Marriage of Becker

25CA1980 & 25CA1981 Marriage of Becker 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1980 & 25CA1981 Douglas County District Court No. 19DR30231 Honorable Daniel Warhola, Judge Honorable Donna Stewart, Magistrate In re the Marriage of Chrissy Sue Becker, Appellee, and Donald Scott Becker, Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division III Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Schutz and Brenton, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Schaffner Law LLC, Joseph Maher, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee Donald Scott Becker, Pro Se *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 Daniel Scott Becker (husband) appeals the district court’s orders adopting the magistrate’s judgments finding him in contempt and imposing remedial and punitive sanctions. Husband also appeals the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s denial of his motion to modify maintenance. We affirm the contempt judgments and the order denying husband’s motion to modify, but we reverse the attorney fees award and remand for further findings. I. Background ¶2 The district court dissolved husband’s marriage with Chrissy Sue Becker (wife) in 2020. As part of permanent orders, the court ordered the parties to divide their 529 accounts and use the funds for their children’s education. The court also ordered husband to pay maintenance and child support to wife. A division of this court affirmed the property division, including the division of the 529 accounts, but reversed the child support calculation based on the district court’s erroneous calculation of overnight visits. See In re Marriage of Becker, (Colo. App. No. 20CA1762, Nov. 18, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). On remand, the district court issued an amended support order recalculating husband’s child support obligation. 1 ¶3 In November 2021, wife moved for indirect contempt (2021 contempt motion) alleging that husband had failed to comply with the permanent orders by underpaying maintenance and child support, and by not utilizing his 529 accounts for the children’s educational costs. She sought punitive and remedial sanctions. In July 2023, the magistrate conducted a hearing on multiple outstanding motions, including wife’s 2021 contempt motion, and found husband in contempt on both allegations (2023 contempt judgment). The magistrate then imposed remedial and punitive sanctions, including a remedial sanction requiring husband to pay wife $13,970 for her reasonable attorney fees and costs related to her contempt motion. Husband petitioned for review, and the district court affirmed the magistrate’s judgment and attorney fees award. ¶4 In July 2023, husband moved to modify maintenance, citing his unemployment and wife’s improved financial circumstances. Three months later, wife moved for indirect remedial and punitive contempt sanctions (2023 contempt motion) for unpaid maintenance and child support. Following a contested hearing regarding both motions, the district court magistrate denied 2  husband’s motion to modify. Finding that husband had subsequently paid the past due maintenance and child support amounts, the court denied wife’s request for remedial sanctions. However, because husband knew of the valid support order, did not pay support as ordered, had the ability to comply, and offended the authority and dignity of the court by his noncompliance, the magistrate ordered punitive sanctions (2024 contempt judgment). Husband petitioned for review, and the district court affirmed the magistrate’s judgment and order. II. Contempt Judgments ¶5 For several reasons, husband contends that the magistrate erred by finding him in remedial and punitive contempt in 2023, ordering him to pay $13,970 of wife’s attorney fees and costs as a remedial sanction, and finding him in punitive contempt in 2024. We uphold the contempt findings, but we reverse the attorney fees award and remand for further findings.1 1 We decline to address husband’s assertion, raised for the first time in his reply brief, that the magistrate erred by requiring him to transfer his 529 accounts to wife as a remedial sanction stemming from the 2023 contempt order. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief). 3  A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review ¶6 There are two types of contempt, direct and indirect, and two types of sanctions, punitive and remedial. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., 2022 COA 3, ¶ 21. This case involves indirect contempt and both types of sanctions. ¶7 Punitive sanctions for indirect contempt are designed to punish “by unconditional fine, fixed sentence of imprisonment, or both, . . . conduct that is found to be offensive to the authority and dignity of the court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4). Such sanctions must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a lawful order existed; (2) the contemnor had knowledge of the order; (3) the contemnor had the ability to comply with the order; and (4) the contemnor willfully refused to comply with the order. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 25. ¶8 In contrast, remedial sanctions for indirect contempt are “imposed to force compliance with a lawful order or to compel performance of an act within the person’s power or present ability to perform.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). To impose such sanctions, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that “the contemnor (1) failed to comply with a lawful court order; (2) knew of 4  the order; and (3) has the present ability to comply with the order.” A.C.B., ¶ 24. ¶9 A magistrate has broad discretion in deciding whether a person is in contempt, and that finding will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See People in Interest of K.S-E., 2021 COA 93, ¶ 18. An abuse of discretion occurs when the magistrate misconstrues or misapplies the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. Sheehan, ¶ 23. ¶ 10 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Carey, 2026 COA 3, ¶ 29; C.R.M. 7(j). Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no record support for them. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. We review de novo the district court’s and magistrate’s legal conclusions. Carey, ¶ 29. 5  B. 2023 Contempt Judgment 1. 529 Accounts ¶ 11 The magistrate found — by a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt — that permanent orders were entered in 2020 requiring the parties to use their respective 529 accounts to contribute to the children’s education, that husband had knowledge of the order, and that he refused to utilize his 529 accounts for the children’s benefit. The magistrate further found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that husband’s conduct was willful and offensive to the dignity of the court. ¶ 12 First, husband contends that the magistrate based her contempt finding on an erroneous interpretation of the permanent orders. Specifically, husband asserts that the magistrate’s interpretation “expan[ded] . . . the original orders” to read in “a specific, affirmative duty of when and how these funds were to be used” that did not exist in the plain reading of the orders. We are not persuaded. ¶ 13 While issuing the permanent order dividing the 529 accounts, the district court stated that dividing the accounts gave husband an opportunity to show the children “here’s this money . . . your 6 mother is responsible for half and I’m responsible for half, and we are dedicating this money to the two of you pursuing your education, whether . . . going to a university, or whatever.” Husband asserts that the magistrate erred by considering this “statement[] of advice to [the] parents” to find that the order required the parties to equally contribute to the children’s education once the children selected a school. Husband does not provide any legal authority supporting his contention that the magistrate could not consider this language, and we are aware of none. Indeed, when interpreting a court order, the order must be read as a whole. See Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 (Colo. 1983) (explaining that rules for interpreting agreements apply to the interpretation of court orders); In re Marriage of Cerrone, 2021 COA 116, ¶ 19 (“[T]he language of the separation agreement must be read as a whole, and in context, to determine the meaning of [the] terms . . . .”). Reading the permanent orders as a whole, the language husband claims is mere advice, is an explanation of the district court’s purpose and intent. Thus, it is reasonably read as an interpretive guide. Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate’s 7  interpretation of the order governing the division and use of the 529 accounts. ¶ 14 Second, husband asserts that the magistrate erred by finding that he failed to comply with the order because he still had time to comply. In essence, husband asserts that the order did not mandate use of the accounts at a specific time or in a specific way and, thus, he had time to use the accounts to contribute to the children’s education because they were still in undergraduate school. But this argument relies on husband’s asserted interpretation of the permanent orders, which we already addressed and rejected above. Furthermore, the magistrate’s judgment focused not only on husband’s failure to comply with the order, but also his refusal to comply with the order. See C.R.C.P. 107(1) (defining contempt as “disobedience or resistance by any person to . . . any . . . order of the court” (emphasis added)). Indeed, when asked about the 529 accounts during the 2023 contempt hearing, husband stated, “I could use all of [the funds] for one child . . . it’s my choice what to do with those and I’m waiting to see what decisions [the children] make.” But the district court ordered half of the fund to be used for each of the two daughters. In addition, 8  wife testified that husband told the children “many times” that they would not receive the money. On one occasion, wife heard husband tell the children that “they would get [the funds] when he dies.” ¶ 15 Given this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s contempt determination regarding husband’s 529 accounts. See K.S-E., ¶ 18. 2. Nonpayment of Support ¶ 16 Following the 2023 contempt hearing, the magistrate also found that husband (1) knew of the support order; (2) owed $80,083.25 in unpaid maintenance and child support; (3) had both the past and present abilities to comply with the order; and (4) willfully violated the order, which offended the dignity of the court. ¶ 17 First, we reject husband’s assertion that the district court erred by adopting the magistrate’s contempt judgment because wife did not present sufficient evidence of his ability to comply with the order. Wife submitted husband’s prior and most recent financial affidavits, which showed that he had at least $500,000 in retirement accounts. Based on this, wife opined that he had the ability to pay the support arrears. The magistrate relied on this 9  evidence to find that husband had the past and present ability to comply. ¶ 18 Nevertheless, husband asserts that the magistrate erred by “fail[ing] to point to what assets or income specifically that [wife] proved were available to [him] to use to comply with the terms of the [c]ourt order.” Husband points to no legal authority, and we are aware of none, requiring the district court to detail exactly what monies or assets it expects a party to use to comply with its orders. Cf. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (requiring the district court to make “sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order”). The magistrate’s judgment was sufficiently explicit to give us a clear understanding of the basis for her finding that husband had the ability to pay. ¶ 19 We are similarly unpersuaded by husband’s assertion that the magistrate improperly shifted the burden to him to prove that he was unable to comply with the order. As husband asserts, the magistrate noted that he “spent so much of his time trying to make [wife] look bad that he forgot that he was the alleged contemnor in most of these motions and that he had a lot more to 10  prove . . . about himself, and simply didn’t do it.” But we do not interpret this as improperly shifting the burden of proof to husband. Notably, for the remedial contempt, husband had the burden to prove his inability to comply with the order. Sheehan, ¶ 24. Although wife had the initial burden to prove husband’s past ability to comply to support her request for punitive sanctions, id. at ¶ 25, once she did so, the burden shifted to husband. See W. Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1057-58 (Colo. 1992) (“Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant may produce evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . .”). Thus, rather than shifting the burden to husband, the magistrate simply noted that he had not met his required burden of proof. ¶ 20 To the extent husband contends that the magistrate erred by relying on his financial affidavit to find that he had the ability to pay, even though she found it not credible, we are not persuaded. After noting that husband’s financial affidavits “ma[d]e absolutely no sense” because of his inaccurate claims of unemployment and increasing assets in the face of asserted financial hardship, the magistrate found that, despite those concerns, she “ha[d] enough information to see . . . that [husband] ha[d] $80,000.” 11 ¶ 21 Finally, we reject husband’s claims that the magistrate erred by relying upon assets that “were not readily available” and had “financial penalties for access” to find that he had the ability to comply with the order. Specifically, citing Sheehan, husband asserts that, by noting his ability to liquidate funds, the magistrate improperly relied on “future transactions” to find that he had the ability to comply with the order. Husband’s reliance on Sheehan is misplaced. In Sheehan, a division of this court held that “[t]he ability to purge the contempt must lie with the contemnor at the time of the hearing, not through some future transaction to obtain additional resources.” Id. at ¶ 37. Thus, the division determined that a district court may not rely on a contemnor’s ability to borrow funds or secure a better job in order to find that the contemnor had the ability to comply with an order. Id. In contrast, here, the magistrate did not find that husband had the ability to comply based on a future expectation of additional resources but based on resources that husband owned at the time of the hearing. Husband’s need to liquidate funds in order to pay the support arrears did not render the magistrate’s consideration of such resources improper. See In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 94 12  (Colo. App. 2008) (upholding punitive and remedial sanctions where the evidence showed that the husband had assets, including property valued at approximately $436,000, to pay wife the balance of a tax assessment). ¶ 22 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by adopting the magistrate’s judgment finding husband in contempt for unpaid support and imposing remedial and punitive sanctions. 3. Wife’s Attorney Fees ¶ 23 Husband asserts that the magistrate erred by awarding wife attorney fees and costs as a remedial sanction. We agree that the magistrate made insufficient findings when determining the amount of attorney fees and costs wife incurred in connection with her 2021 contempt motion. a. Relevant Law and Standard of Review ¶ 24 The district court, in its sound discretion, may award reasonable attorney fees as a remedial sanction “in connection with the contempt proceeding.” See C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2); see also Levin v. Anouna, 990 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Colo. App. 1999) (explaining that the determination of a reasonable fee award in connection with a 13  contempt proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the district court). ¶ 25 The district court’s order “must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order and to enable the appellate court to determine the grounds upon which it rendered its decision.” In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008); see also In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.”). b. Analysis ¶ 26 Wife sought $15,348.05 in attorney fees and costs “solely in relation” to her 2021 contempt motion. Husband objected, claiming that wife’s request went beyond the scope of her motion. In support, he noted that wife’s 2021 contempt motion comprised just two of the eleven issues heard during the 2023 hearing, and he listed numerous billing entries that he claimed were “in no way tied to the two (2) contempts [for which wife was] seeking attorney’s fees.” Husband reiterated this objection at the attorney fees 14  hearing. Wife’s counsel responded that wife’s 2021 contempt motion was “the main focus” of the 2023 hearing and that, before submitting his attorney affidavits, he “very scrupulously tried not to include anything that was unrelated to the contempt action.” ¶ 27 After considering the arguments presented by both parties, the magistrate rejected husband’s objection that several of the billing entries “completely lack[ed] specificity as to what motion the fees relate[d] to,” finding that the billing entries were reasonably limited to protect attorney-client privilege. But the magistrate agreed that $174.50 — related to a contempt filed by husband against wife — and $1,206.50 — approximately one-quarter of her counsel’s fees to prepare for, and attend, the 2023 hearing — should be deducted. The magistrate then awarded wife $13,970, finding that amount to be “reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of the contempt.” ¶ 28 Husband first asserts that