Marriage of Murad CA4/2

Filed 11/5/26 Marriage of Murad CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re the Marriage of JODI and LAITH MURAD. JODI MURAD, E086973 Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. FAMSS1809446) v. OPINION LAITH MURAD, Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven J. Singley, Judge. Affirmed. Laith Murad, in pro. per., for Appellant. 1  Law Offices of Rebekah Ryan Main and Rebekah Ryan Main for Respondent. Appellant Laith Murad (Husband) appeals from the denial of his request for order (RFO)1 seeking to terminate spousal support paid to respondent Jodi Murad (Wife). Husband and Wife had a long-term marriage; they were married in Husband and Wife were married in 1998 and divorced in 2018. At the time of the dissolution, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA), which included an agreement on the payment of spousal support. Husband’s RFO sought to terminate the spousal support, but the trial court denied the request, finding that the relevant language in the MSA precluded terminating or reducing the spousal support obligation. Husband appeals the denial of the RFO. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE AND MSA Husband and Wife were married on June 12, 1998. They had one minor child, born in 2014, who was four years old at the time of dissolution, and two adult children. On December 14, 2018, a dissolution of marriage was filed that was effective May 6, 2019. The parties entered into the MSA as to issues of child support, child custody, and as to spousal support. 1 Husband originally filed a petition for writ of supersedeas seeking relief and a stay of the trial court order. The petition was denied along with the request for an immediate stay by order of this court on October 6, 2025. 2  The MSA provided that commencing on November 1, 2018, Husband would pay Wife $4,311 each month. It included that “Said amount shall continue until the death of [Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a minimum of 14 years. The party’s intent is that [Husband] agrees to pay [Wife] at least $4,311 per month, subject to upward modification only. [Husband] shall also pay 40% of any gross bonus received to [Wife], as and for additional Spousal Support, payable within 30 days of receiving said bonus. [Husband] must report any significant change in his income to [Wife] within 30 days of said change.” The parties acknowledged that the parties enjoyed an upper- middle-class lifestyle during the marriage. Wife had been a full-time homemaker throughout the marriage and homeschooled their two older children. She was a full-time caregiver for their four-year-old daughter. In addition, Husband agreed to pay “up to 50% of any higher education tuition, fees, books and supply costs for [Wife] to attend graduate school or training, not to exceed” $20,000 toward Wife’s education. It further provided, “The amount shall not be considered additional ‘Spousal Support’ but is a reasonable repayment as [Husband] received an MBA degree during the marriage that is valued at over $100,000.” There was a further provision that “The parties agree that [Husband] shall not receive Spousal Support at any time from [Wife], and the Court shall terminate [Husband]’s ability to request Spousal Support from [Wife] at any time. [Husband] understands this may create a hardship to him, but agrees to terminate the Court’s jurisdiction forthwith upon signing this judgment.” The MSA was signed by both parties on December 1, 2018. 3  B. RFO FILED BY HUSBAND On April 17, 2025, Husband filed his RFO seeking a change in spousal support. Husband stated in the RFO that the family court should change or end spousal support. He alleged that Wife was a stay-at-home mom supported by him throughout the marriage. In the MSA, he agreed to pay for a portion of her schooling so she could obtain a master’s degree; she was given the family car; and he paid for moving expenses so she could become self-sufficient without having to rely on him. Husband alleged that Wife had a successful real estate career. In 2022, she earned $176,035. Husband alleged Wife made a verbal agreement to lower spousal support based on her moving to Texas, which had a lower cost of living. She had since “reneged” on her verbal agreement. Husband was seeking a termination of the spousal support in its entirety. Husband also alleged to have been unemployed for eight months, and the burden of spousal support would put him in “debt for life.”2 Husband attached his own declaration to the RFO in lieu of in-person testimony. Husband provided there was an existing judgment dated December 14, 2018, in which there was a provision where he agreed to pay 50 percent of Wife’s higher education funds so she could attend graduate school. The amount was not to exceed $20,000. He alleged this was to further Wife’s ability to be self-sufficient. Husband stated that Wife had completed her master’s degree in May 2022, and this “fulfilled his obligation” to make 2 Husband also requested other orders in the RFO but does not raise these issues on appeal. 4 her self-sufficient. He included language from the MSA regarding spousal support that we have outlined, ante. Husband admitted he owed Wife spousal support in the amount of $12,933. He alleged that Wife had become a real estate agent and her gross income was $208,066. Wife had become self-sufficient and it was “unfair” that he continue to provide spousal support. Husband claimed he had lost his job in April 2020 and had difficulty finding work. Wife agreed verbally to a reduction in spousal support but her attorney had advised Wife that the spousal support could not be modified. Husband referred to the language of the MSA that provided “ ‘Said amount shall continue until death of [Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a minimum of 14 years.’ ” Husband, relying on the language “further court order,” argued that the trial court still had jurisdiction to terminate spousal support. He insists that spousal support should be terminated because Wife was self-sufficient, there was a change in Husband’s income that put a burden on him to pay spousal support, and his attached income and expense declaration showed he was unable to provide for his own needs.3 C. RESPONSE BY WIFE Wife’s counsel filed a response to the RFO. Wife did not consent to the RFO. In support of the response, Wife’s attorney declared that pursuant to the MSA, Husband agreed to pay $4,311 each month for a minimum of 14 years. He had paid spousal 3 Husband included his income and expense declaration but such information is not relevant to the issues on appeal, which involve interpretation of the MSA. 5 support for less than seven years. Spousal support changes were for upward modification only. Wife’s counsel requested that the RFO be denied and that the trial court order that Husband comply with the existing orders. Wife provided a declaration in support of the response in lieu of testimony. Since the spousal support order was for 14 years, and it had only been seven years, the only change could be upward modification. Unfairness to Husband was not a ground upon which spousal support could be modified before the 14-year mark. Wife alleged that Husband lived in a luxury three-bedroom apartment and had a luxury car. Wife stated that Husband never paid fifty percent of her education costs and she had to obtain student loans to pay for her education. Wife denied she ever verbally agreed to a reduction in spousal support. Wife’s attorney filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the response to the RFO. Pursuant to Family Code section 3591, spousal support agreements and orders are subject to modification or termination unless specifically agreed to the contrary by the parties. The language in the MSA was “specific and unambiguous.” It was clear based on the language that spousal support of $4,311 each month was subject to upward modification only and Husband could not request a downward modification. Wife filed a supplemental declaration on August 12, 2025. Wife declared that the spousal support was structured based on Husband’s own proposal. Further, during their 20-year marriage, Wife raised their children and had no income. Husband acknowledged during the dissolution proceedings that due to Wife being a stay-at-home mom, she had no income and no savings. Husband had no physical or medical condition that kept him 6 from working.4 Wife also filed objections to Husband’s declaration based on lack of foundation and hearsay. The trial court ruled on the objections by Wife to the declaration provided by Husband; a majority of the objections were overruled. Those objections that were sustained are relevant to the other issues raised in the lower court that are not issues on appeal. D. TRIAL COURT RULING The RFO was heard on August 14, 2025. Both Wife and Husband were present. Wife’s counsel argued that the evidence presented by Husband that he had no income was insufficient. He had not provided appropriate documentation, and his income and expense declarations had conflicting information as to whether he had any income. There was not enough evidence presented to proceed to an evidentiary hearing. Further, there was the legal issue as to whether spousal support could be modified. Wife’s counsel argued that based on the plain language in the MSA, it could not be modified. Husband responded that he was actively looking for employment. Further, the language of the MSA provided that termination of spousal support was allowed by further court order. Husband clarified that he was not asking for downward modification as the language was clear that there could only be upward modification. He was seeking a court order terminating spousal support. He insisted that the goal of the MSA was to make Wife self-sufficient. She achieved that and spousal support should be terminated. Husband began to argue about the items that Wife had been given, and the trial court 4 Wife and Husband submitted additional income and expense declarations that are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 7 interrupted Husband and advised him that these were issues that would be addressed at trial if the trial court set the matter for trial. The trial court then asked Husband, “procedurally you are saying the language of your MSA says it is non-modifiable whether up or down, but the termination language in your MSA leaves room for support to be terminated?” Husband responded, “Yes.” The trial court then confirmed that Husband was requesting termination of spousal support and not modification. Husband confirmed he was seeking termination based on Wife being self-sufficient. The trial court noted that whether spousal support was subject to termination was driven by the language in the MSA. The trial court allowed Husband to give his final thoughts. Husband insisted he was actively looking for employment. He clarified the statements in his income and expense declarations. The trial court took the issue under submission. A minute order from the hearing on August 14, 2025, provides the written ruling submitted on the same day. The trial court ruled as to spousal support as follows: “The court finds that [Husband] did not file a FL-157[5] with his RFO re. Spousal Support/Other filed 4/17/25. More importantly, the court finds that the relevant language in the parties’ MSA which reads ‘subject to upward modification only’ precludes [Husband] from either reducing or terminating his Spousal Support obligation. 5 An FL-157 form is a spousal or domestic partner support declaration attachment, which explains the facts that support a request for a spousal or domestic partner support judgment. (https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/jcc-form/FL-157 (as of November 4, 2026). 