Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 Macias v. State Personnel Board CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) HAROLD MACIAS, C104494 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 23WM000015) v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) terminated Harold Macias’s employment as a correctional officer at Mule Creek State Prison for participating in an off-duty altercation with a member of the public and lying about the incident in a subsequent investigation. Macias appealed the termination to the State Personnel Board (the Board). An administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing and agreed Macias was an unreliable narrator of events surrounding the altercation. Even so, the ALJ found the Department failed to prove dishonesty or insubordination by a preponderance of the evidence. While the ALJ dismissed those charges, he nevertheless found Macias’s conduct constituted inexcusable neglect of duty, 1 discourteous treatment of the public, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, which justified dismissal. The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision. Macias sought judicial review of the Board’s decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court. The trial court denied the petition. Macias appeals, arguing (1) the Department failed to establish the required nexus between his off-duty misconduct and his employment as a correctional officer, and (2) the Board violated due process by sustaining the termination on different factual bases than those alleged in the operative notice of adverse action. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. The Incident at Tank House Macias and his girlfriend went on a day trip to Sacramento on Saturday, May 29, 2021. They started the day at a midtown restaurant, where Macias had a Bloody Mary and a beer. Next they went to a bar, where they met Macias’s friend and fellow correctional officer, Curtis Williams. After the bar, the group made their way to Tank House, another midtown restaurant. They ate lunch at an outside table and had more drinks. Macias’s girlfriend left Tank House around 2:30 p.m. to attend a family gathering. Macias walked his girlfriend to her car, then headed back to the restaurant to rejoin Williams. Joseph Burkley and a female companion were standing on the sidewalk outside the entrance to Tank House when Macias returned. Facing away from Macias, Burkley moved his elbow slightly as the correctional officer walked by, causing momentary contact between the two. Macias continued walking towards his table. Burkley said, “ ‘You should watch where the fuck you are going.’ ” Macias turned around and walked back towards Burkley, coming to a stop approximately 18 inches 2 from him. The two men then began a profanity laced argument about who was to blame for the contact, and who owed an apology.1 Williams heard the argument and walked to where Macias and Burkley were standing. Williams urged Burkley to go inside the restaurant and place his order. Burkley then started yelling at Williams. After approximately one minute, Macias said something to Burkley, pointed towards an alley adjacent to the restaurant, then walked backwards in the direction of the alley some 10 to 15 feet, while staring at Burkley and gesturing with open palms and arms extended at waist level. Burkley continued to focus on Williams, and Macias soon returned. Tank House employee K.M. came outside and stood between Macias and Burkley, trying to defuse the tension. The argument continued, with K.M. standing in the middle of the cluster of arguing men. After a few moments, Macias again walked backwards towards the alley, still gesturing towards Burkley. As before, Burkley primarily focused on Williams, and Macias quickly returned to the group. The men continued arguing and milling around K.M. After a couple of seconds, Burkley hiked up his shorts and assumed a fighting stance. Macias squared off against him. Burkley reached around K.M. to punch Macias. Macias blocked the punch. Burkley then backed away, and Macias and Williams advanced on him. Burkley punched Williams in the head. Williams quickly recovered and landed several blows of his own. Macias punched Burkley once or twice in the melee. After a few seconds, Burkley started grappling with Williams and forced him to the ground. Macias and Williams then overwhelmed Burkley and pinned him to the ground. K.M walked over and told the men to stop fighting and leave the area. Williams released Burkley and stood up. Macias also stood, while simultaneously holding Burkley 1 By then, Macias had consumed a Bloody Mary, four beers, and two shots of bourbon whiskey. 