because the magistrate erred by entering the remedial contempt judgment, we must also reverse the award of attorney fees. Because we rejected his assertions of error above, we necessarily reject this argument. ¶ 29 We are similarly unpersuaded by husband’s assertion that the magistrate’s “wholesale approach of simply reducing a small portion 15  of the fees by 25% [was] inappropriate.” After considering husband’s objections to the billing entries for the days leading up to the 2023 hearing, and the day of the hearing, the magistrate “went back and . . . looked at [her] notes regarding the hearing to see what the real focus of the hearing was.” After doing so, the magistrate determined that “a greater portion of the hearing” focused on wife’s 2021 contempt motion and, therefore, seventy-five percent of her attorney fees and costs for the days in question “were reasonably related and necessary for [her 2021] motion for contempt citation.” Because the magistrate’s finding was not “patently erroneous and unsupported by the evidence” we will not disturb it. Madison Cap. Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 560 (Colo. App. 2009). ¶ 30 However, we agree with husband that, apart from the two deductions, the magistrate’s order lacks sufficient findings to allow for meaningful review. While we do not expect the magistrate to have addressed each one of husband’s forty-nine objections individually, from the order we cannot discern the basis for the magistrate’s rejection of many of husband’s objections. For example, from the magistrate’s statements that wife’s counsel’s 16  billing entries were not “as detailed as outsiders might like” and, therefore, “the [c]ourt ha[d] to rely on [wife’s counsel] with his recollection of certain things . . . and ha[d] to trust that [he], as an officer of the [c]ourt, [was] presenting appropriate information,” we cannot discern if the magistrate considered husband’s objections to the vague billing entries and found wife’s counsel more credible or instead determined that there was insufficient information to make a finding. ¶ 31 Additionally, several of husband’s objections — such as those to billing entries on March 14, 2023, and March 22, 2023 — asserted that the fees incurred were “in no way tied” to wife’s 2021 contempt motion. We cannot discern if the magistrate considered and rejected these objections and, if so, the basis for their rejection. ¶ 32 Because the magistrate did not make sufficient specific findings supporting her reasons for the award under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), we cannot determine whether she abused her discretion. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the judgment and remand for more specific findings. 17  C. 2024 Contempt Judgment ¶ 33 We next address husband’s contention that the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s 2024 punitive contempt judgment because he was current on his support obligation at the time wife filed her 2023 contempt motion. Wife does not dispute preservation of this contention. ¶ 34 The evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that “at the time that the contempt was filed in October of 2023, [husband] did violate [the] [c]ourt’s order.” Wife described husband’s inconsistent support payments since the entry of the permanent orders, including a pattern of not receiving payments until “a few days before the contempt hearing.” Wife also provided an exhibit in support of her testimony that husband had not complied with the support order. Nevertheless, crediting his own testimony and exhibit, husband asserts that the evidence does not support the magistrate’s finding of noncompliance as of the date of filing. But the magistrate specifically considered husband’s proffered evidence and found it to be inaccurate. Essentially, husband asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the magistrate or district court, which we cannot do. See In re Marriage 18  of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995) (noting that, when the district court resolves conflicting evidence in one party’s favor, we may not reweigh that evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the district court); In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (explaining that even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court”). ¶ 35 Because the record supports the magistrate’s finding that husband had not complied with the support order at the time wife filed the 2023 contempt motion, we need not address husband’s argument that the district court erred by concluding that his “claim that the order only needed to be complied with by the time the motion for contempt was filed [was] simply wrong.” III. Denial of Husband’s Motion to Modify Maintenance ¶ 36 Husband further contends that the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s order denying his motion to modify maintenance. We disagree. A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review ¶ 37 “A modification of maintenance requires a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the 19  existing terms unfair.” In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 73; § 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026. Before July 1, 1993, section 14-10-122(1)(a) provided that a court could modify a maintenance award “only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.” After the General Assembly’s amendment, “[e]ffective July 1, 1993, the term ‘unfair’ was substituted for ‘unconscionable.’” In re Marriage of Swing, 194 P.3d 498, 499 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting Ch. 270, sec. 2, § 14-10-122(1)(a), 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws 1557). ¶ 38 “Whether circumstances have sufficiently changed lies within the sound discretion of the trial court based on the facts presented.” Kann, ¶ 75. “[A] motion to modify requires the court to consider all relevant circumstances of both parties.” In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 