Marriage of Sager

25CA0988 Marriage of Sager 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA0988 Douglas County District Court No. 20DR30015 Honorable Donna Stewart, Judge In re the Marriage of Aaron Wells Sager, Appellant, and Christine Daly Sager, Appellee. ORDERS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Brown and Moultrie, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Law Office of Joel M Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding, Aaron Wells Sager (husband) appeals the denial of his C.R.C.P. 59 motion for relief from the court’s C.R.C.P. 70 order in favor of Christine Daly Sager (wife). We reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. Background ¶2 After twelve years of marriage, the parties entered a separation agreement. As relevant to this appeal, they agreed that they would be awarded their respective retirement and other benefits but that they would hire a joint expert, Fred Ebert, to draft qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) related to husband’s military retired pay. ¶3 Three years later, wife filed a motion for execution under C.R.C.P. 70. She asserted that husband had refused to cooperate with the process of finalizing the QDROs for years and requested that the clerk of court be ordered to sign them on his behalf. Wife attached a “stipulated” military retired pay order of division for the clerk’s signature. The proposed order awarded wife a percentage of husband’s disposable military retired pay, as well as a former spouse survivor benefit plan (SBP), and ordered husband to submit a form to provide for payment of the SBP to wife. In her C.R.C.P. 70 1  motion, wife requested a short hearing “should there be factual or legal disputes regarding the implementation or drafting of the QDROs.” ¶4 The court ordered husband to file a response, and husband did so. He asserted that wife never paid her share of Ebert’s retainer and had instead drafted the QDROs herself. He further stated that he was not refusing to execute the QDROs but had requested changes to them, and those requests had not been resolved. Husband stated no objection to setting a hearing so that the parties could be properly heard. ¶5 In her reply, wife argued that while husband had vaguely objected to the QDROs, he had not identified any specific numbers, percentages, or formulas that he wanted to revise. ¶6 The trial court granted wife’s C.R.C.P. 70 motion without holding a hearing. It directed the clerk of court to sign wife’s proposed military retired pay QDRO on husband’s behalf1 and awarded attorney fees to wife. 1 The court also ordered the clerk of court to sign a stipulated court order acceptable for processing federal employees retirement system benefits, but that order is not at issue on appeal. 2 ¶7 Then, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 and C.R.C.P. 60, husband filed a motion to set aside the court’s C.R.C.P. 70 order to execute the military retired pay QDRO. He argued that the QDRO wife submitted to the court was incorrect in that it utilized the wrong pay grade for husband’s retirement benefits and was based on the length of husband’s service in years as opposed to points. He further argued that the provision of an SBP to wife was contrary to the terms of the separation agreement. ¶8 The court did not rule on husband’s motion; therefore, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j), husband’s C.R.C.P. 59 arguments were deemed denied. Husband’s C.R.C.P. 60 arguments remain pending before the court. ¶9 Husband appeals from the denial of his C.R.C.P. 59 arguments and the court’s order granting wife’s C.R.C.P. 70 motion for execution of the military retired pay QDRO. Because we conclude the district court did not make sufficient findings to facilitate our review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 3  II. Jurisdiction ¶ 10 As an initial matter, we disagree with wife that this court lacks jurisdiction because the district court never entered a final order. Under C.R.C.P. 59(j), a motion for relief brought under C.R.C.P. 59 is “deemed denied” if it is not resolved within sixty-three days. Wife argues that husband’s motion was not brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 because it did not seek to amend any portion of the district court’s order. Instead, she asserts husband’s motion could only have been brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b) because it sought to “set aside” the court’s order. ¶ 11 We recognize that C.R.C.P. 59 and C.R.C.P. 60 serve different purposes. The primary purpose of a C.R.C.P. 59 motion to amend judgment is to give the court an opportunity to correct any errors that it may have made, while a C.R.C.P. 60 motion allows a court to change its previous judgment based on a matter of fact or law that was not previously presented. Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶¶ 25, 26. ¶ 12 And to be sure, husband’s post-trial argument that the court’s C.R.C.P. 70 order is void under federal law is cognizable under C.R.C.P. 60. See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), (b)(5). Because the district court 4  did not rule on this issue — and motions brought under C.R.C.P. 60 are not deemed denied in the same way as those brought under C.R.C.P. 59 — we may not consider it. ¶ 13 But husband’s post-trial motion also asked the court to amend its judgment to accurately reflect the facts and conform to the governing law. Despite wife’s arguments to the contrary, these grounds for relief may be properly construed under C.