Full Opinion

25CA1600 Arnold v Swan 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1600 Washington County District Court No. 22CV4 Honorable Kimbra L. Killin, Judge April Katri Arnold, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michelle Swan, in her official capacity as Treasurer of Washington County, Colorado, Intervenor-Appellant. ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK J. Jones and Sullivan, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 April Katri Arnold, Pro Se Nathan Dumm & Mayer P.C., Marni Nathan Kloster, Caitlin L. Gemmill, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellant ¶1 Intervenor, Michelle Swan, in her official capacity as Treasurer of Washington County, Colorado, appeals the district court’s order awarding costs against her and in favor of plaintiff, April Katri Arnold. She argues, among other things, that costs could not be awarded against her because (1) she was not a party to the underlying lawsuit, and (2) costs may not be awarded against the county. Arnold agrees and concedes that the order should be reversed. Because we also agree, we reverse the order awarding costs against the Treasurer and remand the case for the district court to vacate that award. I. Background ¶2 Arnold owned an undivided one-quarter interest in property in Washington County, as a tenant in common with four other people who owned the remaining three-quarters interest. Arnold was billed for her share of the property taxes separately from the other owners. ¶3 Years ago, the other owners failed to pay their share of the taxes, and a tax lien attached to their interest. Nelson Brent, the defendant in this case, purchased the tax lien and later received a 1 treasurer’s deed for the three-quarters interest. Arnold was not notified of the tax lien sale or Brent’s request for a treasurer’s deed. ¶4 Arnold filed a quiet title action against Brent, alleging that the treasurer’s deed was void. Although she also named “Washington County Gov.” as a defendant, the claims against the county were dismissed, and the case proceeded only as between Arnold and Brent. Brent counterclaimed for partition of the property. After a trial, the district court upheld the treasurer’s deed and ordered the parties to partition the property in proportion to their interests. ¶5 Arnold appealed, and a division of this court reversed. See Arnold v. Brent, 2024 COA 104. The division concluded that the treasurer’s deed was void because a tax lien must be sold for an entire piece of property, rather than a partial interest in the property. Id. at ¶ 33. The division directed the district court on remand to “determine and award to Arnold her reasonable costs associated with bringing her quiet title complaint, defending against Brent’s counterclaim, and pursuing [that] appeal.” Id. at ¶ 40. ¶6 On remand, the Treasurer filed an emergency motion for limited intervention to “address matters related to the refund and collection of taxes associated with the property,” in light of the void 2 deed. The motion explained that the Treasurer did not seek to intervene with respect to “a judgment on costs” or any other pending matters. The district court granted the motion, finding that the Treasurer had a right to “limited intervention for the purpose of determining the refund and collection of property taxes as a result of the voiding of the [t]reasurer’s [d]eed.” ¶7 Arnold then moved for an award of costs against Brent. Noting that Arnold did not seek any relief against the Treasurer, the Treasurer took no position on the motion. The district court awarded Arnold $3,515.84 in costs. But finding that Brent was “simply a purchaser at a tax sale” and “without fault,” the court ordered the costs to be assessed against the Treasurer. II. Award of Costs Against Treasurer ¶8 The Treasurer argues that the district court erred by awarding costs against her because (1) she was not a party, much less a “losing party,” to the underlying litigation or the prior appeal; and 3 (2) costs cannot be assessed against a subdivision of the state. Arnold agrees with the Treasurer on both points.1 So do we. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶9 Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule, “reasonable costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party” in any litigation. C.R.C.P. 54(d). Such costs are generally awarded against the “losing party.” Gf Gaming Corp. v. Taylor, 205 P.3d 523, 526 (Colo. App. 2009). Similarly, if a judgment is reversed on appeal, appellate costs are taxed against the appellee. C.A.R. 39(a)(3). ¶ 10 But costs may be imposed “against the state of Colorado, its officers or agencies . . . only to the extent permitted by law.” C.R.C.P. 54(d); see also C.A.R. 39(b) (“Costs for or against the State of Colorado or any of its agencies or officers will be assessed . . . 1 For the most part, Arnold’s answer brief is a verbatim copy of the Treasurer’s opening brief, with minor changes and additions. Arnold appears to contend that the costs award should have been higher and, perhaps, that it should have been entered against Brent. But Arnold’s appeal was dismissed by this court for failure to file an opening brief, leaving only the Treasurer’s cross-appeal. We therefore do not consider any separate challenge by Arnold to the costs award. Cf. Blocker Expl. Co. v. Frontier Expl., Inc., 740 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1987) (“The general rule is that an appellee must file a cross-appeal in order for an appellate court to consider an alleged error of the trial court which prejudiced the appellee.”). 4 only if authorized by law.”). This means there must be “an explicit legislative provision that specifically and clearly indicates the intent of the legislature to authorize costs against a public entity.” Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 132 (Colo. 2005). Absent that, a court may not award costs against the state or its subdivisions. City & County of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 239 P.3d 1270, 1278 (Colo. 2010). ¶ 11 We review an award of costs for an abuse of discretion, but we review the legal conclusions underlying that award de novo. Jorgensen v. Colo. Rural Props., LLC, 226 P.3d 1255, 1259 (Colo. App. 2010). We interpret statutes and procedural rules de novo. Northstar Project Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO 12, ¶ 12. B. Analysis ¶ 12 We conclude that the award of costs against the Treasurer was improper for two reasons.2 ¶ 13 First, the Treasurer was not a party to any of the proceedings for which costs were awarded. The award included Arnold’s costs 2 Because we reverse the costs award on these bases, we do not address the Treasurer’s other arguments that the costs award was improper because it implied she was at fault, was not supported by the record, and was entered without notice and a hearing. 5 for bringing the quiet title complaint, defending against Brent’s counterclaim, and pursuing her first appeal. The Treasurer did not intervene in the case until after that appeal — and even then, her role was limited to addressing the consequences of the court ruling. See Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012 COA 86, ¶ 92 (holding that costs attributable to case against one party could not be assessed against another party). Indeed, she expressly disclaimed any involvement in the underlying dispute. Thus, Arnold was not a “prevailing party” with respect to the Treasurer. C.R.C.P. 54(d). Nor was the Treasurer an appellee in the prior appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a)(3). ¶ 14 Second, an award of costs against the Treasurer in her official capacity is an award against the county itself. See Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 32; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 699 (Colo. 1996) (“A county is . . . a political subdivision of the state . . . .”). But the district court did not identify — nor are we aware of — any “explicit legislative provision that specifically and clearly indicates the intent of the legislature to authorize costs against a public entity” in this context. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 113 P.3d at 132. And the parties agree there is not one. Thus, costs could not be awarded against 6 the Treasurer under C.R.C.P. 54(d) (or C.A.R. 39). See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 266 P.3d 412, 423-24 (Colo. App. 2011). III. Disposition ¶ 15 The order awarding costs against the Treasurer is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to vacate the award.3 JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur. 3 The prior division’s mandate directed the district court to award Arnold her reasonable costs. See Arnold v. Brent, 2024 COA 104, ¶ 40. The only issue raised in this appeal is whether those costs may be awarded against the Treasurer. We express no opinion as to whether and what costs may be awarded against Brent. 7