Macias v. State Personnel Board CA3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketC104494
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Macias v. State Personnel Board CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
HAROLD MACIAS, C104494
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 23WM000015)
v.
STATE PERSONNEL BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) terminated
Harold Macias’s employment as a correctional officer at Mule Creek State Prison for
participating in an off-duty altercation with a member of the public and lying about the
incident in a subsequent investigation. Macias appealed the termination to the State
Personnel Board (the Board). An administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary
hearing and agreed Macias was an unreliable narrator of events surrounding the
altercation. Even so, the ALJ found the Department failed to prove dishonesty or
insubordination by a preponderance of the evidence. While the ALJ dismissed those
charges, he nevertheless found Macias’s conduct constituted inexcusable neglect of duty,
1
discourteous treatment of the public, willful disobedience, and other failure of good
behavior, which justified dismissal. The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.
Macias sought judicial review of the Board’s decision by filing a petition for writ
of mandate in the trial court. The trial court denied the petition. Macias appeals, arguing
(1) the Department failed to establish the required nexus between his off-duty misconduct
and his employment as a correctional officer, and (2) the Board violated due process by
sustaining the termination on different factual bases than those alleged in the operative
notice of adverse action. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Incident at Tank House
Macias and his girlfriend went on a day trip to Sacramento on Saturday, May 29,
2021. They started the day at a midtown restaurant, where Macias had a Bloody Mary
and a beer. Next they went to a bar, where they met Macias’s friend and fellow
correctional officer, Curtis Williams. After the bar, the group made their way to Tank
House, another midtown restaurant. They ate lunch at an outside table and had more
drinks.
Macias’s girlfriend left Tank House around 2:30 p.m. to attend a family gathering.
Macias walked his girlfriend to her car, then headed back to the restaurant to rejoin
Williams. Joseph Burkley and a female companion were standing on the sidewalk
outside the entrance to Tank House when Macias returned. Facing away from Macias,
Burkley moved his elbow slightly as the correctional officer walked by, causing
momentary contact between the two. Macias continued walking towards his table.
Burkley said, “ ‘You should watch where the fuck you are going.’ ” Macias turned
around and walked back towards Burkley, coming to a stop approximately 18 inches
2
from him. The two men then began a profanity laced argument about who was to blame
for the contact, and who owed an apology.1
Williams heard the argument and walked to where Macias and Burkley were
standing. Williams urged Burkley to go inside the restaurant and place his order.
Burkley then started yelling at Williams. After approximately one minute, Macias said
something to Burkley, pointed towards an alley adjacent to the restaurant, then walked
backwards in the direction of the alley some 10 to 15 feet, while staring at Burkley and
gesturing with open palms and arms extended at waist level. Burkley continued to focus
on Williams, and Macias soon returned.
Tank House employee K.M. came outside and stood between Macias and Burkley,
trying to defuse the tension. The argument continued, with K.M. standing in the middle
of the cluster of arguing men. After a few moments, Macias again walked backwards
towards the alley, still gesturing towards Burkley. As before, Burkley primarily focused
on Williams, and Macias quickly returned to the group.
The men continued arguing and milling around K.M. After a couple of seconds,
Burkley hiked up his shorts and assumed a fighting stance. Macias squared off against
him. Burkley reached around K.M. to punch Macias. Macias blocked the punch.
Burkley then backed away, and Macias and Williams advanced on him. Burkley
punched Williams in the head. Williams quickly recovered and landed several blows of
his own. Macias punched Burkley once or twice in the melee. After a few seconds,
Burkley started grappling with Williams and forced him to the ground. Macias and
Williams then overwhelmed Burkley and pinned him to the ground.
K.M walked over and told the men to stop fighting and leave the area. Williams
released Burkley and stood up. Macias also stood, while simultaneously holding Burkley
1 By then, Macias had consumed a Bloody Mary, four beers, and two shots of bourbon
whiskey.
3
in a front-facing headlock. As they rose, Macias punched Burkley once in the torso.
K.M. stepped between the men again. The fight was over. Burkley walked away from
the restaurant in one direction, and Macias and Williams walked away in another. The
entire altercation lasted approximately three minutes and was recorded on Tank House
surveillance video.
