Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. S286264 Second Appellate District, Division Seven B326977 Los Angeles County Superior Court 21STCP03475 August 3, 2026 Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger and Simons* concurred. Justice Groban filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Liu and Evans concurred. __________________________ * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES S286264 Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. This case presents two related issues about the job classification and salary-setting authority granted to public pension boards and county boards of supervisors. The first issue concerns power granted by the California Constitution giving public pension retirement boards “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17 (section 17).) The question involves the scope of authority granted. Specifically, does that constitutional authority over the management of fund assets and delivery of benefits extend more broadly to empower a retirement board to unilaterally set civil service classification and salary levels for system employees? The second issue concerns the statutory authority of county governments and retirement boards operating under the 1937 County Employees Retirement Law. (CERL; Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq.)1 That inquiry addresses whether, apart from the Constitution, the CERL statutes separately grant county retirement boards the power to set classification and salary levels and compel county boards of supervisors to implement 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. 1 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. these retirement board decisions in the county’s salary ordinance. The Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) is a retirement system operating under the CERL statutory scheme. It petitioned for a writ of mandate compelling the County of Los Angeles (County) to implement its classification and salary decisions for certain staff positions. The trial court denied the writ but the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding retirement boards have the final authority to decide classification and salary setting. In so holding, the court disagreed with Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1110 (Westly), which had construed the constitutional authority of retirement boards more narrowly. We conclude Westly’s narrower construction was correct. Considered as a whole, the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions create a system of cooperative responsibility between retirement boards and governing bodies on issues related to employee classification and compensation. There is no indication that either the Legislature or the voters intended to upset that balance by leaving these decisions to retirement boards alone. We also reject the related argument that CERL imposes a mandatory duty on counties to automatically implement retirement board decisions on classification and salary setting. Instead, we hold that, while CERL grants retirement boards the power to “appoint,” or hire, necessary personnel (§ 31522.1), county governments retain final authority over their civil service classification and salaries. Such decisions are subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion, however, and a writ of mandate may issue if the 2 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. county unreasonably delays or withholds its approval of the retirement board’s recommendations. I. BACKGROUND Resolving the questions on appeal brings into play the intricate legal framework governing county employment and the powers conferred upon retirement boards. A. Legal Framework 1. County Employment and Civil Service The general rule is that governing bodies of California counties have the constitutional and statutory power to “provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of” their employees. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b); see Gov. Code, § 25300; see also County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 285 (County of Riverside).) In counties that have adopted a charter for their governance, the details of county employment are set by ordinance enacted by the county’s governing body. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4, subd. (f).) Los Angeles is a charter county governed by a Board of Supervisors. (L.A. County Charter, § 2.) The County’s charter establishes a civil service system and designates all employment positions as “unclassified” or “classified.” (Id., §§ 30, 33.) Elected officials, heads of County agencies, and other identified executive positions are “unclassified,” with all remaining positions being “classified.” (Id., § 33.) By charter, the County “has a formal civil service system . . . for filling classified positions and fixing the salary and benefits of classified employees.” (Holmgren v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 593, 602 (Holmgren).) Civil service rules exist to ensure fairness in the government workplace. They do so by 3 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. making access to government employment broadly and fairly available under clear criteria for employment and advancement. They are also designed to prevent favoritism or corruption by requiring that all employees are uniformly paid based on their qualifications, job duties, and performance. (See Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 387, 404 (Almassy); Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 164, 169–170.) The County’s civil service rules establish job classifications, hiring qualifications, criteria for recruiting and ranking candidates, and policies and systems for evaluating employees. (L.A. County Charter, § 35.) Here, as the Court of Appeal noted, the term “ ‘classification’ ” means “ ‘ “a set of individual positions, suitable for similar treatment with respect to pay, examination procedures, and work assignments that are clustered or grouped by virtue of the similarity of the nature of work performed, the level of job complexity and responsibility required, the knowledge, skill and ability requirements, and the working conditions.” ’ ” (Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1186 (Los Angeles County Retirement).) The County’s Chief Executive Officer is responsible for classifying all employment positions and recommending salary ranges to the Board of Supervisors consistent with the policy of “ ‘equal pay for equal work.’ ” (Ibid.; see California Attorneys, etc. v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 424, 436 (California Attorneys).) Once approved, these decisions are included in the County’s annual salary ordinance. 4 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 2. Laws Regulating County Retirement Systems a. CERL In 1937, the Legislature enacted CERL, which established a comprehensive set of rules that counties may adopt to govern their public employee pension systems. “Each county system is administered by its own retirement board, which is tasked with implementing CERL’s provisions.” (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1052 (Alameda County).) Generally, the goal of a public pension plan “is to ensure payment of all vested, promised benefits to members, both those currently retired and those who will retire in the future.” (Imperial County Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of Imperial (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 898, 903.) These benefits are funded “from three sources: employer contributions, employee contributions, and investment earnings and appreciation on the system’s trust fund.” (Ibid.) In a CERL system, the employer is typically the county itself, or a political subdivision or district within the county. (Traub v. Board of Retirement (1983) 34 Cal.3d 793, 798 (Traub).) Twenty counties have CERL pension plans. (Alameda County, at p. 1055.) The other 38 counties operate independent plans or contract with the state’s Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS; § 20000 et seq.). (Alameda County, at p. 1055.) Shortly after CERL was enacted, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance opting into the CERL system and adopting “all and every one of” its provisions. (L.A. County Code, § 5.20.010; see Los Angeles County Retirement, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186; Holmgren, supra, 159 5 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. Cal.App.4th at p. 603.)2 Ten years after opting into CERL, the County established LACERA as a CERL system. (Los Angeles County Retirement, at pp. 1186–1187; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373.) LACERA holds, invests, and administers the pensions and benefits of member employees. (Weber v. Board of Retirement (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1442 (Weber).) “Subject to a few exceptions for seasonal and part-time employees, all classified [C]ounty employees are automatically enrolled in” LACERA by operation of law. (Holmgren, at p. 603; see §§ 31550–31552.) 2 That ordinance makes all of CERL’s provisions binding upon the parties here. It states: “The board of supervisors of the county of Los Angeles, state of California, accepts the provisions of an Act of the Legislature of the state of California, entitled ‘An act to provide for the creation, establishment, and adjustment with other systems, of a retirement system for employees of the several counties and districts as defined herein, and attaches of municipal courts, consisting of retirement compensation and death benefits,’ approved June 30, 1937, being Chapter 677 of the Statutes of 1937 [CERL], and said board of supervisors does hereby, by reference adopt and incorporate all and every one of the provisions of said Act of the Legislature as a part of and applicable to, and make all and every one of said provisions a part of and applicable to, the system and schedules of compensation of all officers and other persons employed by the county whose compensation is fixed by the board of supervisors of the county and whose compensation is paid by the county, and all employees and officers of the county of Los Angeles now or hereafter established by ordinance of the board of supervisors, who are or may hereafter be eligible to the benefits of any retirement system under the provisions of said Act.” (L.A. County Code, § 5.20.010.) 6 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. LACERA has both a “board of retirement” (§ 31520) and a “board of investments” (§ 31520.2). The Board of Retirement administers the system, while the Board of Investments manages LACERA’s investment and actuarial policies. (Los Angeles County Retirement, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1187; see Weber, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442.) In a CERL system, county retirement boards do not design individualized pension plans but instead implement the design enacted by the Legislature. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1066– 1067.) A retirement board’s primary duties are to protect the system’s assets through investment decisions and actuarial adjustments, to calculate and deliver benefits and services to system members, and to decide members’ claims. (89 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 152, 158 (2006).) The complex interrelationship between a CERL retirement system and county government is regulated by the Government Code. CERL requires that the county treasurer sit on the retirement board (§§ 31520, 31520.1) and investment board (§ 31520.2). In addition to the county treasurer, half of the remaining members of a CERL retirement board or investment board are appointed by the county’s board of supervisors.3 Accordingly, the managerial as well as “the financial relationship between the county and the retirement system is a close one.” (Corcoran v. Contra Costa County Employees Retirement Bd. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 89, 94 3 In counties with five-member retirement boards, two members are appointed by the county. (§ 31520.) In counties with nine-member retirement boards, or with investment boards, four members are appointed by the county. (§§ 31520.1, 31520.2.) 7 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. (Corcoran); see, e.g., §§ 31590, 31595.1.) Also, as relevant here, a retirement system’s staffing decisions are guided by county requirements. CERL authorizes retirement boards to “appoint such administrative, technical, and clerical staff personnel as are required to accomplish the necessary work of the boards,” but these appointments must “be made from eligible lists created” under the county’s civil service rules. (§ 31522.1.) Under CERL, these staff members “shall be county employees . . . subject to the county civil service or merit system rules” and must be included in the county’s salary ordinance. (§ 31522.1.; see Corcoran, at p. 94.) Retirement boards may also appoint executive personnel, including senior administrators, chief investment and legal officers, and their deputies. These executive personnel are also considered county employees, but they serve at the pleasure of the boards and are not subject to county civil service or merit system rules. (§§ 31522.2–31522.4.) Despite these ties to county government, a CERL retirement board is not a mere agent of the county. A retirement board is not in privity with the county for preclusion purposes because it is “an independent entity” (Traub, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 798) with a “distinctive identity, constituency and interests” (id. at p. 799). The board has “exclusive control” over investments of the retirement fund, which it must manage for the sole purposes of “providing benefits to participants . . . and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system.” (§ 31595.) CERL also requires that retirement boards “annually adopt a budget covering the entire expense of administration of the retirement system, which expense shall be charged against the earnings of the retirement 8 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. fund.” (§ 31580.2, subd. (a).)4 In other words, all costs of administering the retirement system, including staff compensation, are paid from the retirement fund’s investment earnings and not directly from county funds. b. Section 17 The Constitution addresses the powers and responsibilities of public pension boards in section 17 of Article XVI, which covers Public Finance. Section 17 applies not just to county-level retirement boards, but to the retirement board of any public pension or retirement system operating in the state. A 1984 ballot initiative, Proposition 21, amended section 17 to make clear that public pension fund assets are held in trust. (See O’Neal v. Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1202 (O’Neal).) Voters later expanded retirement boards’ authority by enacting Proposition 162, the California Pension Protection Act of 1992. This initiative conferred upon retirement boards “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system, subject to” certain provisions. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.) Proposition 162 specified that retirement boards have “sole and exclusive fiduciary responsibility over” pension fund assets and must “administer the system in a manner that will assure prompt delivery of benefits and related services to the participants and their beneficiaries.” (Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 17, subd. (a).) It further 4 This requirement applies to all retirement systems with appointed staff, including those with specific legislation making their staff employees of the retirement system itself instead of the county. (§ 31580.2, subd. (a); see §§ 31522.1, 31522.5, 31522.7, 31522.9, 31522.10, 31522.11.) 9 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. provided that a retirement board’s fiduciary duty to participants and beneficiaries is paramount, taking precedence over any other duty. (Id., subd. (b).) The constitutional issue involved here concerns the scope and application of Proposition 162’s grant of authority. B. Historical Relationship Between the Parties LACERA manages the retirement fund for the County, for the Los Angeles County Superior Court, and for several outside districts. With a portfolio valued at over $72 billion and over 185,000 members and beneficiaries, it is the largest county retirement system in the nation. In recent years, LACERA has received approximately $3 billion annually from employee and employer contributions and paid approximately $4 billion in benefits. The $1 billion shortfall is paid from investment earnings, which make up the great majority of LACERA’s annual income.5 To manage this system, LACERA has more than 400 employees. Their compensation is LACERA’s largest administrative expense. In each of the three years leading up to this lawsuit, employee salaries and benefits comprised more than three-quarters of total administrative costs. As CERL requires (see § 31580.2, subd. (a)), LACERA maintains its own budget, without County oversight. All administrative costs, including salaries, are paid from LACERA’s investment 5 For example, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2021, nearly 85 percent ($15.63 billion) of LACERA’s total income came from investment earnings. The remainder consisted of contributions from employees ($761 million) and County employers (approximately $1.95 billion). 