3 in a front-facing headlock. As they rose, Macias punched Burkley once in the torso. K.M. stepped between the men again. The fight was over. Burkley walked away from the restaurant in one direction, and Macias and Williams walked away in another. The entire altercation lasted approximately three minutes and was recorded on Tank House surveillance video. B. The Shooting Macias and Williams walked approximately two blocks. As they approached the street corner, a red SUV slowed down and pulled up alongside them. The SUV was driven by Burkley. Burkley came to a complete stop and started yelling profanity at Macias and Williams from his open driver’s side window. Macias stepped off the curb and approached the SUV. He tried to punch Burkley through the open window, but the punch did not land. Macias then stepped away from the SUV, towards the sidewalk. Burkley produced a handgun and shot Macias in the neck. Burkley then sped away. These events were also captured on surveillance video. C. Subsequent Events Macias was transported to the hospital, where he was treated for life-threatening injuries. He eventually made a complete recovery; however, he still suffered from nightmares about the shooting. Burkley was arrested and found to have been on parole at the time of the altercation and shooting. Neither Macias nor Williams was aware of Burkley’s parole status at the time. Macias was interviewed by special agents from the Department’s Office of Internal Affairs in February 2022. He was instructed to answer all questions truthfully. During the interview, Macias indicated he tried to deescalate the confrontation with Burkley, but Burkley would not allow it. Macias said he would not have felt safe walking away from Burkley, as he thought Burkley would attack or follow him. Macias acknowledged punching Burkley through the open window of the SUV but said he thought Burkley was preparing to get out of the SUV to attack him and he wanted to 4 prevent that from happening. These explanations notwithstanding, Macias admitted his off-duty conduct fell below the high standard of conduct expected of peace officers and brought discredit to the Department. D. Administrative Proceedings The Department served Macias with an amended notice of adverse action (the notice) terminating his employment.2 The notice alleged: (1) Macias instigated and unnecessarily engaged in the verbal altercation with Burkley, leading to the physical altercation at Tank House; (2) Macias ran into the street and attacked Burkley through the open window of the SUV; (3) Macias acted dishonestly in the investigative interview by minimizing his role in the altercation and stating he could not have left the restaurant safely; and (4) Macias had been disciplined for another recent incident in which he consumed alcohol and became aggressive with employees of a casino. The notice divided the incident into three segments: the altercation, the shooting, and the interview. With respect to the altercation, the amended notice charged Macias with inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public or other employees, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, in violation of Government Code section 19572, subdivisions (d), (m), (o), and (t).3 With respect to the shooting, the amended notice charged Macias with inexcusable neglect of duty, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, in violation of section 19572, subdivisions (d), (o), and (t). With respect to the interview, the amended notice primarily charged Macias with insubordination and dishonesty, in violation of section 19572, subdivisions (e) and (f). The amended notice charged Macias with inexcusable neglect of duty, insubordination, dishonesty, discourteous treatment of the public or other 2 Williams also received an amended notice of adverse action terminating his employment. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. 5 employees, willful disobedience, violation of the prohibitions set forth in section 19990, and other failure of good behavior. 4 (§ 19572, subds. (d)-(f), (m), (o), (r), and (t).) Macias appealed the termination to the Board.5 An evidentiary hearing was held before an ALJ in November 2022. The ALJ viewed the surveillance videos and heard from six witnesses, including Macias and Williams. Macias admitted he was unnecessarily aggressive with Burkley that day. He acknowledged that the initial contact with Burkley was accidental and allowed that he could have returned to his table, rather than argue with him. By way of explanation, however, Macias said he regularly dealt with agitated and aggressive inmates in prison and had been trained to never turn his back on an inmate acting as though he might pose a threat. Macias elaborated that he has also been trained in deescalation techniques, such as using body language and persuasion to calm agitated inmates. Macias said he used some of these techniques on Burkley, albeit unsuccessfully. When deescalation failed, Macias said he had been trained to neutralize or resolve the threat, rather than walk away. He added that he would not have felt safe walking away from Burkley, as he feared the Tank House patron might pursue or attack him. He suggested that very fear was realized later, when Burkley drove up to him on the street. Macias concluded by saying he honestly believed Burkley had been the primary aggressor that day and spoke truthfully when he told investigators as much. He emphasized that he admitted attempting to punch Burkley through the open window and 4 Macias was also charged with violating the prohibitions set forth in section 19990 (§ 19752, subd. (r)); however, the ALJ struck that charge. 5 Williams also appealed. Macias’s and Williams’s cases were consolidated for purposes of the evidentiary hearing. We focus on the arguments and issues relevant to Macias for obvious reasons; however, we note Williams’s termination was ultimately modified to a suspension without pay for three months. 