Ison v. Lara

Filed 7/16/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE ADAMMA ISON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A170267 v. RICARDO LARA, as Insurance (Alameda County Commissioner, etc., Super. Ct. No. 22CV008022) Defendant and Respondent; FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Interveners and Respondents. Thirty years ago, the commissioner of the Department of Insurance (Commissioner) promulgated a regulation permitting private automobile insurers to consider a driver’s marital status as a factor when setting insurance rates where marital status bears “a substantial relationship to the risk of loss” as required by Proposition 103 — the voter-approved initiative titled the Insurance Rate Reduction and Reform Act, which was enacted to “protect consumers from arbitrary insurance rates and practices” and “ensure that insurance is fair, available, and affordable for all Californians.” (Ins. Code, § 1861.01 et seq., § 1861.02, subd. (a); Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988) text of Prop. 103, § 1, p. 99, italics omitted; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.5, subd. (d)(9) (regulation 2632.5(d)(9) or marital status regulation).) 1  In 2022, Adamma Ison and other unmarried automobile insurance policyholders petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Commissioner to rescind or amend the regulation, arguing it violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51, the Act) and the Rosenthal Auto Insurance Nondiscrimination Law (Ins. Code, § 11628 (RAIN law); undesignated statutory references are to this code). To wit, the Legislature amended the Act in 2005 to prohibit businesses from discriminating against persons based on marital status — a characteristic unmentioned in its former iterations. (Stats. 2005, ch. 420, § 3; former Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) And in 2008, it amended the RAIN law to prohibit any characteristic listed or defined in the Act from constituting a condition or risk for charging a higher insurance rate or premium. (Stats. 2008, ch. 682, § 7; § 11628, subd. (a).) While Ison does not dispute that marital status may justify a higher rate — that is, that it has been shown to have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss — she contends these amendments rendered the regulation inconsistent with its authorizing statutes, which require insurance businesses to comply with the Act. The trial court denied the writ after concluding a limiting provision in the Unruh Civil Rights Act — “This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law” — meant that the after-enacted Act’s protections did not preclude the already- existing marital status regulation specifically addressing insurance rating factors. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (c) (Section 51(c)).) Ison appealed. We affirm. BACKGROUND In 1988, voters approved Proposition 103, which declared that existing laws allowed “insurance companies to charge excessive, unjustified and arbitrary rates.” At the time, there was an open competition system of 2 regulation, “under which ‘rates [were] set by insurers without prior or subsequent approval by the Insurance Commissioner.’ ” (20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 240.) Proposition 103 made “numerous fundamental changes in the regulation of automobile and other types of insurance.” (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 813, 812.) It added “to the Insurance Code article 10—‘entitled “Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates.” ’ ” (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1035 (State Farm).) Among other things, it required the “business of insurance” to comply with “the laws of California applicable to any other business, including, but not limited to, civil rights laws (Section 51 to 53, inclusive, of the Civil Code)” — including the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (§ 1861.03, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 51.) It also required the Commissioner to approve insurance rates and “provide[d] for consumer participation in the administrative ratesetting process.” (Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 750, 753; § 1861.01, subd. (c).) Rates could not be unfairly discriminatory or otherwise violate provisions governing rates and ratings: “No rate shall be approved or remain in effect which is excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of this chapter.” (§ 1861.05, subd. (a) [within ch. 9, titled “Rates and Rating and Other Organizations”].) It also added section 1861.02 to regulate automobile insurance rates: “Rates and premiums for an automobile insurance policy . . . shall be determined by application of the following factors in decreasing order of importance: [¶] (1) The insured’s driving safety record. [¶] (2) The number of miles he or she drives annually. [¶] (3) The number of years of driving experience the insured has had. [¶] (4) Those other factors that the commissioner may adopt by regulation and that have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss.” (§ 1861.02, subd. (a)(1)–(4), italics 3 added.) The provision further specified that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the use of any criterion without approval shall constitute unfair discrimination.” (Id., subd. (a)(4).) An uncodified provision of Proposition 103 notes that a two-thirds majority of the Legislature is required to amend these provisions. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988) text of Prop. 103, § 8, p. 144.) Pursuant to section 1861.02, the Commissioner in 1996 adopted regulations for rating factors — “any factor, including discounts, used by an insurer which establishes or affects the rates, premiums, or charges assessed for a policy of automobile insurance” — for private automobile insurance. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, §§ 2632.1, 2632.2, subd. (a).) The regulations prohibit insurers from using rating factors beyond those identified. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.4, subd. (a) [“No insurer shall use a rating factor which is not set forth in these regulations”].) In addition, “no insurer shall adopt any rating factor based in whole or in part upon the race, language, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, political affiliation, or sexual orientation of any person.” (Ibid.) Nor may insurers use a rating factor “that does not bear a substantial relationship to loss.” (Id., subd. (b).) Certain rating factors are mandatory — an insurer must utilize the insured’s driving safety record, miles driven annually, and years of driving experience for determining rates for coverage. (Id., § 2632.5, subd. (c)(1)–(3).) Others are optional, such as the driver’s type of vehicle, academic standing, and marital status — the factor at issue here. (Id., subd. (d)(1), (6), (9).) The Commissioner further promulgated regulations identifying certain requirements for using optional rating factors like marital status. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, §§ 2632.1–2632.19.) Insurers must file a proposed class plan — among other things, the schedule of rating factors and discounts used when 4 developing rates and premiums — with the Commissioner. (Id, §§ 2632.11, subd. (a), 2632.3, subd. (a).) The Commissioner then ensures “ ‘that the influence of each rating factor applied in an insured’s premium is weighed as specified’ ” by the regulations. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 992.) There is also a “ ‘highly technical, formulaic evaluation of the individual optional rating factors,’ ” including insurers using historical loss data to determine the relative risk of loss presented by the different categories within each rating factor. (Ibid.) The Commissioner reviews each class plan application to ensure, among other things, that the relativities are supported by the summary historical loss data provided by the insurer. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits “arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable” discrimination by business establishments and ensures full and equal access of all people to public accommodations. (Sargoy v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1043; Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) It identifies protected categories, a list that has expanded since 1959 through legislative amendments. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b); Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1151–1154 (Harris).) Today, it provides, in relevant part, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color . . . marital status . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Marital status was expressly added to the Act in 2005 by Assembly Bill No. 1400 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) — it was not in earlier versions of the statute. (Stats. 2005, ch. 420, § 3.) Significantly, the Act has always provided that it does not confer “any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by 5 law.” (§ 51(c); Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833, 837.) The RAIN law, enacted in 1955, prohibits specified discriminatory conduct by automobile liability insurance providers. (§ 11628, subd. (a); Stats. 1955, ch. 125, § 1.) In 2008, the Legislature amended it to provide “nor shall any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of [the Unruh Civil Rights Act], including, but not limited to, language, or location within a geographic area, of itself, constitute a condition or risk for which a high rate, premium, or charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.” (Stats. 2008, ch. 682, § 7; § 11628, subd. (a).) In March 2022, Ison and other unmarried private automobile liability insurance policyholders filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the Commissioner to comply with the Unruh Civil Rights Act and RAIN law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) They alleged the regulation permitting automobile insurers to use marital status as an optional rating factor (regulation 2632.5(d)(9)) conflicts with the Act as amended in 2005 and the RAIN law as amended in 2008. Using this prohibited characteristic for ratemaking, Ison alleged, resulted in unmarried persons being charged approximately $56 to $100 more for insurance than married persons. She sought an order compelling the Commissioner to rescind or amend the regulations to eliminate marital status as a rating factor. She further sought a mandate requiring insurers who use marital status as a rating factor “to file new class plans eliminating marital status as a premium rating factor.” Farmers Insurance Exchange and Mid-Century Insurance Company (Farmers) moved to intervene, claiming a substantial interest in the outcome of this proceeding because they were named defendants in a pending putative class action based 6 on their use of marital status as a rating