8 [Husband]’s argument that he is seeking ‘termination’ as opposed to downward ‘modification’ misses the mark because this is a long-term marriage and the court cannot ‘terminate’ its jurisdiction over Spousal Support absent an expressed and unequivocal waiver of support by [Wife] and no such waiver exists. Thus, all the court could do would be to ‘modify’ the amount downward but the MSA precludes this. Therefore, [Husband’s] request to terminate or reduce Spousal Support obligation is denied.” Husband filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his RFO. DISCUSSION Husband claims the trial court erred as a matter of law by eliminating expressly retained jurisdiction to terminate spousal support. He relies on the language in the MSA, which he claims provides for three independent terminating events for spousal support: his death, Wife’s remarriage, or further court order. He contends the amount of spousal support was not restricted to 14 years but rather the inclusion of the “further court order” preserved jurisdiction of the trial court to terminate spousal support prior to the 14 years. Further, the limit of modification to only upward modification did not apply to the duration of spousal support. He additionally contends that the provision Husband was to provide his financial information to Wife if there was a significant change in his income “presupposes continuing oversight and must be given independent effect.” Finally, he contends the MSA structure reflected that spousal support was designed to end upon Wife’s self-sufficiency. In addition, he argues the trial court denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a dispositive jurisdictional issue in violation of his due process rights. 9  A. INADEQUATE BRIEF AND RECORD Wife argues that Husband provides an inadequate record on appeal and fails to properly cite to the record in his opening brief. She also claims that Husband’s brief “hallucinate[s]” authorities, making it appear the brief was prepared by Artificial Intelligence. “ ‘ “[A]n appealed judgment is presumed correct, and appellant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness.” [Citation.] As a result, on appeal “the party asserting trial court error may not ... rest on the bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal authority on each point raised. [Citation.]” [Citations.] When an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; see also Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) “Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) In addition, an appellant has the burden of “providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; see also Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575 [“a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record”].) 10  Husband provides only a few citations to the record in his opening and reply briefs. While we fault Husband for not providing a detailed statement of facts including all the information that was provided to the trial court below, and the facts of the hearing on August 14, 2025, the briefing is adequate as to the issue of whether the trial court could terminate spousal support as argued in sections I, II, and III of the opening brief. As for whether Husband provided an inadequate record, Wife contends that Husband “fails to provide a record that could support many of the ‘facts’ he argues, including his failure to include the parties’ judgment in the record.” We presume that Wife is referring to the dissolution judgment and MSA. Husband brought a motion to augment the record after the briefs were filed in this case, with the dissolution judgment, including the MSA. We granted the request. There is no prejudice to Wife based on the MSA being submitted after the briefs were filed as she repeatedly refers to the judgment in her respondent’s brief. The record is adequate to review Husband’s claims on appeal that the trial court erred by eliminating expressly retained jurisdiction, the upward modification language only limited modification and not duration, and the MSA was designed for eventual termination of spousal support. However, the failure to include a complete recitation of the facts and reasoned argument in support of his due process claim forfeits the claim on appeal. Husband claims the trial court denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the jurisdictional issue. He claims he tried to explain to the trial court that he sought termination of spousal support under the MSA’s “further court order” language and not a modification of the amount. The trial court interrupted his argument and did not allow 11 Husband to explain the jurisdictional distinction. He concludes that limiting a party’s ability to present his or her case violates due process. This is the entirety of Husband’s argument on this issue. Husband fails to set forth the facts of the hearing where he claims the trial court interrupted him several times, which he claims on appeal violated his due process rights. In the opening and reply briefs, Husband merely cites to pages in the reporter’s transcript, but does not set forth what had occurred at the hearing, only stating that he was interrupted by the trial court. Merely citing to the pages of the reporter’s transcript with no context for these citations and without providing a summary of all of the evidence is not helpful to this court. Husband also argues for the first time in the reply brief that many of his filings were not reviewed by the trial court in a timely manner or rejected, and Wife’s documents were immediately reviewed, showing that the process was not fair or “even- handed.” Husband fails to cite to any part of the record to support this claim. “ ‘It is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations.’ ” (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) “It is not our place to comb the record seeking support for assertions parties fail to substantiate.” (Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 534.) Such failure to properly cite to the record and provide a summary of the facts waives the claim. 