People v. Hernandez

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELA HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. S282186 Fifth Appellate District F076752 Kern County Superior Court BF150639A August 13, 2026 Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Evans, and Danner* concurred. Justice Corrigan filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ S282186 Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. For a noncitizen criminal defendant who is considering whether to enter a guilty plea, preserving the right to remain in the United States is often a crucial consideration. Recognizing this, the Legislature has sought to ensure that defendants meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of their pleas. Penal Code, section 1016.5,1 requires courts, before accepting guilty pleas, to advise defendants that a criminal conviction may have serious immigration consequences. (Id., subd. (a).) Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1473.7(a)(1)) authorizes courts to vacate convictions when a defendant shows “prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” This case concerns a section 1473.7(a)(1) motion brought by Angela Hernandez, a long-time lawful permanent resident of the United States who seeks to withdraw her guilty plea to two controlled substance charges. Two years after entering the plea, Hernandez traveled to Mexico. Returning home to California, she presented herself to immigration authorities at the airport, who detained her and initiated removal proceedings against her. Hernandez claims that she did not understand that pleading 1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. guilty would make her subject to deportation. She claims that if she had understood this, she would have attempted to negotiate a different plea or taken her case to trial. The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion. The court concluded that her attorney had “properly advised” her “regarding the immigration consequences of entering a plea” — a conclusion based largely on Hernandez’s initials next to the immigration consequences advisement on her plea form and her attorney’s signature under a preprinted statement on the same form attesting that he had explained the immigration consequences to her. The Court of Appeal affirmed. On independent review, we reverse. When ruling on a section 1473.7(a)(1) motion, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and focus on the defendant’s subjective understanding. Evidence that a defendant received the immigration consequences advisement required by section 1016.5 before entering their plea is relevant, but not dispositive. Courts rely on defense counsel to ensure that defendants meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of a plea and can make informed decisions whether to accept those consequences. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Hernandez has established prejudicial error that damaged her “ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences” of her convictions. (§ 1473.7(a)(1)). I. BACKGROUND In 2013, Kern County Sheriff’s deputies arrested Hernandez outside a store in Delano. In Hernandez’s car were five trash bags full of marijuana. The trash bags had been placed there by a confidential informant who had recruited 2  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Hernandez to transport them from a nearby vineyard. Hernandez was charged with one count of unlawful transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code § 11360, subd. (a)) and one count of unlawful possession of marijuana for sale (id., § 11359). Hernandez pled guilty to both crimes as charged. Hernandez is a citizen of Mexico. She immigrated to the United States when she was 19 years old. When she entered her plea, she was 55 years old, had lived in the United States for 36 years, and had been a lawful permanent resident for over 20 years. Her “whole family” lived in the United States. She was married and had five children, all either United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, and 14 grandchildren, two of whom she cared for several times a week. Her mother was deceased and her father lived in California. She had no prior criminal record. The parties appear to agree that Hernandez’s guilty pleas to the controlled substance charges exposed her to mandatory removal and exclusion from the United States and rendered her ineligible for almost all forms of immigration relief. In connection with her plea, Hernandez signed a form titled “Felony Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form.” The form was printed in English and contained a long list of advisements. Among them was a modified version of the immigration consequences advisement required by section 1016.5, in which the word “will” was substituted for the statutory “may” and additional language was added. (See id., subd. (a) [“If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 3  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States” (italics added)].) The form’s advisement read: “ALIEN STATUS: I understand that if I am not a Citizen of the United States, my guilty or no contest plea will result in my deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States. Deportation is mandatory for some offenses. I have fully discussed this matter with my attorney and understand the serious immigration consequences of my plea.” Hernandez’s initials appeared on a line next to this paragraph. At the bottom of the plea form, just above Hernandez’s signature, was a preprinted declaration stating that she had read, understood, and initialed each item on the form. The form also contained two preprinted statements, one signed by her retained attorney, J.M. Irigoyen, and the other signed by a Spanish-language interpreter. Irigoyen’s stated, as relevant here, that he had reviewed the form with his client, had “explained any possible immigration consequences that may result from this plea,” and was satisfied his client understood “these things.” The interpreter certified that they had translated the “entire form” into Spanish for