Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Conservatorship of the Person of E.A. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent, v. E.A., Objector and Appellant. S287241 First Appellate District, Division One A169299 Contra Costa County Superior Court P20-00896 July 23, 2026 Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and Delaney* concurred. * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Kruger, Groban, and Evans concurred. CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. S287241 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 authorizes a court, upon the petition of a designated public official, to impose an involuntary conservatorship over a person found to be gravely disabled. A proposed LPS conservatee has a right to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability. By statute, a trial on grave disability must commence within 10 days of the proposed LPS conservatee’s demand, with an additional 15 days available at the request of the proposed conservatee. If a proposed LPS conservatee is found gravely disabled, the court may impose a conservatorship over the conservatee’s person and estate. The conservatorship automatically terminates after one year, but the conservator may petition to renew the conservatorship each year if the conservatee remains gravely disabled. For each renewal, the conservatee may again demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability. Appellant E.A. accepted an LPS conservatorship in 2020 and accepted its renewal in 2021. After her conservator petitioned for a further renewal in 2022, E.A. demanded a jury trial on the issue of grave disability. Her trial was delayed by nearly a year, largely because of resource constraints and court congestion. E.A. repeatedly objected to these delays and moved 1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 1 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. to dismiss the proceedings as a violation of her statutory and constitutional rights. When her case was eventually called to trial, she accepted renewal of her conservatorship pursuant to an agreement with her conservator that she be placed in a less restrictive setting. E.A. appealed that conservatorship order, including on the ground that the pretrial delays violated her constitutional right to due process of law. The Court of Appeal found no due process violation and affirmed. It analyzed the due process question using a four-factor test originally announced by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 (Barker) in the context of a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, which we adopted for use in the context of pretrial delays in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings in Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354 (Camacho). In this court, E.A. contends the Court of Appeal erred by using the four-factor Barker test instead of the more general due process framework discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 (Mathews) and People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 (Ramirez). We disagree. The Barker test is tailored to the type of constitutional error at issue here, and it is sufficiently flexible and responsive that its origins in criminal law do not hamper its utility in this very different proceeding. Applying the Barker test here, we conclude that E.A.’s due process rights were violated by the nearly year-long pretrial delay. By extending almost the entire length of a one-year LPS conservatorship, the delay effectively nullified E.A.’s right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of her liberty. Further, the delay was primarily caused by resource 2 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. constraints and court congestion, and E.A. clearly and repeatedly insisted on her right to a timely trial. While E.A. has not shown substantial prejudice beyond the fact of her pretrial commitment, the lack of such prejudice does not overcome her showing under other Barker factors. Under Barker, “the only possible remedy” for violation of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right in a criminal proceeding is “the unsatisfactorily severe remedy” of dismissal or reversal of the resulting judgment. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522.) But this principle does not dictate the result in the context of LPS conservatorship proceedings, where the Sixth Amendment does not apply and dismissal or reversal may not be in the conservatee’s best interests. Based in part on these differences, we conclude that a due process violation based on pretrial delay in LPS conservatorship proceedings is not a structural error and may be found harmless on direct appeal under appropriate circumstances. Although E.A. was deprived of due process by the lengthy pretrial delay, we conclude this due process violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances presented here. In the appealed conservatorship order, the trial court found that E.A. was gravely disabled, and there is no indication this finding would have been different if the pretrial delays had not occurred. Indeed, there is no indication E.A. was not gravely disabled during the entirety of the relevant period. The Court of Appeal was therefore correct to affirm the conservatorship order. But, because this matter has been rendered moot by subsequent events (see fn. 2, post), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with directions to dismiss E.A.’s appeal as moot. 3 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In August 2020, the director of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department, acting as the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County, filed a petition in the trial court for appointment of a temporary conservator and conservator over the person and estate of 23-year-old E.A. The Public Guardian alleged that E.A. was “[g]ravely disabled as a result of [a] mental