Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Atiyeh v. American Business Bank CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LANNETTE ATIYEH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, G065971 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024- 01444101) AMERICAN BUSINESS BANK, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard J. Oberholzer, Judge. (Retired judge of the Kern Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. September 30, 2025 Request for Judicial Notice. Denied. December 26, 2025 Motion to Augment or Amend the Record on Appeal. Denied. January 22, 2026 Request for Judicial Notice. Denied. January 28, 2026 Request for Judicial Notice. Granted in part and denied in part. Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Prenovost, Normandin, Dawe & Rocha and Tom R. Normandin for Defendant and Respondent. * * * The trial court found plaintiffs and appellants Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh1 to be vexatious litigants, required them to furnish security, and entered a prefiling order against them. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391, 391.3, 391.7.)2 On appeal, plaintiffs have not shown the trial court erred. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2024, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action against defendant and respondent American Business Bank (ABB). In April 2025, ABB filed a motion to deem plaintiffs vexatious litigants, to require them to furnish security, and for entry of a prefiling order. Plaintiffs did not designate those documents as part of the record on this appeal, and the record does not reflect that plaintiffs filed an opposition to ABB’s motion. In their opening brief on appeal, plaintiffs characterize this case as “aris[ing] from a single nonjudicial foreclosure dispute involving [their] residence.” They acknowledge they have “filed multiple actions and motions seeking judicial review of the foreclosure process and related contractual issues,” but they assert “[n]o court ever adjudicated the merits of [their] claims.” 1 At times in the record, this plaintiff’s first name is listed as Ashraf. 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 On September 8, 2025, the trial court (Judge Richard J. Oberholzer) held a hearing, at which ABB appeared but plaintiffs did not. In a September 8, 2025 minute order, the court found plaintiffs to be vexatious litigants and required them to furnish security of $25,000.3 The court addressed plaintiffs’ litigation history and found “it is abundantly clear that Plaintiffs, while acting in propria persona, repeatedly attempted to relitigate the causes of action and issues pled in the First Action[4] after a final determination against them, and repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions, pleadings and papers, or engaged in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay of the foreclosure sale of their real property.” On the same date, the court also entered a prefiling order, stating “Lannette Atiyeh and Ashraf Andy Atiyeh AKA Andy Atiyeh,” “unless represented by an attorney, are prohibited from filing any new litigation in the courts of California without approval of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court in which the action is to be filed.” On September 9, 2025, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to vacate the September 8, 2025 order deeming them vexatious litigants and requiring the furnishing of security, along with a supporting declaration. Among other things, plaintiffs argued the order was void because they had not stipulated to a temporary judge under California Constitution, article VI, section 21. ABB filed an opposition to the ex parte application, with a supporting declaration and exhibits. Plaintiffs filed a reply. On September 3 The top of the minute order identifies the judicial officer as “TEMPORARY JUDGE: Richard J. Oberholzer.” 4 The trial court noted the “First Action” was a different complaint that plaintiffs had filed in August 2024. 3 10, 2025, Judge Oberholzer heard oral argument and entered an order denying the ex parte application. The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement regarding the September 8 or September 10, 2025 hearings. On September 12, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, which stated they were appealing from an order dated September 10, 2025. This court previously indicated it “will construe this appeal to be taken from the orders deeming [plaintiffs] to be vexatious litigants and subjecting them to the prefiling order, in addition to the order denying their motion for reconsideration of those orders.” DISCUSSION I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SHOWN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED “The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391–391.[8]) are designed to curb misuse of the court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system and other litigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169.) Section 391 lists alternative definitions for who qualifies as a vexatious litigant, and two of those alternatives are relevant here: subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3). (Id., subd. (b).) Section 391, subdivision (b)(2), provides that a vexatious litigant is a person who, “[a]fter a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or 4 defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.” (Ibid.) Section 391, subdivision (b)(3), provides that a vexatious litigant is a person who, “[i]n any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Ibid.) “A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) “Under well-established rules of appellate procedure,” plaintiffs, as the appellants, have “the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal and to affirmatively show error.” (In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622; see also Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 954 [“To ‘rebut[] the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,’ the appellant must ‘“‘“supply[] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record”’”’”].) Here, the trial court found plaintiffs were vexatious litigants under both subdivision (b)(2) and subdivision (b)(3) of section 391.5 Although 5 The trial court’s minute order quotes subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of section 391 in the beginning of its discussion. Although the court’s conclusion does not explicitly cite the numbered subdivisions it found applicable, it is clear the court found the alternative definitions in both subdivision (b)(2) and