factor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387; § 1861.10, subd. (a).) The trial court granted leave to intervene and denied the petition. It determined that the Commissioner is not subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act and RAIN law, which only apply to insurance businesses; however, this was not dispositive. Rather, the relevant issue was whether the Commissioner may adopt regulations that permit insurers to use rating factors that are perceived as inconsistent with those statutes. The court determined regulation 2632.5(d)(9) could be harmonized with the Act. It noted Proposition 103 was passed in 1988, when the Act did not list marital status as a protected characteristic. Although voters understood the Act might be amended in the future, and intended that any amendments would apply to insurance rate regulation, the court explained section 51(c) — providing that the Act does not confer any right or privilege on a person “ ‘that is conditioned or limited by law’ ” — limited the Act’s scope. By its plain terms, the Act must “defer” to the already existing marital status regulation, which had the force of law. Thus, the court concluded the regulation was not invalid. DISCUSSION Ison contends the trial court erroneously denied her a writ of mandate to compel the Commissioner to repeal the marital status regulation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1177 [courts may issue writs of mandate to compel public officers or agencies to perform mandatory duties].) She argues regulation 2632.5(d)(9) — authorizing private auto insurers to use marital status as a rating factor when calculating insurance rates — is invalid because it conflicts with the plain terms of the 7 nondiscrimination provisions in sections 1861.03 and 1861.05 — respectively requiring insurers to comply with the Unruh Civil Rights Act and prohibiting the approval or allowing to remain in effect a rate that otherwise violates the provisions governing rates and ratings. (§§ 1861.03, subd. (a), 1861.05, subd. (a); see Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) She further contends the regulation conflicts with the RAIN law, which she argues prohibits insurers from charging higher rates based on a person’s marital status. The Commissioner acknowledges the plain language argument but argues the regulation can be harmonized with the Unruh Civil Rights Act. According to the Commissioner, the limiting language in section 51(c) — that the Act “shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law” — exempts the more specific, already existing marital status regulation from the Act’s stricture. (§ 51(c).) Hence, the regulation does not conflict with or exceed its authorizing statutes in the Insurance Code. A regulation adopted by an agency pursuant to its authorizing statute is valid if it is “ ‘consistent and not in conflict with the statute’ ” and “ ‘reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 108; Gov. Code, § 11342.2.) Agencies granted “substantive rulemaking power are truly ‘making law,’ ” thus “their quasi- legislative rules have the dignity of statutes.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 10–11 (Yamaha).) A review of quasi-legislative regulations is generally limited to determining whether the agency action was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or failed to follow required procedures. (California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 11.) But when “a regulation 8 is challenged as inconsistent with the terms or intent of the authorizing statute,” we independently interpret the statute while affording weight to the administrative construction. (Ibid.; Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 401, 416.) As with statutes, we independently construe initiatives “in a manner that gives effect to the voters’ purpose in adopting the law,” giving words their ordinary meaning, “consider[ing] the text of related provisions and the structure” of the statutory scheme, and presuming “the voters were aware of existing law.” (In re Febbo (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1097; Center for Public Interest Law v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1484.) Courts must strike down as void agency regulations that are inconsistent or in conflict with the governing statute. (California School Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. of Education (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 530, 544.) Having engaged in this review, we conclude the Commissioner has the better argument. I. Ison does not challenge the Commissioner’s determination that marital status has a substantial relationship to the risk of loss, nor that the marital status regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of its authorizing statutes, sections 1861.02 and 1861.05. (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) So we only consider whether the regulation is consistent with those provisions, and we conclude it is. (California School Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. of Education, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) The chronology regarding the enactment of sections 1861.02 and 1861.05, promulgation of regulation 2632.5(d)(9), and the relevant amendment of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is helpful in our assessment of the regulation’s validity. 9  Sections 1861.01 and 1861.02, enacted by Proposition 103, requires the Commissioner to approve insurance rates before their use and “delegate[s] the exclusive authority” to the Commissioner “to approve ‘optional rating factors.’