10 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. earnings. In July 1978, relying on sections 31522.1 and 31580.2 of CERL’s statutory framework, LACERA began hiring fund management personnel and charging the expense against its own budget. Previously, these fund management operations had been handled by the County’s Treasurer and Tax Collector’s Office and paid for from the County’s general fund. Nearly 20 years later, in 1996, LACERA obtained a formal legal opinion regarding the extent of the County’s authority over the appointment of LACERA staff. LACERA’s external counsel concluded section 31522.1 gave LACERA sole authority over hiring, subject only to judicial review. Thus, counsel opined, the Board of Supervisors was required to honor LACERA’s classification and compensation decisions and include those retirement board decisions in the County’s salary ordinance. At the time, the County did not dispute counsel’s conclusions. It removed LACERA employees from County collective bargaining units and placed them into separate units governed by separate memoranda of understanding.6 6 The dissent makes much of County Counsel’s 1996 letter acquiescing in the legal opinion offered by LACERA’s retained counsel. (See dis. opn. of Groban, J., post, at pp. 6, 8, 20, 33.) From this letter and documents expressly referencing it, the dissent projects a 40-year history of “shared understanding” (id. at p. 2) in which the County deferred entirely to LACERA, implementing its every classification and salary decision without question. (See id. at pp. 33–34, 44.) The record does not support this assertion. Indeed, it includes few specifics about the parties’ dealings on these matters before 1996, when LACERA retained outside counsel to research whether the Board of Supervisors had a ministerial duty to implement LACERA’s classification and salary decisions. It is unclear why 11 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. Since these changes, LACERA has operated as an entity that is closely related to, albeit distinct from, the County. LACERA’s operational budget is not included in the County’s budget. LACERA employees are subject to the County’s civil service rules, although these rules are administered by LACERA and not the County. LACERA personnel are assigned to civil service classifications established by the Board of Supervisors, but their classifications and payroll titles are unique to LACERA and separate from Countywide classifications and titles. The County administers LACERA’s payroll, and LACERA uses some County resources for training staff and developing personnel policies. LACERA employees are eligible to participate in the County’s CERL retirement plan and are offered the same fringe benefits, such as health care, provided to County employees. LACERA holdings fund these benefits, including the employer contribution for retirement. C. This Dispute After decades of cooperation, disagreements arose. In 2016 and 2017, based on the results of two internal personnel reviews, the LACERA boards approved several new job classifications and salary adjustments for information technology, management, and administrative positions. In accordance with the parties’ custom, LACERA asked the County to implement these personnel decisions in its salary ordinance. The County’s Chief Executive Officer agreed to some of the requests but refused others, concluding the positions were “not supported,” were not aligned with County classifications, or seeking such an opinion would have been necessary if the parties were in agreement. 12 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. were beyond the salary range of comparable positions in the County or in other counties’ retirement systems. In support of these refusals, County Counsel Mary Wickham wrote an opinion letter disavowing the County’s previous position and asserting that LACERA lacked constitutional or statutory authority to usurp the County’s control over the appointment and compensation of County employees. Wickham’s opinion relied on the text of article XVI, section 17 as interpreted in Westly. In June 2018, the supervisors adopted a salary ordinance consistent with the County Counsel’s views. LACERA did not challenge the 2018 ordinance. The following year, a new chief executive officer joined LACERA and reviewed the organization’s needs. In June 2021, LACERA sought County approval for three new positions and adjustments to the classifications and salary levels for eight existing positions. Several of these requests were for changes the County had already refused in 2018. The County’s response was again largely negative. It approved only one new position (Deputy Chief, Investment Officer) at the salary level requested. It approved a second new position (Information Technology Manager II) but set a lower salary “based on internal alignment considerations with comparable County classifications and external salary data.” A third new position (Principal Staff Counsel) was denied. The County also rejected all but one of LACERA’s eight requested salary adjustments. The one adjustment it granted was at a lower salary than requested. In October 2021, LACERA challenged these actions by seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate directing the County to implement the classification and salary adjustments it had denied. The case turned on whether LACERA or the 13 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. Board of Supervisors had the power to set classifications and salaries. The trial court denied relief. It interpreted Proposition 162 narrowly, relying on the analysis in Westly, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1095. Applying Westly, it determined that while Proposition 162 gave LACERA “plenary authority” over fund management and service delivery (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17), the initiative did not confer new power on retirement boards to set job classifications or salaries. The court further concluded LACERA’s hiring power under CERL was subordinate to the County’s constitutional and statutory authority to establish classifications and compensation for all County employees. It reasoned that section 31522.1 “ ‘permits LACERA to make recommendations to the Board of Supervisors . . . , but the Board of Supervisors does not have a ministerial duty to rubber stamp those requests in a salary ordinance.’ ” (Los Angeles County Retirement, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1197, italics added.) The Court of Appeal reversed, declining to follow Westly. It applied Proposition 162’s phrase “plenary authority” broadly to conclude that the initiative gave retirement boards complete authority over “administration” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17), including the power to establish job classifications and salary levels for the system’s employees. (Los Angeles County Retirement, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1202–1204.) The court also disagreed with the trial court’s analysis of the relevant CERL statutes. (Los Angeles County Retirement, at pp. 1218–1223.) As noted, we granted review to resolve the conflict with Westly and to clarify the scope of retirement boards’ authority on these issues. 14 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. II. DISCUSSION “ ‘A traditional mandamus is sought to enforce a nondiscretionary duty to act on the part of a court, an administrative agency, or officers of a corporate or administrative agency.’ [Citation.] ‘There are two requirements essential to issuance of a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) the respondent [here, the County] has a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty to act; and (2) the petitioner [LACERA] has a clear, present, and beneficial right to performance of that duty.’ ” (Pacifica Firefighters Assn. v. City of Pacifica (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 758, 765.) On review from denial of a mandate petition, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence but independently review its rulings on questions of law. (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1032 (Professional Engineers).) This case involves a purely legal question of which entity has the ultimate authority to approve the classification and salary decisions at issue. Accordingly, our review is de novo. (Ibid.; Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) The claims here are both constitutional and statutory in nature. In resisting LACERA’s writ petition, the County relies in part on constitutional provisions establishing what is colloquially known as the “ ‘ “home rule” ’ ” doctrine. (County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 286; see Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 1, subd. (b), 4, subd. (f).) The County asserts that, under the home rule provisions, it has the constitutional authority to appoint and fix the compensation of all County employees, including those who work for LACERA. It contends this 15 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. authority, as well as the collaborative relationships set out in CERL, were not changed by the enactment of Proposition 162. In sum, it urges that although LACERA has the statutory power to appoint the staff needed to run the retirement system, the County has the final say in deciding the classification and compensation of these County employees. LACERA counters that its employees are County employees only insofar as they are subject to County civil service rules and eligible to receive certain benefits of County employment, like participating in the retirement system. Notwithstanding the home rule provisions, LACERA urges that Proposition 162 changed the legal landscape when it gave retirement boards “plenary authority” over “administration of the [retirement] system.” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.) It argues this plenary authority over administration includes the power to determine classification and compensation for its personnel. LACERA further asserts that CERL imposes a ministerial duty on the County to accept LACERA’s classification and salary designations and include them in the County’s salary ordinance. (See § 31522.1.) Resolving these conflicts requires consideration of a number of interconnected constitutional and statutory provisions governing the powers of county retirement boards. We first turn to the Constitution, then consider the related statutory questions. A. Constitutional Authority over Retirement System Appointments As noted, the California Constitution grants counties control over employee hiring. The constitutional powers of 16 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. counties are grounded in Article XI, which provides for “Local Government.” Article XI divides the state into counties and requires that the Legislature provide for county powers, including the formation in each county of an elected governing body, such as a board of supervisors. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1.) In general law counties, the Constitution directs that the governing body “shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees.” (Id., subd. (b); see § 25300.) This “ ‘home rule’ ” provision was “specifically intended to deprive the Legislature of the power to set compensation for county employees and to entrust that authority to county governing bodies.” (County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 322, 338 (County of Sonoma); see Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1184 (Retired Employees).) Similar provisions apply to counties that have adopted a charter for their governance. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4.) In charter counties, such as Los Angeles County, the governing body has constitutional authority over “fixing and regulating . . . , by ordinance,” the number of “persons to be employed” as well as their “powers, duties, qualifications, and compensation.” (Cal. Const, art. XI, § 4, subd. (f).) “Under the ‘home rule’ doctrine, county charter provisions concerning the operation of the county, and specifically including the county’s right to provide ‘for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees’ (that is, a county’s core operations)” take precedence over conflicting state laws. (Holmgren, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 601; see Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4, subd. (g).) As germane here, the County urges that the home rule doctrine prevents statewide legislation from usurping county 17 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. governments’ constitutional authority to set the salaries of their employees. Elsewhere in the Constitution, article