Cervantes v. Bianco

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA CLARISSA CERVANTES et al., Petitioners, v. CHAD BIANCO, as Sheriff, etc., et al., Respondents; RIVERSIDE COUNTY CITIZENS et al., Real Parties in Interest. S295866 September 24, 2026 Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and Burns* concurred. Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  CERVANTES v. BIANCO S295866 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. In order to protect the integrity of elections, our Elections Code1 carefully limits who can handle and count voted ballots. This case presents the question of whether the Riverside County Sheriff complied with those limitations when, in response to allegations of discrepancies in election counts by a community group, his department seized approximately 650,000 ballots cast in Riverside County at the November 4, 2025 Special Election involving Proposition 50 (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4, 2025) text of Prop. 50; the Election Rigging Response Act). The alleged discrepancy in the number of votes at issue in this case is disputed. The community group contends there is a discrepancy of about 45,896 between handwritten ballot intake log estimates made by polling workers, and the final count certified by the Registrar of Voters. The Registrar of Voters, by contrast, responds that any discrepancy in the final count is closer to 103 votes — 0.016 percent — which the registrar describes as within the normal bounds for differences between preliminary and certified totals. We are not called upon to resolve these factual contentions, and everyone agrees that — 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Elections Code. 1  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. even if true — the claimed discrepancy could not have affected the outcome of the election. Petitioners are four Riverside County residents who voted in the November 2025 election. They allege that their ballots as well as those of approximately 650,000 other Riverside County voters were unlawfully seized. Petitioners request a writ of mandate from this court directing respondent Chad Bianco, the Riverside County Sheriff, to return these ballots and other seized election materials to the custody of respondent Art Tinoco, the Riverside County Registrar of Voters. Bianco contends his actions were permissible because, in response to the concerns raised by the community group, he was performing a criminal investigation and had obtained search warrants. We hold that the seizure of the ballots was unlawful. California law long has recognized that voted ballots require special care and handling to safeguard them from alteration or tampering. Consistent with this principle, the Elections Code narrowly limits the circumstances in which a court may order the production of ballots for inspection, and even in those narrow circumstances, requires that ballots remain in the physical custody of the responsible elections official. Bianco’s seizure of the ballots violated the plain language of section 15551, subdivision (d), commanding that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections official.”2 This provision manifests a legislative intent that ballots remain in the elections official’s custody even in the event of a criminal investigation. As we explain below, this clear 2 In footnote 6, post, we identify recent legislation modifying section 15551 and conclude it does not alter the conclusions we reach in this case. 2  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. custodial command safeguards the integrity of our elections by protecting ballots from alteration, tampering, or other improper interference. To remedy this violation, we issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing Bianco to return the seized ballots to the registrar’s custody and to refrain from further handling of the ballots except as necessary to comply with our order. While allegations of election improprieties are a very serious matter, our Elections Code contains numerous established mechanisms for investigating and proving misconduct that do not compromise the integrity of voted ballots — contrary to the means employed here. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts relating to this petition are discussed at greater length in Bonta v. Bianco.3 Both cases arise out of the sheriff’s department’s seizure of approximately 650,000 ballots cast in Riverside County at the November 4, 2025 Special Election involving Proposition 50. (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4, 2025) text of Prop. 50, p. 18.) In response to allegations of a discrepancy between the registrar’s official count of votes recorded at that election and the total number of votes calculated by a group of concerned citizens, sheriff’s department personnel secured two search warrants in February 2026. The warrants authorized the seizure of ballots cast at the election, as well as other election-related materials, from the registrar. In late February 3 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of all pleadings and exhibits filed in Bonta v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026, S295901). (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 3  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 2026, the sheriff’s department seized the ballots and started to count them. Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s expressed concerns about the seizure of ballots, the sheriff’s department obtained a third search warrant that contemplated the appointment of a special master who would be responsible for counting the ballots. No special master has yet been appointed. Shortly after the third warrant was obtained, petitioners filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate in this court. This petition names Bianco and Tinoco as respondents, and Secretary of State Shirley Weber (see § 13314, subd. (a)(4)) and “Riverside County citizens who cast ballots on Proposition 50 in the [November 2025 election]” as real parties in interest.4 Petitioners allege that the seizure of the ballots and other election materials violated the statutory scheme governing the care and custody of ballots and involved an unlawful recount by unqualified individuals. Petitioners seek a writ of mandate or another extraordinary writ that would direct Bianco “to return in totality the seized election materials and ballots to [the registrar]” and “to report to this court the chain of custody of such election materials, the personnel involved and time/dated timeline”; prohibit “any tallying, counting or handling of ballots by personnel other than elections staff and under procedures not provided for in the [Elections] Code”; and require that the “movement of election materials . . . take place with redundant election officials and in compliance with the procedures and transparency provided for by law.” 4 As discussed below, we conclude petitioners properly sought writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085; we therefore do not address whether Elections Code section 13314 also applies. 4  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. We ordered respondents to show cause, returnable before this court, why petitioners are not entitled to the relief they seek.5 In his return, Bianco contends he lawfully seized the ballots and other election materials pursuant to the search warrants. He further maintains that the special master procedure contemplated by the third search warrant, possibly coupled with other safeguards, adequately addresses any concerns that might otherwise arise from the removal of the ballots from the registrar’s custody. Tinoco, on the other hand, agrees with petitioners “that voted ballots and related election materials should be maintained, preserved, transported, inspected, retained, and administered in accordance with the Elections Code” and “therefore does not oppose the relief requested in the Petition.” The Secretary of State and the Attorney General (appearing as amicus curiae in support of petitioners) likewise both take the position that the ballots were seized unlawfully and must be returned to the registrar. II. DISCUSSION The parties agree that maintaining the integrity of voted ballots is critical to the sanctity of our elections. At the same time, law enforcement has the important responsibility of investigating possible criminal conduct, including crimes that relate to elections. The central question presented in this case is whether law enforcement may circumvent the Elections Code’s comprehensive scheme governing the custody of ballots during and after elections by seizing ballots pursuant to a search warrant and thereby removing them from a local registrar’s 5 We had previously issued an order in Bonta v. Bianco directing Bianco to pause his investigation and preserve all seized items. 5  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. custody. We hold that such a seizure is unlawful under the plain language of section 15551, subdivision (d), which expressly states that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections official.”6 If election misconduct is 6 After oral argument in this case, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1418 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1418), which modified section 15551, subdivision (d)’s previous language stating that “[i]n no event shall” packages containing voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections official.” As amended, section 15551, subdivision (d) now more broadly provides that “[i]n no event” — subject only to two expressly identified exceptions, neither of which is applicable here — “shall any document that is or will be subject to the preservation requirements in Section 17300 to Section 17306, inclusive, or any certified voting technology or electronic data or portion thereof, including source code, or any other election-related material or equipment necessary for the conduct of an election, be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) Senate Bill 1418 also amended section 15551, subdivision (a). (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The Governor signed Senate Bill 1418 on September 19, 2026, and its provisions came into effect immediately. (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 10.) Briefing and argument in this case were premised on the prior language of section 15551, and the parties have not briefed the impact Senate Bill 1418 may have on the issues presented. We conclude that the voted ballots must be returned to the registrar pursuant to section 15551, subdivision (d) as it stood prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1418, and it is evident that the current version of section 15551 is at least as protective of ballots as preexisting law was. (See § 17302, subd. (b)(1)–(10).) Meanwhile, petitioners have emphasized throughout this litigation the importance of having the seized ballots returned promptly to the registrar. Under the circumstances, although we conclude that petitioners have not shown a ministerial duty to return to the registrar anything other than the packages containing voted ballots, we decline to delay the resolution of this dispute by requesting further briefing regarding whether 6  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. suspected, the Elections Code provides several mechanisms for law enforcement to review and examine ballots without compromising their integrity. But those procedures were not followed and the type of seizure that occurred here directly conflicts with the Elections Code’s carefully considered and controlling provisions. We therefore issue a writ of mandate directing Bianco to return the ballots to the registrar forthwith. A. General Principles “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested.” (Id., § 1086.) To secure a writ of mandate, petitioners must show that they have standing to pursue such relief, that they lack an Senate Bill 1418 applies here and creates a ministerial duty to return seized records other than the ballots. Those issues may be addressed, if necessary, in a future proceeding. Consistent with the parties’ presentation of the issues, our analysis considers the language of section 15551 as it read at the time of oral argument in this matter, which (aside from the introduction of subdivisions pursuant to Senate Bill No. 73 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2026, ch. 10) was the same as the language in effect at the time of the seizures. 