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1372; §§ 1861.01, subd. (c), 1861.02.) Section 1861.05 provides that “[n]o rate shall be approved or remain in effect which is excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of this chapter” — chapter 9, “Rates and Rating and Other Organizations.” (§ 1861.05, subd. (a).) Section 1861.03, included in chapter 9, expressly incorporates the Unruh Civil Rights Act — “The business of insurance shall be subject to the laws of California applicable to any other business, including but not limited to, civil rights laws (Sections 51 to 53, inclusive, of the Civil Code).” (§ 1861.03, subd. (a); Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450 [“ ‘By its own terms, the Unruh Civil Rights Act comprises only section 51’ ”].) Reading these provisions together, insurers may not charge — and the Commissioner may not approve or allow to remain in effect — rates that violate the Act. Critically, when voters passed Proposition 103 — enacting sections 1861.02, 1861.03, and 1861.05 — the Unruh Civil Rights Act did not list marital status as a protected characteristic. (Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 3; former Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Instead, it ensured full and equal accommodations no matter a person’s “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 3; former Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Consistent with the Act, the Commissioner promulgated regulations in 1996 that prohibited insurers from adopting “any rating factor based in whole or in part upon the race, language, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, political affiliation, or sexual orientation of any person.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10 10, § 2632.4, subd. (a).) But the Commissioner also authorized insurers to use the marital status of the rated driver as an optional rating factor after determining that it bore a substantial relationship to the risk of loss. (Regulation 2632.5(d)(9).) As a result, insurance businesses determining rates based, in part, on marital status were not otherwise violating chapter 9 of the Insurance Code — i.e., section 1861.03, which incorporates the Act. (§ 1861.05, subd. (a).) As the parties agree, the regulation was then valid because it was consistent “with the terms or intent of the authorizing statute.”1 (California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 11.) Assembly Bill No. 1400 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) — amending the Unruh Civil Rights Act to identify marital status as a protected characteristic — does not change this outcome. (Stats. 2005, ch. 420, § 3.) True, the Insurance Code provides that “[w]henever any reference is made to any portion of this code or of any other law of this State, such reference shall apply to all amendments and additions thereto now or hereafter made.” (§ 9.) And 1 We reject Farmers’s argument that regulation 2632.5(d)(9) does not conflict with the Unruh Civil Rights Act and RAIN law because neither applies to the Commissioner’s rate regulation activities. Though the Commissioner is neither a “business establishment[]” nor an “admitted insurer” — to which the Act and RAIN law apply respectively — this does not address the issue here. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b); § 11628, subd. (a) [prohibiting “admitted insurer[s]” from certain conduct]; Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Foundation, Inc. v. Low (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1240 [Act “has no bearing on any regulation the Commissioner may adopt” because the Department of Insurance is not a “ ‘business establishment’ ”].) Rather than examining whether the Commissioner is liable for civil rights law violations, Ison challenges the Commissioner’s authority to permit insurers to charge rates based on factors that allegedly violate the Act and RAIN law. (§§ 12921, subd. (a), 12926 [Commissioner shall require insurers to fully comply with all provisions of the Insurance Code].) 11 where a statute makes general reference to another statute, “ ‘ “such as a reference to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time to time.” ’ ” (People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 570.) Here, section 1861.03 generally refers to the Act rather than invoking a specific provision of that statutory scheme — “civil rights laws (Sections 51 to 53, inclusive, of the Civil Code).” (§ 1861.03, subd. (a).) Thus, it incorporates the provisions of the Act as they existed in 1988 as well as future amendments. (Rojas, at p. 573.) Construing section 1861.03 in light of the foregoing principles, Ison contends the 2005 amendment of the Unruh Civil Rights Act constrains the Commissioner’s authority to maintain regulation 2632.5(d)(9) and prohibits insurers from charging insurance rates that employ marital status as an optional rating factor. In her view, any rate based in part on marital status would violate section 1861.05 — “[n]o rate shall be approved or remain in effect which is . . . otherwise in violation” of provisions governing rates and factors that affect rate changes. (§ 1861.05, subd. (a); State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) But this reading fails to account for section 51(c), which was unaffected by the 2005 amendment. (Compare Stats. 