the defendant, who had stated that she “understood the contents of the form.” At the bottom of the form was a preprinted paragraph titled “Court’s Findings and Order,” which stated, as relevant here, that “the defendant’s plea(s) and admission(s) are freely and voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and consequences thereof.” The trial court judge signed and dated the order. Irigoyen appeared on behalf of Hernandez for the first and only time at her change of plea hearing. (At her other 4  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. appearances, including her sentencing, she was represented by a different attorney who was handling some appearances for Irigoyen at the time.) During the brief plea colloquy, there was no mention of possible immigration consequences. Irigoyen informed the court that Hernandez was pleading “straight up to both charges.” He noted that the district attorney had offered “local time” and that the court had indicated a sentence of 180 days. In response to a series of yes/no questions from the trial court, Hernandez orally confirmed that she wanted to enter a plea on those terms, had completed the plea form, understood the form, and did not have any questions. Irigoyen requested that the court set the case for sentencing several weeks out so that Hernandez could spend Christmas at home, to which the district attorney assented. The probation office recommended a sentence of probation and indicated that if “additional sanctions” were required in the future, the “low term” of two years would be “warranted.” At sentencing, the court imposed three years’ probation with 180 days in county jail, in accordance with its indicated sentence. The court advised Hernandez that if she left the United States, she was to “maintain contact with probation by mail” and she was “not to reenter the United States without proper authorization.” Hernandez ultimately served only 27 days in jail. About two years after her conviction, while still on probation, Hernandez obtained permission from the probation department to make a trip to Mexico. On her return, she presented herself for entry to immigration and customs officials at Los Angeles International Airport, who detained her, confiscated her lawful permanent resident card, and initiated removal proceedings against her. 5  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Hernandez filed a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She asked the court to allow her to withdraw her plea and to reinstate the original charges so that she could defend against them with the benefit of an accurate understanding of their immigration consequences. She alleged that Irigoyen had advised her to plead guilty as charged and that he did not inform her of the immigration consequences of doing so or of possible defenses or alternative pleas. Before the court ruled on her habeas corpus petition, Hernandez successfully completed probation. At Hernandez’s request, the court then converted her petition to a petition under section 1473.7 — which had taken effect very recently — and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing was conducted by the same judge who took Hernandez’s plea. Irigoyen had died not long before Hernandez filed her habeas corpus petition, and Hernandez was the only witness at her hearing. Hernandez testified that Irigoyen had told her that she “had to plead guilty” and had not told her that she would almost certainly get deported if she did so, even though she had informed him that she was a noncitizen. She testified that if she had known that mandatory deportation was a consequence of her plea, she would have gone to trial because she did not “want to be sent to Mexico.” On cross-examination, Hernandez acknowledged that she had signed the plea form containing the immigration consequences advisement but testified that she did not remember reviewing the form with Irigoyen. The district attorney asked the interpreter to read the advisement to Hernandez, who volunteered, “Never was I told that. Never.” In 6  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. response to further questioning, Hernandez admitted that her initials appeared next to the advisement on the form. She testified that she remembered “signing some documents,” but that Irigoyen had never read the immigration consequences advisement to her or told her that she “could possibly be deported.” When asked to explain how her initials and signature got on the form, she testified: “Well, because if he’s my attorney and he’s telling me, ‘Sign here, initial here,’ I’m going to sign.” Hernandez further testified that she did not remember an interpreter reading the form to her or the court asking if she understood everything in the form. She explained, “I was really nervous then too.” The district attorney then had the court interpreter read Hernandez the transcript of the portion of her plea colloquy in which she responded “yes” when asked whether she had read and understood everything in the plea form and “no” when asked whether she had any questions. Hernandez testified, “. . . I never thought that it would be anything like that, like deportation.” Responding to questions about her interactions with Irigoyen outside of court, Hernandez testified that he did not speak Spanish and that the only time she had spoken to him with an interpreter was in court on the day of her hearing. Hernandez’s new attorney had been unable to obtain Irigoyen’s case file, and Hernandez’s testimony was the only evidence of her out-of-court interactions with Irigoyen. The trial court denied relief. The initial order purported to deny Hernandez’s habeas corpus petition, even though the court had, by its previous order, converted the petition to a petition under section 1473.7. Hernandez moved for 7  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. reconsideration, arguing that the court had failed to consider whether she had shown that she was unable to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the immigration consequences of her plea — the showing required under section 1473.7(a)(1). In