disorder and unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily.” In a supporting declaration, a licensed therapist provided the factual basis for the petition. She explained that E.A. was admitted to an inpatient mental health facility after she was found near a public transit station dressed only in her underwear. E.A. was disoriented and did not know what day it was or how she arrived at the station. A relative reported that E.A. was “talking to herself constantly, running out of the house naked, not taking her medications and sleeping excessive amounts of time.” The relative stated that E.A. did not remain at home, and the relative had “picked [E.A.] up from different motels after different people have abused her.” The therapist diagnosed E.A. with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She wrote that E.A. was “disheveled, unkempt with poor hygiene.” Her thoughts were “disorganized and she is disoriented with no insight into her illness or the reason for hospitalization.” The therapist opined that E.A. was “unable to care for herself or be properly managed in the community, even with the support of her family.” The trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship over E.A.’s person and appointed the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office to represent her. Two months later, E.A. accepted the conservatorship, the court found E.A. to be gravely disabled, and it appointed the Public Guardian as E.A.’s 4 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. conservator. She was placed at a secure mental health rehabilitation center for treatment. In September 2021, the Public Guardian petitioned for reappointment as E.A.’s conservator. Two physicians opined that E.A. remained gravely disabled. A licensed therapist acting as a conservatorship investigator reported that E.A.’s symptoms “remain moderate to severe.” E.A. was unable to care for herself, take her prescribed psychiatric medication, or participate in other treatment. The therapist believed that E.A. remained vulnerable to exploitation, and placement in a less restrictive or unlocked setting would be “potentially dangerous for her.” E.A. accepted renewal of her conservatorship, the court again found E.A. to be gravely disabled, and it reappointed the Public Guardian as E.A.’s conservator. A year later, in September 2022, the Public Guardian again petitioned for reappointment, with the supporting opinions of two physicians. At a hearing on the petition the next month, E.A.’s counsel requested a 30-day continuance, which the court granted. At the continued hearing, E.A.’s counsel requested a further continuance of two weeks, which the court again granted. The next hearing was held on December 2, 2022. E.A. objected to the renewed conservatorship and requested a jury trial. The court set a trial date of January 3, 2023, over the objection of E.A.’s counsel, who apparently sought an earlier date. On the scheduled trial date, E.A.’s counsel stated that she was ready for trial, but the court continued the matter two additional weeks because the court was not available to proceed with trial. On the next trial date, E.A.’s counsel was again 5 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. ready, but the court was still unavailable. The court continued the matter an additional two weeks. At the next trial date, on January 30, 2023, the Public Guardian’s counsel was “unexpectedly out” because of an illness, and therefore the Public Guardian was unable to proceed. The trial court continued trial for a week, although the court believed trial was “unlikely to go . . . because of another trial having precedence.” The next week, E.A.’s counsel said she was able to proceed with trial. The court expressed skepticism, noting that five or six trials had been scheduled for that day. E.A.’s counsel responded that if additional courtrooms had been available, her office would have staffed the matters accordingly. Counsel for the Public Guardian stated that she was not ready to proceed because she understood other matters to have priority. She said, “if we were given notice of a couple days before, that this would instead be a priority jury trial, we would be able to prepare for that.” The court found that both counsel were unavailable and set another trial date in a month’s time. E.A. filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the court denied. On the next trial date, March 6, 2023, the mental health rehabilitation center where E.A. was housed produced documents pursuant to a subpoena, and the Public Guardian moved for a continuance to review them. The trial court found good cause and granted the continuance. Its minute order further stated, “Both parties are unavailable because they are engaged in a jury trial for another client.” E.A. moved to dismiss the petition, which the court again denied. The court proposed to set a further trial date approximately a month later. The court clerk noted that two jury trials and two court trials had 6 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. already been set for that date, but the court nonetheless believed the date would work. At the next hearing, on April 11, 2023, E.A.’s counsel noted “court and counsel unavailability” and did not object to a continuance. The court continued the matter another month. On May 8, 2023, both counsel were unavailable because they were engaged in another trial. Counsel for the Public Guardian nonetheless announced she was ready to proceed and represented that another attorney was available to handle the matter. E.A.’s counsel also asserted she was ready for trial. When the court asked E.A.’s counsel if another attorney was available to handle E.A.’s matter, she replied, “Should the court have an additional department available, we can provide additional staffing.” The court found good cause to continue the matter, since E.A.’s counsel did not represent that a second attorney was presently available. It