2005, ch. 420, § 3 with Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 3; Center for Public Interest Law v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1480 [statutes must be interpreted as a whole].) That provision “anticipates that if there is a conflict between [the Act’s] provisions and those of another statute, the former” — the Act — “defers to the latter.” (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 (Lazar); Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155 [§ 51(c) “suggests that the Act was not 12 intended to create rights of access to public accommodations when . . . other legislation specifically limited or disclaimed those rights”], superseded on other grounds as explained in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 672.) Lazar is instructive. There, the court rejected a challenge to rental car companies’ minimum age requirement as unlawful age discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Lazar, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1499–1500.) It noted the Legislature enacted another statute authorizing rental car contracts to include minimum age requirements. (Id. at pp. 1502–1503.) The court reasoned the “legislative regulation of vehicle rental agreements is more specific than the general antidiscrimination provisions of the Act.” (Id. at p. 1504.) Under those circumstances, the Act “specifically provides that it must not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is otherwise conditioned or limited by law.” (Lazar, at p. 1504.) Regulation 2632.5(d)(9) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act can be similarly reconciled. (State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [examining entire statute, construing words in context, and “ ‘harmonizing its various parts’ ”].) Starting in 1996, the regulation authorized the use of marital status as an optional rating factor that bears a substantial relationship to the risk of loss. Thus, it is more specific than the “general antidiscrimination provisions” of the Act. (Lazar, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) The regulation also specifically approved treating drivers differently based on their marital status. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155 [§ 51(c)’s “plain language suggests that the Act was not intended to create rights of access to public accommodations when . . . other legislation specifically limited or disclaimed those rights”].) In those circumstances, section 51(c) means the Act defers to the marital status regulation. (Lazar, at p. 1504; Wilson v. Fair 13 Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 [“by its own terms,” the Act “is designed not to encroach upon the Insurance Code or other existing law”]; see also Schmidt v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 370, 383 [existing statute restricting housing to adults prevailed over more general provisions of the Act, which did not address age-based protections when the housing statute was enacted].) So understood, the regulation remains consistent with its authorizing statutes — sections 1861.02 and 1861.05 — rather than “ ‘alter[ing] or amend[ing] the governing statute or case law.’ ” (Association of California Ins. Cos. v. Poizner (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1045.)2 Ison offers several arguments disputing this conclusion; they fail to persuade.3 First, she contends the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not confer any right or privilege on a person “that is conditioned or limited by law” (§ 51(c), italics added), and “law” does not include a regulation. Relying on language in Harris — which stated section 51(c) means the Act was not intended to create rights of access to public accommodations when “other legislation specifically limited or disclaimed those rights” — she insists section 51(c)’s limitation applies solely to other statutes enacted by the 2 In light of this conclusion, we do not address the Commissioner’s alternative argument that the marital status regulation is consistent with the Unruh Civil Rights Act or RAIN law because insurers have a legitimate business interest in setting insurance premiums based on risk. 3 Ison argues for the first time on appeal that the marital status regulation violates Civil Code section 51.5, articulating specific types of prohibited discrimination. (Civ. Code, § 51.5, subd. (a); Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 537.) But the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not include Civil Code section 51.5 or other related statutes (Stamps v. Superior Court, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450), and she forfeited this argument by failing to raise the issue in the trial court (Truck Ins. Exchange v. AMCO Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 619, 635). 14 Legislature. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155, italics added.) We disagree. Harris did not purport to define “law” as it is used in section 51(c), and it is not authority for a proposition it did not consider. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155; Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1134.) More importantly, we do not read the term “law” so narrowly. Though Civil Code section 51 does not define that term, various dictionaries define it to include regulations. (Civ. Code, § 51; Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, 1158–1159 [examining dictionary definitions for statutory interpretation]; Merriam-Webster’s Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law> [defining “law” as “a rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed or formally recognized as binding by a supreme controlling authority,” as of July 16, 2026]; Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) [defining “law” as the “aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action,” italics added].) Case law similarly defines “law” broadly, noting that quasi-legislative regulations are “an authentic form of substantive lawmaking.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) By passing Proposition 103, including section 1861.02 — which conferred the Commissioner with authority to adopt by regulation rating factors that have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss — voters “delegated a portion” of “their lawmaking power” to the Commissioner. (In re Febbo, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097; § 1861.02, subd. (a)(4).) The Commissioner proceeded to promulgate regulation 2632.5(d)(9), which has the dignity of a statute. (Yamaha, at p. 10.) Next, Ison argues that nothing in Proposition 103 specifically limited the application of civil rights laws, thus voters did not intend section 51(c) to 15 condition or limit the application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in insurance matters. This argument ignores the presumption that voters are aware of existing, related laws. (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934.) We presume voters understood that section 51(c) — a statute that existed prior to and was expressly incorporated into the Insurance Code by Proposition 103 — required the Act to defer to — rather than encroach upon — the Insurance Code or other existing laws, including validly promulgated regulations. (Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) Ison further contends the Unruh Civil Rights Act controls here because when “there is a conflict between a regulation and a statute or decisional law, it is well settled that the law controls the regulation.” (Kerollis v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1308.) But section 51(c) envisions that the Act confers no right or privilege that a law — such as the marital status regulation — conditions or limits; as we have explained, the two can be harmonized. Moreover, “it is no less settled that when a special and a general statute are in conflict, the former controls” — the special act is an exception to the general statute. (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 420.) Likewise, the Legislature can also authorize an administrative agency to “depart from its existing dispositions on a given topic” “on its behalf.” (Ibid.) Thus, “in cases of conflict,” a “regulation validly adopted pursuant to a delegation of authority under a special statute likewise prevails over the terms of a general statute.” (Ibid.) “This rule of construction is reiterated and specifically made applicable” here by section 1860.1 — “No act done, action taken . . . pursuant to the authority conferred by [chapter 9, governing Rates and Rating and Other Organizations] shall constitute a violation of . . . any other law of this State 16 heretofore or hereafter enacted which does not specifically refer to insurance.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 420; § 1860.1.) As discussed above, the marital status regulation was validly adopted pursuant to sections 1861.02 and 1861.05 before marital status was added to the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Nothing in the language of the Act or Assembly Bill No. 1400 indicates any intent to alter the process or standards for setting insurance rates or to work any other effects on insurance. (Stats. 2005, ch. 420, § 3, p. 3513 [“the Legislature intends to clarify the existing law, rather than to change the law”].) Thus, the specific regulation authorizing reliance on the marital status of a rated driver for insurance rating purposes prevails over the general Act. Next, citing the Disabled Persons Act’s distinction between laws and regulations — “Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public . . . subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, or state or federal regulation” — Ison argues the Legislature knew how to employ precise language to limit rights and privileges by a regulation but consciously omitted it in section 51(c). (Civ. Code, § 54.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) We acknowledge that “ ‘when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 725.) But that principle has no application here. It applies “only when the Legislature has intentionally changed or excluded a term by design” and “when different terms are used in parts of the same statutory scheme that they are presumed to have different meanings.” (Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 364, superseded on other grounds by statute as noted in Eicher v. Advanced Business Integrators, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 17 1363, 1384.) Leaving aside Ison’s failure to identify any evidence the Legislature specifically intended to exclude “regulations” from section 51(c)’s use of the term “law,” section 54.1 is located in a different part of the Civil Code — part 2.5, titled “Blind and Other Physically Disabled Persons.” (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 126 [requiring evidence Legislature intended expressio unius application “ ‘ “lest it prevail as a rule of construction despite the reason for and the