In re B.G. CA2/6

Filed 11/12/26 In re B.G. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re B.G. et al., 2d Juv. Nos. B351569, B353235 Persons Coming Under the (Super. Ct. No. 23JD-00268) Juvenile Court Law. (San Luis Obispo County) SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.G., Defendant and Appellant. R.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court orders terminating services, setting permanency hearings, and terminating her parental rights as to son B.G. and daughter D.G.1 (Welf. & Inst. Code,2 § 366.26.) Mother requests the notice of appeal in case No. B353235 be deemed timely filed. The San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services (the Department) contends Mother’s appeals3 are barred by the disentitlement doctrine, Mother’s failure to comply with the writ requirement, and forfeiture. As to B.G., Mother contends the federal court had jurisdiction, and the juvenile court erred by finding contact would impose a permanent detriment. As to D.G., Mother contends the juvenile court erred because it terminated services without giving notice of the permanency hearing and a basis to bypass services. And as to both children, Mother contends parental rights were improperly terminated. We grant the motion deeming the notice of appeal timely filed and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mother legally adopted B.G. (age 12) and D.G. (age 6) in January 2023.4 Both children suffered from trauma and instability and were receiving therapy. Mother was evicted in 1 In January 2026, the juvenile court granted a name change from V.G. to D.G. 2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 3 Appeal No. B351569 challenges the orders terminating reunification services and setting the cases for section 366.26 hearings. Appeal No. B353235 challenges the termination of parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing. We consolidated the appeals for argument and decision. 4 No father was a party to this case. 2 August 2023 due to nonpayment of rent, threats toward the landlord, and substance abuse. She and the children then lived in a campground, and later in a motel. The children were detained in September 2023 when they were found in a “messy” motel room in the care of Mother’s 18-year-old daughter who was “under the influence of marijuana.” Medication bottles were within their reach. At the detention hearing, the court ordered the children removed from Mother’s custody and placed them with relatives (the foster parents). It was reported that Mother used her adoption assistance money to purchase methamphetamine rather than provide her children with food, basic needs, and safe, stable housing. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted using THC and opiates. She also refused to engage with social workers to complete a child and family team meeting. The court sustained the petition (§ 300, subd. (b)) and adjudged the children dependents of the court. They remained placed with the foster parents. The court ordered reunification services and visitation for both children. Subsequent events regarding B.G. At the 12-month review, B.G., then age 14, remained placed with the foster parents with reunification services. He felt safe and cared for at his placement. He consistently stated he did not want to live with or visit Mother. He was upset that Mother tried to involve him in a civil case, pressured him to fire his lawyer, and asked him to lie. He was also upset that Mother approached him while he was walking and pressured him to get into her car. A status review report in May 2025 indicated that B.G. “continues to adamantly express that he does not want to have 3 contact with [Mother] and does not want to return to her care. Given his age and wishes, it would not be in his best interest to force him home and cause further trauma.” The Department recommended reunification services be terminated as to B.G. at the 18-month hearing because Mother “does not meet the requirements to continue services to the 24-month mark as she has not been in a substance abuse treatment center, was not in custody, and has not been having consistent and regular visitation with [B.G.]. In addition, the Department does not believe that [B.G.] would return to [Mother’s] care if Family Reunification Services were continued given the current dynamic of their relationship.” In June 2025, Mother released confidential case information to approximately 40 unauthorized recipients. She refused to allow contact between B.G. and D.G. despite their close bond and desire to see each other. She sent the foster parents a purported cease and desist notice unilaterally declaring the foster placement unlawful and purporting to revoke the foster parents’ authority. Mother threatened to come to their home and pick up B.G., and threatened a “legal response” if they interfered. She also interfered with B.G.’s therapy and tried to prevent the CASA (court-appointed special advocate) from interacting with him. B.G. stated Mother’s conduct caused him stress and anxiety and he did not wish to have contact with her. He was so frightened he spent several nights in a different location to avoid Mother confronting him. He carried a letter with him identifying him as a foster child in case Mother attempted to remove him or force him into a car. The foster parents obtained a temporary restraining order against Mother barring her from contacting them or B.G. 4  In July 2025, Mother filed a notice purporting to remove the case to federal court. The district court ruled it lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case back to juvenile court. At the 18-month permanency hearing in July 2025, the court