In re G.C. CA4/2

Filed 10/29/26 In re G.C. CA4/2 See Dissenting Opinion NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088091 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ2100481) v. OPINION A.C., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge. Affirmed. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1  On March 19, 2026, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of appellant A.C. (father) and mother to their son G.C. (G.C. or the child) under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father appeals contending respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) and the court failed to adequately discharge their duty of initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) when they failed to contact and interview the paternal grandfather (PGF). DPSS contends the PGF was not “reasonably available.” We affirm. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS A. Referral, Petition, and Detention. On November 27, 2024, DPSS received an immediate response referral of general neglect after mother gave birth to G.C. “on the curb at a friend’s home.” Father was not present at the birth because he was incarcerated.2 He had been arrested on November 18 for vehicle theft and possession of a stolen vehicle. Mother tested positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine, and G.C. started showing withdrawal symptoms. Mother denied Indian ancestry;3 however, father stated the PGF is “Apache Indian from El Paso Texas.” 1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Paternity testing confirmed father to be G.C.’s biological father. 3 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect is intended. 2 The paternal aunt denied Indian ancestry, but when asked about the PGF, she replied, “‘I’m not sure, maybe.’” On December 4, 2024, DPSS initiated this dependency action under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The petition alleged the child was at risk because (1) mother had a history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine and fentanyl, (2) she tested positive for both substances at the time of G.C.’s birth, (3) she previously failed to reunify with another child, and (4) both parents have significant criminal and child welfare histories involving substance abuse and neglect. Father has two older children, including a 12-year-old son who was in the care of the paternal aunt. The petition was amended on February 7, 2025, to add the child’s name (G.C.). At the December 5, 2024, detention hearing—and according to her ICWA 020 form—mother denied having any reason to believe G.C. could be Native American, but the paternal aunt stated PGF (Raymond Castoreno) said he is Native American. She had no information as to his specific tribe; however, she indicated that he lives in Washington. The juvenile court found that ICWA may apply and directed DPSS to conduct further inquiry. The child was detained, and subsequently placed in the same home as his paternal half sibling, A.C.4 B. Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports and Hearing. Upon further inquiry of the paternal aunt, she stated that PGF has “more information [about Indian ancestry; however,] she does not have contact information for 4 The half sibling (A.C.) is not a party to this matter; A.C. and G.C. share the same mother but have different fathers. 3 him.” She “denied any knowledge of any family members being registered tribal members.” In contrast, father claimed PGF “is registered Apache Indian. He was unable to specify further.” Subsequently, DPSS’s ICWA Noticing Office Assistant Lauren Arnoult “was able to find the father’s birth certificate from Washington to find out more information on the [PGF] and the paternal aunt.” DPSS sent certified inquiry notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Fort Sill Apache Tribe, Jicarilla Apache Nation, Mescalero Apache Tribe, San Carlos Apache Tribe, Tonto Apache Tribe of Arizona, White Mountain Apache Tribe, and Yavapai Apache Nation. It stated that the father and paternal aunt “disclosed possible Apache ancestry through the paternal grandfather, Raymond Castoreno.” It noted that PGF is also known as Raymond F. Castoreno, Ramond P. Castoreno, Raymond E. Castoreno, Raymond F. Casterano, Raymond Casterene, and Ray Castoreno. At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition to be true, declared G.C. a dependent of the court, ordered reunification services for father only, supervised visitation for both parents, and stated that ICWA may apply. C. Six-month Review Report and Hearing. In the six-month review report filed August 27, 2025, and addendum filed October 6, 2025, DPSS recommended termination of father’s reunification services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing with a permanent plan of adoption. It stated ICWA does not apply given the responses from the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, Yavapai Apache Nation, Tonto Apache Tribe of Arizona, Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, and Jicarilla Apache Nation. There 4 are no responses from the Mescalero Apache, San Carlos Apache, and White Mountain Apache tribes in the record. Reunification services were not offered to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), and father failed to “engage[] in or compl[y] with any aspect of his case plan.” He was incarcerated when the dependency was initiated in 2024, released on or about January 6, 2025, reincarcerated two days later, released for a few days in February, reincarcerated again, released around