Marriage of Goodwin

26CA0136 Marriage of Goodwin 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA0136 Larimer County District Court No. 25DR30114 Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge In re the Marriage of Tess Braslau Goodwin, Appellant, and Grady Goodwin, Appellee. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Choice City Family Law, LLC, Desiree Gray, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellant Modern Family Law, Ariel Williams, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Tess Braslau Goodwin (wife) and Grady Goodwin (husband), wife appeals the property division and attorney fee portions of the district court’s permanent orders. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts ¶2 In early 2021, wife and her parents bought a house for $395,000, with each listed on the title and owning a one-third interest. Her parents made a $200,000 down payment, and although all three took out a mortgage for the rest, it was understood that wife alone would be obligated to pay it. Not long after, wife and husband moved into the house. ¶3 Toward the end of that year, the parties married. Throughout the marriage, they used their incomes to pay the mortgage. ¶4 In February 2025, wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. ¶5 Several months later, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dissolved the marriage and entered permanent orders. The court found that the house (1) was wife’s separate, premarital property; (2) had a current fair market value of $511,000; and (3) had an outstanding mortgage balance of $147,280. 1 ¶6 The district court determined that the house’s equity had increased by roughly $164,000 during the marriage. And because wife owned one-third of the house, the court divided $164,000 by three and arrived at a marital appreciation of $54,666. Given husband’s contributions toward the mortgage and household bills during the marriage, the court split the appreciation evenly with each party receiving $27,333. The court also denied wife’s request for attorney fees she incurred because of husband’s alleged noncompliance with his disclosure obligations under C.R.C.P. 16.2. ¶7 Wife now appeals. II. Property Division ¶8 Wife contends that the district court (1) miscalculated the house’s marital appreciation and inequitably divided that appreciation between the parties and (2) erred when it denied her request for an award of her attorney fees. We disagree with both contentions. A. Governing Law and Standard of Review ¶9 Before dividing the marital estate, a district court must first determine whether an asset or debt is marital property, which is 2  subject to division, or separate property, which is not. § 14-10- 113(1), C.R.S. 2026. ¶ 10 Property a spouse acquired before the marriage is separate property, but any appreciation in its value during the marriage is marital and divisible. § 14-10-113(1)(d), (4); see In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 521 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 3. ¶ 11 Next, the district court must determine an approximate value of the asset or debt. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9. ¶ 12 Finally, after setting aside any separate property, the district court must equitably divide the marital estate. § 14-10-113(1); see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3 (the division must be equitable, but it need not be equal). To that end, the court must consider all relevant factors, including (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property; (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property becomes effective; and (4) any change in a spouse’s separate property during the marriage or the depletion of separate property for marital 3  purposes. § 14-10-113(1). Specific findings on every statutory factor aren’t required, provided that the court’s overall findings allow an appellate court to determine that its decision is supported by competent evidence. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 19. And weighing the statutory factors is within the court’s sound discretion. In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 67. ¶ 13 The district court has “great latitude” to equitably divide the marital estate based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and we may not disturb its division absent an abuse of that discretion. Collins, ¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1). A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. B. Calculation of the House’s Marital Appreciation ¶ 14 Wife argues that the district court improperly calculated the house’s marital appreciation because it looked at the increase in equity instead of the increase in the house’s value during the marriage. She asserts that the marital appreciation should have been $38,666, not $54,666, based on the house’s value at the time of the dissolution ($511,000) less its value at the time of the 4  marriage ($395,000), divided by three to account for her one-third ownership interest. ¶ 15 It is undisputed that the house was wife’s separate property. The parties agreed that the house was worth $395,000 at the time of the marriage and that $200,000 had been made as a down payment. Wife and her parents took out a $195,000 mortgage to cover the remainder of the purchase price. ¶ 16 Wife and her mother testified that wife was solely responsible for the mortgage. Wife’s parents never made a mortgage payment, and wife indicated that her parents wouldn’t assume responsibility for the mortgage at any point. Husband and wife testified that throughout the marriage they had used their respective incomes to pay down the mortgage. See In re Marriage of Green, 169 P.3d 202, 203 (Colo. App. 2007) (income earned during the marriage is presumed to be marital property); see also Cardona, 321 P.3d at 522 (“When a spouse uses