7  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. adequate remedy at law, and that they seek to enforce a ministerial duty capable of being enforced through a judicial writ. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 (Picklesimer).) We conclude each of these requirements is met here. B. Standing Bianco no longer contests petitioners’ standing,7 so we discuss it only briefly. In general, “To have standing to seek a writ of mandate, a party must be ‘beneficially interested’ [citation], i.e., have ‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.’ ” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361–362.) “Nevertheless, ‘ “where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner] need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in 7 In his preliminary briefing, Bianco challenged petitioners’ standing based on misquoted passages from, and an incorrect recitation of our holding in, Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432 (Common Cause). The law firm responsible for the error apologized and withdrew Bianco’s standing argument. We disapprove of the improper use of artificial intelligence tools, which apparently contributed to the significant error that occurred here and remind counsel of attorneys’ professional duties of competence and candor to the court. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 1.1, 3.3.) We also refer the matter to the State Bar of California to determine whether discipline is warranted. (See canon 3D(2) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics.) 8  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” ’ ” (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166 (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition).) We agree with petitioners that they have standing because they seek to “ ‘ “procure the enforcement of a public duty,” ’ ” namely, the duty to lawfully handle and preserve all ballots cast at an election. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 166.) In this respect, petitioners allege that Bianco’s seizure and retention of the ballots violate various provisions of the Elections Code designed to ensure that ballots are safely maintained and handled only by designated personnel in the manner specified by statute. Enforcement of this duty vindicates the public right to the proper handling of voted ballots. (See Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 439 [recognizing citizens’ public interest standing in a suit against a county to enforce provisions of a statutory voter outreach program].) C. No Adequate Remedy at Law “ ‘The writ of mandate lies generally to compel performance of a legal duty when no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law is available.’ ” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 785.) This requirement has also been satisfied by petitioners. This case presents a question of statewide importance as to which this court’s immediate intervention is warranted. (See, e.g., Legislature of the State of California v. Weber (2024) 16 Cal.5th 237, 246–247; Legislature of the State of California v. Padilla (2020) 9 Cal.5th 867, 871; Patterson v. Padilla (2019) 8 Cal.5th 220, 223.) Even assuming that petitioners could have sought declaratory or injunctive relief in the superior court, 9  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. under the circumstances presented here, a writ proceeding before this court is appropriate to secure the prompt and final resolution of significant legal questions. (See Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 343, fn. 20; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 265; California Teachers Assn. v. Nielsen (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 25, 28–29.) D. Substantive Law To obtain writ relief, petitioners must demonstrate “ ‘ “a clear, present . . . ministerial duty on the part of the respondent[s]” ’ ” that is capable of being enforced. (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Based on our review of the applicable statutes, we conclude Bianco violated his ministerial duty to carry out his law enforcement responsibilities in compliance with the robust protections for the handling of ballots set forth in the Elections Code. One particular provision is dispositive — section 15551, subdivision (d). Until its recent amendment by Senate Bill 1418, this subdivision stated that “[i]n no event shall [voted ballots] be taken from the custody of the elections official.” Following the amendment, it continues to provide that “[i]n no event . . . shall [election materials including voted ballots] . . . be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The plain text of this statute, when read in light of the overall statutory scheme, requires that elections officials maintain custody of voted ballots, even in the event of a criminal investigation. Bianco therefore had no authority to seize the ballots from the registrar’s custody, and writ relief is appropriate to direct their return. 