April 15, and reincarcerated on July 16. His new release date was set for February 20, 2026. While out of custody, he failed to follow through with visitation, had not maintained regular contact with the social worker, and had not drug tested or engaged in any services. The social worker opined that reunification “in this case is very unlikely” since father had neither complied with any case plan requirements nor visited his child. At the contested six-month review hearing on October 15, 2025, the juvenile court found that ICWA does not apply,5 terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing. D. Section 366.26 Report, Addendum, and Hearing. In its section 366.26 report and addendum, DPSS noted the adoptive parents of G.C.’s paternal half sibling A.C. wanted to adopt G.C. On March 19, 2026, the juvenile court noted the parents’ objection to termination of parental rights and adoption, found 5 On March 17, 2026, DPSS asked the maternal grandmother about Indian ancestry. She stated that the maternal great, great grandmother has ancestry with the Taino Puerto Rican Island Tribe; however, there is no tribal registration, and the Taino Tribe is not federally recognized. 5 G.C. adoptable, determined no exception to adoption applied, and terminated parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal. II. DISCUSSION Father contends DPSS failed to contact PGF about G.C.’s possible Indian heritage as required under section 242.2, subdivision (b), and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted. ICWA mandates that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a [s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child[6] is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe” of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) “California’s statutory scheme imposes a duty of initial inquiry on both the [social service agency] and the court. The [social service agency’s] duty arises when a report of abuse or neglect is made and/or when the county takes the child into its temporary custody. [Citation.] The inquiry ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’ [Citation.] Then, on the first appearance upon a petition, ‘the court shall ask each participant present in the 6 An “‘Indian child’” is defined as an unmarried minor who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) 6 hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ [Citations.]” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099, fns. omitted.) When conducting an inquiry investigation, the operative concept is to inquire of those people who are reasonably available to assist the social service agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) A reasonable inquiry and adequate ICWA investigation do not require an inquiry of every possible extended family in every case. (Dezi C., at p. 1140 [“[S]ection 224.2 ‘does not require the [social service] agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’”].) There is no statutory obligation to “‘search for possible Indian ancestry without regard to cost or other practical considerations. Rather, [section 224.2, subdivision (b),] is intended to ensure social workers “ask an added question of extended family members whom [they] often already are investigating in their usual course of work.” [Citation.] Despite its broad terms, section 224.2, subdivision (b) does not require inquiry with every adult living extended family member.’” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 86.) “Agencies are already tasked with investigating the circumstances underlying the child’s removal and identifying and locating the child’s extended family members [citation]; it is a rather simple task to ask those family members about Indian ancestry in this process.” (Dezi C., at p. 1143.) 7  Our review of DPSS’s inquiry is “not a mechanistic analysis of whether the record supports a finding of literal compliance with the statute, but ‘whether the ICWA inquiry conducted has reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry: Whether a child involved in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”’” (In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) “In answering this question, we must also consider the limitations on [DPSS’s] ability to carry out its inquiry under the particular facts of the case. . . . ‘[W]e cannot ask [DPSS] . . . to interview individuals for whom no contact information has been provided.’” (Ibid.) “A juvenile court’s finding that a social service agency conducted an adequate initial inquiry into whether a dependent child is an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of ICWA is affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.’ [Citation.] We review the juvenile court’s finding regarding the adequacy of the inquiry and ICWA’s applicability with deference. [Citation.] The juvenile court’s fact-specific determination is a quintessentially discretionary function. [Citation.] On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent. [Citation.]” (In re K.L. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989, 995.) Citing section 224.2, subdivision (i), father faults DPSS for failing to “provide the [juvenile] court with a showing of its due diligence in seeking to contact extended family members regarding potential Indian status.”