spirit of the enactment” ’ ”].) Section 51(c) appears in part 2, titled “Personal Rights.” It “does not appear that the Legislature’s failure to use identical language” in the Unruh Civil Rights Act “was either intentional or meaningful.” (Smith, at p. 364.) Our reading of section 51(c) and regulation 2362.5(d)(9) also does not contravene State Farm, contrary to Ison’s assertions.4 There, a regulation required insurance companies to publicly disclose demographic information regarding its business organized by ZIP code. (State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1036–1038 [interpreting § 1861.07 and Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2646.6, subd. (c)].) An insurance business argued the regulation exceeded the Commissioner’s authority under Proposition 103 — a statutory scheme it argued primarily addressed rate regulation. (State Farm, at pp. 1039–1040.) The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that Proposition 103 “subjects the business of insurance to laws prohibiting discriminatory and unfair business practices.” (State Farm, at p. 1041.) In addition to rate regulation, it 4 We reject Ison’s request for judicial notice of the Commissioner’s brief filed in State Farm. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).) She did not present it to the trial court in the first instance, and in any event, the brief has no bearing on the issues here. (Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325–326 [declining to take judicial notice of records where proponent “puts forth no reason for its failure” to make request in the trial court]; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) 18 “addresses the underlying factors that may impermissibly affect rates charged by insurers and lead to insurance that is unfair, unavailable, and unaffordable.” (Id. at pp. 1041–1042.) Thus, the Commissioner had the authority to gather the requested information to determine whether the insurance industry underserved certain communities. (Id. at p. 1042.) We agree with State Farm’s uncontroversial observation that insurance businesses are subject to nondiscrimination laws. But we cannot discern anything in the decision that addresses the relationship between the Commissioner’s optional rating factor regulations and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the relevant issue here. (State Farm, at p. 1041.) In sum, regulation 2632.5(d)(9) is not invalid under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the trial court properly denied the writ seeking its rescission. II. Regulation 2632.5(d)(9) also does not conflict with the RAIN law. (§ 11628, subd. (a).) Section 11628, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2654 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.), provides that “any characteristic listed or defined” in the Unruh Civil Rights Act shall not “of itself constitute a condition or risk for which a higher rate, premium, or charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.” (Stats. 2008, ch. 682, § 7; § 11628, subd. (a), italics added.) To the extent this provision may be read to categorically prohibit automobile insurers from using marital status as a basis for charging higher insurance rates, section 11628’s legislative history expressly disavows any intent to alter the Commissioner’s optional rating factor regulations. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [“the ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is 19 consistent with other provisions of the statute”]; § 11628, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) An express statement of legislative intent by Assembly Bill No. 2654’s author printed in the Assembly Journal addresses the apparent conflict between section 11628’s plain language and the Legislature’s purpose. (Assemblymember John Laird, letter to Assembly Chief Clerk E. Dotson Wilson (Sept. 15, 2008) 6 Assem. J. (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) p. 7255; Stokes v. Baker (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 946, 964, fn. 5 [using statement by the sponsoring legislator to ascertain legislative intent if the statement has been approved and “ ‘evidences the understanding of the Legislature’ and not simply the particular legislator’s personal views”].) He explained that section 7 of the bill prohibits discrimination in casualty insurance, “including in the use and establishment of rating factors,” while also acknowledging Proposition 103 authorized the Commissioner to establish optional rating factors through regulation. (Assemblymember John Laird, letter to Assembly Chief Clerk E. Dotson Wilson, supra, 6 Assem. J. (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) p. 7256.) The amendment, he emphasized, was not intended “to amend Prop. 103 with respect to these rating factors.” (Ibid.) And he acknowledged that altering Proposition 103’s rating factor statutes would require a two-thirds majority vote, and “regulatory action by the Insurance Commissioner would be necessary to change the optional rating factors.” (Ibid.) The letter does not reflect that the Legislature intended to strip the Commissioner of authority to maintain the marital status regulation, contrary to Ison’s assertions. It simply assuaged concerns about how “[Assembly Bill No.] 2654 might affect rating factors used by these insurers” by reiterating that only the Commissioner could change any optional rating factors “in light of the fact that Proposition 103 established certain rating 20