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) and (a)(4). Because the district court did not resolve these claims for relief within sixty-three days, they were deemed denied. Accordingly, the district court entered a final order, and we have jurisdiction to review husband’s appeal of the denial of his post-trial motion as well as the court’s C.R.C.P. 70 order in wife’s favor. III. Preservation ¶ 14 Wife further argues that husband’s arguments are not preserved because they were not raised until his post-trial motion for relief. We disagree. ¶ 15 True, husband did not specifically argue in his response to wife’s C.R.C.P. 70 motion that the “stipulated” QDRO she submitted violated federal law and conflicted with the parties’ separation agreement. But he argued that the court should not order the 5  QDRO to be signed on his behalf because he had previously submitted a request for changes to wife’s counsel. He further argued that the parties had exchanged emails about his requested changes and that those changes had not been resolved. Therefore, notwithstanding wife’s representation in her C.R.C.P. 70 motion that all issues had been resolved, we conclude that the district court was on notice that a factual dispute remained.2 Because husband’s response to the C.R.C.P. 70 motion put the court on notice of factual disputes and his C.R.C.P. 59 motion further expanded on those disputes, we conclude his arguments are properly before us. IV. The Record is Insufficient to Enable Our Review ¶ 16 Husband argues that wife’s proposed QDRO violated federal law and conflicted with the parties’ settlement agreement. Specifically, he asserts that, far from being “stipulated” as wife suggested, the proposed QDRO improperly calculated his disposable retired pay, calculated wife’s share of that pay using the 2 As discussed in greater detail below, wife’s response to husband’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion further alerted the court to the parties’ remaining factual disputes. 6  wrong formula, and ordered the election of SBP coverage in clear contravention of the separation agreement (which is silent as to that issue).3 ¶ 17 We conclude that the court erred by ruling on wife’s C.R.C.P. 70 motion without first conducting a hearing and without making sufficient findings and conclusion of law to support issuing the disputed QDRO. As husband indicated in his response to wife’s motion and fleshed out in his C.R.C.P. 59 motion, there are factual and legal disputes regarding the division of the parties’ property that the court must resolve before entering a final QDRO. See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001) (a court must make an equitable distribution of marital property after considering all relevant factors, and its errors in determining the property division in a dissolution case are reversible when they affect the parties’ substantial rights). 3 Husband also argues that C.R.C.P. 70 was an inappropriate vehicle for relief because the military retired pay QDRO was contested, and nothing in the separation agreement required him to sign it. He concedes, however, that this argument was not preserved. Therefore, we do not address it. See Laleh v. Johnson, 2016 COA 4, ¶ 8 (“We generally do not address unpreserved civil issues.”), aff’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 93. 7 ¶ 18 Indeed, wife acknowledged these factual disputes in her response to husband’s post-trial motion, arguing that — contrary to husband’s representations — Ebert had in fact drafted the QDRO that she attached to her C.R.C.P 70 motion.4 Specifically, she argued that the parties “negotiated around the drafting of the QDRO,” resulting in the SBP provisions being added. As evidence, she attached Ebert’s emails suggesting that husband’s arguments were legally and factually incorrect. She further argued that “both her expert and her evidence show[ed] that the parties negotiated for and intended [the SBP] to be included” but that, should the court determine husband’s rank was incorrect, she was agreeable to changing it. ¶ 19 Wife’s response to husband’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion underscores that factual disputes existed for the district court to resolve. She even sought a hearing so that she could present parole evidence regarding the parties’ agreement. Although wife suggested Ebert’s 4 Her earlier pleadings also suggested that the parties were still negotiating. For example, in response to a proposed QDRO that husband submitted, wife asserted that the proposed order did not match the terms of the separation agreement but that the parties were in contact and “may be able to have a meeting of the minds.” (Emphasis added.) 8  emails, which were attached to her response, supported her version of the facts, they were never entered into evidence. Absent an exception, they constitute inadmissible hearsay.5 See CRE 802 (statements by a third party to prove the truth of the matter asserted are generally inadmissible); see also Curry v. Brewer, 2025 COA 28, ¶ 30 (“It is the trial court’s duty to determine the relevance and admissibility of evidence.”). And even if the court considered Ebert’s emails, they merely fomented the parties’ factual dispute by contradicting husband’s verified C.R.C.P. 59 motion. ¶ 20 In this context, we conclude the district court erred. By accepting wife’s proposed QDRO without conducting a hearing and without resolving the parties’ factual and legal disputes about the proposed QDRO, the court abused its discretion. And because the court did not make any findings or explain its legal basis, we cannot meaningfully review its decision. ¶ 21 Accordingly, we reverse the court’s denial of husband’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion and its C.R.C.P. 70 order for execution. On 5 Given Ebert’s alleged statement that he “saw a version of a settlement referencing the SBP,” the emails seem to further support husband’s assertion that, at best, the parties were still negotiating. 9  remand, the court should conduct a hearing and resolve any remaining factual and legal disputes before entering a new QDRO. V. Attorney Fees ¶ 22 Finally, wife requests appellate attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2026; C.A.R. 39(a); and C.A.R. 39.1. Because she has not prevailed on appeal, we deny her request under C.A.R. 39(a) and C.A.R. 39.1. Because the district court is in a superior position to consider her request under section 14-10-119 (including evaluating the parties’ relative financial circumstances), we do not consider this issue. Instead, we direct the district court to consider wife’s request on remand. VI. Disposition ¶ 23 The orders are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur. 10