Marriage of Zhu

25CA2170 Marriage of Zhu 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA2170 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24DR31921 Honorable Christine Washburn, Judge Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge In re the Marriage of Jianqing Mei, Appellee, and Ken Zhu, Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Harris and Martinez*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Crespin Law, LLC, Tomee Crespin, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee AQMN Law, Charles S. McIntyre IV, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 Ken Zhu (husband) appeals the district court’s judgment that dissolved his marriage with Jianqing Mei (wife). We reverse the marital property division and remand the case for the district court to reconsider that division. We otherwise affirm. I. Background ¶2 In late 2024, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of over twenty years. In early 2025, husband was jailed for about a month after being convicted of assaulting wife. Given husband’s incarceration, his attorney attended the initial status conference on his behalf and obtained an extension until March 15, 2025 to complete his C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(2) mandatory financial disclosures. Husband’s attorney then withdrew. ¶3 The district court held a status conference in mid-April 2025, at which husband appeared pro se. The court noted that despite having been released from jail some time ago, husband still hadn’t completed his financial disclosures. In response, husband cited mental health struggles and difficulties with finding an attorney who spoke his native language, Cantonese. The court ordered husband to complete his financial disclosures within seven days, although it denied wife’s request to immediately set a permanent 1  orders hearing. After husband failed again to complete his financial disclosures by the court’s extended deadline, the court set a permanent orders hearing for September 2025. ¶4 At that hearing, husband again appeared pro se and without having completed any financial disclosures. Husband asked the court to continue the hearing for an additional one to two months so he could find an attorney, again citing language difficulties. The court denied husband’s request, finding that his previous attorney had withdrawn about six months earlier and that he’d had plenty of time to both retain an attorney and complete his financial disclosures. The court also explained that it didn’t find husband’s statements regarding his attempts to find an attorney to be credible and that a delay would substantially prejudice wife. ¶5 As a sanction for husband’s lack of disclosures, the district court barred him from presenting any documentary evidence and awarded wife attorney fees, although it denied wife’s request to preclude husband from testifying. ¶6 After taking evidence, the district court issued permanent orders that allocated parental responsibilities for the parties’ one minor child and divided the marital estate, which consisted 2  primarily of about $575,000 in equity in the marital home. In doing so, the court found that husband had dissipated the equity in the marital home by transferring title to his mother. Because husband’s mother wasn’t a party to the case, the court found that it couldn’t order the sale of the marital home. Instead, the court allocated husband the equity associated with the home and ordered him to pay wife $350,000 to account for her portion of the equity plus other assets that husband had dissipated. II. Husband’s Motion to Continue ¶7 We first consider husband’s contention that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request to continue the permanent orders hearing. We disagree. ¶8 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or is based on a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. See id. ¶9 A court should grant a motion to continue only upon a showing of good cause. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11; Miller, 207 P.3d at 932-33. Accordingly, a continuance should generally be limited to 3  situations in which unforeseen and exceptional circumstances would require an adjournment, and the court should weigh the right of the party requesting the continuance to a fair hearing against the prejudice that might result from delay. Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 976 (Colo. 1999); Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853, 858 (Colo. 1985). ¶ 10 We perceive no abuse of the district court’s discretion. Given that husband’s prior attorney had withdrawn about six months earlier, the record supported the court’s finding that husband “had enough time to hire an attorney,” and we may not second-guess the court’s determination that husband’s testimony concerning his attempts to retain a new attorney wasn’t credible. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that it was for the district court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom). ¶ 11 Moreover, we cannot say that the district court erred by finding that a delay would result in “substantial continued prejudice” to wife, considering the last-minute nature of husband’s request, meaning that wife had already prepared for the hearing. 