{AOB 25-26} He focuses on one person: PGF. He claims the PGF was reasonably available because “the record shows his full name and that he was in El Paso, Texas.” In response, DPSS argues that it sought contact 8 information for PGF, but neither the paternal aunt nor the father had any contact information. The paternal aunt believed he was in Washington, while father opined that he was in El Paso, Texas. It cannot be said that PGF was reasonably available. Since neither father nor the paternal aunt had contact information for PGF, the juvenile court could reasonably find that they were the only reasonably available paternal relatives, and DPSS’s inquiry of them regarding G.C.’s status as an Indian child constituted an adequate investigation. (See In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082 [“we cannot ask the agency to intuit the names of unidentified family members or to interview individuals for whom no contact information has been provided”]; In re H.B., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 720 [“[r]equiring [DPSS] to track down information about extended family members beyond that offered by participants in the proceedings would impose an undue burden on [DPSS] and necessarily reduce the resources it has to otherwise protect the welfare of dependent children”].) “We decline to put the onus on [DPSS] to independently track down family members, like [PGF], who are not involved in the dependency proceedings and for whom [DPSS] had no good contact information. . . . Indeed, [DPSS] is not required to ‘cast about’ for investigative leads. [Citation.] [DPSS] is required to ‘ask an added question of extended family members whom [they] often already are investigating in their usual course of work.’ [Citation.] Where, as here, [DPSS] spoke to the parents, all known paternal . . . and maternal relatives . . . , inquiry was sufficient. [Citation.]” (In re K.L., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 996; see In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 382, 384- 9 385 [failure to contact four relatives after inquiring of 13 other relatives is sufficient initial inquiry].) III. DISPOSITION The findings and order of the juvenile court are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS McKINSTER Acting P. J. I concur: LEE J. 10 [In re G.C., E088091] RAPHAEL, J., dissenting. I would conditionally reverse and remand for further inquiry of the paternal grandfather about his Indian citizenship or ancestry. The majority opinion employs standards from case law about the initial inquiry into a child’s Indian status under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b).1 In those cases, courts have appropriately held that child welfare departments need not cast about for investigative leads by tracking down relatives for speculative questioning. This appeal concerns further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e), of a grandfather identified as Indian by both his children. As the trial court found, that information provided “reason to believe” the child was eligible for tribal membership, triggering a duty of further inquiry with requirements distinct from those governing initial inquiry. When a parent or grandparent is identified as Indian, the agency is no longer casting about for an investigative lead. It has a lead to follow. We should make clear that an agency conducting further inquiry must make a meaningful effort to interview an identified relative who may provide information essential to determining a child’s tribal eligibility. 1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 1  I The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over Indian children. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (Dezi C.).) ICWA empowers tribes to “intervene at any point” in a child welfare proceeding involving an Indian child (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), and a tribe may petition a California court to invalidate any action taken in violation of ICWA. (25 U.S.C. § 1914; Dezi C., at p. 1129.) “The protection of the tribal interest is at the core of ICWA and our state counterpart. . . . The relevant rights belong to Indian tribes.” (In re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 711.) Cal-ICWA (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) effectuates ICWA by imposing on child welfare agencies an “affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire into whether a child in a dependency case may be Indian. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “‘The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.’” (In re C.L. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 377, 384.) The duty of further inquiry is at issue here. Initial Inquiry. Even absent an indication a child is Indian, inquiry must occur throughout a dependency case. At “the first contact with each child and each family member, including extended family members, the county welfare department . . . has a duty to inquire whether that child is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Also, at hearings, the trial court must ask every “interested person” at their first appearance whether they have reason to know the child is Indian. (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Even in the initial inquiry, agencies have some duty to seek out family members. 2 After any child is taken into custody, the initial inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child. . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); see Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [“As required by statute, an adequate initial inquiry that reaches beyond parents to extended family members and others facilitates the discovery of Indian identity, and maximizes the chances that potential Indian children are discovered and tribes are notified”].) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) The agency need not locate all these relatives to comply with the initial inquiry duty. “Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that this duty of initial inquiry does not require interviewing ‘every’ extended family member; rather, where the juvenile court’s finding that [the agency] conducted an adequate inquiry and that ICWA does not apply is ‘supported by sufficient evidence,’ conditional reversal is not required ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.’ ” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290, citing Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1140-1141.) Further Inquiry. In 2019, the Legislature “imposed a duty to conduct additional investigation into a child’s possible status as an Indian child if the court or agency has ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)” (In re K.T. (2022) 3 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 743 (K.T.).) The Legislature defined “reason to believe” as having “ ‘information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ ” (Ibid.; § 224.2, subd. (e)(1); see In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 404 [further inquiry triggered by statement by paternal grandmother that she had Indian heritage through her grandmother].) The reason for further inquiry is to help the court “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) Once information triggers the duty of further inquiry, the statute places three specific duties on agencies to perform “‘as soon as practicable.’” (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 743; § 224.2, subd. (e)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) The first of these is “[i]nterviewing” parents and extended family members to “gather the information required” in a list in the statutes. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A); rule 5.481(a)(4)(A); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132 [“The required further inquiry includes . . . interviewing the parents and extended family members”].) One of the required items to be obtained is: “All names known of the Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment, membership, or citizenship information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) Further inquiry naturally demands more of an agency than does an initial inquiry. 4 The initial-inquiry statute requires the agency to ask extended family members whether a child is Indian. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) The further-inquiry statute requires the agency to interview parents and extended family members to gather specified information about the child’s family and ancestry. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A); 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) The statutory scheme would make little sense if the further inquiry duty were no more demanding than the initial inquiry duty. For that reason, the case law about the lack of duty to track down investigative leads in the initial inquiry cases does not control further inquiry cases. (See In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 30-31.) Instead, as here, a further inquiry means there is an investigative lead, and courts should emphasize an agency’s duty to make a meaningful effort to track it down. (See In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 326 [on further inquiry remand, agency must “make a meaningful and thorough inquiry. . .including interviews with extended family members”; In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 297 [same].) In K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 737, our division published an opinion to emphasize the duty of further inquiry. There, the parents had presented a claim of “possible” ancestry in three Indian nations. (Ibid.) The child welfare agency did little investigation, though it sent notices with some information to some tribes. (Id. at p. 738.) The agency conceded that it had failed to satisfy the duty of further inquiry. (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 743.) We stated that, among other things, “they should have tried to contact the maternal grandfather or maternal aunt to obtain additional information about” the Indian heritage. (Ibid.) We stated similar things about the paternal relatives. 5 (Id. at p. 744.) In particular, we stated that the agency “does not discharge their duty of further inquiry until they make a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and interview extended family members and to contact BIA and the tribes.” (Ibid.) We recognized that just as proper notice to tribes is necessary to effectuate ICWA’s purpose, “ ‘an adequate investigation of a family member’s belief [that] a child may have Indian ancestry is essential to ensuring a tribe entitled to ICWA notice will receive it.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Even before the 2019 statutory amendments, our division conditionally reversed in In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 707-709 (K.R.) for further ICWA inquiry where DPSS had sent notices to tribes but failed to adequately inquire of extended family. Tribal membership criteria are unique to each tribe, and “only a tribe can determine whether a child is a member of, or eligible for membership in, that tribe.