marital income to pay down the debt on separate property, thereby increasing its equity, the increased equity is equitably divided in the marital property division.”). ¶ 17 The parties also agreed that at the time of the permanent orders hearing, the house had a fair market value of $511,000, and 5  that the mortgage had dropped to $147,280, leaving about $364,000 in equity. ¶ 18 The district court took the difference in the equity at the time of the dissolution ($364,000) and on the date of the marriage ($200,000) and divided that by three, arriving at a marital appreciation of approximately $54,666. The court then divided $54,666 in half, allocating each party $27,333. ¶ 19 We conclude that the district court correctly considered the increase in equity when determining the marital appreciation. See id.; see also In Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2001) (recognizing that paying premarital debt with marital funds benefits the owning spouse by increasing the equity in separate property and must be considered in the property division). ¶ 20 Wife’s calculation of the house’s marital appreciation is flawed. Wife’s amount of $38,666 considers only the house’s market appreciation and ignores the additional $47,720 in equity created when marital funds were used to pay down the mortgage. ¶ 21 Still, wife asserts that even if the district court properly considered the increase in equity in determining the marital appreciation, it erred by not accepting her “clear and 6  uncontradicted” testimony that her equity in the house was $22,720. Wife reached that figure by subtracting $147,280, the outstanding mortgage balance, from $170,333, which represented her one-third ownership interest in the house’s current market value of $511,000. We presume that the district court considered her testimony, see In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007), and it was the court’s prerogative to believe all, part, or none of it, even if uncontroverted, see In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007); see also In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court, not the reviewing court, to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, including the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom). C. Equal Division of the House’s Marital Appreciation ¶ 22 Wife also contends that the district court erred by equally dividing the house’s marital appreciation. To get there, she says that the evidence shows that husband contributed little, if anything, to the house. But the court found, with record support, that during the marriage, he helped pay the mortgage and other household expenses. See § 14-10-113(1)(a); Thorburn, ¶ 49. In 7  fact, wife testified that husband’s contributions “increase[ed] some of the value and the equity of the [house]” and that because he earned a higher income, he paid a greater share of the “mortgage[,] . . . bills and groceries.” ¶ 23 We reject wife’s claim that in assessing husband’s contributions under section 14-10-113(1)(a), the district court failed to consider evidence that husband lied about being employed and that she was forced to contribute more financially because he withdrew significant amounts of money from their bank account for his personal expenses. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 329; Collins, ¶ 19. Wife’s assertion belies her testimony that she and husband tried to combine incomes and accounts but were unsuccessful, so he would send her money after receiving his paycheck, and she would take care of the bills. This is consistent with the court’s finding that husband contributed to expenses during the marriage. ¶ 24 Wife next asserts that the district court didn’t consider the total economic circumstances of the parties as required under section 14-10-113(1)(c) when dividing the marital appreciation. She points to evidence that she and her parents owned an equal one- third interest in the house and that she was solely responsible for 8  paying its mortgage. The court, however, expressly acknowledged that wife held a one-third ownership interest in the house, and we presume that the court considered the substantial evidence that she alone was obligated to pay the mortgage. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 329; Collins, ¶ 19. Moreover, her assertion essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence or the statutory factors and substitute our judgment for that of the district court; we decline the invitation. See Smith, ¶ 67; Thorburn, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”). ¶ 25 To the extent that wife argues that the district court made no findings regarding her parents’ financial contributions toward the house’s increased value, we decline to address the issue. Wife didn’t give a legal basis to the district court or to us on why or how those contributions to the jointly owned home should be set aside. See In re Marriage of Turilli, 2021 COA 151, ¶ 12 (an issue is preserved for appeal when it is brought to the court’s attention, and the court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also In re Marriage of 9  Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12. We note that wife’s mother testified that she and her husband paid for the house repairs and upgrades because, as parents, they wanted to help all of their children and knew that the parties were experiencing some financial difficulties. ¶ 26 Because the district court properly considered all the relevant statutory factors, made the necessary findings, and those findings have record support, we discern no error. See Collins, ¶ 19. III. Attorney Fees ¶ 27 Last, wife contends that the district court erred by denying her request for attorney fees under section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2026, and section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2026. We