Peo in Interest of NSAZ

26CA0928 Peo in Interest of NSAZ 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA0928 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30702 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of N.S.A.Z., a Child, and Concerning A.A.Z. and A.A., Appellants. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division III Opinion by JUDGE BRENTON Schutz and Martinez*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.A.Z. Steven J. Taylor, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.A. *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.A.Z. (mother) and A.A. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities for N.S.A.Z. (the child) to paternal great- aunt (K.A.). We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the then-four-year-old child based on concerns about housing stability, educational and medical neglect, mother’s and father’s criminal cases, and mother’s substance use. The petition also named the child’s older siblings, A.E.A.Z., J.E.A.Z., and A.N.A.Z., who are not subject to this appeal. The court granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Department, which placed her with her paternal grandparents. The court later granted the Department’s request to place the child with K.A., with whom she remained ¶3 After mother and father entered no-fault admissions, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. The treatment plans required them to (1) maintain a working relationship with the caseworker; (2) obtain stable housing and a legal source of income; 1  (3) comply with probation and not engage in criminal activity; (4) attend family time; (5) meet the children’s physical, emotional, medical, educational, and safety needs, by, among other things, attending medical appointments; and (6) complete a substance use component, which included, among other things, maintaining sobriety and urinalysis (UA) testing. ¶4 In June of 2025, mother and father filed a motion to return the child home, and for a finding that they were fit parents. The juvenile court set the return home/fitness motion for a contested hearing, which was continued on two occasions by agreement of the parties. In January 2026, the Department moved to allocate parental responsibilities to K.A. who, at the time, had served as the child’s placement for fifteen months. ¶5 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing to address the return home/fit parent finding and APR motions in April 2026, three and a half years after the petition was filed. After the two-day hearing, the court allocated physical custody and decision-making regarding the child to K.A. and allocated mother and father supervised parenting time. In doing so, the court did not expressly rule on the parents’ return home/fit parent motion. 2  II. Discussion ¶6 Mother and father argue that the juvenile court erred by allocating parental responsibilities to K.A. because they were fit and entitled to the presumption that their preference for a return home was in the child’s best interest. We discern no reversible error. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶7 A fit parent is generally presumed to act in their child’s best interests. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). The Troxel presumption — where it applies — can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s preference is not in the child’s best interests and that the nonparent’s request is. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 16. The court must also identify special factors supporting an order contrary to the parent’s wishes. Id. ¶8 But the Troxel presumption in favor of the parents is overcome when a court adjudicates a child dependent or neglected. Id. at ¶ 17. After such an adjudication, a parent may regain the Troxel presumption if the court finds that the parent complied with their treatment plan and demonstrated an ability to safely parent the child. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. 3 ¶9 The Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to enter an APR when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10. When doing so, a juvenile court must consider the overriding purpose of the Children’s Code: to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best interests can be served. See § 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 19. If a court allocates parental responsibilities, it must thus do so in accordance with the child’s best interests, focusing on the protection and safety of the child rather than the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13. ¶ 10 A juvenile court may only allocate parental responsibilities to a nonparent if the moving party establishes a compelling reason why it is not in the child’s best interests to return home. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App. 2005). A juvenile court need not find that a parent is unfit before allocating parental responsibilities to a nonparent, though a parent’s unfitness could be a compelling reason not to return the child home. See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶¶ 43-44. 4 ¶ 11 The allocation of parental responsibilities lies within the discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B. v. R.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). When the juvenile court’s findings have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. N.G.G., ¶ 10. B. Analysis ¶ 12 The parents argue that the juvenile court erred by (1) not affording them the Troxel presumption; (2) failing to place the burden on the Department to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, their determination of the child’s best interests; and (3) not finding special factors before ordering an APR to a nonparent over their objection. 