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.) Obtaining meaningful information in the further inquiry can help ensure “tribes’ important sovereign right to determine whether the child is a member of, or eligible for membership in, the tribe.” (Ibid.) II At the first hearing in this case, when the child was nine days old, the child’s aunt was the only paternal family member present. She told the court that her father (the child’s grandfather) “says that he’s Native American.” She said: “I would have to ask him what tribe he’s registered to.” She said he was still living in Washington, and his name was Raymond Castoreno. The court said: “based on the information provided, I’ll find that ICWA may apply and direct the Department to conduct further inquiry.” The 6 minute order stated that the court found “there is reason to believe” the child is Indian and ordered the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) to “complete further inquiry.” DPSS never contacted the paternal grandfather (PGF), even though he was the reason for the further inquiry. Our record shows that the child’s father, apparently then incarcerated in San Diego, told DPSS by phone that the PGF “is registered Apache Indian” and is “from El Paso Texas.” The paternal aunt told DPSS that the PGF “would have more information but she does not have contact information for him.” DPSS asked neither her nor the father for other information that would help find the PGF’s contact information. DPSS used “CalSAWS and idiCORE Interactive Data” to “find the father’s birth certificate from Washington.”2 There is no indication databases were used to find contact information for the PGF. Two weeks after the hearing, DPSS sent notices to eight Apache tribes that contained the paternal grandfather’s name, in various versions that included three different middle initials and some alternate spellings. The agency also sent a notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The record reflects no ICWA inquiry after that point. The court terminated 2 CalSAWS is a “statewide automated welfare system” for benefits programs. (§ 10823.1.) The idiCORE company provides “skip tracing” services. (Swanson v. National Credit Services, Inc. (W.D. Wash May 31, 2022, No. C19-1504-RSL) 2022 U.S. Dist.Lexis 96953 at p. *2.) 7 parental rights about a year and a quarter later. III DPSS learned from the paternal aunt that the PGF, her father, was living in Washington and named Raymond Castoreno. That made him an extended family member whom section 224.2, subdivision (b)(2) states should be asked in the initial inquiry if the child is Indian. In an initial inquiry, though, case law might permit DPSS not to seek him out. DPSS here was tasked with a further inquiry because of reason to believe the child is Indian. Section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(A) identifies the PGF as an extended family member for “[i]nterviewing” to “gather the information” specified about the family. The purpose is to help the court determine if there is reason to know the child is Indian, including by contacting tribes and “sharing information.” (§ 224.2, subds. (e)(2) & (e)(2)(C).) There is thus a stronger burden on DPSS to talk to the PGF than in the initial phase, with no reason to believe the child is Indian. (See K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 743.) Here, though, the reason to talk to the PGF is stronger still. The PGF is the person identified as Indian by his daughter (the aunt) and son (the father). He is the person best positioned to indicate which Indian tribe needs information and what the important family information is. Interviewing him is a statutory requirement, and its value to the inquiry should be obvious. The record indicates DPSS performed some type of database search to learn about 8 the PGF, as the agency provided information to Apache tribes that persons with his first and last name had used three different middle initials and alternate spellings of his name. But the record does not show that DPSS used that database, the other databases used in this case, a DMV records request, or even free Internet searches to locate the PGF’s contact information. (See, e.g., Lang v. Tharpe (E.D. Wis. Sep. 14, 2020, No. 18-cv- 1077-PP) 2020 U.S. Dist.Lexis 167144 at pp.*74-75 [idiCORE search results showed a person’s most recent addresses and earlier addresses]; Swanson v. National Credit Services, Inc., supra, Lexis 96953, at p. *2 [idiCORE used to obtain a Washington phone number].) The agency asked the aunt for the PGF’s contact information, and she said she did not have it. There is no indication that DPSS asked her for other information that would help in a database search. She was raised in Washington until age 13; her parents divorced there when she was 4; yet the record does not show that DPSS asked her for an address or city in which the PGF had lived, to help with database identification of the PGF’s contact information. (See K.R., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 707 [conditionally reversing where our division stated, among other things, “there is no information in the record that DPSS wrote to the paternal grandfather at his last known address to seek [family] information or that it made any other effort to contact him”]; In re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 481 [conditionally reversing where our division stated that DPSS failed to ask the paternal grandfather for details about lineal ancestors and failed to contact paternal cousins who were reportedly registered members of an unidentified 9 Cherokee tribe].) Requiring the agency to make a meaningful effort to locate one identified grandfather is a modest obligation in an inquiry that already requires the collection of detailed family information. (See In re G.