denied E.A.’s renewed motion to dismiss. On July 10, 2023, the court found good cause to continue the matter again because the court was engaged in another trial. The trial judge stated that he had “consulted with the presiding judge and other departments” but “there [are] not other departments available.” When a department became available, E.A.’s matter would be a priority. E.A. filed another motion to dismiss. The court scheduled the next hearing for July 24, 2023, but the record does not reflect any proceedings on that date. The next hearing in the record took place on August 28, 2023. On that date, E.A. was present in court, as was her brother, whom the Public Guardian had called as a percipient witness. Both counsel represented they were ready to proceed. Before trial could start, however, E.A.’s counsel became 7 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. unavailable because another trial in a different department went forward. E.A.’s trial was continued to October 2, 2023. In the meantime, in September 2023, the Public Guardian filed another petition for reappointment as E.A.’s conservator. This petition was also supported by the declarations from two physicians, who attested that E.A. was “still gravely disabled as a result of [a] mental disorder.” As to this new proceeding, E.A.’s counsel filed a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 against the assigned trial judge, who had also been handling the pending 2022 reappointment petition. The challenge was accepted, and both matters were reassigned. On October 2, 2023, before a new trial judge, the parties discussed logistics. The court was not available for a jury trial that day. The court ordered a short continuance, for two days, and noted that E.A.’s trial would be the highest priority trial on calendar. E.A.’s counsel filed another written motion to dismiss (her fifth such motion) the same day. Two days later, the court announced that it had no courtrooms available for a jury trial. The court explained, “[A]ll of the trial departments that I was relying on not only are currently in time-not-waived [misdemeanor] jury trials . . . but [they] have backup jury trials once the current trial goes to deliberation.” The court found good cause to continue the matter by five additional days, to October 9, 2023. The deputy public defender appearing for E.A. objected. Counsel for the Public Guardian noted, however, the deputy public defender who typically represented E.A. — and would be doing so at trial — was at that moment engaged in a different trial. 8 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. It appears E.A.’s counsel was still in trial when the matter was called again, so it was continued a further two days to October 11, 2023. On that date, both parties announced that they were ready to proceed. Over the objection of E.A.’s counsel, the court found good cause for another continuance because no courtrooms were available. The court told the parties the matter was “first” priority. Nonetheless, on October 16, 2023, the court trailed the matter behind a different trial, and it scheduled a further hearing two days later. That day, October 18, the court informed the parties that no courtrooms were available. It explained that “two auxiliary departments are currently in time not waived criminal jury trials[,] each with a backup time not waived criminal jury trial to start” once those juries started their deliberations. The court intended to continue E.A.’s trial to October 23, but her counsel was scheduled to be in trial in a different matter. The court therefore found good cause to continue E.A.’s trial to November 6, 2023. At the next hearing, E.A.’s counsel informed the court that she no longer requested a jury trial, and instead she requested a court trial. Despite this change, the court still had no available courtrooms to hear the matter. Over the objection of E.A.’s counsel, the court continued the matter to November 8, 2023. On that day, E.A. was ill and unable to attend court. The matter was continued again. E.A. was also unable to attend the next hearing, on November 13, 2023, because her residential unit was “on a quarantine” related to COVID-19. The court found good cause to continue the matter. The matter was called for trial on November 28, 2023. At the outset, E.A.’s counsel informed the court that E.A. would 9 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. accept conservatorship by the Public Guardian, pursuant to an agreement that she would be housed in a less restrictive placement at a “super board and care” facility. The court and the parties discussed the fact that two reappointment petitions were currently pending. The court did not believe it could grant the earlier 2022 petition now that the later 2023 petition had been filed. The court entered a new placement order, but it deferred entering a formal conservatorship order until an updated investigator’s report could be prepared. E.A.’s counsel stated that she was reserving her right to argue “the speedy- trial issue” on appeal. The court agreed. The investigator’s report stated that there were “few changes” in E.A.’s condition since the last report in October 2021. She remained gravely disabled due to mental illness. E.A.’s brother, who visited her regularly, concurred. In a phone call, E.A. denied having any mental illness or taking any psychiatric medications. E.A. said she did not like her current placement because they refused to feed her, “not one day at all.” Staff at E.A.’s facility reported that she had been better with her hygiene practices, but frequently shouted insults at fellow patients and staff. They said E.A. denied having a mental illness and did not believe she needed to take psychiatric medications. Based on this report and E.A.’s earlier agreement, the court granted the 2023 petition, found E.A. gravely disabled, and entered a formal order reappointing the Public Guardian as conservator of E.A.’s person. The court also ratified the good faith acts of the Public Guardian since the last conservatorship formally expired in 2022. 