Marriage of Wiggs

25CA1679 Marriage of Wiggs 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1679 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR30847 Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge In re the Marriage of Jennifer Lee Wiggs n/k/a Jennifer Lee Lohner, Appellant, and Kyle William Wiggs, Appellee. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Taubman* and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Price Family Law. LLC, Trista Price, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Griffiths Law PC, Suzanne Griffiths, Christopher Griffiths, Kimberly Newton, Anne Klauck, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Appellee *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding between Jennifer Lee Wiggs, now known as Jennifer Lohner (wife), and Kyle William Wiggs (husband), wife appeals the permanent orders concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities and the marital property division. We affirm the marital property division, but we reverse the court’s allocation of educational decision-making responsibility. I. Background ¶2 The parties were married in 2011 and have three children. In 2023, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage. Shortly thereafter, wife sought and obtained a permanent protection order (PPO) against husband based on a finding that he had committed domestic abuse by physically harassing her on two occasions. Another division of this court affirmed the entry of the PPO in In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶¶ 30-44, 48. ¶3 Reflecting the proceedings’ high-conflict nature, the case involved two parental responsibilities evaluators (PREs), plus multiple additional experts retained by the parties to conduct work product reviews of the PREs and opine on domestic violence issues. ¶4 A lengthy permanent orders hearing was held in early 2025. In the resulting permanent orders, the district court denied wife’s 1  request to relocate the children to Michigan and equally allocated parenting time. Consistent with the previously entered PPO, the court found that husband had committed physical acts of domestic violence on at least two occasions and had exhibited a pattern of coercive control. ¶5 The district court allocated husband sole decision-making responsibility for medical decisions and the children’s extracurricular activities, although the court specified that he could only enroll the children in one extracurricular activity at a time. Although the court allocated sole educational decision-making responsibility to wife, it ordered that the “children shall remain in their current schools unless otherwise agreed” and specified that wife “must select a school no more than ten (10) miles from [husband’s] residence unless otherwise agreed.” ¶6 The district court equally divided the marital estate, which it valued in excess of $1 million. ¶7 The parties filed dueling postjudgment motions asking the court to clarify and reconsider certain aspects of the permanent orders. The court granted each party’s motion in part. 2 ¶8 As relevant here, the court clarified that as to husband’s selected extracurricular activity for each child, he “shall have the right to transport or authorize [paternal grandmother] to transport the children to all activities during [wife’]s parenting time, provided he provides [wife] at least 24 hours’ notice.” The court also clarified that as to medical decisions, if a child has an illness or injury that “reasonably requires non-emergency medical attention necessitating a doctor’s visit . . . , [husband] shall have the right to schedule an appointment and/or retrieve (or have [paternal grandmother] retrieve) the child/ren to obtain care.” The court also reiterated its orders concerning wife’s educational decision-making responsibility, explaining that it was concerned that wife would use the children’s schooling location to retaliate against husband. II. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities ¶9 Wife contends that the district court committed multiple errors when allocating parental responsibilities. We agree in part and accordingly reverse the court’s allocation of educational decision- making responsibility. We disagree with wife’s other arguments. 3  A. Applicable Law and Standards of Review ¶ 10 When allocating parenting time and decision-making responsibility, the court must focus on the children’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the children’s safety, needs, and physical, mental, and emotional conditions. See § 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 7. In making its determination, the court considers all relevant factors, including the best interests factors identified in section 14- 10-124(1.5)(a) and (b). See Collins, ¶ 7; In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 21. The court need not make express findings on each factor, but its findings must allow the reviewing court to determine whether its decision is supported by competent evidence. See In re Marriage of Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. App. 2004). “Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.” In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998). ¶ 11 The court has broad discretion over the allocation of parental responsibilities, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶¶ 23, 26. The court 4  abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. See In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. We exercise every presumption in favor of upholding a court’s best interests decision and will affirm the decision when it has record support. See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26. B. District Court’s Reliance on the Report and Recommendations of PRE Dr. Stephanie Norris ¶ 12 We first consider and reject wife’s challenge to the overall allocation of parental responsibilities based on her claim that the district court improperly relied on the PRE report and testimony of Dr. Stephanie Norris, who wife alleges was insurmountably biased against her. 1. Additional Background ¶ 13 Dr. Norris was the second PRE involved in the proceedings and was appointed, on the parties’ stipulation, to conduct a supplemental PRE evaluation, following an initial PRE evaluation conducted by Dr. Debra Govan. However, wife later filed a motion to terminate Dr. Norris’ appointment, alleging that she had violated the standards governing PREs and lacked objectivity. The district 5  court denied wife’s motion and disagreed that Dr. Norris had exhibited bias or had acted improperly. ¶ 14 Dr. Norris’ resulting PRE report found that both parties had, at various points, engaged in abusive behavior against one another and concluded that some of wife’s conduct towards two of the children constituted child abuse. Ultimately, Dr. Norris recommended that wife’s parenting time be supervised and husband have sole decision-making responsibility until wife completed mental health treatment. ¶ 15 In the permanent orders, the district court found Dr. Norris’ report to be largely “balanced and fair,” and at various points, the court cited Dr. Norris’ observations of the parties and the children. However, the court explicitly rejected Dr. Norris’ recommendation that wife’s parenting time be supervised, finding that the “report [does not] come close to reaching the threshold standard of endangerment,” and the court did not endorse Dr. Norris’ finding that wife was abusive. The court also weighed the recommendations and observations of Dr. Govan and the parties’ other experts. 6  2. Discussion ¶ 16 As we understand it, wife asserts that it was improper for the district court to rely in any way on Dr. Norris because, under the standards set forth in Chief Justice Directive (CJD) 21-02, Directive Concerning Court Appointments of Parental Responsibility Evaluators Pursuant to Section 14-10-127, C.R.S. (amended Dec. 2023), Dr. Norris had developed an “insurmountable bias” against wife. In support, wife primarily cites her own expert, Dr. Jeanette Troncoso, who opined that there were numerous problems with Dr. Norris’ work. However, the district court explicitly considered and rejected Dr. Troncoso’s criticisms of Dr. Norris, explaining that it did “not find any of those criticisms to be significant or in any way reaching the level of indicating [that Dr. Norris’] report was not appropriate, balanced, or fair.” ¶ 17 We are not persuaded by wife’s contentions because it is well- established that “credibility determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the sole discretion of the [district] court.” In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003). Indeed, wife concedes 7  that the district court was “not required to accept Dr. Troncoso’s” criticisms of Dr. Norris. Nevertheless, she effectively asks us to reweigh in her favor the court’s bias and credibility determinations as to Dr. Norris. But we may not second-guess the court’s credibility determinations, including its observation that Dr. Norris was “balanced and fair.” See id.; People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-56 (Colo. 2010) (reversing when appellate court “improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight, sufficiency, and probative value of the evidence”). ¶ 18 Citing other evidence of alleged bias on Dr. Norris’ part, such as wife’s dispute with her over testing the children and certain statements from her report, wife also asserts that the district court did not adequately evaluate wife’s claims of bias under CJD 21-02 and did not make specific findings as to her allegations. However, “we presume that the court considered all the evidence presented.” Collins, ¶ 21. And the district court clearly rejected wife’s specific allegations of bias — whether an appearance of bias, actual bias, or even insurmountable bias — when it denied, with detailed findings, wife’s motion to terminate Dr. Norris’ appointment and later found 8  that the PRE report was “balanced and fair,” see People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 36 (the court’s findings may be implicit in its ruling). ¶ 19 Indeed, contrary to wife’s suggestion that the district court did not scrutinize Dr. Norris’ findings and recommendations, the court adopted only some of them, which indicates to us that the court carefully considered and weighed Dr. Norris’ report and testimony. Cf. In re Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 334 (Colo. App. 1998) (the district court is free to reach its own conclusions and is not required to follow an evaluator’s recommendations). Thus, we again decline to substitute our judgment for the district court’s. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-56; In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court”). ¶ 20 Last, to the extent that wife cites disciplinary proceedings against Dr. Norris occurring after the permanent orders hearing, we may not consider such evidence, because we must disregard the parties’ references to circumstances or events occurring after entry of the orders being appealed or that are not part of the record on 9  appeal. See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 21 For these reasons, we decline to disturb the district court’s allocation of parental responsibilities based on its reliance on Dr. Norris’ testimony and PRE report. C. Allocation of Decision-Making ¶ 22 Wife next challenges the district court’s allocation of decision- making responsibility. We affirm the allocation of medical and extracurricular decision-making responsibility, but we agree that the court abused its discretion by, in effect, awarding the parties joint educational decision-making responsibility. 1. Preservation ¶ 23 To start, we reject husband’s claim that wife failed to preserve these issues for our review. We perceive wife’s contentions, even those framed as constitutional violations, as directed at the district court’s findings, and a party need not object to a court’s findings to preserve a challenge to them. In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17; see C.R.C.P. 52. Likewise, a party need not raise an issue in a postjudgment motion to preserve it for our review. See C.R.C.P. 59(b). We thus consider wife’s contentions. 10  2. “Unconstitutional” Allocation of Extracurricular and Medical Decision-Making Responsibilities ¶ 24 We first consider and reject wife’s contention that the district court infringed on her constitutional right to parent the children by allowing husband to schedule medical appointments and activities during her parenting time as part of its allocation of medical and extracurricular decision-making responsibilities. ¶ 25 Wife is correct that under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65– 66 (2000), she has a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to parent the children. Husband likewise enjoys a fundamental right to parent the children. Consequently, as is well- established, Troxel’s presumption in favor of a fit parent’s parenting decisions is not implicated in a parental responsibilities dispute between two fit parents. See id. at 68; Vanderborgh v. Krauth, 2016 COA 27, ¶¶ 20-21; see also In re Marriage of DePalma, 176 P.3d 829, 832 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 26 Therefore, contrary to wife’s contentions, when allocating parental responsibilities between the parties, the court did not need to apply strict scrutiny or identify a compelling state interest. Crouch, ¶¶ 27-29; see also In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 11  1219 (Colo. App. 2006) (An allocation of sole religious decision- making responsibility, which “expanded one parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of a child at the expense of the other parent’s similar right,” was properly decided based on the child’s best interests.). ¶ 27 We view the order allowing husband to schedule and take the children to extracurricular activities and medical appointments during wife’s parenting time as part of an allocation of decision- making responsibility between two fit parents. See § 14-10-124(7) (requiring the district court to “be as specific as possible” when drafting a parenting plan). Accordingly, such an order was not subject to strict scrutiny. See McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1219. ¶ 28 Wife insists that McSoud requires us to hold otherwise. We disagree. Critically, the permanent orders disapproved of by the court in McSoud provided that if the mother “did not agree to support the child’s Catholic faith, including taking him to Catholic events during her parenting time, she would be prohibited from taking him to a Protestant church.” Id. at 1218. So, the problematic provision in McSoud “not only affect[ed] [the] wife’s rights with respect to the religious upbringing of her child, [but] 12  also interfere[d] with her own rights under the Free Exercise Clause” of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1217. No such concerns are present here because the permanent orders do not restrict wife’s personal constitutional rights in any way. ¶ 29 Indeed, McSoud instead suggests that parenting plan provisions that are designed to facilitate the court’s specific allocation of decision-making responsibility pass constitutional muster. See id. at 1219 (other courts have discerned no constitutional violation in a requirement for one parent to arrange transportation during their parenting time, because such a requirement merely accommodates the custodial parent). 