Marriage of Logan

25CA2483 Marriage of Logan 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA2483 Boulder County District Court No. 18DR525 Honorable Robert R. Gunning, Judge In re the Marriage of Jamie Priscilla Logan, Appellant, and Barclay Lloyd Logan, Appellee. ORDER AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Pawar and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Jamie Priscilla Logan, Pro Se No Appearance for Appellee *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 In this post-decree matter involving Jamie Priscilla Logan (mother) and Barclay Lloyd Logan (father), mother appeals the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s order awarding father $9,960.71 in attorney fees and costs. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 The parties divorced in 2020. In May 2025, a magistrate found mother in remedial contempt of court for failure to comply with certain portions of the court’s parenting time orders and awarded father his attorney fees. The magistrate ordered father to file an affidavit of attorney fees within fourteen days, and father complied, filing an affidavit in which he sought $9,960.71 in attorney fees and costs. The affidavit was accompanied by attorney billing entries and a summary of father’s costs. ¶3 Mother objected, and the magistrate then directed the parties to set a sixty-minute hearing on attorney fees. In late June, the magistrate held a virtual hearing on modifying certain parenting time orders. Partway through, mother refused to participate further and left the hearing. After the hearing concluded, the magistrate and father’s attorney briefly discussed setting the hearing on attorney fees pursuant to the magistrate’s prior order. Father’s 1  attorney indicated that she wanted to address at the hearing two other outstanding attorney fee awards to avoid multiple proceedings. Because mother was no longer present, the magistrate directed counsel to determine when mother was available for a hearing and to file a motion specifically addressing the other attorney fee awards. ¶4 Father never filed a motion seeking additional attorney fees, and the magistrate set a hearing on the contempt-related attorney fees for October 2025. Following that hearing, the magistrate entered an order that awarded father $9,960.71 in contempt-related attorney fees and costs based on a finding that said fees and costs were reasonable. ¶5 Mother petitioned for district court review, and the reviewing district court judge adopted the magistrate’s order. II. Appellate Review of District Court Orders ¶6 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22, 511 P.3d 708, 715. We must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8, 497 P.3d 2  524, 528. We review de novo questions of law. Sheehan, ¶ 22, 511 P.3d at 715. III. Due Process and Other Procedural Contentions ¶7 As we understand it, mother asserts that the magistrate committed multiple procedural errors and ultimately violated her due process rights when awarding father his attorney fees and costs. We are not persuaded. A. Legal Principles ¶8 Procedural due process requires that a party be provided with notice reasonably calculated to apprise the party of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. See In re C.L.S., 252 P.3d 556, 559 (Colo. App. 2011). The essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness. Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 1990). So it “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); accord Van Sickle, 797 P.2d at 1273. ¶9 We review de novo whether a party was accorded sufficient procedural due process. See People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26, 482 P.3d 519, 524. 3  B. Notice of Requested Attorney Fees and Costs ¶ 10 Mother first argues that, because father never filed a motion as the magistrate directed, she was not provided with adequate notice of his requested fees and costs prior to the October 2025 hearing. We disagree because mother was provided with actual notice of the fees and costs that father requested far in advance of the hearing. ¶ 11 Specifically, mother was present at the contempt hearing when the magistrate found that father was entitled to attorney fees and costs and ordered him to file an affidavit within fourteen days. Father did so, and his affidavit sought $9,960.71 in attorney fees and costs — the exact amount eventually awarded by the magistrate. Mother then filed an objection to father’s fee affidavit, meaning that she had received actual notice of the specific attorney fees and costs that father requested. ¶ 12 Mother misconstrues the court’s verbal order at the conclusion of the June hearing requiring father to file a motion for attorney fees. The court’s exchange with father’s counsel indicated that father was to file a motion only if he was seeking additional attorney fees or costs beyond those already reflected in his affidavit. 4  However, father never sought or received any additional fees or costs, so his failure to file a motion did not deprive mother of notice or otherwise violate her right to procedural due process. C. Untimely Production of Exhibits ¶ 13 Mother next argues that she was denied procedural due process because father allegedly provided her with his exhibits only seven days before the attorney fees hearing, contrary to the ten-day requirement in the magistrate’s pre-hearing procedural order. ¶ 14 Our review of mother’s contention is hampered by her failure to provide a transcript of the attorney fees hearing before the magistrate to the reviewing district court judge. Mother has included a transcript of the attorney fees hearing before the magistrate in her appellate record. However, the order of the reviewing district court judge indicates that no such transcript was provided with the filing of mother’s petition for review, nor can we locate any place in the record where mother furnished a transcript before the reviewing district court judge’s ruling. ¶ 15 When a hearing transcript that was not provided to the district court for its review is included in the appellate record, we may not consider it. In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 14, 413 P.3d 5  246, 250. Rather, we are limited to the record that was before the district court. See In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) (because its review was limited to the record considered by the district court, a division of this court only considered the party’s legal arguments). Without considering the transcript, we are unable to ascertain to what extent, if any, mother raised and obtained a ruling from the magistrate regarding the untimely disclosure of father’s exhibits. Thus, just as the district court did, we too must presume, absent a transcript, that the missing record supports the magistrate’s order. See In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d 1225, 1229. D. Due Process Violations Occurring During the Hearing ¶ 16 Finally, mother argues that the magistrate deprived her of due process during the attorney fees hearing. Specifically, mother asserts that the magistrate improperly found that she had waived any objection to the attorney fees’ reasonableness and thus the magistrate did not allow mother to testify, conduct cross-examination, or otherwise challenge the fees’ reasonableness. ¶ 17 Mother’s claims of due process violations occurring during the attorney fees hearing are also reliant on the hearing transcript, 6  which we have concluded we may not consider given her failure to provide it to the reviewing district court judge. See Dean, ¶ 14, 413 P.3d at 250; Rivera, 91 P.3d at 466. Thus, as the reviewing district court judge did, we must again presume that the missing transcript supports the magistrate’s order. See Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at 1229. ¶ 18 We therefore must decline to disturb the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order awarding father $9,960.71 in attorney fees and costs. IV. Disposition ¶ 19 The order is affirmed. JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur. 7