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 31-33 [conditional remand to inquire of paternal grandmother where no contact information had been provided, though she reportedly had been reached on LinkedIn].) When a parent or grandparent is identified as the sole person who knows about the family’s Indian ancestry, contacting that person offers a more direct path to reliable information than piecing together information that others heard from that person. If the process were handled correctly, this inquiry might reduce the burden of sending tribal notices by directing them to a particular tribe identified by the PGF, or it might eliminate the notices entirely. As well, if DPSS provides notices to a tribe, it must supplement later with any information that was required to be in the original notice. (§ 224.2, subd. (j).) Finding the best source early can reduce the need for supplementation. If reasonable efforts do not locate the PGF, DPSS should document those efforts and explain why it did not pursue him further. The agency need not search indefinitely, but it must make a “ ‘meaningful effort’ ” to “locate and interview” a PGF who is identified as an Indian. (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) If the inquiry leads to a “dead end,” at least that would “be the result of investigation not assumption.” (Ibid.) IV ‘“[A]n inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile 10 court’s order terminating parental rights with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by record documentation.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) With an inadequate inquiry the record is underdeveloped, so “it is impossible for reviewing courts to assess prejudice because we simply do not know what additional information will be revealed from an adequate inquiry.” (Ibid.) That is, when the inquiry is inadequate, we do not evaluate whether the inquiry likely would have made a difference. “ICWA and Cal-ICWA . . . make clear that the inquiry is not concerned with the outcome, but rather with the protection of tribal rights, including the tribes’ right to determine whether a child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1144.) Even where a parent’s counsel conceded that “the likelihood of the tribe actually intervening and removing a child from placement is minimal,” our Supreme Court conditionally reversed a case for further inquiry. (Ibid.) Nor were DPSS’s quick notices to eight Apache tribes a substitute for interviewing the PGF. First, the father stated that the PGF is a “registered Apache Indian,” but that has not been confirmed in any way. We cannot evaluate the basis for the father’s view or his certainty of it. He could have misremembered the tribe or nation. Or the PGF may have some Apache ethnicity but registration with a tribe without “Apache” in its name. For instance, some Apaches historically lived with the Comanche and Kiowa, which are separate federally recognized tribes. (See, e.g., Martinez v. State (Okla. Ct. Crim. Appeals 2021) 502 P.3d 1115, 1118 [referring to boundaries of the former “Kiowa Comanche Apache Reservation”]; 91 Fed. Reg. 4102.) The father described the PGF as 11 from El Paso, and the only federally recognized tribe in that city is not Apache, but the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo. (89 Fed. Reg. 14679.) A National Park Service study described that tribe as a “melting pot” characterized by “frequent intermarriage” with members of tribes that include Apache. (National Park Service, Amistad National Recreation Area, Del Rio Texas: American Indian Tribal Affiliation Study, Phase 1: Ethnohistoric Literature Review (2002) <https://npshistory.com/publications/amis/aspr- 34/chap3.htm>[as of Oct. 26, 2026]) Another tribe, the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, was not noticed because it currently does not have “Apache” in its name, yet it used to be known as the Fort McDowell Mohave-Apache Community. (See In re Glorianna K. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447; 68 Fed. Reg. 68180.) Any of these tribes have “ ‘sole authority’ ” to determine their membership eligibility criteria and who meets it, and if they wished to intervene in this case, their determination on the child’s citizenship would be “‘“‘conclusive’”’” for Cal-ICWA. (In re A.A. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.) These possibilities illustrate why identifying the tribes entitled to notice, and determining what information those tribes need, can require care and deliberation. (See 91 Fed. Reg. 4102 [listing 575 federally recognized tribes].) Relying on secondhand statements without pursuing the person identified as the source of relevant information risks replacing “investigation” with “assumption.” (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) The PGF is the most direct source of information about his tribal affiliation, if any, yet no one interviewed him. 12  V Were this an initial-inquiry case, with no indication that the child might be Indian, I would apply the case law cited by the majority and accept DPSS’s inquiry. But this is a further-inquiry case, triggered because the grandfather’s own children identified him as Indian. DPSS should therefore be required to make a meaningful effort to locate and interview him. His ancestry could bear directly on whether the child is an Indian child under ICWA. I would conditionally reverse and remand for further inquiry. RAPHAEL _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ J. 13