subdivision (b)(3) applied, as its explanation for the vexatious litigant finding closely tracked the language of both statutory provisions: “it is abundantly clear that Plaintiffs, while acting in propria persona, repeatedly attempted to relitigate the causes of action and issues pled in the First Action after a final determination against them [subdivision 5 plaintiffs’ opening and reply briefs on appeal address subdivision (b)(3) of section 391, their appellate briefs do not mention subdivision (b)(2), let alone provide developed argument that subdivision (b)(2) is inapplicable here. Accordingly, plaintiffs have forfeited any challenge to the determination that they are vexatious litigants under section 391, subdivision (b)(2), by failing to provide any developed argument with citation to applicable authority. (See Br. C. v. Be. C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 259, 264 [“‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived’”].) Because plaintiffs have not shown the trial court erred in finding them to be vexatious litigants under subdivision (b)(2) of section 391, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in also finding them to be vexatious litigants under subdivision (b)(3). Plaintiffs contend the vexatious litigant ruling “was procedurally barred by the prior denial of the same motion.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) According to plaintiffs, “[u]nder settled California law, one superior court judge may not overrule another on the same motion in the same case absent changed circumstances or proper review.” Plaintiffs appear to be referring to a September 4, 2025 minute order by Judge Robert S. Nelson in Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2025-01467981, which is a different case.6 Plaintiffs do not provide developed argument with citation to (b)(2)], and repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions, pleadings and papers, or engaged in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay of the foreclosure sale of their real property [subdivision (b)(3)].” 6 Judge Nelson denied the vexatious litigant motion filed by ABB in that case because he found that “Plaintiff ‘Community Estate of Andy, and Lannette Atiyeh’ does not qualify as a vexatious litigant under section 6 applicable authority demonstrating that Judge Nelson’s order in a different case would somehow preclude Judge Oberholzer from granting ABB’s motion in this case to deem plaintiffs vexatious litigants. We conclude it did not. Plaintiffs next assert “the erroneous designation was improperly expanded beyond its lawful scope and caused collateral prejudice.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) Although this argument is not clear, plaintiffs appear to be asserting they have been improperly prejudiced by the prefiling order. Section 391.7, however, “does not deny the vexatious litigant access to the courts, but operates solely to preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and their attendant expenditures of time and costs. [Citation.] Vexatious litigant statutes are constitutional and do not deprive a litigant of due process of law.” (Bravo v. Ismaj, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221–222; see also Shalant v. Girardi, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“‘[s]ection 391.7 “operates beyond the pending case”’”].)7 Plaintiffs contend they “were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to oppose the motion prior to entry of the order.” Plaintiffs’ only citation for this assertion is to the minute order declaring them vexatious; they do not explain why they did not file an opposition to ABB’s motion or 391 . . . . This is because, while the present lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff ‘Community Estate of Andy, and Lannette Atiyeh’ . . . , the three prior lawsuits (2024-01421110, 2024-01444101, and 8:25-cv-00062) were filed by Andy Atiyeh and Lannette Atiyeh, as individuals . . . , and the bankruptcy petition was filed by Ashraf Andy Atiyeh . . . .” 7 Plaintiffs also suggest the trial court’s orders are unclear. We disagree. There is nothing unclear or ambiguous about the court’s orders. The court found plaintiffs to be vexatious litigants under section 391, subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3), required plaintiffs to furnish security under section 391.3, and entered a prefiling order under section 391.7. And then it denied plaintiffs’ ex parte application that sought reconsideration. 7 attend the hearing. To the extent plaintiffs are suggesting some kind of due process violation, plaintiffs have forfeited any such argument by failing to provide developed argument. Plaintiffs argue “the vexatious-litigant order replicates [ABB’s] advocacy rather than reflecting independent judicial findings.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) As an initial matter, plaintiffs’ only record citation in this section of their opening brief is to the trial court’s September 8, 2025 minute order, and they include no record citations to the filings by ABB that are purportedly “replicate[d]” by the court. In any event, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the court did not exercise its discretion in considering the issues and determining that plaintiffs are vexatious litigants. (See Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 741 [“‘It is a basic presumption indulged in by reviewing courts that the trial court is presumed to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties’”]; Election Integrity Project California, Inc. v. Lunn (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 443, 449 [stating “[o]n appeal we presume a trial court proceeded correctly” and “[t]o overcome that presumption, the record must affirmatively show the trial court failed to weigh the evidence”].) Plaintiffs argue “[a] temporary judge’s authority derives solely from the parties’ stipulation under [a]rticle VI, [s]ection 21 of the California Constitution,”8 and assert that, because they did not stipulate to Judge Oberholzer, he had no authority to enter any of the challenged orders. The 8 Article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution provides: “On stipulation of the parties litigant the court may order a cause to be tried by a temporary judge who is a member of the State Bar, sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the cause.” (Ibid.) 8 problem is that plaintiffs’ argument is based on the premise that Judge Oberholzer was acting as a temporary judge pursuant to article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution. ABB, however, states Judge