response, the trial court issued a new order denying the petition under section 1473.7 for substantially the same reasons it gave in its initial order, citing to habeas corpus cases in support of its ruling. The court concluded: “[F]rom the record of the plea and sentencing, it does appear that Mr. Irigoyen properly advised Ms. Hernandez regarding the immigration consequences of entering a plea. Her claims now appear to be ‘post hoc assertions’ that are contradicted by the record of the plea.” Hernandez appealed, the Court of Appeal affirmed, and we granted review and ultimately transferred the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of our opinion in People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar). The Court of Appeal again affirmed and we again granted review, later transferring the case for reconsideration in light of our opinion in People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza). The Court of Appeal affirmed for a third time in a divided, unpublished opinion. The majority read the advisement on the plea form as clearly informing Hernandez that her plea “would result in her deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.” It also accorded deference to the trial court’s “implied finding” that Hernandez’s testimony “lacked credibility in light of the contemporaneous record of her plea.” It concluded that Hernandez had failed to show that she “did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences” of her plea. 8  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. The dissent observed that the trial court had focused on whether Hernandez “was adequately advised” rather than on “her subjective understanding of the immigration consequences.” The dissenting justice would have concluded that Hernandez’s testimony about her lack of understanding was sufficiently corroborated by objective evidence, particularly “the fact that she obtained permission from probation to travel to Mexico and returned on an international flight, which subjected her to the scrutiny of immigration officials at Los Angeles International Airport.” He would have held that Hernandez did not “meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of her plea.” We granted review for a third time and now reverse. II. DISCUSSION To establish eligibility to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1473.7(a)(1), a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) “error damaging [the defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence” and (2) that the damage resulted in prejudice. (Ibid.; see id., § 1473.7, subd. (f)(1) [standard of proof].) In considering Hernandez’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her section 1473.7(a)(1) motion, we independently review the evidence in the record. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 526–528.) Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe Hernandez when she was giving her testimony, we defer to its factual findings to the extent that they turn on its assessment of Hernandez’s credibility. (Id. at pp. 527–528.) We also accord deference to findings based on the trial court’s 9  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. observations of Hernandez during the plea proceedings because the judge who heard Hernandez’s section 1473.7(a)(1) motion was the same judge who took her plea. (Vivar, at p. 528.) But we do not defer to those findings that are based on written materials, since we are similarly situated to the trial court when interpreting a “cold record.” (Ibid.) And we may “ ‘ ‘reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting” ’ ” and the trial court’s conclusions are based in part on its assessment of “ ‘ “the credibility of witnesses [it] heard and observed.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 527.) Ultimately, it is for us to decide, exercising our independent judgment, whether the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes “prejudicial error” damaging Hernandez’s ability to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of the charges to which she pled, or her ability to defend against those consequences or to knowingly accept them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see Vivar, at p. 528.) A. Hernandez Has Established Error Hernandez contends that, in concluding that she had not established error, the courts below gave undue weight to the written record of her plea, particularly to the preprinted immigration consequences advisement on her plea form. The proper inquiry, she argues, considers the totality of the circumstances and focuses on a defendant’s subjective understanding. The Attorney General agrees with Hernandez about the nature of the inquiry but argues that Hernandez has not made the showing required to establish error. Exercising our independent judgment and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Hernandez has made the required showing. 10  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 1. In Evaluating Error, Courts Consider All Evidence Relevant to the Defendant’s Ability To Meaningfully Understand, Defend Against, or Knowingly Accept the Immigration Consequences of a Conviction In determining whether a defendant has established error for purposes of section 1473.7(a)(1), we focus on the defendant’s subjective understanding at the time they entered their guilty plea. (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769 (Alatorre).) We ask whether the defendant has shown that they were unable to “meaningfully understand” the immigration consequences of their plea, or that their ability to “defend against” or “knowingly accept” those consequences was impaired. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 905–911 (Manzanilla).) “The key is the mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have understood under the circumstances.” (People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (Carrillo).) A defendant may establish error by showing that they entered a plea without a meaningful understanding of the “actual or potential adverse immigration consequences” of the resulting conviction or sentence. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example, a defendant may show that their attorney provided incomplete or inaccurate advice about the plea’s immigration consequences or did not effectively communicate the immigration consequences, so the defendant entered the plea without a meaningful understanding of them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) Alternatively, a defendant may show error in the form of subjective misunderstanding or ignorance that damaged their ability to “defend against” these consequences. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example, a defendant may show that they were unaware of 11  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. possible alternative approaches to their defense that could have mitigated the immigration consequences or led to an immigration-safe disposition. Such approaches may include alternative pleas or sentences they could have attempted to negotiate or defenses they could have raised at trial. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 531–532; People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009 (Camacho).) Finally, a defendant may establish error by showing that they did not “knowingly accept” the consequences of their conviction. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example, evidence that a defendant sought to withdraw their plea when they learned of its consequences, that they applied for an immigration benefit after entering their plea, or that they contested their removal can support a showing that the defendant did not knowingly accept the immigration consequences of their conviction. Because the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s subjective understanding, courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1) motions must look beyond the record of the plea and consider the totality of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry. (Cf. People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361 [going “beyond the courtroom colloquy” and examining the “totality of circumstances” to evaluate whether plea was knowing and voluntary]; People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 898–899 (Patterson) [in deciding whether to permit withdrawal of guilty plea under § 1018 based on defendant’s mistake or ignorance courts consider “ ‘all factors necessary to bring about a just result’ ”].) Courts must engage in a case-specific examination that involves assessing credibility and weighing circumstantial evidence. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [considering evidence of the court’s advisement, counsel’s advice, and defendant’s statements and actions in determining 12  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. that defendant had established that he “did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea”].) While the focus of the error inquiry is on the defendant’s subjective understanding, a defendant’s bare assertion that they did not understand the immigration consequences or the options available to them to defend against those consequences is insufficient to establish error; the assertion must be corroborated by objective evidence. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [requiring objective evidence to support assertion that defendant would not have entered plea].) Such evidence may include evidence related to the quality of defense counsel’s representation of the defendant and the nature of their interactions. (See People v. Benitez-Torres (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1266–1268 (Benitez-Torres).) This evidence may be contained in the record of the plea, including defense counsel’s written and oral representations to the court; in the defendant’s case file; or in declarations or testimony by the defendant, defense counsel, witnesses, or immigration law experts. (See Espinoza, at p. 324; People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 322 (Rodriguez); Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 905–911.) Relevant evidence includes evidence of whether counsel inquired about the defendant’s current immigration status and plans to apply for immigration benefits;2 whether counsel fully advised the defendant of 2 We use the term “immigration benefits” to refer generally to any sort of legal authorization that allows a noncitizen to lawfully enter the United States or remain here to live, work, study, or travel, either temporarily or permanently. Such benefits include immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, various 13  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. definite and potential immigration consequences of the conviction and sentence that would result from the plea; whether counsel’s advice about the immigration consequences of the plea was accurate; whether counsel informed defendant of potential alternative pleas that would have eliminated or mitigated the immigration consequences; whether counsel attempted to negotiate such a plea with the prosecution; and whether counsel discussed with the defendant the advantages and disadvantages of going to trial, including possible defenses to the charges. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1176–1177 (Curiel); Manzanilla, at pp. 905–911; People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 671–673 (Villalba); Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17; § 1016.3, subds. (a) & (b).) Evidence of whether the defendant or defense counsel consulted with an immigration law expert about immigration consequences and possible alternative pleas — either before or after the plea — and if so, of the advice received, is also relevant. (See Espinoza, at p. 324; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1003, 1009.) A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel may support a finding of error, but a defendant may establish error without proving that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 523; Camacho, at p. 1007.) Relevant evidence also includes evidence of the trial court’s efforts to confirm that the defendant understood the forms of humanitarian relief, adjustment of status to permanent residency, relief from removal, employment authorization, family reunification, and naturalization. (See 8 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. (2026).) 