People v. Sanmiguel

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOEL SANMIGUEL, Defendant and Appellant. S287786 Second Appellate District, Division Six B328160 Ventura County Superior Court 2022002116 July 30, 2026 Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Evans, and Egerton* concurred. * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL S287786 Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. For nearly half a century, our law has steadfastly prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or other protected status in selecting juries. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 273 (Wheeler); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 91 (Batson).) The reason for this prohibition is as familiar as it is vital to the operation of a system that guarantees equal treatment to all. As our cases have repeatedly and consistently recognized, discrimination in jury selection harms not only litigants and persons called to jury service, but the very integrity of our system of justice. To enforce the prohibition, the courts in Wheeler and Batson set forth a procedural framework for determining whether a litigant’s decision to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror was motivated by improper bias. After years of experience applying this framework, commentators increasingly came to question whether the framework is adequate to identify and curb improper discrimination when it occurs. In response to these concerns, the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which establishes a new framework for evaluating discrimination-related objections to peremptory challenges. Under the statute, if an objection is made to a peremptory challenge, the striking party must give its reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (b), (c) (section 231.7).) If, after considering the striking party’s reasons, a “court determines 1  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1) (section 231.7(d)(1).) This case concerns the provisions of section 231.7 addressing a situation in which the striking party gives reasons relating to the prospective juror’s demeanor, behavior, or manner of responding to questions (collectively referred to as behavior-based reasons). Under the statute, these reasons “are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred . . . . Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(2) (section 231.7(g)(2).) Here, a prosecutor listed multiple reasons for striking a prospective juror, including a behavior-based reason: that the prospective juror was not as engaged and was less attentive than other prospective jurors. The trial court confirmed the prosecutor’s observations and overruled the defense’s section 231.7 objection without insisting on a further explanation of why these behaviors “matter[] to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(2).) The Court of Appeal affirmed. It concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of such explanation, the prosecutor’s and court’s observations about the prospective juror’s attentiveness were not only sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the behavior-based reason was invalid, but also independently sufficient to establish the lawfulness of the strike. 2  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. The Court of Appeal’s resolution of the issue reveals a number of points of uncertainty in the developing law of section 231.7. We now clarify two general principles about behavior-based reasons under section 231.7, subdivision (g). First, to overcome the presumption that a behavior-based reason is invalid, the striking party must offer an explanation that is sufficient to allow the court to evaluate the reason as part of its overarching determination of whether an objective observer would view race or other protected status as a factor in the exercise of the peremptory challenge. A court may be able to confirm, for instance, that a prospective juror is not making eye contact. But it cannot adequately evaluate the striking party’s motivation unless the striking party tells the court what it is inferring from the behavior about how the prospective juror would perform the duties of a juror — as the statute puts it, why the lack of eye contact “matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(2).) Ultimately, the explanation requirement is a functional one, and the statute does not prescribe a rigid sequence of steps or a particular verbal formula that must be employed to satisfy it. Second, whether a behavior-based reason is found to be valid or invalid is not dispositive of the ultimate inquiry into the presence of unlawful discrimination. If the reason is invalid, it may not be relied on to justify the strike. While reliance on an invalid reason is generally a significant consideration — and, depending on the circumstances, may prove dispositive — a court still must consider any other reasons proffered and other relevant circumstances to determine whether the strike was unlawful under section 231.7. Conversely, finding that the statutory presumption of invalidity has been overcome is not necessarily dispositive of the lawfulness of the strike. A court 3  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. may conclude that a behavior-based reason is valid and yet determine, after weighing other reasons and relevant circumstances, that an objective observer would still likely conclude that race or other protected status was a factor in the peremptory challenge. Because the Court of Appeal in this case did not apply these principles in evaluating the section 231.7 challenge, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. A. Because this is our first case interpreting section 231.7, we begin by reviewing the relevant legal background in some detail. In selecting a jury, litigants may raise two types of challenges to prospective jurors: for cause and peremptory. (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 273; Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b).) For-cause challenges are limited to concerns about prospective juror qualifications and actual or implied bias. (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1) [permitting “[a] challenge for cause” for “[g]eneral disqualification,” “[i]mplied bias,” or “[a]ctual bias”]; see id., § 228 [defining “general disqualification”].) Peremptory challenges, in contrast, were “designed to be used ‘for any reason, or no reason at all.’