People v. Esquivias

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL ALBERTO ESQUIVIAS, Defendant and Appellant. S286371 Second Appellate District, Division Two B329800 Los Angeles County Superior Court PA077370 August 17, 2026 Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and Gooding* concurred. Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu concurred. * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS S286371 Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. A habeas corpus proceeding is equitable in nature, and a court “has broad authority to craft a remedy ‘as the justice of the case may require.’ ” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 976 (Palmer), quoting Pen. Code,1 § 1484.) Petitioner Miguel Alberto Esquivias filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging only that he was entitled to relief from his firearm enhancements under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682), which granted trial courts discretion to strike these previously mandatory enhancements. The superior court ultimately granted relief on that sole claim by striking petitioner’s firearm enhancements. On appeal, petitioner argued that the superior court’s habeas corpus remedy, affecting one aspect of his sentence, entitled him to reconsideration of his entire sentence with the benefit of all relevant ameliorative laws. The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that a grant of habeas corpus relief is not an “ ‘all-or-nothing’ proposition” and “a trial court is not obligated to revisit a defendant’s entire sentence on habeas corpus review merely because it grants review to revisit a portion of that sentence.” (People v. Esquivias (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 (Esquivias).) We affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision. Since a full resentencing was neither 1 Subsequent section numbers refer to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 1  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. constitutionally nor statutorily compelled to remedy petitioner’s specific claim for discretionary, retroactive sentencing relief pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620, the habeas corpus court had broad equitable authority to conclude that “the justice of the case” only required striking petitioner’s firearm enhancements. (§ 1484.) Habeas corpus petitions must be assessed on a case- by-case basis, and this is not a case where petitioner’s original sentence was constitutionally infirm or unauthorized. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In June 2013, petitioner fatally shot a rival gang member several times. Approximately two weeks after the killing, petitioner and his friend robbed two people at gunpoint. During the robbery, petitioner asked one of the victims for his gang affiliation. In May 2015, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of robbery (§ 211), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found that the crimes, except the felon in possession count, were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing death in connection with the murder (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)), and that petitioner personally used a firearm and a principal was armed in the commission of the robberies (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). Petitioner admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction that qualified as a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced petitioner to prison for 37 years and 8 months, plus 75 years to life. As relevant, petitioner’s firearm enhancements accounted for an indeterminate term of 2  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 25 years to life, plus 13 years 4 months of his determinate sentence. On July 26, 2017, the Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction. We thereafter denied his petition for review on November 1, 2017. Senate Bill No. 620 then became effective after our decision to deny review but before petitioner’s time to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. As a result, the parties agree that petitioner’s judgment was not final on direct review when Senate Bill No. 620 took effect. Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 amended sections 12022.53 and 12022.5 to provide trial courts, “in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385,” the discretion to “strike or dismiss” previously mandatory firearm enhancements. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2; Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h).) Petitioner’s judgment became final on January 30, 2018.2 (See Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.) On January 24, 2022, almost four years after his criminal judgment became final, petitioner, in propria persona, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court seeking retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to Estrada. (See In re Estrada (1965) 2 Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, so his judgment became final 90 days after we denied his petition for review. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306.) Before the trial court, the district attorney incorrectly calculated the date of finality as February 27, 2018, and the superior court accepted this concession. However, this miscalculation has no impact on the analysis since it is undisputed that petitioner’s case was not final on direct review when Senate Bill No. 620 took effect on January 1, 2018. 