Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 In re N.P. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re N.P. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E088399 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, (Super. Ct. Nos. J298156, J298157, J298158, J298159) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v. B.T., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson, Judge. Affirmed. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 1 Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent I. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appellant, B.T. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 terminating her parental rights to her four minor children. Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that plaintiff and respondent, the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duties of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. We affirm. II. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In August 2023, CFS filed a petition under section 300 on behalf Mother’s children, and the juvenile court ordered them detained the following day. CFS began investigating the matter, which included investigation into the parents’ Indian ancestry. In August 2023, Father submitted a parental notification of Indian status form stating he had no Indian ancestry, which was consistent with his statement at the detention hearing that he had none. When CFS asked Father about the children’s 1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Because Mother’s appeal concerns only ICWA, we discuss only facts relevant to ICWA. 2 ancestry, he denied they had any Indian ancestry. Father’s sister and mother also told CFS they had no Indian ancestry. In March 2024, August 2024, and January 2025, Father again denied any Indian ancestry. Father’s father denied any Indian ancestry in August 2025. At the detention hearing, Mother told the juvenile court that she has Cherokee ancestry but that she was not registered with the tribe. She claimed that ancestry came from her mother. In August 2023, Mother told CFS she had no Indian ancestry. A few days later, however, Mother submitted a parental notification of Indian status form stating that she had Cherokee ancestry. Mother also filed a “Family Find and ICWA Inquiry” form stating that she had Indian ancestry. About a week later, CFS asked Mother about her Indian ancestry, and she claimed she might have Indian ancestry, but she was not sure because she was adopted. She said her biological mother would have more information. Mother could not provide any information about other family members who might have information about Mother’s potential Indian ancestry. However, CFS spoke with Mother’s sister, who denied any Indian ancestry. She gave CFS the name and contact information of Mother’s biological mother and the name of the children’s maternal great-grandmother. The maternal aunt did not have any contact information for the maternal great-grandmother. 3 In August 2023, CFS called the maternal grandmother twice to discuss the children’s potential Indian heritage. She did not pick up either time or return CFS’s calls. Around the same time, CFS sent inquiry letters via certified mail to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians of Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the Cherokee Nation. CFS never received a response from the BIA or the tribes. In March 2024, August 2024, and January 2025, Mother told CFS she did not have Indian ancestry. CFS eventually got a hold of the maternal grandmother in April 2025. She denied having any Indian ancestry. The maternal grandfather also denied any Indian ancestry and told CFS there were no other family members who might have information about the children’s potential Indian ancestry. In April 2025, CFS tried to speak to a maternal cousin to discuss Mother’s potential Indian ancestry and a nonrelative extended family member, but CFS could not get contact information for them. CFS also could not find any adult siblings of the children. In June 2025, the maternal aunt again denied any Indian ancestry. The maternal uncle did as well. 4 In July 2025, CFS told the juvenile court that it had complied with its ICWA duty of inquiry and asked the court to find that the children are not Indian children. The juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply. In September 2025, however, Mother filed a parental notification of Indian status form stating, “Have Native American Blood. Don’t know the tribe.” In April 2026, the juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing. After the close of evidence and argument from the parties, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights to the children and freed them for adoption. Mother timely appealed. III. DISCUSSION CFS has an affirmative duty at the outset of a dependency proceeding to determine if a child is an Indian child. (In re K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 118-119; § 224.2, subd. (c).) If the “court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court, social worker, or probation officer shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e), italics added.) “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible 5 for membership in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know” as set forth in 3 section 224.2, subdivision (d). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) “[R]eason to believe” exists whenever there is “information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) The required further inquiry includes, but does not require, interviewing the parents and extended family members to gather the information necessary for an ICWA notice, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services to gather the names and contact information of the pertinent tribes, informally contacting the tribes, and contacting any other person who may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child's membership status or eligibility. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).) If the court finds that the duty of inquiry has been satisfied, and there is no reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court may find that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404.) 3 Mother acknowledges that “[t]his is a case of reason to believe the children may be Indian children.” 6 On this record, the juvenile court properly found that CFS satisfied its ICWA inquiry duties and that ICWA does not apply. After CFS had “reason to believe” the children might be Indian children, it asked every available maternal and paternal family member about the children’s potential Indian ancestry, and they all denied any. Mother and Father likewise denied any Indian heritage on multiple occasions. Mother does not identify any family member CFS could have, but did not contact. CFS also sent inquiry letters to the BIA and three Cherokee tribes via certified mail. Although none of them responded, we presume they received the letters. (See Evid. Code, § 641 [“[a] letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received”]; see also In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183 [notice of dependency petition presumed received by father when sent via certified mail, return receipt requested].) But because they did not respond, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that the BIA and the tribes had no relevant information on the children. In any event, Mother provides no authority to support her argument that CFS had to obtain and submit proof that their inquiry letters were received for CFS to satisfy 4 its duty of further inquiry. 4 As CFS correctly notes, that may have been necessary, if at all, only if there was “reason to know” the children were Indian children, which is not the case here. (See (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subds. (a), (b); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1049; “The sharing of information with tribes at [the further] inquiry stage is distinct from formal ICWA notice, which requires a ‘reason to know’—rather than a ‘reason to believe’—that the child is an Indian child.”) Even then, “The purpose of the ICWA notice provisions is to enable the tribe or the BIA to investigate and determine whether the child is in fact an Indian child. [Citation.] Notice given under ICWA must therefore contain enough information to permit the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its 7 Mother nonetheless argues that CFS failed to discharge its duty of inquiry because in September 2025, after the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, she submitted a form stating that she has “Native American Blood” but did not know the tribe, yet CFS did not investigate further. But, by that point, CFS had asked Mother several times about her Indian ancestry, and she denied any. Despite her denials, CFS continued its inquiry by asking every possible maternal and family member whether the children have Indian ancestry and sending inquiry letters to the BIA and three Cherokee tribes. Because it is undisputed that CFS inquired with all currently identified extended family members, the juvenile court’s properly found that CFS performed a sufficient further ICWA inquiry and that ICWA does not apply here. And because Mother’s only argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA does not apply, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in terminating the parents’ parental rights. records to determine the child's eligibility for membership.” (Cheyanne F., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) CFS’s inquiry letters provided sufficient information for the Cherokee tribes to determine if the children were tribal members. 8 IV. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order terminating the parents’ parental rights to the children is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ J. We concur: McKINSTER _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ Acting P. J. FIELDS _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ J. 9