14  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea and had an opportunity to discuss them with their attorney and tailor their defense strategy accordingly. (See Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899–900, 910–911.) Such evidence may be found in the written record, including the advisements and findings contained in the plea form, and the transcript of the plea proceedings, including any discussion related to immigration consequences in the plea colloquy. Evidence that the trial court gave the defendant the generic advisement of immigration consequences required by section 1016.5 is relevant because it tends to show that the defendant was made aware of the possibility that a conviction could have serious immigration consequences and the need to consult with an attorney about any immigration-related concerns; however, such evidence does not alone show that the defendant received complete and accurate advice and meaningfully understood that advice. (See § 1016.5, subd. (d); Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962 (Padron); Manzanilla, at p. 906; § 1016.5, subd. (a); cf. Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 897–898.) Evidence that the trial court gave a confusing or inaccurate advisement would tend to support a finding of error. (Villalba, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 671, 675; cf. S.B. No. 281 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) [amending section 1016.5 to require courts to give statutory advisement “verbatim”].) Evidence of whether the court provided the defendant “additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of the advisement” and consult with counsel is also relevant. (§ 1016.5, subd. (b); see § 1016.3, subds. (a) & (b).) And finally, relevant evidence includes evidence of the defendant’s subjective understanding, or lack thereof, of the 15  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. immigration consequences of the plea and their options for avoiding or mitigating those consequences. The most direct evidence of a defendant’s subjective understanding consists of the defendant’s own statements to the court when entering the plea and in declarations or testimony given in support of their section 1473.7(a)(1) motion. (See Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17 [defendant “is the only one with direct access to his state of mind”].) A defendant’s testimony that they did not understand the immigration consequences or their options for defending against those consequences may be corroborated by evidence of the defendant’s priorities relevant to the plea. This includes evidence of the defendant’s immigration status and prospects of obtaining immigration benefits; evidence of how long the defendant has lived in the United States, at what age they came here, and the strength of their ties to their country of origin; and evidence of the nature and extent of the defendant’s ties to the United States and their family and community in this country. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 962; Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177.) Evidence of the defendant’s personal characteristics may also shed light on their ability to understand the plea, its consequences, and their options. This includes evidence of the defendant’s education level, occupation, intellectual capacity, mental health, disability, literacy, age, and sophistication; evidence of the defendant’s English language proficiency and ability to understand the interpreter, if any; and evidence of the defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system. (People v. Diaz (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 102, 114–115; Padron, at p. 961; Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 18; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) Such evidence may be 16  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. presented through documents and through declarations or testimony of family members, friends, medical professionals, defense counsel, and others. Evidence of a defendant’s statements and conduct during and after the plea proceedings may suggest understanding and informed acceptance of immigration consequences or lack thereof. This includes evidence that the defendant either voluntarily brought themselves to the attention of immigration authorities — for example, by presenting themselves for admission at an airport or border crossing station or by applying for an immigration benefit — or that the defendant avoided contact with immigration authorities; evidence of whether or not the defendant understood they would be placed in removal proceedings or transferred to immigration custody after completing their sentence; and evidence that the defendant expressed concerns about potential immigration consequences of their conviction either before or after entering their plea. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177; Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) Evidence of the defendant’s concern about immigration consequences (or lack of such concern) may be found in interactions with friends, family members, the sentencing court, the probation department, or attorneys. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 522; People v. Diaz, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 115; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899–900, 910– 911; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.) Because the burden is on the defendant to establish error and because courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the defendant has satisfied this burden, it will generally be in a defendant’s interest to create a robust record. (See Espinoza, supra, 17  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 14 Cal.5th at p. 325 [“The more robust and inclusive a record, the greater the opportunity for effective persuasion and meaningful judicial review”].) However, “no specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Ibid.) 2. The Preponderance of the Evidence Shows Error As we have noted, Irigoyen died before Hernandez filed her habeas corpus petition and her new attorney was not able to obtain any records Irigoyen may have kept related to her case.3 The record here consists primarily of the court records from Hernandez’s plea and sentencing and her testimony at the evidentiary hearing on her section 1437.7(a)(1) motion. In our independent review of this record, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings to the extent that they were based on the court’s observations of Hernandez when testifying. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–528; Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1174–1175.) Although the trial court did not expressly rely on its observations of Hernandez, its conclusion that Hernandez’s claims were based on “post hoc assertions” implies that it did not credit Hernandez’s testimony that she was “never” given the immigration consequences advisement and that Irigoyen never told her that she “could possibly be deported.” Our independent review confirms that this testimony is “contradicted by the 3 When available, a declaration or testimony from plea counsel can be very helpful in establishing eligibility for section 1473.7(a)(1) relief. (See, e.g., Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002–1005 [defense counsel’s testimony established that he had inadequately researched immigration consequences and had given inaccurate advice].) However, “[a] party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325.) 18  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. record of the plea”: The plea form indicates that Hernandez received an immigration consequences advisement and that Irigoyen discussed it with her. We therefore credit the trial court’s implied finding that Hernandez’s testimony that she was “never told” she could possibly be deported was not credible. Other aspects of Hernandez’s testimony, however, are credible and supported by the record of her criminal case. Significantly, Hernandez testified that, although she answered “yes” when the court asked her whether she understood everything in the plea form, she “never thought that it would be anything like that, like deportation.” Her testimony that she did not understand she would be deported is corroborated, most compellingly, by evidence that just two years after entering her plea, she obtained permission from the probation department to travel to Mexico and on her return, presented herself to immigration authorities at the airport, triggering proceedings to revoke her permanent residency and deport her. We found error based on similar evidence in Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 320. Like Hernandez, Espinoza was a long-time permanent resident who, after pleading guilty to an offense that made him deportable and barred his reentry, “took an international commercial flight to the United States.” (Ibid.) We observed that doing so “predictably required subjecting himself to the scrutiny of United States immigration officials.” (Ibid.) We reasoned that voluntarily bringing oneself to the attention of immigration authorities in this way “is not consistent with the behavior of a person who understood that his convictions effectively ended his lawful resident status.” (Ibid.) Given Hernandez’s long-term residence in the United States, her status as a lawful permanent resident, and her close and extensive family ties in California, her decisions to seek and 19  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. obtain permission from the probation department to leave the United States, to travel to Mexico, and to attempt to lawfully reenter through a port of entry support an inference that she did not “meaningfully understand” the immigration consequences of her conviction. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see Espinoza, at p. 320; Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 770–771.) Hernandez’s testimony about the circumstances in which she entered her plea further supports her claim that she did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of doing so. When asked to explain why she pled guilty, Hernandez testified that Irigoyen told her that she “had to.” Hernandez acknowledged that she signed the plea form and initialed the immigration advisement on it, but she asserted that Irigoyen had not explained the advisement to her. When asked why she had signed the plea form without understanding it, she explained: “if he’s my attorney and he’s telling me, ‘sign here, initial here,’ I’m going to sign.” When asked why she answered “yes” when the court asked her whether she understood the plea form, she responded that she was “really nervous.” Other evidence corroborates Hernandez’s account. The record shows that Hernandez required a Spanish-language interpreter for all her court appearances. Irigoyen did not speak Spanish, and the only time she met with him with an interpreter was at the court on the day she entered her plea. Irigoyen did not request additional time from the court to counsel Hernandez on the immigration consequences of pleading guilty or her options for defending against them. (See § 1016.5, subd. (b).) Hernandez, having no record of prior criminal conduct, had never entered a plea before. And the plea colloquy was brief, consisting of a series of yes/no questions with no direct reference to immigration consequences. 20  PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Moreover, the meaning of the form immigration consequences advisement that Hernandez initialed is far from clear. It begins: “I understand that if I am not a Citizen of the United States, my guilty or no contest plea will result in my deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.” The seemingly unequivocal phrasing of this acknowledgement (“will result”) is undermined by its appearance on a standard, preprinted form presented to all felony defendants regardless of their specific