10  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 1. Overview of relevant Elections Code provisions To provide context for our analysis, we outline the most relevant Elections Code provisions. The Elections Code sets forth a comprehensive statutory framework for the care and handling of ballots, including detailed procedures governing the transportation and counting of ballots during an election; the retention and disposal of ballots after an election; and the review of ballots in the event of an election contest8 or criminal prosecution. These procedures reflect a legislative intent to ensure the integrity of the ballots through strict chain-of- custody protocols, robust oversight, and public transparency. The Elections Code requires that precinct workers undergo specialized training in elections procedures and ballot handling protocols (§ 12309.5, subd. (a)(1)–(8)) and declare under oath that they will faithfully discharge their duties (§ 12321, subd. (b)). As voting occurs, a voter hands their ballot, or the envelope containing their ballot, to one of these workers, who must put the ballot in a ballot container. (§ 14277.) After the polls close on election day, “the precinct board shall, in the presence of the public,” “(1) [s]eal the container used to transport voted ballots and insure that the precinct number, or in an election conducted using a voter center, the vote center number, is designated on the ballot container”; “(2) [c]ertify, sign, and seal the several packages or envelopes [of related 8 An election contest is a civil action challenging an election on various grounds, in which a recount may occur at trial in the presence of all parties, if necessary to determine the contest. (See §§ 16100, 16101, 16601.) This case does not involve an election contest. 11  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. materials] as directed by the elections official”;9 and “(3) [b]y not less than two of their number, deliver the ballot container and packages to the elections official at the central counting place in the manner prescribed by the elections official. The ballot container and packages shall remain in their exclusive possession until delivered to the elections official.” (§ 15201, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also § 15202.) Vote by mail ballots are subject to similarly strict custody and handling requirements. (See §§ 3017, 3019, 3025, subd. (b), 3026.) Only designated elections personnel may count ballots (§§ 15205, 15207; see also § 18575 [making it a felony for a person other than an elections officer to “perform[] or discharge[] any of the duties of an election officer in regard to the handling, counting, or canvassing of any ballots”]), and “[a]ll proceedings at the central counting place . . . shall be open to the view of the public” (§ 15204). During the counting process, “no person, except one employed and designated for the purpose by the elections official or his or her authorized deputy, shall touch any ballot container.” (Ibid.) “[A]s soon as” the ballots are all counted, they “shall not thereafter be examined by any person” but instead must “be carefully sealed in a strong envelope” with “[t]he signatures of each member of the precinct board . . . written across the seal.” (§ 15279.) “After ballots are counted 9 See sections 14431 (requiring the precinct board to “enclose and seal in one or more packages” the following: “all voted, spoiled, canceled, or unused ballots”) and 14432, subdivisions (a)–(e) (requiring the precinct board to “enclose and seal in one or two packages” the following: “[t]wo tally sheets, if ballots are to be tabulated manually at the precinct”; the “roster”; the “copy of the voter list”; the “challenge list”; and the “assisted voter’s list”). 12  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. and sealed, the elections official may not open any ballots nor permit any ballots to be opened except” under specified circumstances not relevant here (see §§ 15303, 15304) or in the event of a recount. (§ 15370.)10 After an election, ballots remain in the custody of the responsible elections official, who then must destroy them at specific junctures identified in the Elections Code. For elections such as the November 2025 Special Election with no federal races on the ballot, the following “shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election” (§ 17302, subd. (b)): “[t]he packages containing” “[v]oted polling place ballots,” “[p]aper cast vote records,” “[v]oted vote by mail voter ballots,” “[v]ote by mail voter identification envelopes,” “[v]oted provisional voter ballots,” “[v]oted conditional voter registration ballots,” “[p]rovisional ballot voter identification envelopes,” “[s]poiled ballots,” “[c]anceled ballots,” and “[u]nused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)–(10).) “If a contest is not commenced within the six- month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent 10 Under the Elections Code, a recount can be initiated through different channels, depending on the circumstances. (See §§ 15610 [recount initiated by the elections official], 15620 [recount initiated by “any voter” at the voter’s expense], 15640 [recount initiated by the district attorney], and 15645 [recount initiated by the Governor].) Statutory recounts include detailed procedures to ensure ballot integrity and public transparency, such as strict rules regarding the examination and touching of ballots and requirements that recounts take place in public view. (See, e.g., §§ 15625, subd. (a), 15629, subd. (c), 15630, subds. (a), (b).) No such recount was initiated in this case. 13  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters’ signatures is not commenced within the six-month period . . . the elections official shall have [these] items . . . destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the items are destroyed or recycled.” (§ 17302, subd. (c).)11 Most critical here, section 15551 addresses what occurs when an election contest or criminal prosecution is commenced within that six-month timeframe. Prior to its recent amendment through Senate Bill 1418, it provided in full: “(a) If a contest or any such criminal prosecution[12] has been commenced before the date fixed for its destruction, the package containing the voted ballots shall be subject to the order of the 11 In non-federal elections, elections officials are also required to keep packages containing the following materials “for a period of six months”: two tally sheets; the copy of the roster used as the voting record; challenge lists; and assisted voter lists. (§ 17304, subd. (b).) If a contest or criminal prosecution is not commenced within six months, the elections official “may have the packages destroyed or recycled.” (Id., subd. (d).) In addition, “The elections official shall preserve all rosters or combined rosters and voter lists . . . until five years after the date of the election, after which they may be destroyed by that official.” (§ 17300, subd. (a)(1).) 