granted B.G.’s petition to change court order (§ 388) and barred visitation or contact with Mother because it found it was permanently detrimental to him. The court terminated reunification services as to B.G. and set a section 366.26 hearing. Subsequent events regarding D.G. At the 12-month review, D.G. was ordered returned to Mother with family maintenance services. Mother was thereafter unable to maintain stable housing due to nonpayment of rent and lease violations. At one point, Mother and D.G. squatted in an apartment. For a time, they had no running water or electricity. D.G. witnessed Mother shouting at and threatening an older daughter and throwing and breaking things. Mother canceled an appointment for D.G. to see her attorney’s representative and declined to reschedule it. D.G. desired to live with the foster parents so she could see B.G. more often and could “ ‘stay in one house’ ” and not “ ‘have to move so much.’ ” D.G. had 20 truancies at school and had not been to therapy for several months. Mother was evicted from her residence in July 2025. She did not notify the Department where she and D.G. were living. A protective custody warrant was issued. The Department searched for Mother and D.G. in several counties but was unable to find them. In August, Mother was arrested for violating the restraining order but refused to disclose D.G.’s location. The Department found D.G. shortly thereafter. The Department filed a section 387 supplemental petition 5 seeking D.G.’s removal from Mother’s custody because “[t]he previous disposition has not been effective in the protection or rehabilitation of the child.” It alleged that Mother violated the case plan by not allowing D.G. to visit B.G. for four months, did not appear in court with D.G. as ordered, discontinued D.G.’s therapy, and did not make D.G. available to contact her attorney, social worker, or CASA. Mother did not appear at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the section 387 petition on September 3, 2025. The court found the allegations of the petition true. The court placed D.G. in the same foster home as B.G. Over the objection of Mother’s counsel, the court terminated Mother’s services as to D.G. and set a section 366.26 hearing. Termination of parental rights The Department recommended termination of Mother’s parental rights as to both children. Neither child wanted contact with Mother. The foster parents and both children wanted the foster parents to adopt them. Mother was present via Zoom at the section 366.26 permanency hearing for both minors on January 14, 2026. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights, found the children were likely to be adopted, and designated adoption as the permanent plan. DISCUSSION Notice of appeal Mother requests that we deem the notice of appeal in case No. B353235 timely filed. We grant the motion. On March 12, 2026, Mother in pro per sent an email to the clerk of the juvenile court seeking to appeal the termination of parental rights. The email stated: “Please submit my Jv-800 to 6 appeal all findings and orders from Jan 14, 2026 & subsequent hearings & to preserve the record. [¶] Please send confirmation when received.” The email concluded with Mother’s name and email addresses. Neither a JV-800 (optional Judicial Council notice of appeal form) nor other documentation was attached. The juvenile court clerk stamped the email “Electronically FILED: 03/12/2026.” Filing of the notice of appeal on that day was shown in the court’s case summary docket. The following day, the clerk emailed Mother and asked if “the JV-800 was mistakenly not attached to the email.” The email was returned as undeliverable because Mother’s mailbox was full. Treating Mother’s email as a notice of appeal, the clerk advised the reporter to prepare a reporter’s transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court,5 rule 8.405(b)(1)(B).) On March 18, Mother filed an amended notice of appeal. The juvenile court clerk served copies of it on the parties and the Court of Appeal, inaccurately identifying it as “the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL Judicial Council Form JV-800 filed March 12, 2026 by MOTHER.” We requested and received letter briefs to address whether the March 12 email constituted an effective and timely notice of appeal. On June 24, Mother also filed a motion in this court to deem the notice of appeal timely filed. The Department opposed the motion. We grant the motion. “This state has a ‘strong public policy in favor of hearing appeals on their merits and of not depriving a party of [their] right of appeal because of technical noncompliance where [they are] attempting to perfect [their] appeal in good faith.’ ” (Seeley 5 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 7 v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 853–854; see K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882.) “The notice of appeal must be liberally construed, and is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Rule 8.405(a)(3).) The March 12 email here stated the date of the judgment appealed from and was sufficient to advise the court of Mother’s intent to appeal. (Mamer v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 569, 571–572.) Mother’s typed name was also a sufficient signature. (Rules 2.257(a), 8.75(b)(1), 8.405(a)(2); Smith v. Ostly (1959) 53 Cal.2d 262, 265.) The only information lacking was the case number. But the clerk’s office was able to identify the case because it filed the email under the proper case number and entered it in the case information docket for that case. The March 12 email was also timely because it was sent within the jurisdictional deadline of 60 days from the order appealed from. (Rule 8.406(a)(1).) We need not resolve whether the email was a “ ‘document’ ” submitted for “ ‘[e]lectronic filing.’ ” (Rule 2.250(b)(1) & (7); see Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6, subd. (a); Gharraee v. Trader Joe’s Co. (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 786, 792.) Here, Mother could reasonably rely on the clerk’s actions accepting the email as a notice of appeal. (See People v. Martin (1963) 60 Cal.2d 615, 618–619.) Because we conclude the March 12 email was sufficient, we need not discuss whether the amended notice of appeal was timely. Procedural challenges The Department contends Mother’s appeals are barred based on disentitlement, forfeiture, and the failure to file writ petitions. Except for the contention that Mother forfeited her claim of inadequate notice of the September 3 hearing on the 8 supplemental section 387 petition, we reject the Department’s contentions. 1. Disentitlement The Department asks that we dismiss Mother’s appeals because she failed to attend trial court hearings, disobeyed court orders, and did not cooperate with counsel or the Department. Disentitlement “ ‘ “ ‘is an exercise of a state court’s inherent power to use its processes to induce compliance’ ” with a presumptively valid order.’ ” (In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, 474.) “In dependency cases, the doctrine has been applied only in cases of the most egregious conduct by the appellant, which frustrates the purpose of dependency law and makes it impossible to protect the child or act in the child’s best interests.” (Ibid.) Dismissal is discretionary. (Ibid.) We do not condone Mother’s violations of court orders, but conclude they did not prevent the juvenile court from exercising its jurisdiction to protect the children. We exercise our discretion to not apply the disentitlement doctrine. 2. Writ requirement Mother was not present at the hearings when the juvenile court terminated reunification services regarding B.G. and D.G. and set section 366.26 hearings. In each case, the clerk mailed a blank Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition (Judicial Council Forms form JV-820) to Mother’s post office box. The notice regarding D.G. was mailed one day late. (Rule 5.590(b)(2); In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 726 [rule’s time limits mandatory].) Ordinarily, an order setting a 366.26 hearing, “or any findings subsumed therein, [cannot] be appealed unless earlier writ review of any substantive claim was first sought and 9 denied.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413; § 366.26, subd. (l)(1); rules 5.590(b), 5.695(f)(6)–(10), 8.450, 8.452.) The appellant must file a timely notice of intent to file the writ petition. (Rules 5.590(b), 5.695(f)(6), 8.450(e).) But Judicial Council forms JV-820 (notice of intent to file writ petition) and JV-825 (petition for extraordinary writ) “must accompany all mailed and electronically served notices informing the parties of their rights.” (Rule 5.590(b)(4).) The clerk here provided only form JV-820 and not JV-825. Because the juvenile court did not provide the notice required by rule 5.590(b), good cause exists to excuse the failure to comply with the writ requirement. (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1245.)6 3. Forfeiture We agree Mother forfeited the claim of inadequate notice of the hearing on the supplemental section 387 petition on September 3. But we conclude Mother did not forfeit issues she adequately raised in the juvenile court: the juvenile court’s jurisdiction after removal to federal court, and whether visitation would be detrimental to B.G. (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) Because these issues present questions of law or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence (In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287–288), we reach the merits. 6 While Mother did not file a notice of intent to file a writ, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court alleging that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction due to the pendency of the federal action and seeking immediate return of the children. The petition was summarily denied. We grant Mother’s request for judicial notice of the writ petition and order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).) 10  Federal court jurisdiction regarding B.G. Mother contends the juvenile court had no jurisdiction on July 30, 2025, when it terminated reunification services as to B.G. because it had not yet received notice that the federal court had remanded the case. We are not persuaded. On July 17, 2025, Mother filed a notice in federal district court purporting to remove the case to federal court. On July 30, Mother filed notice in juvenile court of the federal court filing. But on July 30, the district court ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case back to juvenile court. The federal court sent a certified copy of the order the same day. We conclude the timing of these filings does not establish jurisdiction was suspended when the juvenile court made its orders on July 30. State court jurisdiction is suspended when notice of removal is filed with the state court (here, on July 30). (Spanair S.A. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 348, 355–356.) But remand to the state court was effective when the federal court mailed the state court a certified copy of the order denying removal (here, also on July 30). (Id. at pp. 356–358.) Because the order terminating reunification services as to D.G. and setting the section 366.26 hearing also occurred on July 30, Mother has not met her burden to show that jurisdiction was suspended. (See Holcomb v. Bingham Toyota (9th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2d 109, 110.) Termination of services regarding B.G. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when, at the 18-month review hearing, it terminated reunification services and contact as to B.G. based on a finding of permanent detriment. We disagree. “[C]ourt-ordered services may be extended up to a 11 maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Here, the court ordered B.G. removed from Mother’s custody and placed with the foster parents at the detention hearing in October 2023, more than 18 months before the 18-month review hearing of July 30, 2025. At that hearing, the time to provide services had expired. Mother has not shown “ ‘ “extraordinary circumstances” ’ ” that would have warranted continuing the permanency planning hearing and reunification services beyond 18 months. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632–633.) The court also did not err when it terminated visitation as to B.G. “In any case in which the court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held, it shall also order the termination of reunification services to the parent or legal guardian. The court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).) This standard applies where, as here, the finding is made at a hearing on a petition for modification pursuant to section 388. (In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 760.) There is a split of authority whether we review denial of visitation for substantial evidence or abuse of discretion. (See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1219.) We conclude there was no error under either standard. Mother gave the foster parents written demands stating the court-ordered foster placement was unlawful and threatening to take B.G. Mother did not allow B.G. to visit his sister, tried to involve him in a civil case, and asked him to lie. Mother’s actions caused B.G. stress and anxiety and he did not want contact with her. This evidence supported the 12 termination of visitation and reunification services. We also reject Mother’s contention that the standards to issue a restraining order were not met. The standards for restraining orders (§ 213.5) do not apply to the termination of reunification services and visitation that were made here pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (h). (See In re D.B. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 592, 610 [issuance of restraining order under § 213.5 does not require consideration of family preservation “[w]ithin the context of the complex dependency rubric”].) Notice of hearing to terminate services regarding D.G. Mother contends the court did not provide adequate notice of the September 3 hearing on the Department’s section 387 petition. This claim is forfeited because Mother’s counsel did not object to lack of notice on September 3, and Mother did not make a motion in the trial court to vacate the ruling based on lack of notice. (Avalos v. Perez (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 773, 776–777.) Forfeiture aside, adequate notice was provided to Mother. In August 2025, Mother left the county in violation of a court order and her whereabouts were unknown to the Department. Mother willfully failed to appear at the hearing on August 7 when the September 3 hearing date was announced. The Department provided notice to Mother’s post office box on August 15. Mother had notified the Department that this was her address, and she provided it as her address in court filings. We conclude the Department provided “ ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Mother] of the pendency of the action and afford [her] an opportunity to present [her] objections.’ ” (In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1418.) 13  Termination of services regarding D.G. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it discontinued reunification services regarding D.G. because it did not find a basis to bypass services. We disagree. At the jurisdictional and disposition hearing on the supplemental section 387 petition, the 18-month period to provide “court-ordered services” had expired. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A).) This time limit applies where, as here, the minor has received a combination of reunification and maintenance services, which are “part of the continuum of child welfare services.” (Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 165 (Carolyn R.); In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 381.) The court had placed D.G. with the foster parents at the detention hearing in October 2023. Reunification services were ordered at the disposition hearing on the original petition in December 2023. While D.G. was later returned to Mother’s custody, “[p]hysical custody of the child by the parents or guardians during the applicable time period . . . shall not serve to interrupt the running of the [reunification] time period.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Family maintenance services were also ordered when she was returned to Mother. Where the court sustains a supplemental section 387 petition and orders the child removed, and where the services have already been offered for 18 months, the court may extend services only under “very limited circumstances.”7 (Carolyn R., at p. 167.) None of those 7 Those circumstances include “when: no reunification plan was ever developed for the parent [citation]; the court finds reasonable services were not offered [citation]; or the best interests of the child would be served by a continuance (see § 352) of an 18-month review hearing [citation].” (Carolyn R., at p. 167.) 