Marriage of Park

25CA1500 Marriage of Park 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1500 Adams County District Court No. 25DR30467 Honorable Michal Lord-Blegen, Judge In re the Marriage of Marjorie Grace Burge, Appellee, and Jun-Kyou Park, Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division II Opinion by JUDGE YUN Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Modern Family Law, Nicholas Tootalian, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this post-dissolution proceeding involving Jun-Kyou Park (father) and Marjorie Grace Burge (mother), father appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for district court review of a magistrate’s order. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 During the pendency of the parties’ dissolution of marriage case, mother moved for a civil protection order against father. The magistrate issued a temporary protection order and scheduled a hearing for a permanent one. Four days before the hearing, mother moved to extend the hearing’s duration, which the magistrate addressed in an order explaining that, while there was good cause to extend the duration, it did not have time to do so on the scheduled date. The order included the following: “Should either party wish to move to continue the hearing, the court will be able to consider a longer setting at a future date.” ¶3 The evening before the scheduled hearing, mother moved to continue the hearing. The magistrate proceeded with the hearing without addressing the continuance request, later deeming it moot. Father did not appear for the hearing. The magistrate then issued a 1  permanent protection order against father by default under section 13-14-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026. ¶4 Father filed a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 60(b) and C.R.C.P. 59(a) and (d). The magistrate denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Matheny, 2024 COA 81, ¶ 19 (“A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60.”). In accordance with the magistrate’s rules in effect at the time, father timely filed a petition for district court review of the magistrate’s permanent protection order. C.R.M. 7(a)(5).1 In the petition, father requested a new hearing under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and (b)(5). The district court determined that father had not properly petitioned for review and adopted the magistrate’s order as its final order. 1 C.R.M. 7 (2025) was in effect at the time father filed his petition for review with the district court. C.R.M. 7 has since been amended. See Rule Change 2025(18), Colorado Rules for Magistrates (Amended and Adopted by the Court En Banc, Sep. 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/S7P6-9RVS. We refer to the 2025 version throughout this opinion. 2  II. C.A.R. 28 ¶5 Mother correctly asserts that father’s opening brief fails to comply with C.A.R. 28(a)(6), (7). Specifically, she points out that • the summary of the arguments “merely repeat[s] the argument headings or issue presented for review” contrary to C.A.R. 28(a)(6)(C); • the brief does not identify the precise location in the record where issues were raised and where the court ruled as required by C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); and • father misstates both a case holding and the applicable standard of review in violation of C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A), (B). ¶6 We expect parties to read, be familiar with, and comply with the Colorado Appellate Rules. People v. Durapau, 280 P.3d 42, 50 (Colo. App. 2011). Failure to comply with the rules may result in our refusal to consider certain arguments or the dismissal of an appeal. See C.A.R. 38(a); Bruce v. City of Colo. Springs, 252 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Ordinarily, we would summarily strike plaintiff’s briefs and dismiss the appeal” for failure “to meet the basic requirements of C.A.R. 28.”); Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 3  148 P.3d 289, 291-92 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining to consider the arguments on appeal because the opening brief violated C.A.R. 28). ¶7 Despite father’s lack of adherence to the procedural rules, we elect to consider father’s arguments on the merits. See People in Interest of G.R.N.M., 228 P.3d 976, 978 (Colo. App. 2010) (recognizing the discretion to consider appellant’s argument on the merits even though the appellant did not comply with the Colorado Appellate Rules). III. Standards of Review ¶8 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Carey, 2026 COA 3, ¶ 29; C.R.M. 7(j). Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no record support for them. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. We review de novo the district court’s and magistrate’s legal conclusions. Carey, ¶ 29. ¶9 An appellate court reviews a district court’s C.R.C.P. 60(b) ruling for an abuse of discretion. Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 318-19 (Colo. 2010). A court 4  abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or is contrary to law. Curry v. Brewer, 2025 COA 28, ¶ 49. IV. Magistrate’s Order ¶ 10 Father argues that the magistrate violated his constitutional right to due process by issuing the permanent protection order by default. However, we cannot address this argument — which consists of only one sentence with no citation to legal authority — because it is underdeveloped. Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that we do not address underdeveloped arguments). V. District Court’s Order ¶ 11 Father makes several arguments alleging error in the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s decision. A. Reliance on Allegedly Inapplicable Case Law ¶ 12 Father challenges the district court’s reliance on several cases. As explained below, the court did not err in relying on these cases to support its determination. ¶ 13 First, father challenges the court’s reliance on In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, as a basis for adopting the magistrate’s order. 