5 ¶ 13 These arguments, though, proceed from the premise that the parents were entitled to the Troxel presumption at the time of the APR. But by virtue of the adjudication of dependency or neglect, they were not. The court did not find that mother or father complied with their treatment plan or that they regained fitness. It did not find that either parent had demonstrated an ability to safely parent the child. Cf. N.G.G., ¶¶ 18-19 (Troxel presumption was restored following adjudication when the juvenile court found that mother had complied with her treatment plan and was able to safely parent the children). ¶ 14 Rather, the evidence presented below and the court’s findings demonstrate that neither parent was entitled to reinstatement of the Troxel presumption at the time of the APR. ¶ 15 As to mother, the juvenile court implicitly found that she had failed to comply with her treatment plan by highlighting her failure to provide drug testing or communicate with the caseworker. The court found “lots of promises and very little follow through” and concluded that mother “just didn’t do what [she] needed to do.” ¶ 16 Despite many efforts, the caseworker was only able to meet with mother face to face once during the sixteen months she was 6  assigned to the case. Thus, the caseworker could not verify income or housing. And mother had not been to any of the child’s medical appointments. Finally, the caseworker, an expert in social casework with an emphasis in child protection, had “concerns related to substance use impacting [mother’s] ability to parent and to meet [the child’s] needs.” ¶ 17 Mother argues that because the juvenile court had returned custody of the child’s older sister, A.N.A.Z., to mother and the Department dismissed A.N.A.Z. from the case, mother must have demonstrated an ability to care for the child. But the court did not return A.N.A.Z. to mother because she had regained fitness. The court decided to return then-twelve-year-old A.N.A.Z. to mother’s custody because A.N.A.Z. had run away from her placement and “it was safer for [A.N.A.Z.] to choose where she was going to be than to be hiding out . . . [b]ecause there was no way for [A.N.A.Z.] to go to school if she knew that there was a warrant out for her to be taken into foster care.” And the caseworker testified that A.N.A.Z. was not returned to mother “with [the Department’s] recommendation.” ¶ 18 Moreover, the court had to consider each child separately, see People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 419 (Colo. App. 2009), 7  and “[a] parent may be unfit as to one, but not all, of . . . her children.” People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588 (Colo. App. 2003). So the return of the older sister to mother does not compel the conclusion that mother was fit as to the child. ¶ 19 In N.G.G., the court noted that the Troxel presumption had been restored by evidence that the mother “had complied with her treatment plan and that she was able to safely parent the children.” N.G.G., ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Here, the findings and evidence affirmatively refuted the first grounds (treatment-plan compliance) and did not establish the second (ability to safely parent). So the Troxel presumption as to mother was not restored. ¶ 20 To the extent mother implicitly argues that the juvenile court erred in not expressly ruling on her motion to return the child to her, the court made express findings, as examined above, that implicitly reject the basis for her motion. Mother does not cite, and we are not aware of, any authority that would require the court to explicitly reject her return home/fit parent motion when the court’s APR ruling does so implicitly. ¶ 21 As to father, the caseworker testified that he had “not complied with his treatment plan at all” and that the caseworker 8  had not met with him “throughout the duration of this case.” Because of father’s lack of engagement in the case, the caseworker was unable to verify his income or housing. Father also refused to have supervised visits with the child, sign releases of information, or submit UA tests. Ultimately, the caseworker was “unable to determine if he [was] an appropriate caregiver” because he “refused to do anything that the Department ha[d] asked of him.”1 ¶ 22 The record supports the court’s findings and shows that the parents did not comply with their treatment plans. The caseworker testified that the parents had “not engaged in any treatment or anything” and that there had “not been much engagement . . . throughout the entire case.” In light of this record, parents had not shown entitlement to restoration of the Troxel presumption at the time of the APR. 1 Father complains that the juvenile court made no express findings as to him in the order allocating parental responsibilities. But Father does not cite, and we are not aware of, any authority requiring such specific findings where the Troxel presumption has not been restored following a finding of dependency or neglect. And father does not argue on appeal that the court erred by not explicitly ruling on the return home/fit parent motion. 9 ¶ 23 On the other hand, the caseworker testified that K.A. had demonstrated that she could care for the child. During the eighteen months the child was placed with K.A., all her needs were met. The caseworker opined that K.A. was “a strong advocate” for the child. The caseworker recommended that the juvenile court grant an APR to K.A. ¶ 24 In sum, the juvenile court did not err by not affording the parents the Troxel presumption. The record otherwise supports the court’s findings, including that an APR to K.A. was in the child’s best interests. And based on those findings, the court’s APR order was neither a misapplication of the law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Thus, we perceive no abuse of discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14. III. Disposition ¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur. 10