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 (Scott).) Peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required, but they “traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.” (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 91.) The idea is that peremptory challenges “allow[] removal of a biased juror” when “the party either cannot establish his reason by normal methods of proof or cannot do so without causing embarrassment to the challenged venireman 4  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. and resentment among the remaining jurors.” (Wheeler at p. 275; see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 353.) The federal and state Constitutions, however, place important limits on parties’ ability to strike prospective jurors: While peremptory strikes may be made for virtually any reason, they may not be made because of the prospective juror’s race or other protected status. Nearly 50 years ago, in Wheeler, this court held that “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277.) While it is acceptable to “seek to eliminate a specific bias” derived from personal experience, a party that “presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds . . . and peremptorily strikes all such persons for that reason alone” violates the right to “an impartial jury guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 276.) A decade later, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal “Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89.) The court explained that “[p]urposeful racial discrimination . . . denies [a defendant] the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure”: “ ‘[A] body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine.’ ” (Id. at p. 86.) But the harm “extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant”; it also harms the prospective jurors and, 5  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. ultimately, operates to “undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” (Id. at p. 87.) The courts in Wheeler and Batson set forth a substantially similar three-step burden-shifting inquiry to guide the trial court’s constitutional review of a peremptory strike. (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383.) Step one of the Batson/Wheeler test requires the defendant to “make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.) If the defendant makes out a prima facie case, the second step shifts the burden “ ‘to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” (Ibid.) At step three, the trial court decides “ ‘whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Ibid.) After many years of experience employing this framework, commentators in California and in other parts of the country increasingly raised concerns about its adequacy in addressing the problem of discrimination in jury selection. Several states across the country began to study the issue and consider potential reforms. (See Jury Selection Work Group: Final Report to the Supreme Court of California (July 2022) p. 2, fn. 2 [describing efforts in Washington, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Connecticut, and New Jersey].)1 In 2020, this court appointed a workgroup to study issues related to discrimination in jury 1 This report is available at <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/ sites/default/files/newsroom/2022-09/Jury%20Selection %20Work%20Group%20Final%20Report.pdf> (as of July 30, 2026). All internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name at <http://courts.ca.gov/opinions/ cited-supreme-court-opinions>. 6  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. selection in California. (Id. at p. 1.) While that effort was still underway, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 3070), a reform proposal modeled after a rule recently adopted in the state of Washington. (Stats. 2020, ch. 318; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 2020, p. 10 [“The procedures laid out in [Assembly Bill No. 3070] are modeled on the new rule used in Washington courts (GR 37) and tailored by various stakeholders and Committee staff in order to increase clarity and workability”].) The legislative findings and declarations accompanying Assembly Bill No. 3070 plainly describe the impetus for reform. Finding “that peremptory challenges are frequently used in criminal cases to exclude potential jurors from serving based on their race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that exclusion from jury service has disproportionately harmed African Americans, Latinos, and other people of color,” the Legislature crafted procedures intended to further the important “purpose of eliminating the use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias, in the exercise of peremptory challenges.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1, subds. (b), (c).) The statute, now codified as Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, “applies in all jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022.” (§ 231.7, subd. (i).) B. Section 231.7 prohibits removing a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s actual or perceived “race, 7  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation.” (§ 231.7, subd. (a).) (For simplicity’s sake, we refer in this opinion to “race or other protected status.”) To effectuate this overarching prohibition, the statute sets out a framework that differs from Batson/Wheeler in several important respects. If another party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, then the party that exercised the peremptory challenge must state the reasons for the challenge; there is no requirement that the objecting party first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court evaluates the reasons given and rules on the objection, stating its reasons on the record. (§ 231.7, subds. (b)–(d).) In ruling on the objection, the court may “not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7(d)(1).) Rather, the court evaluates “the reasons given . . . in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (Ibid.; see id., subd. (d)(3) [articulating a non- exhaustive list of circumstances the court may consider, such as whether: “[t]he objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror”; “[t]he alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group”; and “race [or other protected status] . . . bear on the facts of the case to be tried”].) Perhaps the most significant departure from Batson/Wheeler concerns the standard the court applies in making this determination. In passing section 231.7, the Legislature found that “requiring proof of intentional bias,” as Batson/Wheeler does, “renders the procedure ineffective.