5  In Dean, the division held that “[w]ithout reviewing the transcripts, we are unable to evaluate the evidence to determine whether it sufficiently supports the magistrate’s orders.” Id. at ¶ 15. Father contends that Dean is distinguishable because “no transcript could be filed as no testimony was taken at the [p]ermanent [p]rotection [o]rder hearing.” However, the record on appeal includes a transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, and this transcript was not provided to the district court for its evaluation of the magistrate’s ruling. See In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) (considering only the party’s legal arguments because its review was limited to the record considered by the district court). Given these circumstances, the court did not err by concluding that it was unable to evaluate the evidence relied on in the magistrate’s ruling. ¶ 14 Second, father challenges the court’s reliance on Goodman in reviewing his C.R.C.P. 60 claims. In Goodman, the supreme court analyzed excusable neglect as grounds for relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). 222 P.3d at 318–23. Father contends that his C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) argument was based on mistake, not excusable neglect, and thus Goodman is inapplicable. See Klosterman v. 6  Indus. Comm’n, 694 P.2d 873, 875–76 (Colo. App. 1984) (rejecting the analogy to excusable neglect under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) for purposes of reviewing mistake under the Workers’ Compensation Act because “while considerations constituting mistake or error and excusable neglect may sometimes overlap, we do not consider them to be synonymous”). However, in his petition for magistrate review, father argued that his failure to appear at the permanent order hearing was due solely to excusable neglect. The district court therefore did not err in reviewing father’s C.R.C.P. 60 claims under the excusable neglect standard. B. C.R.C.P. 60(b) ¶ 15 Finally, father contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a new permanent protection order hearing under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), which permits post-judgment relief for “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” and C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), which permits relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” We perceive no basis for reversal. ¶ 16 At the outset, we decline to consider father’s arguments under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) because they fall within the scope of 7  C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), rendering subsection (b)(5) inapplicable. See SR Condos., LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866, 870 (Colo. App. 2007) (C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) applies only to extreme or extraordinary circumstances not covered by any other provision of C.R.C.P. 60(b)). Accordingly, we address only father’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) argument. ¶ 17 The district court correctly noted that C.R.M. 7 granted it authority to review “the particularly stated alleged errors of the magistrate.” See C.R.M. 7(a)(10) (granting the district court the power only to “adopt, reject, or modify” the magistrate’s order). The court then denied father’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) claim solely because father “had not alleged the [m]agistrate committed any error.” But the record shows that father believed the magistrate erroneously issued a default judgment against him, in violation of his right to due process. In his petition for review, father described the specific error and supporting facts he believed entitled him to relief under this claim. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (explaining that counsel must inform the court of the specific errors asserted, the relevant facts, and the supporting legal authorities). Because the record does not support the court’s order, it abused its discretion in denying father’s due process claim. 8 ¶ 18 Nevertheless, the court’s error was harmless because father’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) claim, raised in the petition for district court review, was premature. Technically, there was no judgment that could be set aside under C.R.C.P. 60(b) until the district court decided the petition for review. See In re Marriage of Schmidt, 42 P.3d 81, 82 (Colo. App. 2002) (a denial of a motion to review has the effect of “adopting the magistrate’s order”). Accordingly, father’s request for C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) relief was not properly brought in his petition for review. VI. Mother’s Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs ¶ 19 Mother requests an award of her appellate attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 39(a), section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2026, and C.A.R. 39.1. Although father’s arguments were, at times, difficult to discern, we cannot say that his appeal lacked substantial justification or was interposed for delay or harassment. § 13-17-102(4). As a result, we deny mother’s request for an award of her appellate attorney fees. However, given our disposition, we grant mother’s request for appellate costs pursuant to C.A.R. 39(a). See C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.”), (c)(2) (“A party who wants costs to be taxed 9  in the appellate court must file an itemized and verified bill of costs with the clerk of the [district] court.”). VII. Disposition ¶ 20 The order is affirmed. JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur. 10