Peo in Interest of MM

26CA0586 Peo in Interest of MM 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA0586 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV187 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of M.M., M.G.M., and E.J.M.L., Children, and Concerning A.M.L., Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division IV Opinion by JUDGE BERGER* Harris and Gomez, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for M.M. Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for M.G.M. and E.J.L.M. Andrew Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.M.L. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationships with M.M., M.G.M., and E.J.M.L. (the children). We affirm.1 I. Background ¶2 In April 2022, Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the then-three, seven, and eight-year-old children.2 The Department alleged concerns about mother’s housing instability, history of mental health issues, and lack of supervision over the children. It also alleged concerns about medical and educational neglect, as well as domestic violence and substance use in the home. The Department noted that the family had an “extensive social service history” and had been involved in a prior dependency and neglect case. For nine months, the children remained in mother’s custody under the 1 The juvenile court also entered a judgment terminating father’s parent-child legal relationships with the children, but he does not appeal. Thus, we do not address or disturb that judgment. 2 The petition included mother’s four older children, but they were not included in the judgment terminating mother’s parental rights and are not part of this appeal. 1  Department’s supervision. Thereafter, the juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The Department initially placed the children with kin but later moved them to foster care. In June 2022, mother admitted the allegations in the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan that required mother to establish stability, cooperate with the Department, show an understanding of the children’s needs, demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, address substance abuse issues, and engage in mental health treatment. ¶3 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental rights, and the juvenile court held a two-day hearing on the motion. Nearly four years after the case opened, the court terminated mother’s parental rights. II. Evidentiary Issues A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review ¶4 In general, juvenile courts must apply the rules of evidence. People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 10; see also Daugaard v. People in Interest of Daugaard, 488 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1971) (the Children’s Code does not dispense with rules of 2  evidence which directly bear upon substantive proof), overruled on other grounds by People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371 (Colo. 2007). ¶5 We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 60. A juvenile court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. B. Expert Testimony ¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by allowing the caseworker to testify as an expert in “social casework with an emphasis in child protection.” Specifically, she argues that the court improperly admitted the testimony without making the findings required by People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001). We disagree. 1. Applicable Law ¶7 The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Shreck and CRE 702. People in Interest of A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 16. Upon proper objection, the juvenile court must “make specific findings as to the four Shreck factors — reliability, qualifications, usefulness, and CRE 403 — before admitting such testimony.” Id. at ¶ 20; See Ruibal v. People, 2018 CO 93, ¶ 13. 3 ¶8 However, to trigger this requirement, a party must “state a specific challenge pursuant to Shreck” and establish a basis for that challenge. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 n.5, 1201 (Colo. 2011); see also A.F., ¶ 13 n.2 (noting that the juvenile court was required to make findings regarding the four Shreck factors when the objecting party “raised detailed and specific objections as to each prong of the Shreck analysis”). If a party fails to state a specific challenge pursuant to Shreck, a trial court may properly determine that the request does not warrant a Shreck analysis at all. Rector, 248 P.3d at 1200. 2. Analysis ¶9 Mother asserts that the juvenile court was required to make findings regarding all four Shreck factors because she objected to the caseworker’s expert testimony under CRE 702 and Shreck. But at the hearing, mother objected to the caseworker’s “expertise” because “all of her training [was] simply on-the-job training” and she had “no education or training beyond job requirements that would meet any criteria of Shreck.” In other words, mother specifically challenged one Shreck factor — the qualifications of the witness. And, before overruling mother’s objection, the juvenile 4  court made findings in relation to that factor. It found, with record support, that the caseworker was qualified as an expert based on her experience in the child protection field, educational background, training, and caseworker certification. To the extent mother argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to make findings regarding the three additional Shreck factors, we disagree. Although mother referenced Shreck in her objection to the caseworker’s testimony, she did not raise “detailed and specific objections” as to the reliability, usefulness, or CRE 403 prongs of Shreck. A.F., ¶ 13 n.2. Nor did she argue that those factors formed the basis of her challenge to the caseworker’s expert testimony. See Rector, 248 P.3d at 1200 n.5. ¶ 10 Thus, given the limited objection by mother, the court could reasonably have decided that a full Shreck analysis was unnecessary to determine the admissibility of the caseworker’s expert testimony. See id. at 1200 (concluding that in deciding whether a determination of admissibility requires a Shreck inquiry, a trial court must consider the issues as framed in the motion before it). 