3  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 747 (Estrada) [holding that, absent a contrary savings clause, ameliorative legislation is presumed to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” i.e., all cases not “reduced to final judgment”].) In their informal response, the People (per the district attorney) conceded that Senate Bill No. 620 applied to petitioner’s case because his judgment was not final on appeal when it became effective. In a supplemental response, the People asserted that the superior court should not exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss petitioner’s firearm enhancements because “the interests of justice would not be served by doing so in this particular case.” In his reply, petitioner asked the court to favorably exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620. He also raised for the first time a request for the court to dismiss his prior strike conviction (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)). He additionally asked that the court dismiss his other enhancements, including his gang enhancements after applying Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 333) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2022), which became effective after his case was final on direct review. On February 24, 2023, at a hearing in petitioner’s habeas corpus matter, the superior court explained that the parties agreed petitioner had made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief, i.e., petitioner was entitled to an opportunity for the trial court to consider exercising its discretion to strike his firearm enhancements under Senate Bill No. 620. At a subsequent hearing in March 2023, the superior court first explained that petitioner’s habeas corpus petition sought “specific relief” under Senate Bill No. 620. The court rejected petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a full resentencing 4  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. with the benefit of all ameliorative laws “that have been enacted into law up to today’s date.” The court observed that petitioner’s case was final in 2018 and “limit[ed] this particular habeas petition’s scope to whether or not to exercise” discretion under Senate Bill No. 620. The court struck petitioner’s firearm enhancements, thereby reducing his sentence by 38 years and four months. The court rejected petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to full resentencing, which he argued should have resulted in the reduction of his sentence by over 40 more years. The court explained that any further reduction in petitioner’s sentence would “undermine the intentions of how I exercise this discretion today.” Petitioner appealed, arguing again that, when the superior court exercised its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 to strike his firearm enhancements, he was entitled to full resentencing with the benefit of all ameliorative laws that took effect after his judgment became final on direct review, including Assembly Bill No. 333 and Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017– 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1393). In relevant part, “Assembly Bill [No.] 333 [effective January 1, 2022] amended Penal Code section 186.22 by imposing new substantive requirements relating to gang enhancements . . . .” (People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Senate Bill No. 1393, effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013), expanded a court’s discretion to dismiss a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with petitioner, holding that the habeas corpus court could strike petitioner’s firearm enhancements without rendering the remainder of petitioner’s sentence subject to reconsideration. (See Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) We granted review. In People v. Duenas (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 553, review 5  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. granted July 30, 2025, S291631 (Duenas), a divided Court of Appeal subsequently disagreed with Esquivias’s relevant reasoning, concluding instead that when a habeas corpus court strikes part of a sentence, it is “required to conduct a full resentencing” (Duenas, at p. 560) with the benefit of all intervening ameliorative laws. (See id. at p. 563.) We affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision below and disapprove Duenas’s broad proposition that a habeas corpus petitioner is always entitled to full resentencing whenever a habeas corpus court grants relief as to a portion of a petitioner’s sentence. While some habeas corpus claims may require vacating a petitioner’s entire sentence (see People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 (Padilla) [discussed post]), petitioner’s claim for retroactive relief under Senate Bill No. 620’s statutory amendments did not. When presented with a meritorious habeas corpus claim, the court necessarily assesses the appropriate remedy on a case-by-case basis. II. DISCUSSION “The court will determine the appropriate disposition of a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the allegations of the petition as originally filed and any amended or supplemental petition for which leave to file has been granted.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.) It is “improper to state new claims or theories for the first time in the informal reply or traverse.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 444 (Reno).) Applying these accepted pleading principles here, petitioner admits the superior court was initially required only to consider “the sole issue raised” in his habeas corpus petition, i.e., whether he was entitled to seek relief from his firearm enhancements under Senate Bill No. 620. 6  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Where the parties disagree is on the question of what is required when a habeas corpus court determines partial resentencing is an appropriate remedy for the specific claim before it. According to petitioner, “because a criminal sentence constitutes an integrated whole,” once the superior court decided to strike his firearm enhancements, it “effectively vacated [petitioner’s] entire sentence, which rendered the sentence nonfinal” for purposes of applying all applicable ameliorative laws. In petitioner’s view, which is echoed by the dissent, the court could have maintained finality by leaving his sentence intact, but its exercise of discretion with respect to part of his sentence triggered entitlement to full resentencing with Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity. (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 745, 747; see also dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 8–10.) Petitioner alleges that his judgment was reopened and he is thus entitled to the benefit of all ameliorative laws, including Assembly Bill No. 333 and Senate Bill No. 1393, which became effective after his criminal judgment was final on direct review in January 2018. The People instead argue that the question of “whether a judgment becomes nonfinal on habeas corpus