B. The Shooting
Macias and Williams walked approximately two blocks. As they approached the
street corner, a red SUV slowed down and pulled up alongside them. The SUV was
driven by Burkley. Burkley came to a complete stop and started yelling profanity at
Macias and Williams from his open driver’s side window.
Macias stepped off the curb and approached the SUV. He tried to punch Burkley
through the open window, but the punch did not land. Macias then stepped away from
the SUV, towards the sidewalk. Burkley produced a handgun and shot Macias in the
neck. Burkley then sped away. These events were also captured on surveillance video.
C. Subsequent Events
Macias was transported to the hospital, where he was treated for life-threatening
injuries. He eventually made a complete recovery; however, he still suffered from
nightmares about the shooting. Burkley was arrested and found to have been on parole at
the time of the altercation and shooting. Neither Macias nor Williams was aware of
Burkley’s parole status at the time.
Macias was interviewed by special agents from the Department’s Office of
Internal Affairs in February 2022. He was instructed to answer all questions truthfully.
During the interview, Macias indicated he tried to deescalate the confrontation with
Burkley, but Burkley would not allow it. Macias said he would not have felt safe
walking away from Burkley, as he thought Burkley would attack or follow him. Macias
acknowledged punching Burkley through the open window of the SUV but said he
thought Burkley was preparing to get out of the SUV to attack him and he wanted to
4
prevent that from happening. These explanations notwithstanding, Macias admitted his
off-duty conduct fell below the high standard of conduct expected of peace officers and
brought discredit to the Department.
D. Administrative Proceedings
The Department served Macias with an amended notice of adverse action (the
notice) terminating his employment.2 The notice alleged: (1) Macias instigated and
unnecessarily engaged in the verbal altercation with Burkley, leading to the physical
altercation at Tank House; (2) Macias ran into the street and attacked Burkley through the
open window of the SUV; (3) Macias acted dishonestly in the investigative interview by
minimizing his role in the altercation and stating he could not have left the restaurant
safely; and (4) Macias had been disciplined for another recent incident in which he
consumed alcohol and became aggressive with employees of a casino.
The notice divided the incident into three segments: the altercation, the shooting,
and the interview. With respect to the altercation, the amended notice charged Macias
with inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public or other
employees, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, in violation of
Government Code section 19572, subdivisions (d), (m), (o), and (t).3 With respect to the
shooting, the amended notice charged Macias with inexcusable neglect of duty, willful
disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, in violation of section 19572,
subdivisions (d), (o), and (t). With respect to the interview, the amended notice primarily
charged Macias with insubordination and dishonesty, in violation of section 19572,
subdivisions (e) and (f). The amended notice charged Macias with inexcusable neglect of
duty, insubordination, dishonesty, discourteous treatment of the public or other
2 Williams also received an amended notice of adverse action terminating his
employment.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
5
employees, willful disobedience, violation of the prohibitions set forth in section 19990,
and other failure of good behavior. 4 (§ 19572, subds. (d)-(f), (m), (o), (r), and (t).)
Macias appealed the termination to the Board.5 An evidentiary hearing was held
before an ALJ in November 2022. The ALJ viewed the surveillance videos and heard
from six witnesses, including Macias and Williams. Macias admitted he was
unnecessarily aggressive with Burkley that day. He acknowledged that the initial contact
with Burkley was accidental and allowed that he could have returned to his table, rather
than argue with him. By way of explanation, however, Macias said he regularly dealt
with agitated and aggressive inmates in prison and had been trained to never turn his back
on an inmate acting as though he might pose a threat.
Macias elaborated that he has also been trained in deescalation techniques, such as
using body language and persuasion to calm agitated inmates. Macias said he used some
of these techniques on Burkley, albeit unsuccessfully. When deescalation failed, Macias
said he had been trained to neutralize or resolve the threat, rather than walk away. He
added that he would not have felt safe walking away from Burkley, as he feared the Tank
House patron might pursue or attack him. He suggested that very fear was realized later,
when Burkley drove up to him on the street.
Macias concluded by saying he honestly believed Burkley had been the primary
aggressor that day and spoke truthfully when he told investigators as much. He
emphasized that he admitted attempting to punch Burkley through the open window and
4 Macias was also charged with violating the prohibitions set forth in section 19990 (§
19752, subd. (r)); however, the ALJ struck that charge.