XVI, section 17 regulates the investment of public pension or retirement funds. The constitutional question here is whether Proposition 162’s amendments to section 17 shifted authority over classification and salary setting for retirement system staff away from county governing bodies and to retirement boards. There is no dispute that voters have the authority to amend the Constitution in this way. The question is whether they intended to do so. To answer that question, we must construe article XVI, section 17, as that provision was amended by Proposition 162. Familiar rules guide the analysis. “We apply the same interpretive principles to initiatives as to legislative enactments, beginning with the text as the best guide to voter intent and turning to extrinsic sources such as ballot materials when necessary to resolve ambiguities.” (In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 125 (C.B.).) For a provision enacted by the electorate, “it is the voters’ intent that controls.” (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796.) “Once the electorate’s intent has been ascertained, the provisions must be construed to conform to that intent. [Citation.] ‘[W]e may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.’ ” (Ibid.) 1. Background Regarding Proposition 162’s Passage Article XVI, section 17 “reached [its] current form through two ballot initiatives. The first, Proposition 21, [was] passed in 1984 in an apparent response to the emerging financial markets 18 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. of the 1980’s.” (O’Neal, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1202.) Motivated by concerns that market changes made retirement benefits vulnerable to various risks, Proposition 21 amended section 17 and “introduced the principle that ‘assets of a public pension or retirement system are trust funds’ that ‘shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the pension or retirement system and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system.’ ” (O’Neal, at p. 1202.) The second ballot initiative, Proposition 162, was passed in 1992 in response to “actions by the Governor and Legislature to balance the state budget by limiting or delaying the state’s employer contributions to CalPERS.” (Westly, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100; see O’Neal, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1203.) Among these actions, 1982 legislation had barred the state from making a portion of its employer contributions and required instead that any deficiencies be covered by CalPERS reserve funds. (Westly, at p. 1100; Claypool v. Wilson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 646, 655.) Then, in the early 1990’s, the Legislature made several changes to delay the state’s employer contribution payments. In 1990, it changed the payment schedule from monthly to quarterly; the next year, it changed the schedule to semiannually; and the year after that, it changed the schedule to “ ‘ “semiannually, six months in arrears.” ’ ” (Westly, at p. 1100; see Board of Administration v. Wilson (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1117.) In 1991, the Legislature also repealed statutes granting cost-of-living adjustments to retirees and passed legislation directing that these adjustment expenditures be allocated instead to defray the state’s employer contributions. (Claypool, at pp. 657–658.) The same 1991 law transferred 19 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. many actuarial duties from the CalPERS retirement board to the governor. (Id. at p. 658.) It was in this environment that voters passed Proposition 162, the California Pension Protection Act of 1992, and expanded the authority of public pension retirement boards. As amended by Proposition 162, the opening paragraph of article XVI, section 17 gives public pension retirement boards “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1992) text of Prop. 162, § 4, p. 70, italics omitted (hereafter Ballot Pamp.).) Voters further delineated that responsibility in the subdivisions that follow. (Id., at pp. 70–71 [amending Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subds. (a)–(h)].) Those subdivisions provide that a retirement board has “sole and exclusive fiduciary responsibility” over managing system assets and assuring prompt delivery of benefits and services to participants and their beneficiaries. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subd. (a).) They return “the sole and exclusive power to provide for actuarial services” to retirement boards (id., subd. (e)) and specify that a board’s duty to participants and their beneficiaries takes “precedence over any other duty” (id., subd. (b)). Other subdivisions address the selection and removal of retirement board members (id., subd. (f)), define the term “ ‘retirement board’ ” (id., subd. (h)), and provide that the Legislature “may . . . continue to prohibit certain investments” when in the public interest (id., subd. (g)). Finally, Proposition 162 left substantively unchanged two subdivisions that require retirement board members to act with prudence and diligence (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subd. (c)) and to diversify investments (id., subd. (d)). Taken together, section 17’s 20 LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSN. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. subdivisions shed light on the scope of the “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility” the voters intended to confer. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.)7 7 The full text of article XVI, section 17, with language added by Proposition 162 in italics, is as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of law or this Constitution to the contrary, the retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall have plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system, subject to all of the following: “(a) The retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall have the sole and exclusive fiduc