12 The phrase “such criminal prosecution” no longer appears in section 15551 due to changes made by Senate Bill 1418. (See Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The statute now refers to “any contest or criminal prosecution.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The background to the earlier “such criminal prosecution” (§ 15551, former subd. (a)) language suggests that it included prosecutions described in section 17302, subdivision (c), i.e., “a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters’ signatures.” (See former § 7201, as amended by Stats. 1955, ch. 517, § 1.5, p. 993.) 14  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. court in which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending and shall not be destroyed until after final determination of the contest or criminal prosecution. [¶] (b) In the case of a congressional election contest, the elections official shall hold the ballots of that congressional district in custody subject to the inspection of any committee of the House of Representatives having in charge the investigation of the contest, until the final determination of the contest by the House of Representatives. [¶] (c) In the case of a contest in the State Legislature, the elections official shall hold the ballots of the Senate or Assembly district in custody subject to the inspection of any committee of the Senate or Assembly having in charge the investigation of the contest until the final determination of the contest or the final adjournment of the session of the Legislature in which the contest is filed, whichever is the later. [¶] (d) In no event shall the package or its contents be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Former § 15551, italics added.) As previously observed, the current version of section 15551, subdivision (d), as amended by Senate Bill 1418, continues to include language providing that “[i]n no event . . . shall [specified election records] . . . be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) In sum, the Elections Code contemplates that voted ballots remain in the continuous custody and control of elections officials from the moment the voter deposits them until the moment they are destroyed. 2. Analysis In petitioners’ view, section 15551’s mandate that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the elections official” (§ 15551, subd. (d)) — when read in context of 15  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. the overall statutory scheme governing the handling of ballots — means voted ballots may not be removed from the registrar’s custody for any reason, even by law enforcement pursuant to a criminal investigation. Thus, petitioners assert, the sheriff’s department acted unlawfully in removing the ballots from the registrar’s custody, notwithstanding the fact it had obtained a search warrant to seize them. Bianco acknowledges that section 15551 reflects “the Legislature’s concern for ballot security and election-official custody,” but argues that section 15551 should not be interpreted to foreclose law enforcement from seizing ballots, and removing them from the custody of elections officials, pursuant to a search warrant. He emphasizes that a search warrant is itself a kind of court order authorized by statute, albeit one situated outside the Elections Code. (See Pen. Code, § 1523 et seq. [statutory scheme applicable to search warrants].) He argues that we should harmonize a court’s authority to issue search warrants under the Penal Code with the ballot- protection provisions of the Elections Code in a way that authorizes the unprecedented action he took here. As the parties’ respective positions demonstrate, the meaning of section 15551 is at the crux of this dispute. To determine section 15551’s meaning, we apply general principles of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable 16  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California Coastal Com. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 366.) a. Section 15551’s text Starting with section 15551’s text, the statute specifies only two situations in which voted ballots are “subject to the order of the court.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) Those situations are (1) an election “contest,” and (2) a “criminal prosecution.” (Ibid.) Neither circumstance is present here. No election contest has been filed, and the issuance of a search warrant, by itself, does not trigger a “criminal prosecution.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) A criminal prosecution commences only upon the occurrence of certain events — none of which has occurred in this case — and may only be initiated by a public prosecutor. (Pen. Code, § 804 [for statute of limitation purposes, except as otherwise provided, the “prosecution for an offense is commenced” upon the occurrence of an indictment, information, complaint, arraignment, or an arrest or bench warrant specifically identifying a defendant]; Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 451 [“[t]he prosecution of criminal offenses on behalf of the People is the sole responsibility of the public prosecutor”]; People v. Case (1980) 105 CalApp.3d 826, 832 [“It is a matter of common knowledge that most search warrants are issued prior to and independent of any pending prosecution”].) 