5 Williams also appealed. Macias’s and Williams’s cases were consolidated for purposes
of the evidentiary hearing. We focus on the arguments and issues relevant to Macias for
obvious reasons; however, we note Williams’s termination was ultimately modified to a
suspension without pay for three months.
6
acknowledged that his conduct fell below the high standard expected of peace officers
and brought discredit to the Department.
Williams similarly testified that he had been trained on deescalation techniques by
the Department and tried to use those techniques with Burkley. When those efforts
failed, Williams said he thought he should stand his ground until Burkley calmed down
or left the restaurant. Like Macias, Williams said he would not have felt safe leaving the
restaurant while Burkley remained agitated.
The ALJ also heard from Brian Leonard and Andrew Gartner, two off-duty peace
officers who happened to be at Tank House that day. Leonard testified Macias and
Burkley were “equally engaged” in the altercation, and “equally aggressive” toward one
another. He noted that the role of primary aggressor shifted over the course of the
interaction. Gartner, for his part, opined that any of the participants in the Tank House
altercation—Macias, Williams, or Burkley—could have extracted himself from the
argument at any time. Gartner added that peace officers are “expected to be held to a
higher standard and act a certain way on and off duty.”
Retired correctional lieutenant John Diaz testified for Macias as an expert on
training correctional officers on deescalation techniques and the use of force. Diaz
explained that correctional officers are trained to continuously assess whether people are
threats, whether the officers are on or off-duty, and regardless of setting. Upon
recognizing a potential threat, Diaz said the correctional officer should then consider how
best to resolve it. Diaz added that the Department favors minimal use of force and is
“very big on de-escalation.”
Dr. Laurence Miller testified for Macias as an expert in neuropsychology and
police psychology. He explained that critical threats have an effect on memory and
mental processing that can lead to inaccurate reporting, even among people genuinely
striving for accuracy. He opined that someone in Macias’s position, who suffered life-
7
threatening injuries, might magnify the threat in their memory, or hyper focus on some
details to the exclusion of others, without intending to deceive anyone.
The ALJ issued his proposed decision in December 2022. The proposed decision
included a nine-page credibility determination using the criteria provided by Evidence
Code section 780. (Evid. Code, § 780 [when evaluating credibility, the trier of fact may
consider “any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness
of the [witness’s] testimony,” including witness demeanor; character of testimony; extent
of the witness’s ability to perceive, recollect, or communicate any matter about which she
or he testifies; the existence or nonexistence of bias, interest, or motive; the existence or
nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness; and the witness’s attitude toward the
action or testimony”].) Generally speaking, the ALJ found that Macias was a “poor
historian[]” of the events of May 29, 2021, but “appeared earnest in trying to provide
clear testimony.”
The ALJ noted the Tank House surveillance video showed Macias and Burkley
behaving aggressively with one another, consistent with the testimony of Leonard and
Gartner. The ALJ also noted that Macias backed away from Burkley twice, as though
inviting him to fight in the nearby alley. That evidence demonstrated that Macias was an
aggressor in the altercation at Tank House and undermined his contention that he could
not have left the restaurant or walked away from Burkley.
Even as he questioned Macias’s version of events, the ALJ left open the possibility
that Macias may have believed he had been truthful with investigators. The ALJ found
reasonable Dr. Miller’s hypothesis that Macias’s memory might have been skewed by the
trauma of the shooting. The ALJ also noted that nearly nine months elapsed between
incident and interview, allowing Macias’s memories to be affected by intervening
impressions, such as nightmares. On balance, the ALJ found credible Macias’s assertion
that he had not been dishonest in the interview.
8
Turning to the charges, the ALJ determined Macias knew he had a duty to act
professionally at all times, treat the public with dignity and respect, and avoid conduct
reflecting poorly on himself or the Department, whether on duty or off. The ALJ found
Macias breached that duty by engaging in a profanity-laced argument with Burkley in
public, directing hostility and aggression towards Burkley, continuing the altercation
despite opportunities to walk away, striking Burkley in the torso after the physical
altercation was essentially over, and approaching Burkley’s SUV and attempting to strike
him through the open window. The ALJ found that conduct constituted inexcusable
neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public, willful disobedience, and other
failure of good behavior, in violation of section 19752, subdivisions (d), (m), (o), and (t).