5  C. Caseworker’s Report ¶ 11 Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting and relying on inadmissible hearsay contained in the caseworker’s termination report. We reject this contention. 1. Applicable Law ¶ 12 The Children’s Code provides that reports “relating to the child’s mental, physical, and social history” are admissible and may be considered for determining the facts at a termination hearing as long as the court requires, upon request, that “the person who wrote the report or prepared the material appear as a witness and be subject to both direct and cross-examination.” §§ 19-1-107(2), 19-3-604(3), C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of R.D.H., 944 P.2d 660, 664 (Colo. App. 1997). When a report is admissible under a statutory provision, any hearsay objections “go to the weight and probative value of the reports rather than to their admissibility.” R.D.H., 944 P.2d at 664. 2. Analysis ¶ 13 Mother argues that the court should not have admitted and relied on the termination report because it contained hearsay statements from third parties, including treatment providers. 6  Under section 19-3-604(3), the termination report is admissible, as long as the author or “the person who wrote the report or prepared the material” is available for direct or cross-examination upon the request of the respondent. Mother could have cross-examined the third-party declarants, ameliorating any hearsay concerns, but she did not request their presence at the trial. Moreover, the only prejudice she identifies from the admission of the report is the court’s supposed reliance on a statement that mother lived with her boyfriend and one other person. But mother herself admitted that she lived with her boyfriend, and the caseworker testified, based on her own observation during a home visit, that a third person appeared to live in the apartment. Therefore, even assuming the court erred in admitting the report, we discern no basis for reversing the judgment. D. Legal Conclusion Testimony ¶ 14 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by permitting the caseworker to offer “legal conclusion testimony on the precise termination criteria.” We discern no reversible error. 7  1. Applicable Law ¶ 15 “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” CRE 704. However, a witness may not “tell the [factfinder] what result to reach or form conclusions for the [factfinder] that they are competent to reach on their own.” People in Interest of J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 21 (citation omitted). 2. Analysis ¶ 16 Over mother’s objections, the juvenile court permitted the caseworker to opine that mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. It is true that to terminate mother’s parental rights, the court was required to reach those exact conclusions. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II)-(III). However, any error in the admission of the caseworker’s opinions regarding mother’s fitness and ability to become fit does not require reversal. ¶ 17 First, because the court was sitting as the trier of fact, we presume that it knew it was not required to accept the caseworker’s opinions. See Young v. Burke, 338 P.2d 284, 285 (Colo. 1959) (holding that when the court sits as the factfinder, it is the “final 8  judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses, including expert witnesses”); c.f. J.R., ¶ 30 (deciding that part of determining whether expert testimony usurped the function of the jury is analyzing whether the jury was properly instructed that it may accept or reject the expert’s opinion). ¶ 18 Second, nothing in the court’s order indicates that it deferred to the caseworker’s opinions in concluding that mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. Indeed, the court did not mention the caseworker’s specific opinions regarding the two statutory factors at all. Instead, it based its conclusion on its own extensive factual findings about mother’s fitness and ability to become fit. And, as discussed infra Parts III.D. and III.E. below, those findings were supported by the record. ¶ 19 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any error in admitting the caseworker’s “legal conclusion testimony” was harmless. See CRE 103(a) (providing that an error in the admission of evidence is harmless if it does not affect a party’s substantial rights); People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (determining that an error does not affect a substantial right if it cannot be said 9  with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the trial).3 III. Statutory Termination Criteria A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review ¶ 20 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c). ¶ 21 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the court’s factual findings for 3 Mother asserts that we should review the alleged error under the constitutional harmless error standard of reversal because her fundamental right to parent was at stake during the termination proceedings. But that standard applies only when the error itself “specifically and directly” offends a constitutional right. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1097 (Colo. 2010). It does not apply simply because, as mother argues, a constitutional right is generally at stake during a particular proceeding. Thus, we decline to review the alleged evidentiary error under the constitutional harmless error standard of reversal in this instance. 10  clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. Id. B. Treatment Plan Appropriateness ¶ 22 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that her treatment plan was appropriate because it was not reasonably calculated to render her fit. We disagree. 1. Applicable Law ¶ 23 An appropriate treatment plan is one that relates to the child’s needs and is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2026. Appropriateness is measured by the likelihood of success in reuniting the family and by the extent to which the plan’s requirements were realistic in light of the facts existing at the time it was adopted. People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 10. In determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the court must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately address the safety concerns that led to the filing of the petition. People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. 11  2. Analysis ¶ 24 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s treatment plan was appropriate. It shows that the treatment plan objectives addressed the Department’s specific concerns about mother’s ability to parent the children at the time the petition was filed and during the months leading up to the plan’s approval. See id. ¶ 25 We reject mother’s argument that her treatment plan was inappropriate because it required her to complete ninety days of negative urinalysis (UA) testing as a prerequisite to expansion of family time. As best we can tell, mother’s court-approved treatment plan did not contain such a requirement. To the extent mother argues that the Department unilaterally added the requirement to the court-approved treatment plan, which rendered it inappropriate, she never made that argument to the juvenile court and it is unpreserved. We decline to address it for the first time on appeal. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (noting that in dependency and neglect cases, appellate courts review only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court). 12 ¶ 26 Accordingly, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s treatment plan was appropriate. C. Reasonable Efforts ¶ 27 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the children. Again, we disagree. 1. Applicable Law ¶ 28 As part of its determination of parental fitness, the juvenile court must consider whether the department of human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See § 19-3-100.5(1), C.R.S. 2026; § 19-3-604(2)(h); People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114). Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2026, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). ¶ 29 The juvenile court should analyze a department’s efforts by considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the 13  completion of the entire treatment plan. People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. 2. Analysis ¶ 30 To support its overall determination that the Department made reasonable efforts, the juvenile court found that the Department provided services to address the concerns that brought the family to its attention. Specifically, the court found, with record support, that the caseworker made referrals for family time, life skills services, individual therapy, and outpatient substance abuse treatment. Mother does not challenge those findings. ¶ 31 She argues that the Department did not fulfill its reasonable efforts obligation because it (1) failed to provide adequate family time services; (2) assigned an unhelpful caseworker to her case; and (3) offered therapeutic life skills too late in the proceedings. We reject all three arguments. a. Family Time ¶ 32 As relevant here, a department must provide family time services for parents with children in out-of-home placement if those services are determined to be necessary and appropriate by the individual case plan. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest of 14  E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 14. The children’s health and safety are the paramount concerns in the juvenile court’s determination of whether, and what type of, family time services are necessary and appropriate. See § 19-3-208(2)(a); People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17. ¶ 33 Mother does not assert that the Department wholly failed to provide family time services, as required under section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Indeed, the record indicates the Department provided supervised family time, as ordered by the court, throughout the case. Even so, mother argues that her family time was inadequate for two reasons. i. Location of Family Time ¶ 34 First, mother asserts that the Department failed to meet its reasonable efforts obligation because it restricted her family time by changing its location to a visitation facility and then failing to provide transportation to that facility. ¶ 35 To start, we note that mother seems to conflate the juvenile court’s authority to order or restrict family time with the Department’s obligation to provide it. To clarify, the juvenile court, not the department, is tasked with deciding what family time 15  services are necessary and appropriate in a particular case. See People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 22; People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006) (deciding that because questions