structural or (2) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On this question, our decision in People v. Crabtree , 2024 CO 40M , ¶¶ 27, 32, 550 P.3d 656 , 664-65, is informative. ¶48 In Crabtree , we concluded that errors of the kind presented here (i.e., those that omit an element of the offense from the jury's review) are nonstructural and therefore, when preserved, are subject to constitutional harmless error review. See id. ; see also Washington v. Recuenco , 548 U.S. 212, 218, 222 (2006) (noting that "[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element 23 to the jury, is not structural error" and that if the defendant was represented by counsel and was tried by an impartial tribunal, then there is a strong presumption that constitutional errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis); Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) ("Unlike such defects as the complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence."). ¶49 Accordingly, under Crabtree , a preserved error like that at issue here is not structural but rather is subject to constitutional harmless error review. The question thus remains whether, on the facts presented, the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hagos , ¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119 . We conclude that it was. ¶50 During the habitual offender phase of the proceedings below, the People submitted evidence of Brown's prior felony convictions in Colorado for attempted theft (in Denver County) and forgery (one in Eagle County, one in Boulder County, and one in Douglas County) and in California for taking a vehicle without consent (one in Los Angeles County and one in San Diego County). ¶51 To prove that Brown was the same defendant who had been convicted of felonies in each of these prior cases, the People presented, among other things, 24 triple-certified case files for all but one of the judgments of convictions (the remaining file was dual certified). These files included, in different combinations, consistent physical descriptions of Brown; Brown's correct name, date of birth, and social security number (although one file had an apparent typographical error in the social security number); fingerprint cards with identical state identification numbers; and photographs of him. ¶52 In addition, the case files for each of the foregoing matters reflected different guilty plea, conviction, and sentencing dates, ranging from 1995 to 2008, thus demonstrating that Brown's prior felonies indisputably arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. ¶53 In these circumstances, the evidence presented on the habitual criminal counts against Brown was overwhelming, and any error in the trial court's adjudication of Brown as a habitual offender was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bartley v. People , 817 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Colo. 1991) ("A constitutional error is harmless when the evidence properly received against a defendant is so overwhelming that the constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). ¶54 In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by Brown's contentions that the prior felony records are unreliable because (1) some original exhibits were lost; (2) several of the prior convictions were decades old; and (3) the California 25 offenses may have been eligible for reclassification as misdemeanors under California law. ¶55 As noted above, all but one of the case files were triple certified. In particular, the triple-certified cases bore certifications from (1) the clerk or judicial assistant of the court attesting that the attached files were true and complete; (2) a judge of said court certifying the clerk or judicial assistant to be the custodian of records; and (3) the clerk or judicial assistant certifying the judge to be a judge of said court. All such certifications exhibited the court's seal. The other case file, while not triple certified, was dual certified and contained all of the foregoing markers of authenticity except for the final certification from the clerk certifying the judge to be a judge of the particular court. Accordingly, the case files were properly authenticated, and we perceive no basis on which to challenge their reliability. See Brown v. People , 238 P.2d 847, 851 (Colo. 1951) (concluding that triple-certified copies of final judgments containing certifications like those introduced here "clearly are amply and properly certified public records and come within all definitions of due authentication"); see also § 18-1.3-802, C.R.S. (2025) ("[A] duly authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against shall be prima facie evidence of such convictions ...."). 26 ¶56 In addition, the passage of time alone does not call into question the authenticity of records prepared before January 1, 1998 when the records are "in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning [their] authenticity" and were found "in a place where [they], if authentic, would likely be." CRE 901(b)(8). The applicable record prepared before January 1, 1998 satisfied these requirements. ¶57 Finally, even assuming without deciding that the felony convictions in California were eligible for misdemeanor reclassification, the record still demonstrates Brown's involvement in more than three prior felonies, thus satisfying the requirements of the habitual offender statute. ¶58 We therefore conclude that (1) the habitual offender statute was not facially unconstitutional and (2) any error in the trial court's adjudicating Brown as a habitual offender without submitting the matter to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. III. Conclusion ¶59 For these reasons, we conclude that Manzo remains good law and is not distinguishable and therefore, the trial court did not reversibly err in entering judgment against Brown for LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) without requiring the prosecution to prove any culpable mental state. ¶60 We further conclude that the prior habitual offender statute under which Brown was adjudicated was not unconstitutional on its face and that any error in 27 the trial court's adjudicating Brown as a habitual offender without submitting the matter to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶61 Accordingly, we affirm the division's judgment. 