However, the ALJ found Macias had not been shown to have been intentionally dishonest
in the interview. Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the charges of insubordination and
dishonesty.
The ALJ sustained the penalty of dismissal, noting the incident was Macias’s
second adverse action involving off-duty misconduct and alcohol consumption. Both
incidents involved aggressive and belligerent behavior towards members of the public,
and both were close in time, suggesting a high likelihood of recurrence. The ALJ
concluded: “Macias has displayed a lack of self-control, a failure of good judgment, and
a tendency to use unreasonable and unnecessary force to resolve disputes. [The
Department] has every right to have concerns about [] Macias’s continued employment as
[a correctional officer]. [The Department’s] loss of confidence in Macias is well
justified. While dismissal is a harsh penalty, it is not unwarranted under the
circumstances.” The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.
E. Trial Court Proceedings
Macias filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5. The Department opposed the petition. The trial court issued a tentative ruling
9
denying the petition. Following argument, the trial court affirmed the tentative ruling and
entered judgment in favor of the Department and Board. This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Macias advances two arguments on appeal. First, he argues the Board erred in
finding a nexus between his off-duty misconduct and his employment as a correctional
officer. Second, he argues the Board violated due process by sustaining the termination
on different factual bases than those alleged in the notice. Neither argument has merit.
A. Standard of Review
The Board is the state agency vested with authority to review disciplinary actions
taken against public employees. (Thaxton v. State Personnel Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
681, 691.) In conducting that review, the Board acts in an adjudicatory capacity under
powers granted by the California Constitution. (Ibid.) As such, the Board acts much as a
trial court would in an ordinary judicial proceeding; it makes factual findings and
exercises discretion on matters within its jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
The Board’s decision may be reviewed by the superior court by way of a petition
for writ of administrative mandamus. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) The trial
court reviews the Board’s findings for substantial evidence, considering all relevant
evidence in the administrative record including evidence that fairly detracts from the
evidence supporting the Board’s findings. (Cate v. State Personnel Bd. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 270, 281.) Our review is the same as that of the trial court; we
independently determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings, not
the trial court’s conclusions. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1479, 1487; Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 742.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. [Citation.] Such evidence must be reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-585.) In applying the substantial evidence test, “ ‘ “[w]e do
10
not reweigh the evidence; we indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor
of [the Board’s] decision. Its findings come before us ‘with a strong presumption as to
their correctness and regularity.’ ” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if
[the Board’s] decision ‘ “ ‘is one which could have been made by reasonable
people.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Palmieri v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 845, 851.) The
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the Board’s findings are not supported
by substantial evidence. (Telish v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1497.)
The penalty imposed by the Board is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Skelly v.
State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 217; County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service
Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877.) In considering whether
an abuse of discretion has occurred in the context of public employee discipline, “ ‘the
overriding consideration … is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or
if repeated is likely to result in, “[h]arm to the public service.” [Citations.] Other
relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood
of its recurrence.’ [Citation.] The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional
employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury and the government at risk of
incurring liability.” (County of Santa Cruz v. Civil Service Commission of Santa Cruz
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1582; see also County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1615.) Purely legal questions, such as whether an
employee received sufficient notice, are reviewed de novo. (Rodgers v. State Personnel
Bd. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Rodgers).)
B. Evidence of Nexus
Section 19572, subdivision (t) authorizes discipline for “[o]ther failure of good
behavior either during or outside of duty hours, which is of such a nature that it causes
discredit to the appointing authority or the person’s employment.” The subdivision
requires “more than failure of good behavior.” (Warren v. State Personnel Bd. (1979) 94
11
Cal.App.3d 95, 104.) It also requires that the misconduct “be of such a nature as to
reflect upon the employee’s job.” (Yancey v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
478, 483; accord Stanton v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 729, 739-740.)
That is, the misconduct “must bear some rational relationship to [the person’s]
employment and must be of such character that it can easily result in the impairment or
disruption of the public service.” (Warren, supra, at p. 104; see Johnson v. County of
Santa Clara (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 26, 32.) [“ ‘If the misconduct bears some rational
relationship to the employment and is of a character that can reasonably result in the
impairment or disruption of public service,’ the employee may be disciplined”].) Macias
argues the Board improperly based its nexus finding on the mere fact he engaged in a
heated argument with a member of the public. But there was more to it than that.