17  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. But even if a criminal prosecution had commenced, allowing for a court-ordered production, section 15551’s plain text prohibits the removal of the ballots from the registrar’s physical custody. Section 15551, subdivision (a) identifies limited circumstances in which a court might order the production of ballots for inspection, i.e., election contests or criminal prosecutions. And even in those limited circumstances, section 15551, subdivision (d) expressly provides that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the elections official.” This provision reflects a legislative intent that, even in those situations in which it is necessary to view or recount ballots as evidence, they remain in the physical custody of the responsible elections official. This is consistent with the overall statutory scheme in which section 15551 resides, which is designed to ensure the integrity of ballots through continuous custody by election professionals, bolstered by public oversight. This interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d)’s plain text does not, as Bianco contends, “expressly repeal Penal Code warrant authority” or otherwise ignore the possibility of criminal proceedings. Instead, as the registrar explains, “rather than overlooking the possibility of criminal proceedings, the Legislature expressly addressed them and nevertheless required continued custodial control by the elections official.” Nor are we persuaded by Bianco’s strained alternative interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d) as only governing the custody of ballots in those situations addressed in section 15551, subdivisions (a) through (c). Such an interpretation is undermined by a statutory framework that, at all times throughout the election process, entrusts the handling of voted ballots only to trained and sworn elections officials. It is also difficult to fathom why the Legislature would allow law 18  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. enforcement to seize ballots pursuant to a search warrant before any criminal prosecution commenced, while expressly prohibiting ballots from being “taken” from the custody of the responsible elections official (§ 15551, subd. (d)) when they become the subject of a criminal prosecution (§ 15551, subd. (a)). Nothing in the statute supports this incongruous reading. To the contrary, allowing ballots to be seized and removed from the custody of the responsible elections official pursuant to a warrant or other court order not expressly mentioned in section 15551 would create a substantial gap in the otherwise comprehensive statutory scheme for the retention and handling of voted ballots. Thus, based on its plain text, we conclude that section 15551 unambiguously prohibits the removal of ballots from an elections official’s custody, notwithstanding the existence of a search warrant authorizing their seizure. b. Legislative history and relevant case law Because we consider the plain text of section 15551 to be unambiguous, it is unnecessary to take the further step of consulting extrinsic resources to guide our interpretation. (Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 713.) However, a brief review of section 15551’s legislative history, and the case law interpreting its predecessor statutes, only serves to bolster our interpretation of the plain text. As originally adopted, the Political Code of 1872 (since repealed and, as relevant here, replaced by the Elections Code) set forth detailed procedures for the collection, handling, counting, sealing, and transport of ballots that are in many respects analogous to the procedures in place today. (See former Pol. Code, §§ 1185, 1186, 1198, 1225, 1226, 1228, 1252, 1253, 19  CERVANTES v. BIANCO Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 1257, 1258, 1259, 1265, 1266.) Within that code, sections 1265 and 1266 governed the retention and destruction of ballots. Section 1265 provided that, “Upon the receipt of the [precinct] packages the [county] Clerk must file the one containing ballots, and must keep it unopened and unaltered for twelve months, after which time, if there is not a contest commenced in some tribunal having jurisdiction about such election, he must burn the package, without opening or examining its contents.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1265.) Section 1266 further provided that, “If within twelve months there is such a contest commenced, [the clerk] must keep the package unopened and unaltered until it is finally determined, when he must, as provided in the preceding section, destroy it, unless such package is, by virtue of an order of the tribunal in which the contest is pending, brought and opened before it, to the end that evidence may be had of its contents, in which event the package and its contents are in the custody of such tribunal.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1266.) In Ex parte Brown (1892) 97 Cal. 83, we construed these statutes as prohibiting a court from ordering the production of ballots except in the limited circumstance of an election contest. In Brown, a precinct inspector was charged with a felony offense involving an election. (Id. at pp. 84–85.) The county registrar was found guilty of contempt after he refused to comply with a superior court order to produce and open in court the sealed package of ballots that had been returned at the inspector’s precinct. (Id. at p. 85.) The registrar then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the order directing him to produce and open the ballot package was unlawful pursuant to former Political Code sections 1265 and 1266. (Brown, at p. 85.) We granted the writ, explaining