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1, subd. (b).) In contrast to Batson/Wheeler, the ultimate question under section 231.7 is 8  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. not whether the striking party has purposefully discriminated on the basis of race or other protected status. The question is, rather, whether “there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race [or other protected status] . . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7(d)(1).) An “objectively reasonable person” is one who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).) The statute sets out two categories of reasons that, because of their association with discrimination, are treated as invalid unless certain conditions are met. (§ 231.7, subds. (e), (g); see Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1, subd. (b) [“many of the reasons routinely advanced to justify the exclusion of jurors from protected groups are in fact associated with stereotypes about those groups or otherwise based on unlawful discrimination”].) These reasons are presumed invalid unless rebutted; there is no longer a presumption of validity, in contrast to the approach in our Batson/Wheeler case law. (Cf. People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 [“ ‘ “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [striking party’s] explanation,” ’ the reason will be deemed neutral”]; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1052 (Mai) [“the prosecutor’s demeanor observations, even if not explicitly confirmed by the record, are a permissible race- neutral ground for peremptory excusal, especially when they were not disputed in the trial court”].) The first category is set out in section 231.7, subdivision (e) (section 231.7(e)), which provides: “A peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the 9  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race . . . [or other protected status], and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e); see id., subd. (f) [setting out further instructions for the application of the clear and convincing standard].) Subdivision (e) then lists a number of reasons that are, broadly speaking, reasons disproportionately associated with particular racial or other cognizable groups. These include, for instance, “having a negative experience with law enforcement,” “[n]ot being a native English speaker,” and “[e]mployment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by members” of cognizable groups. (Id., subd. (e)(1), (7), (10); see also id., subd. (e)(13) [adding “[a]ny justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party”].) The second category, set forth in section 231.7, subdivision (g), is the category at issue in this case. Subdivision (g)(1) lists reasons that have “historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection” that relate to the prospective juror’s behavior, demeanor, or manner of answering questions. (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1).) The reasons are: (A) “The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact”; (B) “The prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor”; and (C) “The prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1)(A)– (C).) Subdivision (g)(2) provides that such reasons “are 10  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(2).) The statute states that if a court finds a peremptory challenge improper during jury selection and the objecting party so requests, the court must “[q]uash the jury venire and start jury selection anew.” (§ 231.7, subd. (h)(1).) Otherwise, the court may seat the prospective juror, provide the objecting party additional challenges, or “[p]rovide another remedy as the court deems appropriate.” (§ 231.7, subd. (h)(3)–(5).) A denial of a section 231.7 objection “shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) “The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record,” and it “shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror.” (Ibid.) The statute instructs, finally: “Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.” (Ibid.) 11  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. C. Defendant Joel SanMiguel was tried by jury for willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, along with associated enhancements. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; id., § 245, subd. (a)(1).) Jury selection commenced in August 2023, more than a year after Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 became applicable. The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror S.M. Defense counsel made a section 231.7 objection, stating his client, SanMiguel, is “of Latino descent” and “[S.M.], as far as [defense counsel] could tell, is — was the only Latino man left of the 18.” Citing section 231.7, the trial court asked the prosecutor to justify the strike. The prosecutor initially gave several reasons. First, “the victim in this case . . . is also Hispanic. I wouldn’t have a reason to kick Hispanic people when I have a Hispanic on Hispanic crime.” Second, S.M. “didn’t have much of anything to say. His responses were extremely brief.” Third, “[t]here are other people in the following six that are on the front that I believe will be jurors that I prefer more to [S.M.].” And fourth, another prospective juror “has a Hispanic surname. I have not kicked her.” The trial court requested clarification to understand “exactly what the explanation was because the explanation sounded like it was [S.M.] didn’t really say much of anything.” The prosecutor reiterated that S.M. “did not have much to say about what my questions were.” The prosecutor then added “another” reason: that S.M. “was not fully following some of the orders from the Court. He walked out with papers, walked back in during breaks.” The prosecutor clarified he was referring to 12  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. S.M. leaving with the court questionnaire, to which the trial court responded it never “gave any orders about that” — although it “would have if [it] would have thought about it.” The prosecutor added “that [S.M.] walked back in when the rest of the jury had already been excused. . . . [Y]ou look at these small little things of what jurors are doing and how close they’re paying attention to the process.” The prosecutor went on to explain that he felt other prospective jurors were “being more attentive” and “giving more eye contact,” whereas S.M. was “kind of looking down. I don’t feel like he’s being as engaged as other people are.” The trial court “confirm[ed] exactly what the prosecutor did say . . . about [S.M.’s] body language.” It “notice[d] that . . . [S.M.] ha[d] a very flat affect, and he [was] looking down most of the time. He [was] not responding to questions the same way