28 JUSTICE SAMOUR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment only in part. ¶62 Popular culture is full of stories about characters who, sometimes after decades, struggle to break free from long-held opinions and assumptions. Good Will Hunting , the 1997 classic, captures this insight: People often hold tight to the beliefs they formed first, not necessarily because those beliefs are right, but because they are familiar, deeply ingrained, and worn in—providing a sense of security that alternatives do not. Letting go of a conclusion that has not aged well, even when compelling reasons point firmly in another direction, is never easy. I perceive that such reluctance may be playing out in this case. ¶63 Twenty years ago, in People v. Manzo , 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006), our court held that leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury ("LTS (SBI)") was a strict liability offense—even though it was a class 5 felony punishable by prison. That determination rested on a brittle foundation. And in the decades since, developments in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence and Colorado's statutory provisions have steadily eroded Manzo 's footing. ¶64 Rather than step back and reconsider, the majority doubles down and reaffirms Manzo 's holding. In doing so, it overlooks that the ground beneath Manzo was shaky to begin with and has only grown more precarious with time. Yes, stare decisis is a principle we live by. But stare decisis is a presumption, not 29 a prison—a doctrine of stability, not an unyielding gatekeeper. And it recognizes that when continued adherence to precedent, in the face of change, would betray the law's underlying principles, its grip must loosen. Otherwise, precedent becomes an anchor too heavy for the vessel of law to navigate wisely. ¶65 Because I believe the time has come to put Manzo out to pasture, I strongly—but respectfully—register my unequivocal disagreement with the portion of the majority opinion that continues to consign leaving the scene of an accident ("LTS") to strict liability status. By allowing Manzo to dictate the path forward, the majority ensures that Colorado remains on an island—apparently the only state in the nation where courts refuse to impute a mens rea to an LTS statute that is silent on that element. ¶66 But because the error in this case was constitutionally harmless, I concur in part and concur in the judgment only in part. Although course correction may offer little benefit to the defendant, Jason P. Brown, I write at length because this issue warrants attention. I see an urgent need to sound the alarm about what I perceive as a significant risk of grave injustice in Colorado. Consider this: Brown was convicted of a class 3 felony carrying a possible twelve-year prison sentence—he received forty-eight years after his habitual criminal adjudication—for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death ("LTS (death)"), even though the prosecution was not required to prove that he was 30 aware he'd been involved in an accident or otherwise acted with scienter. And while Brown himself may not have been morally blameless—an eyewitness told him he'd run over two people before he fled—his case nevertheless exposes a stark reality: Manzo and today's decision condemn drivers who are morally blameless to suffer the same fate. As I demonstrate, the question isn't whether such drivers are at risk of being unfairly charged, convicted, and sentenced in Colorado, but how many of them will be. ¶67 And the kicker is that nobody appears to be coming to the rescue. The legislature has not seen fit to abrogate Manzo in the twenty years since its announcement, and this court today decides to defend it, giving the legislature even less reason to question it. I. Analysis A. Colorado: We Have a Problem—And the Majority Doesn't See It ¶68 The majority's insistence on following Manzo has serious consequences. By prolonging Manzo' s reign, the majority ensures that Colorado drivers will continue to be charged, convicted, and punished under section 42-4-1601(1), C.R.S. (2025), for LTS (SBI) or LTS (death), without proof of any awareness that they were involved in an accident. [1] Put differently, the majority holds fast to Manzo 's 31 ill-advised conclusion that LTS is a strict liability offense—indifferent to whether the driver acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. ¶69 Notably, during oral argument, the People acknowledged—almost with a shrug—that strict liability could "result hypothetically in the rare prosecution of a morally blameless defendant." They added that this was a calculated legislative choice—one they deemed acceptable because, in their estimation, morally blameless drivers "will be in the small minority," and strict liability is needed to advance public-safety goals. I did a double take when I heard the remark. I did another just now after writing it down. The prospect of an innocent driver being swept into the gears of the criminal justice machine—even if rare—cannot be written off as an unfortunate but tolerable cost of doing business. ¶70 Whatever happened to the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"? Schlup v. Delo , 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J, concurring)). Isn't it still a maxim of the law "that it is better that ninety-nine . . . offenders should escape, than that one innocent man should 32 be condemned"? Thomas Starkie, Treatise on the Law of Evidence 756 (1824) (quoted with approval in Schlup , 513 U.S. at 325 ). This principle is not some quaint relic gathering dust on a shelf; it is the bedrock of our criminal justice system. Indeed, the "concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system." Schlup , 513 U.S. at 325 . ¶71 Yet even in the face of the People's concession—an open admission that innocence may hypothetically be collateral damage—my colleagues in the majority choose to stand by Manzo . I cannot join them. When the law tolerates the very real risk of the conviction of the morally blameless, it ha