The ALJ found Macias’s off-duty conduct discredited himself and the Department
and caused the Department to lose confidence in his good judgment. That finding was
supported by evidence of all the poor choices Macias made that day, beginning with the
choice to confront Burkley over an “insignificant accidental contact.” After Burkley
demanded that Macias should “ ‘watch where the fuck [he was] going,’ ” Macias could
have ignored the comment or offered an apology, if only to keep the peace. Instead,
Macias turned around, walked back to Burkley and allowed himself to be drawn into a
profanity-laced argument that continued “for over three minutes on a public street in view
of several Tank House patrons.” During those three minutes, Macias was presented with
multiple opportunities to remove himself from the situation, as he appropriately
conceded. But he also missed multiple opportunities to deescalate.
After the initial contact and confrontation outside Tank House, Williams
approached the arguing men and tried to calm Burkley. Macias could have yielded to
Williams’s attempt to deescalate. Instead, he started walking backwards towards the
alley, gesturing to Burkley as though inviting him to fight there. Burkley ignored the
invitation, and Macias could have taken the opportunity to extricate himself from the
12
altercation or leave the restaurant entirely. Instead, he returned to the argument and
continued to engage with Burkley. K.M. intervened, and Macias again walked
backwards towards the alley. “On both occasions,” the ALJ said, “Macias appeared to be
‘calling out’ Burkley to leave the Tank House entrance and fight him.” Once again,
Macias could have taken the opportunity to extricate himself from the altercation or leave
the restaurant. As before, he chose to continue to engage with an increasingly agitated
Burkley.
Macias testified he had been trained to deescalate situations involving agitated and
aggressive inmates using body language and verbal persuasion. He said he used those
techniques “at least once a week” as a correctional officer in the administrative
segregation unit. He also testified he tried to use deescalation techniques to defuse the
situation with Burkley. But the evidence showed Macias directed profanity at Burkley,
used aggressive and confrontational body language, and repeatedly chose to escalate the
conflict rather than temper his response. Even after Burkley had been subdued in the
scuffle, Macias gratuitously punched him in the torso. Later, he approached Burkley’s
SUV and took a swing at him through the driver’s side window. That Burkley also
behaved badly—indeed, criminally—does not excuse Macias’s conduct.
Peace officers are held to a higher standard than other public employees. (See
Ackerman v. State Personnel Bd. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 395, 399.) They are “ ‘the
guardians of the peace and security of the community, and the efficiency of our whole
system, designed for the purpose of maintaining law and order, depends upon the extent
to which such officers perform their duties and are faithful to the trust reposed in them.’ ”
(Hankla v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1224.)
Correctional officers are charged with maintaining order in prisons, where they may be
called upon to make quick decisions in a volatile setting, with potentially dangerous
inmates. (See Hudson v. McMillian (1992) 503 U.S. 1, 6 [“corrections officials must
make their decisions ‘in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a
13
second chance’ ”]; see also Furtado v. State Personnel Board, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at
p. 739 [“prisons are volatile environments where there are fights between inmates,
assaults and sometimes riots”].) Correctional officers cannot fulfill that charge when
they overreact to trivial harms or indulge unnecessary aggression.
Gray v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1229 (Gray) is analogous. In
Gray, an off-duty correctional officer assaulted a man he saw leaving his ex-girlfriend’s
house. (Id. at p. 1231.) The officer threatened to shoot the man if he retaliated. (Ibid.)
Although the officer had a gun in his car, he merely pretended to have a gun during the
assault. (Ibid.) Afterward, the officer retrieved the gun from his car and broke into his
ex-girlfriend’s house. (Ibid.) Police arrived and arrested him for assault. (Ibid.)
The Department terminated the officer, and the Board upheld the termination.
(Gray, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1231.) The officer filed a petition for writ of
mandate. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the petition and the officer appealed, challenging
the sufficiency of the nexus between his conduct and employment. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal pointed to evidence that “the ability to make calm, reasoned judgments under
pressure was required of correctional officers,” and accepted the Board’s view that the
officer’s “demonstration of lack of self-control and misuse of his weapon indicated that
he could lose control in the life or death atmosphere of the prison.” (Id. at p. 1233.)