37. “The party seeking a modification has a heavy burden of proving that the provisions have become unfair under all relevant circumstances.” Kann, ¶ 74. ¶ 39 Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the court’s ruling. Id. at ¶ 75. “In assessing whether a trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we ask not whether 20  we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006). Credibility determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the district court’s “sole discretion.” In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003). But “[w]e review the district court’s application of legal standards and legal conclusions de novo.” In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 9. B. Analysis ¶ 40 Before denying husband’s motion to modify maintenance, the magistrate considered (1) the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the original support order; (2) the parties’ current incomes and financial circumstances; (3) husband’s assertion that wife was voluntarily underemployed; (4) wife’s reasonable financial needs; (5) husband’s reasonable financial needs and ability to pay maintenance; and (6) the advisory maintenance amount pursuant to section 14-10-114(3)(b), C.R.S. 2026. After these considerations, the magistrate found, as relevant to this appeal, that: 21  • at the time of the support order, husband earned $298,000 per year and wife earned $3,333 per month; • at the time of the modification hearing, husband earned $18,333 per month and wife earned $6,000 per month; • the parties had comparable assets; • wife was not voluntarily underemployed; and • the advisory maintenance amount under the guidelines would be $3,733 per month. Based on these findings, the magistrate determined that husband had not met his burden to prove that the current maintenance amount of $4,500 was unconscionable. 1. The Court Applied the Proper Legal Standard ¶ 41 Husband asserts that the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s order by applying the incorrect legal standard. In support of his assertion, husband highlights the magistrate’s reference to unconscionability in conjunction with In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1989) and In re Marriage of Anderson, 638 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1981), which were both decided prior to the statutory change. But, before referencing these cases, the magistrate correctly noted that “[u]nder [section] 14-10-122, the 22  [c]ourt needs to make a finding of . . . a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unfair.” Therefore, based on the record, we conclude that the magistrate was aware of, and applied, the proper legal standard when denying husband’s motion to modify. ¶ 42 In parts of the order, the magistrate did use the terms “unfair” and “unconscionable” interchangeably. Prior to the General Assembly’s change to section 14-10-122(1)(a), courts in Colorado likened unconscionability to unfairness. See In re Marriage of DaFoe, 677 P.2d 426, 427 (Colo. App. 1983) (“[T]he test of unconscionability is whether there has been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances which renders the existing maintenance provision unfair . . . .”); Aldinger v. Aldinger, 813 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. App. 1991) (directing district courts that the proper question to ask when analyzing motions to modify maintenance is “[h]ave the terms of the original award become unfair, i.e., unconscionable”). On this basis, a division of this court concluded that the General Assembly’s word change did not alter the legal standard. Swing, 194 P.3d at 499-500. 23 ¶ 43 Husband urges us to depart from Swing, citing extensive legislative history surrounding the amendment to section 14-10-122(1)(a), which demonstrates that some members of the General Assembly thought “unconscionable” was a higher standard than “unfair.” But husband did not present this argument to the district court in his petition for review, therefore, we will not consider it. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[A] party seeking review of a magistrate’s decision must raise a particular issue in the district court so that the district court may have an opportunity to correct any error that may have been made by the magistrate.”); Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1188 n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“We review only the specific arguments a party pursued before the district court.”). ¶ 44 Nothing in the record, or cited by husband, suggests that the magistrate understood “unconscionable” to have any different meaning than “unfair.” To the contrary, because the magistrate used the terms interchangeably, we conclude she thought they had the same meaning, as did the court in Swing. And nothing suggests the magistrate intended a meaning of “unfair” other than the one 24  the courts in Colorado had likened to “unconscionable.” For these reasons, we conclude that the magistrate did not err by using the terms interchangeably when denying husband’s motion to modify. 2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Husband’s Motion to Modify Maintenance ¶ 45 Husband next contends that the magistrate erred by making several inaccurate and improper findings to deny his maintenance modification request. ¶ 46 First, husband asserts that the magistrate erred by finding that wife was not voluntarily underemployed. Pursuant to section 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV), “[i]f a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, maintenance must be calculated based on a determination of potential income.” But a party shall not be deemed underemployed if their “employment is a good faith career choice.” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B). We will not disturb a court’s findings regarding voluntary unemployment or underemployment unless the court’s determination is not supported by the record and, therefore, is clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Bregar, 952 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. App. 1997). 