concerning the children’s health and safety are matters entrusted to the juvenile court’s discretion, the court itself must make decisions regarding visitation). It follows that only the juvenile court, not the department, may restrict family time. See § 19-3-217(1)(d), C.R.S. 2026 (“The court may only restrict or deny family time if it is necessary to protect the child’s . . . safety or mental, emotional, or physical health.” (emphasis added)); see also People in Interest of K.C., 685 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Colo. App. 1984) (noting that visitation may not be denied without the court’s approval or knowledge).4 ¶ 36 On the other hand, to meet its reasonable efforts obligation under section 19-3-208(2)(b), a department must provide family time as ordered by the juvenile court. People in Interest of C.N.T., 4 To the extent mother argues that the change in location constituted a restriction of her family time, which required court approval and a hearing under section 19-3-217(3), she does not direct us to any part of the record showing that she made that argument to the juvenile court. Thus, we decline to address it. See M.B., ¶ 14. 16  2026 COA 47, ¶ 42. Thus, a department’s failure to provide family time as ordered by the court may constitute a lack of reasonable efforts, but it does not constitute a “restriction” of family time. Similarly, a department’s failure to address barriers preventing a parent from attending family time may constitute a lack of reasonable efforts, but is not a “restriction” of family time. ¶ 37 Viewing mother’s arguments through that lens, we now turn to her contention that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts because it moved her family time to a visitation center that required her to travel four hours each way to attend her visits. We agree that in general, a department’s decision to move family time to a location that requires the parent to travel four hours each way — essentially creating a barrier to the court-ordered family time — without a good reason for doing so may constitute a lack of reasonable efforts. But under the circumstances in this case, reversal is not required. ¶ 38 First, nothing in the record indicates that the Department or caseworker knew that it took mother four hours to get to the visitation center using public transportation. True, the caseworker’s report, which was admitted into evidence, noted that 17  mother missed at least five visits at the visitation center because she had “no transportation” or “no ride.” The report also indicates that the Department provided monthly bus passes to mother; in other words, it attempted to alleviate that barrier by providing mother with a mode of transportation to attend visits. But mother points to nothing showing that the Department or the caseworker knew that it took her four hours to get from her apartment to the visitation center when she used the provided mode of transportation. In fact, mother testified that she never asked the current caseworker (who was assigned to the case the entire time visits were held at the visitation center) if it was possible to move the visits to a closer location. ¶ 39 Second, the record does not indicate that the Department moved the location of mother’s family time without any justification. At the termination hearing, the family time supervisor testified that in July 2025, she recommended moving mother’s family time to a visitation center after two incidents led the supervisor to believe she could no longer ensure the children’s safety if the visits continued to occur in mother’s home or in public. Although the juvenile court did not specifically find that the Department’s justification for 18  changing the location of family time was reasonable, it credited that testimony. ¶ 40 Third, even if the Department knew that it took mother an unreasonable amount of time to get to the visitation center and its justification for changing the location of family time was not reasonable, reversal still is not warranted. Mother does not explain, nor do we understand, how changing the location of family time to an inconvenient location for a six-month period in the context of a four-year case rendered the Department’s overall efforts to provide family time unreasonable. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (noting that to analyze reasonable efforts, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances). This is especially true when considering that the Department arranged weekly in-home visits throughout the rest of the proceedings. ¶ 41 Finally, the juvenile court’s order does not indicate that it significantly relied on mother’s failure to attend visits during the time that they were held at the visitation center. In its thirteen-page order, the court mentioned mother’s decreased family time attendance during the timeframe in which it occurred at the visitation center. But the majority of its discussion related to family 19  time focused on the concerns about mother when she did attend visits. ¶ 42 Accordingly, we reject mother’s reasonable efforts argument related to the location of family time and transportation to the visitation facility. ii. Condition for Expanding Family Time ¶ 43 Mother argues that the Department improperly conditioned expansion of family time on ninety days of negative UAs but then made it impossible for her to meet that condition by not providing transportation to the UA facility. ¶ 44 To the extent mother asserts that the condition itself was improper, we disagree because the condition was based on an agreement between mother, her therapists, and the caseworker, and mother did not subsequently object to it. ¶ 45 We are also unpersuaded by mother’s assertion that the