Accordingly, the court concluded the conduct was likely to cause harm to the public
service, which sufficiently established the required nexus. (Id. at pp. 1232-1233.) The
same analysis applies here.
Here, as in Gray, the Board could reasonably conclude Macias’s conduct cast
doubt on his “ability to make calm, reasoned judgments under pressure” at work. (Gray,
supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1233; see also Thompson v. State Personnel Bd. (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 423, 430 [“A correctional officer must be able to maintain self-control”].)
The Board could also reasonably conclude Macias’s lack of restraint could easily result in
impairment or disruption of the public service. Correctional officers must be able to rely
14
upon one another to maintain composure in high stress situations. (See generally Sager v.
County of Yuba (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1060-1061 [“because of the nature of
peace officer organizations, in which officers must rely on each other during life-
threatening situations, they must possess personal qualities conducive to building trust
and cooperation”].) An officer who becomes combative at the slightest provocation
cannot be counted on to keep cool under pressure, let alone implement the Department’s
preference for deescalation. Such an officer loses the confidence of the Department and
his peers, presents a safety risk to inmates and prison staff, and threatens the public fisc.
Any of these things could impair or disrupt the public service. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 1052,
1061 [deputy sheriff’s “inability to control her anger and lack of sound judgment while
under stress” presented risk of harm to the public service]; see also Hankla v. Long Beach
Civil Service Comm, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 [“Forcing the police department to
retain an officer who is unable to handle competently either his emotions or his gun poses
too great a threat of harm to the public service to be countenanced”]; and see County of
Santa Cruz v. Civil Service Commission of Santa Cruz, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582
[“The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct
places people at risk of injury and the government at risk of incurring liability”].)
Macias’s contrary arguments are unconvincing. Macias argues he “never did
anything to connect himself to [the Department] or otherwise embroil his state
employment throughout the entirety of the altercation giving rise to the [notice of adverse
action].” He emphasizes he was off-duty, and there was no evidence he displayed a
badge or otherwise invoked the Department during the altercation. He also observes he
was not alleged to have violated the law. But these things are not required to establish a
nexus or demonstrate harm to the public service. (See Anderson v. State Personnel Bd.
(1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 761, 768 (Anderson) [section 19752, “subdivision (t) does not
require ‘that the employee be convicted of a crime [or] that it appear that [his] actions …
[were] illegal’ ”].)
15
Macias argues the Board erred in relying on Anderson, in which an officer was
dismissed from the California Highway Patrol for recurring episodes of nude activity in
view of his neighbors. (Anderson, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 764-767.) The officer’s
supervisor testified that “knowledge of [the dismissed officer’s] activities would
undermine his credibility with members of other law enforcement agencies and attenuate
his effectiveness with both peers and subordinates within the CHP.” (Id. at p. 769.) The
trial court found credible the supervisor’s assessment that the officer’s off-duty activity
“cast discredit upon himself and the agency he represented and had so undermined his
relationship with law enforcement personnel that it could ‘easily result in the impairment
or disruption of the public service.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that
the supervisor’s testimony provided substantial evidence of a nexus between the officer’s
off-duty activity and employment. (Id. at pp. 769-770.)
Macias labors to distinguish Anderson, noting “there was no such testimony from
anyone at the [the Department] establishing such a nexus.” But Anderson does not
require a supervisor’s testimony to establish the existence of a nexus. Here, as we have
said, the evidence established that correctional officers are expected to deescalate
confrontations, rather than escalate them, and Macias demonstrated he was unwilling or
unable to meet that expectation. Substantial evidence thus supports the existence of a
nexus between Macias’s off-duty misconduct and his employment as a correctional
officer.
C. Due Process
Macias next argues the Board violated due process by sustaining the termination
on factual bases that were “significantly different” than those alleged in the notice.
According to Macias, the notice advised he was subject to termination for instigating the
Tank House altercation and lying about it to investigators. However, Macias says, the
evidence showed only that he engaged in the altercation, not that he started it.
Furthermore, Macias observes, the Board dismissed the charges of insubordination and
16
dishonesty. Taking these things together, Macias argues the Board violated due process
by sustaining the dismissal “for essentially being rude to a member of the public even
though he was not the one who instigated the physical confrontation and was not
dishonest.” We are not persuaded.