25 ¶ 47 The magistrate found that wife was not voluntarily underemployed because she had an established, stable job in an otherwise unstable industry, and her income was close to the mean income that husband’s vocational expert testified wife could be earning. The record supports these findings. Wife is the general manager of a restaurant where she has worked for the past twenty-one years. Wife testified that the restaurant industry as a whole is “in trouble” because of inflation, and the turnover for managers is “[e]xtremely high.” But at her current position she knows she “ha[s] an income, it’s very secure, [and] it’s very safe.” ¶ 48 Nevertheless, husband asserts that the magistrate erred by finding wife was not voluntarily underemployed because the magistrate disregarded the testimony of his vocational expert, including her testimony that wife admitted she could earn more money at a different restaurant. But the magistrate expressly acknowledged that “the testimony [was] that if [wife] went and worked for Red Robin or Chili’s that she may be making up to $100,000, based on her experience” before determining that other factors, including stability, made wife’s current job a reasonable career choice. See Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207. 26 ¶ 49 We also reject husband’s assertion that, by relying on the comfort and stability wife enjoyed at her current job, the magistrate “basically placed [her] own morality into the equation.” To the contrary, there was evidence properly before the magistrate for her consideration in determining whether wife’s current job was a good faith career choice and, therefore, exempted from a finding of voluntary underemployment. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B). We will not disturb a magistrate’s finding when it has evidentiary support. See Carey, ¶ 29. ¶ 50 To the extent husband also asserts that the magistrate erred by finding that wife still needed maintenance, despite her improved financial situation, we disagree. Wife testified that she had to remove funds from her investment account, in part, to meet her reasonable needs and, when she does not receive maintenance as ordered “[i]t causes [her] a lot of panic” and requires her to limit her expenses. Even so, husband asserts that the magistrate erred by disregarding other evidence that he believes showed that wife no longer needs maintenance. But it was for the magistrate to consider, and weigh, all the admitted evidence and decide what inferences and conclusions to draw therefrom. See Lewis, 66 P.3d 27  at 207. Additionally, as the magistrate noted, wife’s increased income did not require a conclusion that the original maintenance amount was unfair. See Udis, 780 P.2d at 503 (“[T]he fact that a spouse who receives maintenance enjoys increased income in comparison to the amount of income earned by that spouse at the time the decree was entered does not necessarily require the conclusion that the initial award of maintenance has been rendered unconscionable.”). ¶ 51 Second, husband contends that the magistrate erred by finding that he had assets comparable in value to that of wife. The magistrate found that during husband’s claimed period of unemployment, he had $1.1 million in assets, which had not decreased. Husband contends that the magistrate erred by “ignor[ing] [his] testimony that he had to use all of his inheritance that he received in order to accomplish this.” Determining what weight to give the evidence was in the magistrate’s sole province and, because the record supports her finding, we may not disturb it on review. See Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207; Thorburn, ¶ 25. ¶ 52 Third, husband contends that the magistrate erred by finding that he stated during his testimony that he had the present ability 28  to pay any past due maintenance amounts. But our review of the record shows that when asked if he was “taking the position . . . that [he was] not able to pay what [wife was] claiming [he] should be paying in arrearages,” husband responded “[n]o, I’m not taking that position at all.” Although husband later added that he would have to borrow the money to pay the arrears, it was for the magistrate to determine what inferences and conclusions to draw from the evidence. Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207. ¶ 53 Moreover, husband’s statement was not the sole evidence relied on by the magistrate to determine husband’s ability to pay maintenance. She also considered husband’s financial statements and assets listed therein, as discussed above. In other words, to the extent the magistrate erred by finding that husband admitted his ability to pay, any such error was harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”); Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (“An error affects a substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” (citation omitted)). 29 ¶ 54 Fourth, husband contends that the magistrate erred by finding that, using the parties’ current incomes, the advisory maintenance amount would be $3,733 per month. We agree that the magistrate failed to discount this amount by twenty-five percent because maintenance is not taxable income to wife or tax deductible for husband. See § 14-10-114(3)(b)(I)(C). Nevertheless, we conclude that this miscalculation does not require reversal. ¶ 55 When deciding a motion to modify maintenance, a court is not required to consider the advisory guidelines. See § 14-10-114(5)(a). Moreover, here, because the parties’ combined annual adjusted gross income exceeds $240,000, “the calculation methodology . . . for determining the advisory guideline amount of maintenance does not apply.” § 14-10-114(3.5). Above all, the magistrate did not base her denial of husband’s modification request solely on the advisory maintenance guidelines. The ma