disagree. A. Governing Law and Standard of Review ¶ 28 In domestic relations cases, the parties “owe each other and the court a duty of full and honest disclosure of all facts that materially affect their rights and interests.” C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(1); see In re Marriage of Martin, 2021 COA 101, ¶ 25 (“C.R.C.P. 16.2 establishes heightened disclosure rules for domestic relations cases, 10  recognizing that the parties in such cases stand in a special relationship to each other.”). Thus, “a party must affirmatively disclose all information that is material to the resolution of the case without awaiting inquiry from the other party.” C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(1). ¶ 29 A district court has considerable discretion to impose appropriate sanctions if a party fails to comply with their obligations under the disclosure rule. C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(5), (j) (authorizing the district court to impose sanctions for failure to provide mandatory disclosures or to comply with any other provision of the rule); see also Wright, ¶ 27. ¶ 30 As relevant here, a district court may award attorney fees when a party “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding.” § 13-17- 102(4). Because the plain language of section 13-17-102(1) allows, but doesn’t require, the court to award attorney fees, we review the court’s decision to deny fees for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Tognoni, 313 P.3d 655, 660-61 (Colo. App. 2011) (district court has broad discretion when determining whether to award attorney fees under section 13-17-102). ¶ 31 Likewise, under section 14-10-119, the district court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees after considering the 11  parties’ financial resources. In re Marriage of Oberg, 900 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Colo. App. 1994). B. Discussion ¶ 32 Wife maintains that the district court should’ve awarded her attorney fees for the additional work she claimed was caused by husband’s noncompliance with his C.R.C.P. 16.2 disclosure obligations. ¶ 33 The district court declined to award any attorney fees. The court found that wife hadn’t met her burden of proving she was entitled to fees under section 13-17-102. ¶ 34 The record supports the district court’s decision. ¶ 35 When asked why husband should pay some of her attorney fees, wife explained that given his inadequate financial disclosures under C.R.C.P. 16.2, she had no choice but to take “extra steps,” like using formal discovery methods, to get the required information. Specifically, she alleged that he (1) provided incomplete statements for certain checking accounts; (2) failed to list a certain savings account on two sworn financial statements; (3) didn’t disclose all savings and brokerage accounts associated with a Cash App account; (4) withheld paystubs from previous 12  employers; and (5) refused to give documentation concerning his cryptocurrency. And because of his lack of transparency, wife also said that she had to issue a subpoena to his former employer to verify that he had no retirement accounts. ¶ 36 Wife never moved to compel the allegedly missing disclosures or otherwise asked the district court to find that husband violated C.R.C.P. 16.2. As a result, the court made no such finding. ¶ 37 Contrary to wife’s suggestion, a fee award under section 13- 17-102 isn’t automatic whenever a party fails to provide complete C.R.C.P. 16.2 financial disclosures. The court had broad discretion to decide whether husband’s conduct unnecessarily expanded the proceedings and, if so, whether that conduct warranted an award of fees. See Tognoni, 313 P.3d at 660-61. And because wife does not explain why the court’s decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, we discern no abuse of its discretion. See id. ¶ 38 On the same basis, wife also insists that she was entitled to attorney fees under section 14-10-119. But husband’s alleged failure to comply with C.R.C.P. 16.2 couldn’t, by itself, support an award under that statute. This is because the primary purpose of 13  section 14-10-119 “is to equalize the parties’ financial positions.” See In re Marriage of Anthony-Guillar, 207 P.3d 934, 944 (Colo. App. 2009); see also In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269, 272 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The apportionment of attorney fees under [section] 14-10- 119 is fundamentally different from statutory and contractual fee- shifting provisions that premise the award of attorney fees on the merits of the claims and a determination of who prevailed in the action.”). But see In re Marriage of Trout, 897 P.2d 838, 840 (Colo. App. 1994) (a district court may consider a party’s actions in initiating unwarranted proceedings when awarding attorney fees, as long as the purpose of the award is primarily equitable apportionment and not punitive). Wife doesn’t tell us why or how the parties’ financial positions justified an award to her. ¶ 39 Nor are we persuaded by wife’s assertion that the district court failed to make sufficient findings to support its denial of section 14-10-119 fees. Cf. Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1032, 1034- 35 (Colo. 2011) (specific factual findings under section 13-17-102 are required when a district court awards fees, but not when it denies them); In re Marriage of Aragon, 2019 COA 76, ¶¶ 10-11 14  (specific findings are required when fees are granted under section 14-10-119). ¶ 40 Insofar as wife argues that the district court should have imposed sanctions under C.R.C.P. 16.2(j), she didn’t request that relief in the district court. We won’t consider that argument for the first time on appeal. See Turilli, ¶ 12. IV. Disposition ¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE KUHN concur. 15