6 acknowledged that his conduct fell below the high standard expected of peace officers and brought discredit to the Department. Williams similarly testified that he had been trained on deescalation techniques by the Department and tried to use those techniques with Burkley. When those efforts failed, Williams said he thought he should stand his ground until Burkley calmed down or left the restaurant. Like Macias, Williams said he would not have felt safe leaving the restaurant while Burkley remained agitated. The ALJ also heard from Brian Leonard and Andrew Gartner, two off-duty peace officers who happened to be at Tank House that day. Leonard testified Macias and Burkley were “equally engaged” in the altercation, and “equally aggressive” toward one another. He noted that the role of primary aggressor shifted over the course of the interaction. Gartner, for his part, opined that any of the participants in the Tank House altercation—Macias, Williams, or Burkley—could have extracted himself from the argument at any time. Gartner added that peace officers are “expected to be held to a higher standard and act a certain way on and off duty.” Retired correctional lieutenant John Diaz testified for Macias as an expert on training correctional officers on deescalation techniques and the use of force. Diaz explained that correctional officers are trained to continuously assess whether people are threats, whether the officers are on or off-duty, and regardless of setting. Upon recognizing a potential threat, Diaz said the correctional officer should then consider how best to resolve it. Diaz added that the Department favors minimal use of force and is “very big on de-escalation.” Dr. Laurence Miller testified for Macias as an expert in neuropsychology and police psychology. He explained that critical threats have an effect on memory and mental processing that can lead to inaccurate reporting, even among people genuinely striving for accuracy. He opined that someone in Macias’s position, who suffered life- 7 threatening injuries, might magnify the threat in their memory, or hyper focus on some details to the exclusion of others, without intending to deceive anyone. The ALJ issued his proposed decision in December 2022. The proposed decision included a nine-page credibility determination using the criteria provided by Evidence Code section 780. (Evid. Code, § 780 [when evaluating credibility, the trier of fact may consider “any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the [witness’s] testimony,” including witness demeanor; character of testimony; extent of the witness’s ability to perceive, recollect, or communicate any matter about which she or he testifies; the existence or nonexistence of bias, interest, or motive; the existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness; and the witness’s attitude toward the action or testimony”].) Generally speaking, the ALJ found that Macias was a “poor historian[]” of the events of May 29, 2021, but “appeared earnest in trying to provide clear testimony.” The ALJ noted the Tank House surveillance video showed Macias and Burkley behaving aggressively with one another, consistent with the testimony of Leonard and Gartner. The ALJ also noted that Macias backed away from Burkley twice, as though inviting him to fight in the nearby alley. That evidence demonstrated that Macias was an aggressor in the altercation at Tank House and undermined his contention that he could not have left the restaurant or walked away from Burkley. Even as he questioned Macias’s version of events, the ALJ left open the possibility that Macias may have believed he had been truthful with investigators. The ALJ found reasonable Dr. Miller’s hypothesis that Macias’s memory might have been skewed by the trauma of the shooting. The ALJ also noted that nearly nine months elapsed between incident and interview, allowing Macias’s memories to be affected by intervening impressions, such as nightmares. On balance, the ALJ found credible Macias’s assertion that he had not been dishonest in the interview. 8 Turning to the charges, the ALJ determined Macias knew he had a duty to act professionally at all times, treat the public with dignity and respect, and avoid conduct reflecting poorly on himself or the Department, whether on duty or off. The ALJ found Macias breached that duty by engaging in a profanity-laced argument with Burkley in public, directing hostility and aggression towards Burkley, continuing the altercation despite opportunities to walk away, striking Burkley in the torso after the physical altercation was essentially over, and approaching Burkley’s SUV and attempting to strike him through the open window. The ALJ found that conduct constituted inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, in violation of section 19752, subdivisions (d), (m), (o), and (t). However, the ALJ found Macias had not been shown to have been intentionally dishonest in the interview. Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the charges of insubordination and dishonesty. The ALJ sustained the penalty of dismissal, noting the incident was Macias’s second adverse action involving off-duty misconduct and alcohol consumption. Both incidents involved aggressive and belligerent behavior towards members of the public, and both were close in time, suggesting a high likelihood of recurrence. The ALJ concluded: “Macias has displayed a lack of self-control, a failure of good judgment, and a tendency to use unreasonable and unnecessary force to resolve disputes. [The Department] has every right to have concerns about [] Macias’s continued employment as [a correctional officer]. [The Department’s] loss of confidence in Macias is well justified. While dismissal is a harsh penalty, it is not unwarranted under the circumstances.” The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision. E. Trial Court Proceedings Macias filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The Department opposed the petition. The trial court issued a tentative ruling 9 denying the petition. Following argument, the trial court affirmed the tentative ruling and entered judgment in favor of the Department and Board. This appeal timely followed. II. DISCUSSION Macias advances two arguments on appeal. First, he argues the Board erred in finding a nexus between his off-duty misconduct and his employment as a correctional officer. Second, he argues the Board violated due process by sustaining the termination on different factual bases than those alleged in the notice. Neither argument has merit. A. Standard of Review The Board is the state agency vested with authority to review disciplinary actions taken against public employees. (Thaxton v. State Personnel Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 681, 691.) In conducting that review, the Board acts in an adjudicatory capacity under powers granted by the California Constitution. (Ibid.) As such, the Board acts much as a trial court would in an ordinary judicial proceeding; it makes factual findings and exercises discretion on matters within its jurisdiction. (Ibid.) The Board’s decision may be reviewed by the superior court by way of a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) The trial court reviews the Board’s findings for substantial evidence, considering all relevant evidence in the administrative record including evidence that fairly detracts from the evidence supporting the Board’s findings. (Cate v. State Personnel Bd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 270, 281.) Our review is the same as that of the trial court; we independently determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings, not the trial court’s conclusions. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487; Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 742.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [Citation.] Such evidence must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-585.) In applying the substantial evidence test, “ ‘ “[w]e do 10 not reweigh the evidence; we indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor of [the Board’s] decision. Its findings come before us ‘with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.’ ” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if [the Board’s] decision ‘ “ ‘is one which could have been made by reasonable people.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Palmieri v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 845, 851.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the Board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) The penalty imposed by the Board is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 217; County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877.) In considering whether an abuse of discretion has occurred in the context of public employee discipline, “ ‘the overriding consideration … is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, “[h]arm to the public service.” [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.’ [Citation.] The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury and the government at risk of incurring liability.” (County of Santa Cruz v. Civil Service Commission of Santa Cruz (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1582; see also County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1615.) Purely legal questions, such as whether an employee received sufficient notice, are reviewed de novo. (Rodgers v. State Personnel Bd. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Rodgers).) B. Evidence of Nexus Section 19572, subdivision (t) authorizes discipline for “[o]ther failure of good behavior either during or outside of duty hours, which is of such a nature that it causes discredit to the appointing authority or the person’s employment.” The subdivision requires “more than failure of good behavior.” (Warren v. State Personnel Bd. (1979) 94 11 Cal.App.3d 95, 104.) It also requires that the misconduct “be of such a nature as to reflect upon the employee’s job.” (Yancey v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 478, 483; accord Stanton v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 729, 739-740.) That is, the misconduct “must bear some rational relationship to [the person’s] employment and must be of such character that it can easily result in the impairment or disruption of the public service.” (Warren, supra, at p. 104; see Johnson v. County of Santa Clara (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 26, 32.) [“ ‘If the misconduct bears some rational relationship to the employment and is of a character that can reasonably result in the impairment or disruption of public service,’ the employee may be disciplined”].) Macias argues