4  Cf. Benster v. Bell, 267 P. 792, 793-94 (Colo. 1928) (a motion to continue made “the very day and hour of trial” was properly denied given that the trial had been on the docket for months). ¶ 12 In sum, the district court appropriately weighed proceeding immediately with husband appearing pro se against the prejudice to wife if the hearing were continued. See Butler, 704 P.2d at 858; see also In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (noting that our supreme court has expressed unbridled confidence in district courts to weigh conflicting evidence). ¶ 13 Lastly, we disagree with husband’s assertion that the district court was required to make findings on the numerous factors identified in People v. Brown, 2014 CO 25, ¶ 24, when weighing his request for a continuance. The holding in Brown was premised on a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of their choice — a right that doesn’t exist in a civil case like this one. See id. at ¶ 16; People v. Cobb, 944 P.2d 574, 576-77 (Colo. App. 1996) (recognizing that there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case). Thus, Brown is inapplicable. 5  III. Right to an Interpreter ¶ 14 We next consider and reject husband’s contention that the district court erred by not providing him with an interpreter to assist him with completing his mandatory financial disclosures.1 ¶ 15 As an initial matter, we disagree with wife that husband failed to preserve this issue for our review. While husband didn’t explicitly ask the district court for an interpreter, during the April status conference, he informed the court that the language barrier made it difficult for him to gather the necessary information and complete his disclosures. If husband had a right to an interpreter, his expression of difficulty could be sufficient to have put the district court on notice of his need for one. Cf. People v. Chavez, 2012 COA 61, ¶ 17 (recognizing that a defendant may have a right to an interpreter “when the trial court is on notice that the defendant has an obvious and significant language difficulty”). ¶ 16 Thus, we conclude that the issue is preserved. See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[T]o preserve the issue for appeal all that was needed was that the 1 Husband had an interpreter for the status conferences at which he appeared and for the permanent orders hearing. 6  issue be brought to the attention of the trial court and that the court be given an opportunity to rule on it.”). ¶ 17 In support of his claim that he was entitled to an interpreter to assist him with his financial disclosures, husband cites Chief Justice Directive 06-03, Directive Concerning Language Interpreters and Access to the Courts by Persons with Limited English Proficiency (amended March 2023), which we interpret de novo. See In re Betterton-Fike, 2020 CO 19, ¶ 22. ¶ 18 Husband specifically relies on section II.A of that directive, which provides that “the courts shall assign and pay for language interpretation for all parties in interest during or ancillary to a court proceeding,” including: • “[f]acilitation of communication outside of the judicial officer’s presence in order to allow a court proceeding to continue as scheduled”; • “[f]acilitation of communication with parties in interest in court mandated programs including without limitation family court facilitations and mediations”; and 7  • “[c]ompletion of evaluations and investigations ordered by and performed for the purpose of aiding the court in making a determination.” ¶ 19 We do not view preparation of C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(2) mandatory financial disclosures as plainly falling with any of the listed circumstances requiring an interpreter. Indeed, if the directive had intended for a party’s disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure to qualify for an interpreter, the directive could have said so. Cf. Archuleta v. Roane, 2024 CO 74, ¶ 9 (interpreting court rules according to their plain and ordinary meaning). ¶ 20 Moreover, husband’s reading of the directive is incomplete. Critically, section II.D limits the scope of when a party is entitled to an interpreter, providing that [e]xcept as provided in Section[] II.A . . . , the court shall not arrange, provide or pay for language interpretation during or ancillary to a court proceeding to facilitate communication with attorneys . . . or other parties related to a case involving [limited English proficient] individuals for the purpose of gathering background information, investigation, trial preparation, [or] witness interviews . . . ; or for any other communication which is not part of a court proceeding or ancillary thereto as delineated in Section II.A. 8  (Emphasis added.) ¶ 21 We read section II.D as prohibiting the appointment of an interpreter for a party except where specifically described in section II.A, which exclusively determines what circumstances are “ancillary” to a court proceeding. And because preparation of financial disclosures didn’t fall within the circumstances described in section II.A, the plain language of section II.D did not allow the court to appoint an interpreter to assist with them. ¶ 22 Finally, to the extent that husband asserts he was entitled to an interpreter for other reasons, such as under any additional rights afforded to him under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we decline to address his assertion because it is undeveloped. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We will not consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development.”). IV. Sanctions for Failure to Complete Financial Disclosures ¶ 23 We next reject husband’s conclusory contention that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning him under C.R.C.P. 16.2 for failing to complete his financial disclosures. 