14 exceptions apply here. Accordingly, the court may terminate services and set a section 366.26 hearing. (Id., at p. 162.) In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, upon which Mother relies, is not to the contrary. Z.G. held that parental rights cannot be terminated based solely on a finding of probable adoption, but must also include one of the “additional findings” of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (Z.G., at p. 387.) Z.G. did not address the basis for terminating reunification services. “Failure to order additional reunification services when a court removes a child from parental custody incident to a section 387 petition is reversible error only if under the particular facts of the case the juvenile court abuses its discretion in failing to order such services.” (Carolyn R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166–167.) Here, Mother’s conduct supported termination of reunification services. Mother violated the case plan by not allowing D.G. to visit B.G., discontinuing D.G.’s therapy, and not making D.G. available to contact her attorney, social worker, or CASA. Mother remained unable to provide stable housing and did not notify the Department of her or D.G.’s whereabouts. As a result, the Department could not check on D.G.’s physical or emotional wellbeing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Termination of parental rights The court may terminate parental rights when it finds by clear and convincing evidence it is likely the child will be adopted, and makes one of the “additional findings” of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re Z.G., supra, 19 Cal.5th at Extension of services to 24 months is authorized under sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(4) and 366.22, subdivision (b). 15 p. 387.) These additional findings include that “under Section 366.21 or 366.22, that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated reunification services, [which] shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Reunification services regarding B.G. were terminated at the 18-month review hearing. Reunification services regarding D.G. were terminated at the disposition of the Department’s supplemental section 387 petition. Termination of parental rights is not limited to cases where reunification services had been terminated at a review hearing (as with B.G), but also applies where the order was made at a section 387 hearing (as with D.G.). In ordering reunification services terminated at the section 387 hearing, the court “essentially borrow[s] from the periodic review statutes [sections 366.21 or 366.22] their provisions relating to reunification services and apply those provisions in determining a parent’s entitlement to further reunification services.” (D.T. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1039.) And “[i]n any case in which the court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held, it shall also order the termination of reunification services to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h), italics added.) Here, termination of parental rights was authorized because the children were removed from Mother’s custody, reunification services had been terminated at a review or section 387 hearing, and the court found it likely they would be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Because the statutory preference is adoption, parental rights were appropriately terminated. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) Mother contends the record did not establish she was unfit. 16 We are not persuaded. “By the time dependency proceedings have reached the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple specific findings of parental unfitness,” including “the grounds for initial removal of the child from parental custody” and “a series of hearings involving ongoing reunification efforts.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253.) Such findings were made here. “[T]he purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) This case is unlike In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, upon which Mother relies. There, parental rights were terminated for the noncustodial nonoffending father based on his inability to find housing. (Id. at p. 1212.) But here, detriment to the children was not limited to Mother’s inconsistent ability to provide housing. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, asked B.G. to lie thereby causing him undue stress, pressured B.G. to get into her car, interfered with B.G.’s therapy and his contact with CASA, and threatened to remove B.G. from the foster parents’ custody. Mother refused to disclose D.G.’s whereabouts, refused to bring her to court as ordered, missed D.G.’s therapy appointments, and failed to make her available to her attorney or to the Department. She also violated the visitation order by not allowing the children to see each other, which was important to both of them. Substantial evidence supports the orders terminating parental rights and setting adoption as the permanent plan. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services (B351569), entered July 30, 2025, as to B.G. (23JD- 17 00268-001), and September 3, 2025, as to D.G. (23JD-00268-002), and terminating Mother’s parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan as to both children entered January 14, 2026 (B353235), are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. BALTODANO, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J. 18  Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, Vincent M. Uberti, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.