Department made it impossible for her to meet the condition for expanding family time because it failed to provide transportation to the UA facility. It is unclear if mother ever identified transportation as a barrier to completing UAs. Mother does not identify where in the record she preserved this argument. True, at the termination 20  hearing, she testified that she missed UAs because she “never had a way.” But when she elaborated on that point, she explained that she missed UAs when she did not feel well or was depressed — not because of a lack of transportation. Nonetheless, as noted above, the record shows that the Department provided at least some transportation assistance to mother. Further, mother testified that her substance abuse treatment provider also gave her bus tickets throughout the case. Thus, we reject mother’s reasonable efforts argument regarding the condition for expanding family time and transportation to the UA facility. b. Caseworker Assignment ¶ 46 Mother next argues that the court’s reasonable efforts determination was erroneous because the Department assigned a particular caseworker to the case despite mother’s prior difficulties and disagreements with that caseworker. ¶ 47 However, mother does not explain, and we do not understand, how the Department’s specific caseworker assignments fall within the “set of services” it is required to provide to meet its reasonable efforts obligation. See § 19-3-208(1), (2)(a)-(b). Accordingly, we 21  reject mother’s argument that assigning a caseworker who she believed was unhelpful constituted a lack of reasonable efforts. c. Life Skills Services ¶ 48 Mother argues that the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts determination was erroneous because the Department did not provide “therapeutic” life skills services until two months before the termination hearing. We disagree. ¶ 49 The caseworker testified that at the beginning of case, the Department referred mother for life skills services. However, mother’s attendance was “not always consistent,” and it was difficult for the provider to engage mother. The caseworker further testified that when she was assigned to the case in late 2024, she made another referral for life skills services with a different provider. The second provider also reported that it was difficult to get mother to engage in the services. Nonetheless, when the second provider left her position, the caseworker offered to make a third referral for life skills services. But mother declined the offer because she did not want to work with a new provider. Based on that concern, mother’s therapist agreed to “provide some life skills in the process of doing individual therapy.” And at the termination 22  hearing, the therapist testified that she had been working on life skills with mother for about a month. ¶ 50 Still, mother argues that the Department’s efforts were lacking because the first two life skills providers did not provide “therapeutic” life skills. But mother does not explain the difference between the life skills services offered by the first two providers and the “therapeutic” life skills offered by her therapist. At the termination hearing, she did not elicit any testimony explaining that difference or argue that she specifically needed “therapeutic” life skills services. Thus, we reject her argument, especially when considering the evidence showing that the Department provided life skills services throughout the case. ¶ 51 In conclusion, because we reject all of mother’s reasonable efforts arguments, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the children. D. Fitness Determination 1. Applicable Law ¶ 52 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. 23  S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 9. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” Id. 2. Analysis ¶ 53 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit based on “concerns regarding her substance use, parenting capacity, and overall stability.” The court acknowledged that mother had made some positive changes but found that those changes had not mitigated the safety concerns that brought the family to the Department’s attention. Thus, the court found that mother could not provide reasonable parental care or meet the children’s needs. ¶ 54 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The caseworker testified that at the time of the termination hearing, the Department still had concerns about mother’s “sobriety, stability, parenting skills, and protective capacities.” She testified that despite mother’s engagement in substance abuse treatment, she had not demonstrated sustained sobriety. The caseworker also testified that mother had not missed any recent UAs but had been inconsistent with completing UAs throughout the case. And she testified that mother tested positive for cocaine two months before 24 the termination hearing. The family-time supervisor testified that mother was often distracted by her phone and disengaged during the visits. She estimated that during each four-hour visit, mother was actively engaged with the children for about one hour, while the children did activities on their own for the remaining three. The supervisor testified that mother’s lack of engagement had not improved during the pendency of the case; she still had to remind mother to engage with the children throughout every visit. Further, the supervisor testified that mother struggled to manage all of the children together. Based on these reports from the family time supervisor, the caseworker had concerns about mother’s ability to meet the children’s needs and parent them full-time. Moreover, the caseworker testified that while mother had obtained housing, it was unclear if