Oberholzer is a retired superior court judge who was assigned under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution,9 which is a different section with different requirements. Retired judges who sit by assignment pursuant to article VI, section 6 do not require stipulations by the parties in order to hear a matter. (See Western Sierra, Inc. v. Ramos (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 482, 486 [noting, once a retired judge is assigned under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution, “he has ‘judicial authority’”].) Plaintiffs do not directly address ABB’s assertion. They do not dispute that Judge Oberholzer is a retired judge who was sitting by assignment under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.10 Nor do plaintiffs argue that parties must stipulate to a retired judge assigned under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. Instead, plaintiffs simply reiterate in their reply brief that they did not stipulate to a temporary judge. 9 Article VI, section 6, subdivision (e) of the California Constitution provides: “The Chief Justice shall seek to expedite judicial business and to equalize the work of judges. The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but only with the judge’s consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction. A retired judge who consents may be assigned to any court.” (Ibid.) 10 Although the top of the minute order includes the notation “temporary judge” before Judge Oberholzer’s name, we do not interpret that as establishing that Judge Oberholzer was a temporary judge under article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution, instead of being temporarily assigned under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. (See Mahler v. Judicial Council of California (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 82, 92–98 [discussing retired judges and the “Temporary Assigned Judges Program”].) 9 Plaintiffs have the burden of showing error on appeal and have not shown Judge Oberholzer was a temporary judge proceeding under section 21 of article VI of the California Constitution (which would have required a stipulation by the parties) instead of under section 6 of that article (which did not). Moreover, plaintiffs did not provide a reporter’s transcript or settled statement regarding the September 8 or September 10, 2025 hearings. We therefore presume Judge Oberholzer acted properly by proceeding because he was a retired judge who was assigned under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201 [“We must therefore presume that what occurred at that hearing supports the judgment”]; People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1462, fn. 5 [“We presume the official duty has been regularly performed [citation], and this presumption applies to the actions of trial judges and court clerks”].)11 II. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION On September 30, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of two filings in a different case, Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2025-0146798: (1) a September 25, 2025 “notice of discrepancy and objection to defendant’s notice of ruling; request for court clarification; memorandum of points and authorities” (capitalization and boldface omitted); and (2) a September 29, 2025 “declaration of Andy Atiyeh in support of notice of discrepancy/objection” (capitalization and boldface omitted) and attached 11 We note Judge Oberholzer often sits by assignment in Orange County (as a retired judge of the Kern County Superior Court), pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. (See, e.g., Doe v. County of Orange (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1276; M.A. v. B.F. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 559; Casson v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1204.) 10 exhibits. We deny this request for judicial notice as these documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (See County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29 [denying “requests for judicial notice on the ground the materials in question are unnecessary to resolution of the appeal”].) On December 26, 2025, ABB filed a motion to augment or amend the record on appeal, which sought to add more than 100 documents to the record on appeal. We deny ABB’s motion on the ground that they are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal or are already part of the record. On January 22, 2026, ABB filed a request for judicial notice of three filings in other cases: (1) the complaint in Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2024-01421110; (2) an August 5, 2025 order in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. 25STCV20525; and (3) a July 29, 2025 order in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. 25STCV20525. We deny this request for judicial notice as these documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal given our conclusion that plaintiffs forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s determination that they are vexatious litigants under section 391, subdivision (b)(2). On January 28, 2026, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of five documents: (1) a September 4, 2025 minute order from Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2025-01467981; (2) the September 8, 2025 minute order from this case; (3) the December 30, 2025 “reply to appellants’ response to order re appearance of frivolous appeal” by ABB in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case No. 25-6580; (4) a January 26, 2026 order in United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case No. 25-6580; and (5) a September 18, 2025 “notice of ruling re motion to deem plaintiffs vexatious litigants” in Orange County Superior Court case No. 30- 11 2025-01467981. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) We grant this request for judicial notice as to the first document, which is Judge Nelson’s order discussed above. We deny this request for judicial notice as to the second, third, fourth, and fifth documents. The second document is already in the record on appeal and the third, fourth, and fifth documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. Appellants’ September 30, 2025 request for judicial notice is denied. Respondent’s December 26, 2025 motion to augment or amend the record on appeal and January 22, 2026 request for judicial notice are denied. Appellant’s January 28, 2026 request for judicial notice is granted in part and denied in part. GOODING, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. SCOTT, J. 12