9 ¶ 24 If a party doesn’t comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P. 16.2, the other party may request sanctions. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(5), (j); C.R.C.P. 37(a)(2)(A); In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 28. Sanctions may include preventing the noncomplying party from introducing evidence, prohibiting them from contesting a designated claim or defense, entering a default judgment, or ordering them to pay attorney fees. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(j); C.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(C), (c)(1). The court has considerable discretion to impose appropriate sanctions based on the circumstances. Wright, ¶ 27. ¶ 25 We perceive no abuse of the district court’s considerable discretion. Husband received multiple extensions to complete his financial disclosures, and over nine months had lapsed since the commencement of the case. At the April status conference, the district court warned husband of the potential consequences that could occur if he didn’t complete his disclosures. Yet husband nevertheless failed to provide any financial disclosures. Given these circumstances, we cannot say that it was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair for the court to sanction husband by awarding wife attorney fees and barring him from presenting 10  documentary evidence at the permanent orders hearing. See Miller, 207 P.3d at 932. V. Marital Home ¶ 26 We now consider husband’s challenge to the district court’s finding that he committed marital dissipation involving the marital home by transferring title in the home to his mother. ¶ 27 The district court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital estate in such proportions as it deems just based on the facts and circumstances of the case. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2026; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. While the court must disregard marital misconduct, In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 75, it may consider and account for economic fault, which occurs when a spouse dissipates marital assets in contemplation of dissolution, In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 542-43 (Colo. 1995). See also In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1174 (Colo. App. 2006) (recognizing that “the trial court appropriately remedied [a party’s] dissipation of assets by including the funds he had dissipated as part of the marital estate”). We review the court’s allocation of the marital estate for an abuse of discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 28. 11 ¶ 28 The district court found that the home was marital property and that husband had dissipated the home’s approximately $575,000 of equity by quitclaiming the home to his mother after wife reported his domestic violence. However, both parties now agree that husband’s attempted transfer of the home to his mother was ineffectual given that he had previously transferred the home to the Ken Zhu Trust. Considering this agreement and given the district court’s finding (which we do not disturb) that the home constituted marital property, we reverse the marital property division and remand the case for the court to reconsider its dissipation findings and the disposition of the marital home. ¶ 29 When reconsidering its findings concerning dissipation and the disposition of the marital home, the district court may exercise discretion in determining whether additional evidence is necessary or whether it should rely solely on evidence from the prior hearing. Cf. In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App. 1989). ¶ 30 On remand, if the district court changes its existing findings concerning the dissipation of the marital home, or otherwise alters the disposition of the marital home, the court must reconsider the entire marital property division in light of the parties’ economic 12  circumstances at the time of remand. See In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 697, 699 (Colo. 1993); In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 53. In such an instance, the court may consider the evidence from the permanent orders hearing but should also give the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence on their present circumstances in determining an equitable division of the marital estate. See In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 21. However, the court may not recharacterize property as marital or separate or revalue the marital property accounted for in the existing property division. See Medeiros, ¶ 25. VI. Appellate Attorney Fees ¶ 31 Lastly, we consider the parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees. Both parties request an award of their appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2026, based on dueling assertions that portions of the other party’s briefing lacked substantial justification. However, we do not view the parties’ respective briefs as lacking substantial justification such that an award of attorney fees is appropriate. We therefore deny their requests. 13  VII. Disposition ¶ 32 Those portions of the judgment concerning the marital property division are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All other portions of the judgment challenged by husband are affirmed. Those portions of the permanent orders not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed. JUDGE HARRIS and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur. 14