will depend on the particular remedy fashioned by the court.” The People concede that, if a particular claim requires vacating a petitioner’s entire sentence, “then the judgment is nonfinal and the petitioner is entitled to full resentencing.” However, “not all habeas remedies operate in a way that makes a once-final judgment nonfinal.” We reject petitioner’s and the dissent’s sweeping proposition that, in all cases, any habeas corpus remedy affecting part of a petitioner’s sentence requires the habeas corpus court to conduct a full resentencing. “The applicable 7  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. procedure [in a habeas corpus matter] generally has depended upon the nature of the relief sought in the petition.” (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583, italics omitted.) The Court of Appeal below properly concluded that petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief under Senate Bill No. 620’s statutory amendments did not leave the habeas corpus court with an “ ‘all- or-nothing’ ” choice, thereby requiring the court to resentence petitioner in full or not at all. (Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Rather, “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S 298, 319.) Under well-established habeas corpus principles, “[a] court considering a petition for writ of habeas corpus has broad authority to craft a remedy ‘as the justice of the case may require.’ ” (Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 976, quoting § 1484.) “ ‘[I]t is well settled that the writ of habeas corpus does not afford an all-inclusive remedy available at all times as a matter of right.’ ” (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068–1069; cf. Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 451 [“ ‘ “the availability of the writ properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments” ’ ”].) It may well be that the equities of a particular case require the habeas corpus court to vacate a petitioner’s entire sentence and conduct a full resentencing, applying all relevant ameliorative laws, but that will not always be the case. Rather, a court’s 8  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. determination of the most appropriate equitable remedy in a habeas corpus matter is a case- and fact-specific inquiry.3 Our dissenting colleagues would have us employ a one- size-fits-all approach that is at odds with the traditional flexibility afforded to habeas corpus courts to meet the demands of a particular case. The dissent criticizes the majority for not citing a “single case” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 18) that is directly on point. But this is occasioned by the fact, recognized by the dissent and with which we agree, that the procedural posture here is “rare and idiosyncratic.” (Id. at p. 25.) More to the point, Estrada has been binding precedent for 60 years, and habeas corpus relief has been available for much longer. If the issue before us is as “straightforward” (id. at p. 5) as the dissent suggests, thereby necessitating a simple application of the full resentencing rule, then the dissent should be able to cite myriad habeas corpus cases where full resentencing has occurred on similar facts. But it cannot. The dissent’s analysis suffers from one fatal flaw at its inception. The dissent asserts that “the only way the superior court could afford relief was to initiate a new sentencing 3 The dissent argues that our “bespoke rule has several potential drawbacks if applied more generally to cases involving partial sentencing relief after a grant of a habeas corpus petition.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.) As an initial matter, we do not understand why the dissent would try to broaden the potential impact of a decision that it thinks is so patently incorrect. But, more to the point, we mean what we say: this case arises under a unique procedural history; our holding should not be “applied more generally” given that habeas corpus relief is claim specific; and our holding is (as the Attorney General agrees) specific to petitioner’s state statutory claim pursuant to Estrada. 9  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. hearing” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3) because habeas corpus courts have no authority “to define the scope of a sentencing court’s jurisdiction to conduct resentencing or to determine the application of Estrada retroactivity” (id. at p. 5). This is simply incorrect in the context of a petitioner who raised a single habeas corpus claim for discretionary, statutory relief under Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity to nonfinal judgments from his concededly valid, final judgment. (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 745, 747.) But once the dissent embraces this faulty premise, then all its conclusions seemingly “fall into place:” this case requires a basic application of Estrada; Estrada should be applied broadly; the full resentencing rule requires that every aspect of petitioner’s sentence be reconsidered. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 1–2, 5–8.) This reasoning gets it wrong at the crucial first step. Because petitioner’s judgment was final, absent a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, petitioner had no avenue to assert his claim for discretionary, retroactive sentencing relief under Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to Estrada. If, as the dissent maintains, a habeas corpus court is unable to assume jurisdiction and “determine the application of Estrada retroactivity” (dis. opn., at p. 5), then petitioner’s Estrada claim would have failed at the outset because it depended on just such a determination. Nor is a habeas corpus court, having determined that a remedy is warranted, obligated in the situation presented here to reopen a sentence for all purposes instead of ordering tailored relief. Our case law affords habeas corpus courts greater flexibility than the dissent’s position 10  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. would allow them.4 (See, e.g., Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 976; In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 583.) Without recognizing the fault in its underlying premise that the habeas corpus court could not determine the appropriate scope of sentencing relief and Estrada’s application, the dissent asks us to adopt an ever-shifting formulation of finality under Estrada for purposes of this case: (1) a petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief under Estrada only because his judgment is already final and he cannot be aided on direct appeal; then (2) after the habeas corpus court exercises its discretion to aid petitioner post-finality; (3) a pivot to a new finality date for Estrada (which now is after the time he asserted his case was final for purposes of (1)). Contrary to the dissent’s circular logic, and for reasons explained in greater detail below, our holding better honors Estrada’s presumption that “new laws that lessen punishment 4 As noted, habeas corpus proceedings are equitable in nature. The high court has “said that courts of equity ‘must be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.’ . . . [But] often the ‘exercise of a court’s equity powers . . . must be made on a case-by-case basis.’ ” (Holland v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 631, 649–650, citation omitted.) The high court has “followed a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’ ” (Id. at p. 650.) We, too, recognize that habeas corpus courts should “exercise judgment in light of prior precedent, but with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.” (Ibid.) This is such an “appropriate case” and the habeas corpus court was not limited to a rigid, all-or-nothing choice between providing no relief to petitioner or fully resentencing him. 11  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. apply retroactively to all defendants whose judgments are not final” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 1), better preserves society’s interest in the finality of judgments (see Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 451), and best maintains a habeas corpus court’s traditional flexibility to fashion relief as the justice of a particular case may require (see Palmer, at p. 976). The dissent also criticizes our case-specific affirmance of the habeas corpus court’s tailored grant of relief as “significantly more complicated” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3) than the dissent’s “easy-to-apply” approach. (Id. at p. 5.) We disagree with the premise that our framework is more complicated. But even accepting the dissent’s view, our job is to interpret the law as dictated by precedent and statute, even if that interpretation requires a more “complicated” approach. We are also more confident than our dissenting colleagues in the ability of our lower courts to understand and apply our holding going forward. (See id. at pp. 21–23.) Moreover, it is certainly the case that the dissent’s proposed interpretation may inure to petitioner’s benefit in this individual matter. But its one-size-fits-all approach to sentencing steals from the habeas corpus court, sitting in equity, the opportunity to fashion tailored relief on a case-by-case basis as justice requires. We think it ill advised to sacrifice equity for simplicity. In support of their contrary position, petitioner and the dissent rely on our decisions in Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th 152 and People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez). Those cases are readily distinguishable. The dissent posits that “[t]he case that most clearly articulates the governing principles of finality here” and “the proper application of Estrada” is Padilla. (Dis. opn. of Evans, 12  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. J., post, at p. 8.) The dissent boldly states that Padilla stands for the broad proposition that, “[s]imply put, habeas corpus relief resulting in a modification of sentence renders a case nonfinal.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.) But Padilla did not consider whether a habeas corpus court that credits a delayed claim for statutory relief under Estrada must fully resentence the petitioner. (See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“As we have repeatedly observed, ‘ “cases are not authority for propositions not considered” ’ ”].) In fact, Padilla actually lends support to our conclusion here that, on different facts, the remedy for the specific habeas corpus claim pled and proven will necessitate vacating the petitioner’s sentence and thereby unwinding its finality for purposes of applying intervening ameliorative laws. The Padilla petitioner, who had been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole as a juvenile, came before our court on appeal after his original sentence was deemed unconstitutional and vacated in habeas corpus proceedings. (See Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 159; see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [holding that mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the 8th Amend.], Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 208 [concluding that “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law” that is retroactive in cases on collateral review].) This court in Padilla explained that “a criminal judgment’s finality may be interrupted by a subsequent habeas corpus action . . . . When a habeas corpus court vacates a prior judgment and orders a new trial or new sentencing hearing, the prior judgment — now ineffective — can no longer be a final one [for purposes of Estrada’s inference of retroactivity for ameliorative laws].” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 164, italics added.) In discussing why the retroactive 13  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. application of ameliorative laws was appropriate in Padilla, we emphasized, “[w]hen a defendant’s sentence has been vacated, the parties’ interests in repose and finality are necessarily diminished; at that point, the countervailing interest in effectuating current legislative policy decisions may appropriately control.” (Id. at p. 168, italics added.) The same cannot be said here. As the dissent concedes, “[t]o be sure, Esquivias’s case was final.