the Board improperly based its nexus finding on the mere fact he engaged in a heated argument with a member of the public. But there was more to it than that. The ALJ found Macias’s off-duty conduct discredited himself and the Department and caused the Department to lose confidence in his good judgment. That finding was supported by evidence of all the poor choices Macias made that day, beginning with the choice to confront Burkley over an “insignificant accidental contact.” After Burkley demanded that Macias should “ ‘watch where the fuck [he was] going,’ ” Macias could have ignored the comment or offered an apology, if only to keep the peace. Instead, Macias turned around, walked back to Burkley and allowed himself to be drawn into a profanity-laced argument that continued “for over three minutes on a public street in view of several Tank House patrons.” During those three minutes, Macias was presented with multiple opportunities to remove himself from the situation, as he appropriately conceded. But he also missed multiple opportunities to deescalate. After the initial contact and confrontation outside Tank House, Williams approached the arguing men and tried to calm Burkley. Macias could have yielded to Williams’s attempt to deescalate. Instead, he started walking backwards towards the alley, gesturing to Burkley as though inviting him to fight there. Burkley ignored the invitation, and Macias could have taken the opportunity to extricate himself from the 12 altercation or leave the restaurant entirely. Instead, he returned to the argument and continued to engage with Burkley. K.M. intervened, and Macias again walked backwards towards the alley. “On both occasions,” the ALJ said, “Macias appeared to be ‘calling out’ Burkley to leave the Tank House entrance and fight him.” Once again, Macias could have taken the opportunity to extricate himself from the altercation or leave the restaurant. As before, he chose to continue to engage with an increasingly agitated Burkley. Macias testified he had been trained to deescalate situations involving agitated and aggressive inmates using body language and verbal persuasion. He said he used those techniques “at least once a week” as a correctional officer in the administrative segregation unit. He also testified he tried to use deescalation techniques to defuse the situation with Burkley. But the evidence showed Macias directed profanity at Burkley, used aggressive and confrontational body language, and repeatedly chose to escalate the conflict rather than temper his response. Even after Burkley had been subdued in the scuffle, Macias gratuitously punched him in the torso. Later, he approached Burkley’s SUV and took a swing at him through the driver’s side window. That Burkley also behaved badly—indeed, criminally—does not excuse Macias’s conduct. Peace officers are held to a higher standard than other public employees. (See Ackerman v. State Personnel Bd. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 395, 399.) They are “ ‘the guardians of the peace and security of the community, and the efficiency of our whole system, designed for the purpose of maintaining law and order, depends upon the extent to which such officers perform their duties and are faithful to the trust reposed in them.’ ” (Hankla v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1224.) Correctional officers are charged with maintaining order in prisons, where they may be called upon to make quick decisions in a volatile setting, with potentially dangerous inmates. (See Hudson v. McMillian (1992) 503 U.S. 1, 6 [“corrections officials must make their decisions ‘in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a 13 second chance’ ”]; see also Furtado v. State Personnel Board, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 [“prisons are volatile environments where there are fights between inmates, assaults and sometimes riots”].) Correctional officers cannot fulfill that charge when they overreact to trivial harms or indulge unnecessary aggression. Gray v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1229 (Gray) is analogous. In Gray, an off-duty correctional officer assaulted a man he saw leaving his ex-girlfriend’s house. (Id. at p. 1231.) The officer threatened to shoot the man if he retaliated. (Ibid.) Although the officer had a gun in his car, he merely pretended to have a gun during the assault. (Ibid.) Afterward, the officer retrieved the gun from his car and broke into his ex-girlfriend’s house. (Ibid.) Police arrived and arrested him for assault. (Ibid.) The Department terminated the officer, and the Board upheld the termination. (Gray, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1231.) The officer filed a petition for writ of mandate. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the petition and the officer appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the nexus between his conduct and employment. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal pointed to evidence that “the ability to make calm, reasoned judgments under pressure was required of correctional officers,” and accepted the Board’s view that the officer’s “demonstration of lack of self-control and misuse of his weapon indicated that he could lose control in the life or death atmosphere of the prison.” (Id. at p. 1233.) Accordingly, the court concluded the conduct was likely to cause harm to the public service, which sufficiently established the required nexus. (Id. at pp. 1232-1233.) The same analysis applies here. Here, as in Gray, the Board could reasonably conclude Macias’s conduct cast doubt on his “ability to make calm, reasoned judgments under pressure” at work. (Gray, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1233; see also Thompson v. State Personnel Bd. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 423, 430 [“A correctional officer must be able to maintain self-control”].) The Board could also reasonably conclude Macias’s lack of restraint could easily result in impairment or disruption of the public service. Correctional officers must be able to rely 14 upon one another to maintain composure in high stress situations. (See generally Sager v. County of Yuba (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1060-1061 [“because of the nature of peace officer organizations, in which officers must rely on each other during life- threatening situations, they must possess personal qualities conducive to building trust and cooperation”].) An officer who becomes combative at the slightest provocation cannot be counted on to keep cool under pressure, let alone implement the Department’s preference for deescalation. Such an officer loses the confidence of the Department and his peers, presents a safety risk to inmates and prison staff, and threatens the public fisc. Any of these things could impair or disrupt the public service. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 1052, 1061 [deputy sheriff’s “inability to control her anger and lack of sound judgment while under stress” presented risk of harm to the public service]; see also Hankla v. Long Beach Civil Service Comm, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 [“Forcing the police department to retain an officer who is unable to handle competently either his emotions or his gun poses too great a threat of harm to the public service to be countenanced”]; and see County of Santa Cruz v. Civil Service Commission of Santa Cruz, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582 [“The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury and the government at risk of incurring liability”].) Macias’s contrary arguments are unconvincing. Macias argues he “never did anything to connect himself to [the Department] or otherwise embroil his state employment throughout the entirety of the altercation giving rise to the [notice of adverse action].” He emphasizes he was off-duty, and there was no evidence he displayed a badge or otherwise invoked the Department during the altercation. He also observes he was not alleged to have violated the law. But these things are not required to establish a nexus or demonstrate harm to the public service. (See Anderson v. State Personnel Bd. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 761, 768 (Anderson) [section 19752, “subdivision (t) does not require ‘that the employee be convicted of a crime [or] that it appear that [his] actions … [were] illegal’ ”].) 15 Macias argues the Board erred in relying on Anderson, in which an officer was dismissed from the California Highway Patrol for recurring episodes of nude activity in view of his neighbors. (Anderson, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 764-767.) The officer’s supervisor testified that “knowledge of [the dismissed officer’s] activities would undermine his credibility with members of other law enforcement agencies and attenuate his effectiveness with both peers and subordinates within the CHP.” (Id. at p. 769.) The trial court found credible the supervisor’s assessment that the officer’s off-duty activity “cast discredit upon himself and the agency he represented and had so undermined his relationship with law enforcement personnel that it could ‘easily result in the impairment or disruption of the public service.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the supervisor’s testimony provided substantial evidence of a nexus between the officer’s off-duty activity and employment. (Id. at pp. 769-770.) Macias labors to distinguish Anderson, noting “there was no such testimony from anyone at the [the Department] establishing such a nexus.” But Anderson does not require a supervisor’s testimony to establish the existence of a nexus. Here, as we have said, the evidence established that correctional officers are expected to deescalate confrontations, rather than escalate them, and Macias demonstrated he was unwilling or unable to meet that expectation. Substantial evidence thus supports the existence of a nexus between Macias’s off-duty misconduct and his employment as a correctional officer. C. Due Process Macias next argues the Board violated due process by sustaining the termination on factual bases that were “significantly different” than those alleged in the notice. According to Macias, the notice advised he was subject to termination for instigating the Tank House altercation and lying about it to investigators. However, Macias says, the evidence showed only that he engaged in the altercation, not that he started it. Furthermore, Macias observes, the Board dismissed the charges of insubordination and 16 dishonesty. Taking these things together, Macias argues the Board violated due process by sustaining the dismissal “for essentially being rude to a member of the public even though he was not the one who instigated the physical confrontation and was not dishonest.” We are not persuaded. The Due Process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions place procedural constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of vested property interests. (Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 946.) In cases of public employment, the employee has due process rights in matters involving contemplated discipline. (Bollinger v. San Diego Civil Service Com. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 568, 575.) Due process requires process that, prior to imposing discipline, the public employer give the employee (1) notice of the proposed disciplinary action, (2) the grounds therefor, (3) the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and (4) a meaningful opportunity to respond before a reasonably impartial and uninvolved reviewer. (Id. at pp. 575-576.) Our court has described the due process principles applicable to the discipline of state employees as follows: “Due process requires that the [employee] be given ‘notice … of the standards by which his conduct is to be measured’ [citation] and ‘fair notice as to the reach of the [disciplinary] procedure.’ [Citation.] That requires that the [employee] be given adequate notice both of the claimed legal standard and the events which are alleged to contravene it and an opportunity to challenge them. Where the cause alleged has potential application to a broad range of conduct, such as unprofessional conduct, the events alleged to contravene the charge do more than allege what must be proved. They also provide criteria by which the charge is narrowed.” (Brown v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1164, fn. 5.) As previously discussed, the notice divides the relevant events into three episodes: the Tank House altercation, the shooting, and the interview. The notice describes the altercation in minute detail, beginning with the accidental elbow bump and ending with 17 the sucker punch to Burkley’s torso. Although the notice alleges Macias “initiated” or “instigated” the altercation, the allegations as a whole confirm he was alleged to have initiated or instigated the verbal altercation (which was neither proved nor disproved at the hearing), and that was not the primary thrust of the Tank House charges in any event. The notice alleges: “You neglected your duties, willfully neglected [the Department’s] expectations of you, and brought discredit on the Department by your actions at the Tank House. You engaged Mr. Burkley in a heated verbal altercation for a full three minutes before any physical violence happened. Regardless of who initially bumped into whom or who said what to whom, it was completely unnecessary for you to turn around and walk back to engage Mr. Burkley in the first place. Your unacceptable behavior continued when you continued to engage Mr. Burkley in an escalating verbal altercation for three full minutes before he finally hit you. Finally, even after you and CO Williams had physical control of Mr. Burkley and CO Williams had felt it safe to let go, you sucker-punched Mr. Burkley in the stomach before releasing him from a headlock. Even though Mr. Burkley was eventually the one who engaged in physical violence first, it was you and CO Williams who egged him on and refused to simply walk away from the situation.” The notice further alleges Macias’s participation in the Tank House incident constituted inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public or other employees, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, all of which constitute grounds for discipline. (§ 19572, subds. (d), (m), (o), & (t).) Although the charges of insubordination and dishonesty were not sustained (§ 19572, subds. (e) and (f)), Macias was clearly on notice that he was subject to dismissal for his role in the Tank House incident (to say nothing of the shooting), regardless of who “started it.” The notice thus gave “adequate notice both of the claimed legal standard[s] and the events which are alleged to contravene” them. (Brown v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1164, fn. 5.) 18 Rodgers, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 1, on which Macias relies, does not lead us to conclude otherwise. In Rodgers, the notice of adverse action charged correctional sergeant Rodgers with inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior based on allegations he refused to conduct a restraint check, ordered subordinates to falsify forms saying he performed the check, then angrily confronted those subordinates upon learning they reported the alleged misconduct to another sergeant. (Id. at pp. 5-6.) Following an evidentiary hearing, an ALJ concluded the Department failed to prove that Rodgers refused to perform the restraint check or directed subordinates to falsify forms. (Id. at p. 8.) However, the ALJ found Rodgers had been angry and used profanity in confronting his subordinates, but for a different reason than alleged in the notice; namely, the ALJ found Rodgers was angry and used profanity because he believed the subordinates inaccurately reported him for neglect of duty, not because he believed they accurately reported his intentional misconduct. (Id. at p. 9.) The SPB ado