it was stable because mother had been approved for her apartment based on a misrepresentation that all of the children were living with her. The caseworker also testified that, based on her observations of the apartment, it appeared that other people may have been living there. This was concerning to the caseworker because without knowing who was living in the apartment, she 25  could not run background checks or ensure that the children were safe around those people. ¶ 55 We reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court’s determination of unfitness was erroneous because the court relied on the testimony that mother tested positive for cocaine in December 2025 even though that particular UA had not been confirmed. During the hearing, mother did not object to the testimony about the December 2025 UA or argue that the results were inadmissible because they were unconfirmed. Thus, to the extent mother argues that the testimony was inadmissible, we decline to address that unpreserved argument. See M.B., ¶ 14. And to the extent that mother argues the court erroneously relied on the testimony, we disagree because the testimony was admitted without objection. See CRE 103(a)(1) (providing that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a timely objection appears on the record); see also Hartman v. Freedman, 591 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Colo. 1979) (holding that a factfinder may look to the testimony and exhibits which are admitted as evidence for the facts upon which to base their decision), superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 286, sec. 1, 26  § 8-4-101(8)(a)(III), 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 1850, 1852 (currently codified at § 8-4-101(14)(a)(III), as recognized in, Carruthers v. Carrier Access Corp., 251 P.3d 1199, 1208-09 (Colo. App. 2010). ¶ 56 We also reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court’s unfitness determination was erroneous because it was based on her lack of sobriety when there was no evidence that substance use negatively affected her parenting. The caseworker testified that mother’s substance use negatively affected the children because mother often chose to “hang out with friends” and use substances “at the expense of the children being unsupervised.” ¶ 57 Last, we reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court’s unfitness determination was erroneous because she substantially complied with her treatment plan. Partial or even substantial compliance with a treatment plan may not be sufficient to render a parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005). To that end, the juvenile court heard and considered the evidence showing that mother complied with some aspects of her treatment plan. But it still concluded that mother was unfit. And the court’s findings, based on evidence in the record, were sufficient to support that conclusion. 27 ¶ 58 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s determination that mother was unfit. E. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time ¶ 59 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We discern no error. 1. Applicable Law ¶ 60 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007). The determination of a reasonable time is necessarily fact specific, and what constitutes a reasonable time may vary from case to case. Id. In determining whether a parent can become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any change has occurred during the pendency of the proceeding. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). ¶ 61 When a child is under six years old at the time the petition is filed, the juvenile court must consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See 28  §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2026. Any dependency and neglect hearing conducted under the EPP provisions because it involves a child under the age of six shall, if appropriate, include all children residing in the same household. See §§ 19-3-104, 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2026; People in Interest of T.M., 240 P.3d 542, 546 (Colo. App. 2010). 2. Analysis ¶ 62 The juvenile court found that mother could not become fit within a reasonable time because she had not resolved the Department’s safety concerns despite the case remaining open for four years. The court also noted that the EPP provisions applied, and it was therefore required to ensure that the children were placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. ¶ 63 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. By the time of termination, over three and a half years had passed since the court adopted mother’s treatment plan. And the children had been in out-of-home placement for approximately three years. ¶ 64 Moreover, the family time supervisor testified that mother’s lack of engagement with the children had not improved throughout the case. The caseworker testified that despite having access to 29  services for several years, mother had not mitigated the Department’s concerns and “everything [was] the exact same as it was when [the case] first opened.” ¶ 65 To the extent mother argues that the juvenile court should have given her more time because she had made progress on her treatment plan, we disagree. As noted above, the court heard the testimony about mother’s progress and acknowledged that mother had made some positive changes during the case. But it still concluded that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. And the court’s record-supported findings were sufficient to support its conclusion. ¶ 66 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s determination that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time.