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.) Petitioner’s sole claim in his habeas corpus petition was that though his case was long-since final, he was nonetheless entitled to relief because his case was not final when Senate Bill No. 620 became effective. In other words, petitioner’s habeas corpus action reinforced that his criminal judgment was final on direct review in 2018 and the parties’ interest in finality was in no way diminished by petitioner’s limited Estrada claim or the remedy ultimately granted to redress his claim. On these facts, it cannot be said, as the dissent would have us say, that finality was “ ‘interrupted.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.) It is the dissent who, in fact, “completely ignores” (id. at p. 10) the distinct procedural posture in Padilla. Because the Padilla petitioner’s original sentence was unconstitutional, “the justice of the case” (§ 1484) necessitated that it be vacated and, as the Attorney General concedes, “[i]n that event,” his judgment rightly “returned to nonfinal status,” interrupting finality. As the Court of Appeal explained, “[i]n Padilla, the question was the effect of an earlier order on a habeas corpus petition that had already vacated the defendant’s entire sentence (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 158); here, the question is whether a court is required to vacate the entire sentence in the first place.” (Esquivias, supra¸ 103 Cal.App.5th 14  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. at p. 979.)5 The answer to that question in this matter is “no.” After imposition of petitioner’s sentence, Senate Bill No. 620 simply expanded the trial court’s discretion to strike firearm enhancements to his potential benefit. (Cf. People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 696 [the appellant’s claim for relief pursuant to Estrada under ameliorative legislation conferring greater discretion to trial courts to strike serious felony enhancements did “not constitute an attack on the validity of his plea because the claim does not challenge his plea as defective when made”].) Petitioner acknowledges that his original sentence was constitutional and did not need to be vacated by admitting that the superior court could have completely declined to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 and left his original sentence undisturbed. And we are not persuaded by petitioner’s circular logic, which is echoed by Amici Curiae the California Public Defenders Association and the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, as well as our dissenting colleagues, that the superior court’s choice to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 to strike the firearm enhancements, in turn, required the court to “reconsider the sentence as a whole” as though it had been vacated. Instead, the superior court could conclude “the justice of the case” 5 Contrary to the dissent’s logic, this is not about whether the “magic word ‘vacate’ ” was uttered by the trial court. (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.) Instead, it is in recognition that Padilla arose in a completely different context, i.e., in light of binding United States Supreme Court precedent regarding the sentencing of juveniles — the sentence that was imposed in Padilla of life without the possibility of parole as a juvenile was unconstitutional in toto. 15  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. (§ 1484) required a more targeted approach to remedy petitioner’s claim pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620. Petitioner’s and the dissent’s reliance on our decision in Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th 388 for the sweeping proposition that any modification to a sentence on habeas corpus “reopens the entire case” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 7) fares no better. Petitioner and the dissent argue that Lopez’s reasoning supports the view that the habeas corpus court could not divide petitioner’s judgment for finality purposes. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 2, 7, 13–14.) According to petitioner, the Attorney General’s “insistence that every aspect of [his] sentence other than the firearm enhancements remained final sidesteps” Lopez’s articulation of “the Estrada inquiry, which asks ‘whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.’ ” But crucially, Lopez did not involve habeas corpus proceedings collaterally attacking a final judgment. Rather, in Lopez, on direct review, the Court of Appeal affirmed appellant Oscar Lopez’s convictions, but remanded “to the trial court for further sentencing.” (Lopez, at p. 393.) While awaiting resentencing, Assembly Bill No. 333 took effect. (Lopez, at p. 394.) However, the trial court declined to apply its provisions to Lopez’s case “on the ground that [Lopez’s] conviction was final” for Estrada purposes. (Ibid.) We rejected this premise under our well-established precedent, explaining that “[a] case is final when ‘the courts can no longer provide a remedy to a defendant on direct review.’ [Citation.] For Estrada purposes, the ‘judgment’ means the ‘ “judgment of conviction” ’ and the sentence.” (Id. at p. 395, last italics added.) “Because Estrada requires ameliorative legislation to be applied as broadly as constitutionally permissible, and because Lopez’s judgment was not reduced to a final disposition, his case [wa]s not final for 16  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. purposes of Estrada.” (Id. at p. 400.) Lopez was therefore “entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill [No.] 333’s substantive changes.” (Ibid.) We observed in closing, “It would tax judicial resources to require defendants like Lopez to take a second appeal to secure a second remand to the superior court in order to obtain any relief to which they may be entitled.” (Ibid., italics added.) Here, unlike the ongoing direct appeal in Lopez (the more typical procedural posture for an Estrada claim) that prevented Lopez’s judgment from being reduced to a final disposition, petitioner conceded in his habeas corpus petition that his criminal judgment had been final on direct review for nearly four years, i.e., the remittitur had issued and “ ‘the courts [could] no longer provide a remedy to [petitioner] on direct review.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 395.) As we have said, “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is” “an independent, collateral challenge to an earlier, completed criminal prosecution.” (Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, 975, italics added.) “[A] petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment . . . .” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) Where petitioner admitted his judgment was reduced to a final and authorized disposition in 2018, the habeas corpus court could conclude that petitioner was not automatically entitled to the benefit of all ameliorative legislation that was enacted after that valid 2018 finality date. This situation is wholly distinct from Lopez, where ameliorative legislation became effective while the appeal was still pending on direct review. (Cf. In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 [explaining that “resort to habeas corpus” was unnecessary because the petitioner had “a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law”].) For these reasons, petitioner’s and the 17  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. dissent’s reliance on Lopez’s statements about Estrada’s application to nonfinal criminal judgments do not answer the distinct question presented in this habeas corpus matter. Nor do we read In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78 (Cortez) as requiring a different habeas corpus procedure here, as the dissent would have us do. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 10–11.) In Cortez, similar to Padilla, the habeas corpus petitioner sought retroactive relief following our decision in People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 (Tenorio), in which we invalidated as unconstitutional a statute preventing the sentencing court from striking prior narcotics convictions without the approval of the district attorney. We held that if the habeas corpus court decided to strike a prior conviction, it should vacate the sentence. (Id. at p. 89.) But, as stated, unlike in Cortez, petitioner was not originally sentenced under any unconstitutional statute. Rather, he belatedly sought only the retroactive benefit of Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to Estrada’s logic (because his judgment was not final until January 30, 2018). We see no inconsistency between our limited holding here and our holding in Cortez, both of which provide procedures well-suited to “the nature of the relief sought in the petition.” (In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 583.) If anything, Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78 contradicts the dissent’s stance that the habeas corpus court “had no authority” to strike petitioner’s firearm enhancements (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3). Petitioner’s counsel and the dissent express concern that habeas corpus courts, or “nonsentencing courts” (id. at p. 16), especially appellate habeas corpus courts, are ill- equipped to make resentencing decisions. (See id. at pp. 14–23.) But Cortez makes clear (see Cortez, at p. 88) that habeas corpus claims like petitioner’s should always originate in the superior 18  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. court that rendered judgment and “[t]he superior court that rendered the judgment is best equipped to consider the claim in the first instance, to hold an evidentiary hearing when necessary, and to grant relief if appropriate.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895, italics added; see also ibid. [“A higher court ‘has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court’ ”].) As the dissent points out, “in Cortez, we emphasized that the sentencing court was the appropriate jurisdiction for resolving the habeas claim and the potential resentencing ‘since the sentencing court has the files which are necessary’ to adjudicate the claim. (Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88, fn. 9.)” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 22.) The additional cases relied on by the dissent only reinforce this principle. (See id. at pp. 11, 26, citing People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 (Belmontes) [a habeas corpus petition alleging “a court may have been influenced by an erroneous understanding of the scope of its sentencing powers” should “be filed in the sentencing court”]; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, fn. 13 [a habeas corpus petition seeking retroactive discretionary relief under our holding should be filed in the sentencing court].) For this reason, the dissent’s concerns about habeas corpus courts making uninformed sentencing decisions, lacking an appropriate record, or “ceding California sentencing authority to federal courts” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 21) are misplaced.6 Petitioner correctly presented his claim for 6 The dissent does not quarrel with, nor could it, the well- accepted proposition that habeas corpus claims like petitioner’s should always originate in the superior court that rendered judgment. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 21.) Instead, 19  PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. discretionary sentencing relief pursuant to Estrada and Senate Bill No. 620 in the “superior court that rendered the judgment.” (Robinson, at p. 895.) In Cortez, after identifying the superior court as the proper habeas corpus venue, we directed the habeas corpus court to both determine whether to strike the prior convictions at issue and, if the court did so, to resentence the petitioner. (Cortez, at p. 89.) The same result was appropriate here.7 the dissent posits various hypotheticals not presented here. For example, the dissent asserts that petitioner “might have argued . . . that his appellate counsel was ineffective” and thereby could have transformed his claim into a federal constitutional claim. (Ibid.) But petitioner did not raise any such claim. This case concerns only state courts applying state law. Nothing in this opinion addresses the division of authority between state courts and a federal habeas corpus court that grants relief to a state prisoner. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Gunn v. Ignacio (9th Cir. 2001) 263 F.3d 965, 971 [“we do not constrain the state’s determination of how to formulate the relief.”].) The dissent’s hypothetical argument about a distinct type of claim not raised here has no bearing on our analysis. 7 While we directed the habeas corpus courts in Cortez to “vacate th