everybody else d[id]. There [was] no — he’s not making eye contact at all. He was doing the same thing with the Court.” The court continued “that [S.M.] did enter the courtroom at a time when nobody else did,” which was not “a violation of a Court order, necessarily, but it show[ed] that he’s not paying attention to what everybody else is doing.” The court “den[ied] the motion based on 231.7,” reiterating that it “understands what the prosecutor is saying, and the Court can confirm the same thing.” At the completion of trial, the jury convicted SanMiguel of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true that SanMiguel personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced 13  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. SanMiguel to an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole after seven years for the attempted murder, consecutive to four years for the deadly weapon and great bodily injury enhancements. On appeal, SanMiguel argued the trial court erred in denying his section 231.7 objection. A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the denial. The majority acknowledged that several of “the prosecutor’s stated reasons for challenging S.M.” were “presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g)” because they “critiqued some combination of S.M.’s demeanor and inattentiveness.” (People v. SanMiguel (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 880, 889–890 (SanMiguel).) The majority added that “section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) contains both ‘ “confirmation” ’ and ‘ “explanation” ’ requirements,” and while the majority questioned “why behaviors like inattentiveness would require further explanation,” it acknowledged that “the prosecutor and trial court could have made a more extensive and thorough inquiry.” (Id. at pp. 890–891.) The majority concluded, however, that reversal was unwarranted because S.M.’s “lack of attention alone” both “overc[ame] the presumption of invalidity” and “was a sufficient reason for his dismissal.” (Id. at p. 891.) The majority reasoned: “No matter what a person’s background, race, or economic standing, if the juror does not pay attention, the juror does not belong on any jury.” (Ibid.)2 2 Justice Yegan also wrote a concurring opinion. (SanMiguel, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 891–893 (conc. opn. of Yegan, J.).) He opined that the automatic reversal requirement in section 231.7, subdivision (j) is unconstitutional 14  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. Justice Cody, dissenting in part, “disagree[d] . . . with the majority’s conclusion that the presumption of invalidity was overcome.” (SanMiguel, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 894 (dis. opn. of Cody, J.).) Because the “prosecutor never explained why S.M.’s behavior ‘matter[ed] to the case to be tried,’ ” Justice Cody concluded that the court “must treat as conclusive the presumption that [S.M.] was excused for invalid, discriminatory reasons.” (Id. at pp. 894–895 (dis. opn. of Cody, J.).) Justice Cody noted: “One may well wonder why behaviors like inattentiveness would require further explanation.” (Id. at p. 895 (dis. opn. of Cody, J.).) But the court was not, in her view, “at liberty to delete the unambiguous explanation requirement.” (Ibid.) Justice Cody added that “[t]he prosecutor’s remaining reasons for challenging S.M. [were] unsupported by the record or [were] otherwise unpersuasive.” (Ibid.) We granted review to address the court’s interpretation of section 231.7, subdivision (g) (section 231.7(g)). II. We consider the interpretation of section 231.7(g) de novo, reading the provision in its broader statutory context and giving the language its usual and ordinary meaning. (People v. Castillolopez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 322, 329.) “If the language is clear in context, our work is at an end. If it is not clear, we may consider other aids, including the statute’s legislative history.” (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 498.) because it violates the separation of powers doctrine. No party in this case challenges the constitutionality of section 231.7 and we do not address the meaning or constitutionality of subdivision (j) here. 15  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. Section 231.7(g) provides, as relevant here, that when a striking party offers one of the listed behavior-based reasons — for instance, the prospective juror’s inattentiveness, level of eye contact, or lack of rapport with counsel — that reason is “presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(1)–(2).) The primary issue SanMiguel raises is whether the presumptive invalidity of a behavior-based reason for striking a prospective juror has been rebutted when the trial court confirms that the asserted behavior occurred but counsel has not explained why the behavior “matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(2).) As the case comes to us, however, there is no dispute on this point. The Attorney General agrees that when a striking party offers a behavior-based reason, both confirmation and explanation are necessary to rebut the presumption that the reason is invalid. Even though the parties agree on this first, threshold point, it bears further examination. The question whether the explanation required by section 231.7(g) is necessary to rebut the statutory presumption of invalidity implicates other questions regarding the meaning of the statute — including the question that does now divide the parties, which concerns what it means, precisely, to say that the presumption of invalidity has not been rebutted. 16  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. A. The parties’ view that an explanation is required to rebut the presumption of invalidity tracks the rule articulated by appellate courts to address the issue. Although none has engaged in extensive analysis, all of the Courts of Appeal (with the arguable exception of the court in this case) have read the statute as setting up two requirements for rebutting the statutory presumption that a behavior-based reason is invalid: (1) confirmation of the behavior; and (2) an explanation of why the behavior matters. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 794 (Ortiz); People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 890–891 (Caparrotta); People v. Barnes (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 560, 582.) We are not, however, bound by the parties’ or the appellate courts’ interpretation of the law; its meaning falls to us to decide. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 268.) And although we ultimately take the same view, the issue is not as straightforward as the case law or the parties’ agreement might suggest. Only confirmation is explicitly described in section 231.7(g)(2) as a requirement for rebutting the presumption of invalidity. The explanation requirement is set forth in a separate sentence that, on its face, neither specifies what sort of explanation is required nor says anything about rebutting the presumption. The statute does speak in mandatory terms: “The counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor . . . matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7(g)(2), italics added.) That of course means an explanation is required. (E.g., In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1087.) But does it mean that an explanation is required to rebut the presumption of invalidity? 17  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. It is not uncommon for statutes to impose requirements without specifying precisely what consequences flow from failure to comply. (See, e.g., Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hosp. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 340 [describing so-called directory statutes for which no consequence is specified]; Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 [“generally, requirements relating to the time within which an act must be done are directory rather than mandatory or jurisdictional, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed”].) One might plausibly conclude that while section 231.7(g) requires an explanation, an explanation is not required to rebut the presumption of invalidity; instead, by failing to specify the consequences of failing to explain the reason, the statute leaves it to the court to decide whether it should nonetheless consider the reason as part of its totality-of- the-circumstances determination under section 231.7(d)(1). The text alone does not clearly tell us whether an explanation is required to rebut the presumption of invalidity under section 231.7(g), so we must consider the role that these component parts are designed to play in the larger statutory scheme. (See, e.g., People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 795 [“If the words appear susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we look to other indicia of legislative intent, bearing in mind the admonition that ‘[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence’ [citation] and that apparent ‘ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes’ ”].) The inquiry leads us to two further questions: (1) what kind of explanation, precisely, the statute demands; and (2) what happens if the presumption of invalidity is not overcome. 18  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. B. To answer the first question, we start by reviewing the Legislature’s overarching purposes in enacting section 231.7 in general, and section 231.7(g) in particular. The Legislature’s uncodified findings explain its intent to “put into place an effective procedure for eliminating the unfair exclusion of potential jurors” for reasons infected by discrimination. (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1, subd. (a).) One of the Legislature’s central concerns was identifying and preventing conscious and unconscious bias affecting jury selection. (See id. at § 1, subd. (a) [“It is the intent of the Legislature that this act be broadly construed to further the purpose of eliminating the use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias, in the exercise of peremptory challenges”]; see also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3070, supra, as amended May 4, 2020, p. 6 [“[T]he existing procedure cannot address strikes exercised because of implicit bias, that is, unconscious or automatic attitudes and stereotypes”].) With this overarching goal in mind, the Legislature crafted procedures designed to give both trial and appellate courts more information to assess whether conscious or unconscious bias was likely a factor in the peremptory challenge — as is evidenced by the requirement that a striking party state its reasons when an objection is made, regardless of whether a prima facie case of discrimination is established (§ 231.7, subd. (c)), and the requirement that the court explain the reasons for its ruling on the record (§ 231.7(d)(1)). The former requirement in particular, as the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary analysis explained, gives “appellate courts . . . more information with which to determine whether discrimination occurred during jury selection.” (Assem. 19  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3070, supra, as amended May 4, 2020, p. 10.) As numerous courts have recognized, demeanor- and behavior-based reasons, by their nature, pose several potential challenges and risks. For one, “ ‘explanations which focus upon a venireperson’s body language or demeanor . . . are subjective and can easily be used . . . as a pretext for excluding persons on the basis of race’ ” or other protected status. (People v. Hicks (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1240; see also Harris v. Hardy (7th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3d 942, 965 (Harris) [“Demeanor-based explanations for a strike are particularly susceptible to serving as pretexts for discrimination”].) Demeanor- or behavior-based strikes can also reflect unconsciously held attitudes rooted in stereotypes or cultural misunderstandings. (See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 106 (conc. opn. of Marshall, J.) [“A prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically”]; see also, e.g., Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases (2002) 9 Clinical L.Rev. 373, 394 [explaining that cultural differences in patterns of eye contact can lead to a mistaken “inference that the listener is inattentive”].) In some cases, what a striking party interprets as a problematic attitude may in reality represent a reasonable reaction to the striking party’s own exhibition of bias or other problematic behavior. (See People v. Silas (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1106 [observing, where prosecutor gave as a reason for striking a Black prospective juror that she was “openly hostile” in response to questioning about Black Lives Matter, that the prospective juror “became hostile when subjected to concededly inappropriate 20  PEOPLE v. SANMIGUEL Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. questions”].) And reasons based on a person’s demeanor or behavior in the trial court, unless explored on the record, are difficult to evaluate on appeal. (See, e.g., People v