10 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. E.A. appealed the order reappointing the Public Guardian as her conservator. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the reappointment order and directed the trial court to dismiss the earlier 2022 petition as moot. It held the trial delays E.A. experienced did not require that the conservatorship order be reversed. The court recognized that the LPS Act required trial to begin within 10 days of the proposed conservatee’s demand, with a possible extension of 15 days, but it held that these deadlines were merely directory, not mandatory. (See fn. 4, post.) The court further held that E.A. had not established any violation of her constitutional right to due process. Following the four-factor framework discussed in Barker, supra, 407 U.S. 514, and adopted in Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th 354, the court assumed without deciding that the first factor (length of the delay) weighed in support of a due process violation. It also believed the third factor (assertion of rights) supported a violation. But it found the second factor (responsibility for the delay) less supportive because trial had been continued several times at the prompting of E.A. or her counsel. As to the fourth factor (prejudice), the court found that E.A. had not shown any. The court explained that there was “no reason on this record to question that E.A. remained gravely disabled when she agreed to extend her conservatorship in November 2023.” Nor had E.A. shown that the delay “ ‘had [an] appreciable impact on [her] ability to present [her] defense.’ ” E.A. had therefore failed to establish a due process violation 11 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. based on delay. E.A. filed a petition for review in this court, which we granted.2 2 In January 2025, after this court granted review, the Public Guardian filed a motion in the trial court to terminate the conservatorship over E.A.’s person and dismiss the proceedings. The Public Guardian believed that E.A. was no longer gravely disabled and “the goals of the conservatorship have been reached.” A supporting declaration explained that E.A. had consistently taken her prescribed psychiatric medication, engaged in activities at her board and care facility, and otherwise been successful in this placement over the previous seven months. E.A. had agreed to outpatient therapy and money management in the event the conservatorship was terminated. The trial court granted the motion and terminated the conservatorship. It directed the Public Guardian to ensure that a care coordination plan was in place for E.A., as required by statute. (§ 5361, subd. (c)(2).) Because the underlying conservatorship has terminated, E.A.’s appeal challenging her conservatorship is now moot. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 705–706, fn. 3 (K.P.); see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2025) Appeal, § 777, p. 797 [“an action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events”].) We have observed that the problem of mootness “frequently arises in this area of law given the short duration of conservatorships.” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1094, fn. 2 (Eric B.).) We therefore exercise our discretion to consider the issues raised in this matter, notwithstanding its mootness, “[b]ecause the case raises important issues capable of repetition but likely to evade review.” (Ibid.) Given this approach, we need not consider whether E.A.’s acceptance of a conservatorship in 2023 also mooted her challenge to the delay in holding trial on the 2022 petition. 12 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. II. DISCUSSION A. Statutory Framework “The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 (John L.).) “The overall statutory scheme describes a detailed, calibrated system for intervention when circumstances indicate a person may be suffering from a mental health disorder. In addition to conservatorships, the [LPS] Act permits 3-day, 14-day, and 30- day involuntary detentions for intensive treatment.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 706.) Although only grave disability as a result of a mental disorder is at issue here, the LPS Act also authorizes detentions and conservatorships for “individuals who are imminently dangerous to themselves or others, or are impaired by chronic alcoholism.” (K.P., at p. 706, fn. 4.) “When a treatment professional determines a person is gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to establish a conservatorship.” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1095; see § 5352.) Grave disability, in this context, means the proposed conservatee “is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) “The purpose of conservatorship . . . is to provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement.” (§ 5350.1.) “[B]ecause the private interests implicated in an LPS conservatorship are significant, ‘several layers of important safeguards’ have been built into the system [citation] to ‘vigilantly guard[] against erroneous conclusions’ in such 13 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. proceedings.” (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 151; see generally id. at pp. 151–152; K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 707– 710.) As relevant here, the proposed LPS conservatee may demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [“The due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act”].) By statute, the trial “shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand, except that the court shall continue the trial date for a period not to exceed 15 days upon the request of counsel for the proposed conservatee.” (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2).) “Failure to commence the trial within that period of time is grounds for dismissal of the conservatorship proceedings.” (Ibid.) If the court finds that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled and appoints a conservator, the conservatorship automatically terminates after one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a).) If the conservator believes the conservatee remains gravely disabled at that time, the conservator may petition for reappointment for an additional one-year period. (Id., subd. (b).) The conservator may continue to petition for yearly reappointment for so long as a conservatorship remains necessary. A conservatee’s right to a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability applies in reappointment proceedings as well. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(3).) B. Pretrial Delays and Due Process E.A. contends the pretrial delays she experienced violated her constitutional right to due process of law because the delay 14 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. nearly encompassed the entire one-year conservatorship period. We have not previously considered whether pretrial delays in this context can violate due process and, if so, how courts should identify whether a pretrial delay amounts to a constitutional violation.3 “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542.) But “ ‘ “[d]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 334.) In Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th 354, we considered a similar due process argument in the context of a different civil commitment scheme, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act; § 6600 et seq.). Under the SVP Act, certain convicted sex offenders may be indefinitely committed if they “are found to have mental disorders that make them likely to reoffend after release from prison.” (Camacho, at p. 367.) Like the LPS Act, the SVP Act “sets forth extensive administrative and judicial procedures for determining whether an individual is properly classified as an SVP.” (Camacho, at p. 369.) Also like the LPS Act, the SVP Act allows a proposed SVP to request a jury trial on the ultimate question of whether the person is properly subject to involuntary commitment under the statutory scheme. 3 In her briefing, E.A. refers to both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, but she does not meaningfully distinguish between the two. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. (Camacho, at p. 370.) The proposed SVP in Camacho argued that a years-long delay in holding such a trial violated his right to due process. (Id. at p. 368.) In Camacho, we agreed with the proposed SVP that such a delay could, under appropriate circumstances, violate due process. “ ‘The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ [Citation.] Thus . . . individuals facing commitment under the SVP Act have a due process right to a timely trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.) We embrace the same principle here. Like a proposed SVP, a proposed LPS conservatee has a due process right to an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, which necessarily implies a due process right to a timely trial. Indeed, neither party here disputes that a proposed LPS conservatee has a due process right to a timely trial. What they do dispute is the appropriate framework for identifying a due process violation in this context. This dispute presents a question of law that we consider de novo. (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142; see Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 [“Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their resolution is reviewed independently”].) The Court of Appeal, following our opinion in Camacho, adopted the four-factor test announced in Barker, supra, 407 U.S. 514, which was developed to address a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. The Public Guardian agrees the Barker test is appropriate. E.A. does not. For the first time in this court, she contends the more 16 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. general due process frameworks described in Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. 319, and Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d 260, should govern. We disagree and hold that the four-factor Barker test supplies the appropriate framework for considering whether a pretrial delay violates due process in this context. Barker explained that the speedy trial right was “a ‘slippery’ one” because, among other things, “the accused may not actually want a speedy trial and may perceive a tactical advantage in delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380.) Moreover, “ ‘the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights.’ [Citation.] ‘We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.’ ” (Ibid.) Given these uncertainties, “the Barker court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for determining when the right has been violated. The court instead identified four factors for courts to examine: the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. [Citation.] The defendant carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s multifactor test.’ [Citation.] Because none of these factors is dispositive, ‘courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process’ to determine whether trial has been unconstitutionally delayed.” (Ibid.) By contrast, the more general Mathews test provides three factors for courts to consider in determining whether a procedure is adequate to protect a person’s right to due process under the federal Constitution: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 17 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) In Ramirez, this court identified a fourth factor that courts should consider when the due process guarantee of the California Constitution is at issue. This additional factor recognizes “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official.” (Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 269.) In Camacho, we held that it was unnecessary for courts to consider the Mathews factors to determine whether a proposed SVP’s due process right to a timely trial had been violated. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.) Instead, it was sufficient for courts to consider the four-factor Barker test. We noted that the Barker test had been employed beyond the strict confines of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, including allegedly unconstitutional delays in sentencing proceedings, in civil forfeiture proceedings, and in furnishing a reporter’s transcript for use in a criminal appeal. (Id. at p. 380.) We concluded the Barker factors were “likewise appropriate for use in evaluating due process claims based on delays in holding SVP trials.” (Id. at p. 381.) We observed that the significance of timing in SVP trials was similar in certain respects to its significance in criminal trials, including the possibility that a proposed SVP may not want a speedy trial and the impossibility of defining “with any precision a fixed point at which trial must occur.” (Ibid.) To the extent differences between SVP trials and criminal trials might be relevant to the question of timing, we 18 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. held that “the flexibility of the [Barker] test allows courts to account for those differences.” (Ibid.) The Mathews test, by contrast, focuses on “the value of additional procedural safeguards for the sake of reducing error.” (Id. at p. 382.) It is therefore “more clearly suited to questions about the adequacy of procedures used in government decisionmaking than to questions about the timing of those decisions.” (Ibid.) For similar reasons, we conclude that the Barker factors, not the Mathews test, supply the appropriate framework for assessing pretrial delays in LPS conservatorship proceedings. LPS conservatorship proceedings are analogous to SVP proceedings in that they involve a singular trial, with a jury right, that may lead to involuntary commitment upon an adverse verdict. Additional features of LPS conservatorship proceedings, like SVP proceedings, support the use of the Barker factors. For example, the person subject to potential involuntary commitment (or that person’s counsel) may have a tactical incentive to delay the proceedings. “From the individual’s perspective, allowing more time for treatment may ultimately improve the chance of success at trial, insofar as treatment may help address a mental disorder” that would otherwise lead to involuntary commitment. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 377; see id. at p. 381 [some individuals “may perceive a tactical advantage in delay”].) Although a proposed LPS conservatee may have a lesser incentive to delay the proceedings than a proposed SVP, given the limited duration of an LPS conservatorship, a proposed LPS conservatee may still desire a delay if the outcome of a timely trial would be unfavorable. Further, because due process is a flexible concept, no bright-line rule exists to define a constitutional violation, and the Barker factors properly account for that uncertainty. (Id. at 19 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. p. 381.)4 Thus, the “broadly relevant set of functional, case- dependent factors” identified in Barker and adopted in Camacho, at page 381, should be applied to LPS trial delays as well. Again, to the extent the LPS context differs from either criminal trials or SVP proceedings, “the flexibility of the [Barker] test allows courts to account for those differences.” (Ibid.) E.A. argues that Camacho is distinguishable because the SVP commitment at issue there was of indefinite duration, whereas an LPS conservatorship is limited to one year. While this difference may affect the analysis of any particular alleged violation of due process (see pt. II.C., post), Camacho did not rely on the fact of indefinite duration as a reason to adopt the Barker test, and the limited duration of an LPS conservatorship does not undermine the rationales outlined above for the application of the Barker test in the LPS context. These rationales center on the unusual characteristics of the speedy trial right and the analogous due process claim based on pretrial delay. Camacho’s reasoning applies here because a similar type of pretrial delay is at issue. E.A. has provided no persuasive explanation why 4 While the LPS Act requires a conservatorship trial to begin within 10 or 25 days (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2)), the Courts of Appeal have held that this statutory deadline is merely directory, not mandatory. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of A.H. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 227, 248 (A.H.); Conservatorship of T.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1361, 1386 [directory deadline allows trial courts to “retain the flexibility to accommodate circumstances beyond a party’s control” for the benefit of both the proposed conservatee and the public].) E.A. does not argue otherwise, and the issue is not within the scope of these proceedings. We therefore need not express any opinion regarding the directory or mandatory nature of this statute. 20 CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A. Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. the difference in commitment periods should result in the adoption of the more general test in Mathews and Ramirez, to the exclusion of the more tailored Barker test.5 More generally, E.A. contends the Barker test is inadequate because it does not explicitly require courts to address the dignitary interests of an individual. As noted, in Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 269, we held that courts examining a due process claim under the California Constitution must consider, in addition to the Mathews factors, “the dignitary interest in informin