The Due Process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions place procedural
constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of vested property
interests. (Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 940, 946.) In cases of public employment, the employee has due process
rights in matters involving contemplated discipline. (Bollinger v. San Diego Civil Service
Com. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 568, 575.) Due process requires process that, prior to
imposing discipline, the public employer give the employee (1) notice of the proposed
disciplinary action, (2) the grounds therefor, (3) the charges and materials upon which the
action is based, and (4) a meaningful opportunity to respond before a reasonably
impartial and uninvolved reviewer. (Id. at pp. 575-576.)
Our court has described the due process principles applicable to the discipline of
state employees as follows: “Due process requires that the [employee] be given ‘notice
… of the standards by which his conduct is to be measured’ [citation] and ‘fair notice as
to the reach of the [disciplinary] procedure.’ [Citation.] That requires that the
[employee] be given adequate notice both of the claimed legal standard and the events
which are alleged to contravene it and an opportunity to challenge them. Where the
cause alleged has potential application to a broad range of conduct, such as
unprofessional conduct, the events alleged to contravene the charge do more than allege
what must be proved. They also provide criteria by which the charge is narrowed.”
(Brown v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1164, fn. 5.)
As previously discussed, the notice divides the relevant events into three episodes:
the Tank House altercation, the shooting, and the interview. The notice describes the
altercation in minute detail, beginning with the accidental elbow bump and ending with
17
the sucker punch to Burkley’s torso. Although the notice alleges Macias “initiated” or
“instigated” the altercation, the allegations as a whole confirm he was alleged to have
initiated or instigated the verbal altercation (which was neither proved nor disproved at
the hearing), and that was not the primary thrust of the Tank House charges in any event.
The notice alleges: “You neglected your duties, willfully neglected [the
Department’s] expectations of you, and brought discredit on the Department by your
actions at the Tank House. You engaged Mr. Burkley in a heated verbal altercation for a
full three minutes before any physical violence happened. Regardless of who initially
bumped into whom or who said what to whom, it was completely unnecessary for you to
turn around and walk back to engage Mr. Burkley in the first place. Your unacceptable
behavior continued when you continued to engage Mr. Burkley in an escalating verbal
altercation for three full minutes before he finally hit you. Finally, even after you and CO
Williams had physical control of Mr. Burkley and CO Williams had felt it safe to let go,
you sucker-punched Mr. Burkley in the stomach before releasing him from a headlock.
Even though Mr. Burkley was eventually the one who engaged in physical violence first,
it was you and CO Williams who egged him on and refused to simply walk away from
the situation.”
The notice further alleges Macias’s participation in the Tank House incident
constituted inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment of the public or other
employees, willful disobedience, and other failure of good behavior, all of which
constitute grounds for discipline. (§ 19572, subds. (d), (m), (o), & (t).) Although the
charges of insubordination and dishonesty were not sustained (§ 19572, subds. (e) and
(f)), Macias was clearly on notice that he was subject to dismissal for his role in the Tank
House incident (to say nothing of the shooting), regardless of who “started it.” The
notice thus gave “adequate notice both of the claimed legal standard[s] and the events
which are alleged to contravene” them. (Brown v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 166
Cal.App.3d at p. 1164, fn. 5.)
18
Rodgers, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 1, on which Macias relies, does not lead us to
conclude otherwise. In Rodgers, the notice of adverse action charged correctional
sergeant Rodgers with inexcusable neglect of duty, discourteous treatment, willful
disobedience, and other failure of good behavior based on allegations he refused to
conduct a restraint check, ordered subordinates to falsify forms saying he performed the
check, then angrily confronted those subordinates upon learning they reported the alleged
misconduct to another sergeant. (Id. at pp. 5-6.) Following an evidentiary hearing, an
ALJ concluded the Department failed to prove that Rodgers refused to perform the
restraint check or directed subordinates to falsify forms. (Id. at p. 8.) However, the ALJ
found Rodgers had been angry and used profanity in confronting his subordinates, but for
a different reason than alleged in the notice; namely, the ALJ found Rodgers was angry
and used profanity because he believed the subordinates inaccurately reported him for
neglect of duty, not because he believed they accurately reported his intentional
misconduct. (Id. at p. 9.) The SPB ado