3. Delegation of Parenting Time and Failure to Consider Wife’s Safety and Well-being ¶ 30 We similarly disagree with wife that the district court improperly delegated decisions concerning her parenting time to husband by permitting him to schedule medical appointments and extracurricular activities during her parenting time. ¶ 31 In support, wife points to In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 334-35 (Colo. App. 2007), which held that it was improper for 13  the district court to allow the father to decide what contact, if any, the mother could have with the children. But the district court here clearly delineated the parties’ parenting time. And contrary to wife’s assertion that husband received “unfettered” control over her parenting time, the court created a clear framework governing the circumstances under which the children’s medical appointments or extracurricular activities could interfere with wife’s parenting time. ¶ 32 Specifically, the court limited husband to enrolling the children in only one extracurricular activity at a time and limited husband’s ability to schedule medical appointments during wife’s parenting time to circumstances where a child “reasonably requires non-emergency medical attention necessitating a doctor’s visit.” Given these guardrails, we do not perceive the district court’s orders as akin to the improper delegation of parenting time that occurred in Hatton. See id. ¶ 33 We also reject wife’s conclusory assertion that the court failed to consider, as the primary concern, her safety and well-being as the abused party. See § 14-10-124(4)(d). Notably, the court clarified that its orders did not modify the PPO protecting wife, and therefore, husband could only attend extracurricular activities 14  during wife’s parenting time if wife opted not to attend those activities herself. And the court explained that the requirement that parenting time exchanges occur through a third party, such as paternal grandmother, remained in place. ¶ 34 So, even though the district court gave husband the ability to schedule limited activities and appointments during wife’s parenting time, we disagree that the court failed to consider wife’s safety and well-being as a primary concern. 4. De Facto Allocation of Joint Educational Decision-Making Responsibility ¶ 35 We agree with wife that the district court abused its discretion by allocating her sole educational decision-making responsibility while also requiring her to obtain husband’s consent to change the children’s schools or place the children in a school more than ten miles from husband’s residence. ¶ 36 Section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A), provides that where one of the parties has “committed an act of domestic violence” or has “engaged in a pattern of domestic violence,” it is not in the best interests of the child[ren] to allocate mutual decision-making responsibility over the objection of the other party . . . , unless the court finds that there is credible evidence of 15  the ability of the parties to make decisions cooperatively in the best interest of the child[ren] in a manner that is safe for the abused party and the child. ¶ 37 The requirement that husband agree to any change to the children’s current schools and to the location of any school that is more than ten miles away from his residence constitutes a de facto allocation of joint decision-making because both parties are required to make those specific educational decisions. The court found that husband had committed domestic violence. But, in spite of that finding, it did not find credible evidence of the parties’ ability to safely make cooperative decisions in the children’s best interests, as required by section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A). To the contrary, the court found “that these parties have not demonstrated any ability to make joint decisions regarding the children.” ¶ 38 Based on the record before us, we reverse the judgment allocating educational decision-making responsibility and remand the case for the court to reconsider it. On remand, before implementing any form of joint decision-making, the district court must make the requisite findings under the statutory scheme. 16 ¶ 39 On remand, the court’s findings must also address the parties’ circumstances and the children’s best interests at the time of the remand proceedings. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27. Although the court may rely on the existing record, it must also afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning their current circumstances and the children’s best interests. Id. The existing allocation of decision- making responsibility shall remain in effect pending the remand proceedings and the entry of a new judgment.1 See id. III. Marital Property Division ¶ 40 We next reject wife’s challenge to the district court’s valuation and allocation of three of husband’s business interests. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 41 The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital estate based on the facts and circumstances presented, and we will 1 Given our disposition requiring the district court to reconsider its allocation of educational decision-making responsibility based on the parties’ present circumstances, we decline to address wife’s additional arguments that said allocation also violated her constitutional rights and section 14-10-130, C.R.S. 2026. 17  not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. ¶ 42 When dividing marital property, the district court determines the property’s approximate current value. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. In doing so, the court may select one party’s valuation over the other party’s, or it may determine its own reasonable value. Medeiros, ¶ 41. We will not disturb the court’s value determination if it is reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole. Id. But the court must make sufficiently explicit factual findings to give us a clear understanding of its order’s basis. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9. B. UX Wealth ¶ 43 Wife argues that the district court made insufficient findings to support its valuation of husband’s fifty percent interest in UX Wealth at $280,569. We disagree. ¶ 44 The district court began its calculation of that value by determining that, after certain adjustments, the entirety of UX Wealth was worth $944,246 using an income value approach and $782,331 using an asset value approach. The court then indicated that it had averaged those two values and applied a twenty percent 18  lack-of-marketability discount and a fifteen percent lack-of-control discount before finding husband’s fifty percent interest to be worth $280,569. ¶ 45 As we understand it, wife argues that it is unclear how the district court determined the initial $944,246 and $782,331 figures that it then used to value UX Wealth. Husband’s valuation expert, Preston Hoeffer, testified as to the $944,246 income-based valuation, and that figure was also reflected in his expert report. Similarly, the $782,331 figure corresponding to the asset value approach appears in the report of wife’s expert, Boris Sobolev. So these values were obtained from the parties’ respective experts. ¶ 46 Wife also argues, for the first time in her reply brief, that the district court abused its discretion by averaging the different valuation methods and otherwise failed to justify that decision. We decline to address this new contention. See In re Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 14 (declining to address an argument not raised in a party’s opening brief). 19  C. Bellese Investment ¶ 47 We next disagree with wife’s assertion that the district court erred by finding that husband’s “Bellese” investment was included in its valuation of UX Wealth. ¶ 48 Wife cites Mr. Sobolev’s report, which indicated that he had limited information about Bellese and was “unable to value” it. But other portions of Mr. Sobolev’s report considered Bellese as part of UX Wealth at a value of $25,000, and Mr. Sobolev confirmed the same in his testimony despite his difficulties with determining a value. The district court weighed and resolved this conflicting evidence, and we therefore decline to disturb its finding that Bellese was included in the value of UX Wealth. See In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007). D. ETF Action and/or THOR Investment Partners, LLC ¶ 49 Lastly, we reject wife’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion by failing to value and immediately divide assets known as ETF Action and/or THOR Investment Partners, LLC (ETF/THOR). ¶ 50 The district court found that it had received limited information concerning these assets, which were investments in 20  exchange traded funds. The court explained that husband had failed to fully disclose these investments during discovery and the permanent orders hearing, and therefore it could not ascertain whether the assets were owned directly by him or through his 22.5% interest in THOR Financial Technologies, LLC, which the court had already valued and divided. Nor could the court ascertain the individual value of the ETF/THOR assets. Accordingly, the court ordered that “[t]o the extent that [ETF /THOR] are separate entities of which [husband] owns a 22.5 percent interest, the [c]ourt shall retain jurisdiction and divide the marital value of [the] same on a 50/50 basis between the parties if and when any monies are received.” ¶ 51 Citing section 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2026, which requires the court to value marital property as of the date of the decree, wife argues that the court erred because it did not value ETF/THOR and otherwise left the parties with indefinite joint ownership of the assets. We perceive no abuse of the court’s discretion because it was the parties’ duty to present the court with the requisite data to allow it to make a sufficient valuation, and any failure by the parties in this regard does not provide them with grounds for 21  review. In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23. The court plainly found that it lacked sufficient information. ¶ 52 We also disagree that the district court improperly reserved jurisdiction to divide any future proceeds, if any, from ETF/THOR. Under the “reserve jurisdiction method,” the court could “reserve jurisdiction to distribute [an] asset ‘if, as, and when, it is paid out.’” In re Marriage of Paul, 821 P.2d 925, 927 (Colo. App. 1991) (discussing how the reserve jurisdiction method, although developed to divide vested but unmatured pensions, has been applied to other contingent property interests as well) (quoting In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1988). We decline to disturb the marital property division. IV. Disposition ¶ 53 The portions of the permanent orders allocating medical and extracurricular decision-making responsibilities and the portions of the permanent orders relying on Dr. Norris’ opinions are affirmed. The marital property division is affirmed. The portions of the permanent orders concerning educational decision-making responsibility are reversed, and the case is remanded for further 22 proceedings consistent with this opinion. The portions of the permanent orders not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed. JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur. 23