12  Further, even if we ignore Husband’s failure to cite to the record, he merely concludes that since he was interrupted, his due process rights were violated. As stated, when an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument,’ ” we treat the issue as waived. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) Husband merely concludes that his due process rights were violated based on the trial court interrupting him. This conclusive contention is not accompanied by reasoned argument, and we find he has waived the issue. Finally, Wife claims that Husband “hallucinate[s]” the legal authorities provided in his briefs. Wife refers to the citation “Founding Members v. Motion Picture Assn.,” cited by Husband, insisting it does not exist. In the reply brief, Husband explains that his citation to Founding Members “inadvertently referenced the wrong reporter/year.” He provides that the correct citation is Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, and it was a mere typographical error in the opening brief. While the two citations are significantly different, we will accept the representation and consider the new authority. Wife does not identify any other citations to authority in Husband’s brief that do not exist to support her claim, and we will not consider the opening brief to be inadequate based on one incorrect citation. B. DENIAL OF THE RFO The provision of spousal support that is disputed states, “Said amount shall continue until the death of [Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a minimum of 14 years. The party’s intent is that [Husband] agrees to pay [Wife] at least 13 $4,311 per month, subject to upward modification only.” There was also a provision that Husband was to report any significant change in his income to Wife within 30 days of the change. “ ‘In marriages of “long duration” (presumptively 10 years or longer), the court is deemed to retain spousal support jurisdiction “indefinitely” (notwithstanding the absence of an express reservation of jurisdiction) absent written agreement of the parties to the contrary or a court order terminating spousal support.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hibbard (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014; see also Fam. Code § 4336, subds. (a), (b) & (c).) “Nevertheless, a court’s spousal support jurisdiction is limited by other events set forth in the statutory scheme. For example, as relevant here, a spousal support agreement ‘may not be modified or revoked to the extent that a written agreement ... specifically provides that the spousal support is not subject to modification or termination.’ ” (Hibbard, at p. 1014., fn. omitted; see also Fam. Code, § 3591, subd. (c) [“An agreement for spousal support may not be modified or revoked to the extent that a written agreement, or, if there is no written agreement, an oral agreement entered into in open court between the parties, specifically provides that the spousal support is not subject to modification or termination”].) “ ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.’ ” (In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) “We interpret a contract to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties at the time they formed the contract. [Citations.] We discern the parties’ intention based on the written contract 14 alone, if possible, but may also consider the circumstances under which the contract was made and its subject matter. [Citations.] We consider the contract as a whole, and interpret contested provisions in their context, not in isolation, with the aim of giving effect to all provisions, if doing so is reasonably possible. [Citations.] [¶] In interpreting a contract, we give the words their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties or usage have given the words a specialized or technical meaning.” (Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 306.) The trial court’s interpretation of a marital settlement agreement and jurisdiction, if any, to modify the judgment are questions of law subject to de novo review. (In re Marriage of Rosenfeld & Gross (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 485.) The language of the MSA provided that there could be a further court order on spousal support. It also contained a provision that the only modification could be an upward modification. While Husband argues that he was seeking “termination” and not a “modification,” in essence his request would lead to a downward modification of support to zero. This would be in direct conflict with the language of the MSA. “It is well established that no specific formula or ‘ “magic” words’ are required to preclude modification.” (In re Marriage of Hibbard, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) Here, the agreement was that Husband would pay Wife $4,311 in spousal support with the only possible modification being upward modification. The trial court was restrained by the language in the MSA to not reduce spousal support to zero. 15  Moreover, even if we were to consider that the request by Husband was for termination and not modification, there is also language that Wife was entitled to a minimum of 14 years of support. The trial court could not terminate spousal support when the intent of the parties was clear that Wife receive spousal support for a minimum of 14 years. This time was either set based on the duration of the marriage or possibly the date upon which the parties assumed Wife would be self-sufficient, but nothing in the MSA provides the intent of the parties other than that she receive spousal support for a minimum of 14 years. There is no provision in the MSA that Wife must become self- sufficient in order for spousal support to continue. A reasonable interpretation is that the parties agreed that spousal support would continue for at least 14 years. Husband argues in the reply brief that this interpretation would require the payment of spousal support for a minimum of 14 years even upon the death of Husband or the remarriage of Wife. We agree with Husband that this does present an ambiguity in the MSA. “[A]n ambiguity in the language of a marital property agreement ... must be decided in favor of the right to spousal support.” (In re Marriage of Vomacka (1984) 36 Cal.3d 459, 469 (Vomacka).) There was no extrinsic evidence presented by Husband as to the meaning of this clause. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the MSA as providing that the minimum of 14 years applied, assuming that Husband was not deceased and that Wife had not remarried. Any further court order applied to extending spousal support beyond the 14 years or an upward modification, assuming again that Husband was not deceased and Wife had not remarried. 16  Husband complains that if the MSA language is interpreted to find that the trial court had no authority to terminate spousal support, it would render the provision that he report any significant changes in income to Wife within 30 days surplusage. “An interpretation that leaves part of a contract as surplusage is to be avoided.” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) Reasonably interpreted, the trial court retained jurisdiction to extend the spousal support beyond 14 years or to modify the spousal support upward. Reporting any significant changes in income could lead to an upward modification of spousal support if requested by Wife. Based on the language in the MSA, the parties did not contemplate that the spousal support would be terminated prior to the minimum 14 years, or that it would be reduced. Additionally, in considering the MSA as a whole, the child support provision provided language that “Said support shall continue until further order of the court, or until the child has married, dies, is emancipated, reaches the age of 19, or reaches the age of 18 and is no longer a full-time high school student, whichever occurs first.” There was no minimum duration set for child support, unlike the spousal support provision. This further evidences the parties’ intent that Wife receive a minimum of 14 years of spousal support. Husband relies on Vomacka, supra, 36 Cal.3d 459, to support his claim that the language “further court order” preserves jurisdiction to terminate support.6 The question 6 We note that Husband does not provide a pinpoint citation to Vomacka for this point, but we will review the opinion despite his failure to provide an appropriate citation. Husband also relies on In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978 for the same proposition. He fails to provide a pinpoint citation, and our review of the case does 17 resolved in Vomacka was whether a trial court has jurisdiction “to extend spousal support payments past a date it has specified as the last opportunity the supported spouse may request such payments?” The settlement agreement included language that the husband was to pay the wife $275 of spousal support “each month thereafter until further order from the Court, the death of either party, the remarriage of [the wife], or August 1, 1982, whichever first occurs. The Court shall retain jurisdiction regarding spousal support until September 1, 1984, at which time [the wife]’s right to request spousal support from [the husband] shall terminate forever.” (Id. at pp. 461-462.) The trial court found that the language of the agreement did not mean there was an absolute termination of spousal support on September 1, 1984, but rather, that the wife could not request such support after that date. It modified spousal support to $600 each month. (Id. at p. 462.) On appeal, the husband complained that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by extending spousal support beyond the agreed-upon termination date. (Id. at pp. 462-463.) The Vomacka court found three policies favored modification of the settlement agreement to extend spousal support beyond the September 1, 1984, date. First, it found that orders for absolute termination of spousal support, “particularly [in] lengthy marriages,” are disfavored unless it is shown that the supported spouse is self-supporting. (Vomacka, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 468.) It further recognized that any ambiguity in a not support his claim. Further, his citation in the opening brief to In re Marriage of Liss (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1456 is incorrect; it is 1426. He corrects the citation in the reply brief but again he fails to provide a pinpoint citation. Further, the case only provides that reservation of jurisdiction over spousal support “after a lengthy marriage is supported by strong policy.” (Id. at pp. 1429-1430.) 18 marital settlement agreement must “favor the right to spousal support.” (Id. at p. 469.) Finally, it found the third policy favoring an extension was “that language in a spousal support order suggesting that modification of its terms will be permitted is routinely interpreted as a retention of the court’s fundamental jurisdiction to modify and, upon a proper factual showing, to extend the spousal support provisions contained therein.” (Id. at p. 470.) It concluded, “[T]he instant trial court’s retention of jurisdiction until September 1, 1984, to hear [the wife]’s requests for spousal support implies that the court retained the power to grant such requests. If the court was without jurisdiction to award spousal support past September 1, 1984, its retention of jurisdiction until that date to hear [the wife]’s requests for support would be meaningless. [Citations.] Accordingly, the court’s retention of jurisdiction until September 1, 1984, to modify the spousal support provisions of the interlocutory decree necessarily included a retention of its fundamental jurisdiction to extend spousal support payments beyond that date.” (Id. at p. 471.) Initially, we do not read Vomacka to mean that the language “further court order” preserves the court’s jurisdiction to terminate support as argued by Husband. Rather, Vomacka recognized that any further court order must comply with the policies of providing spousal support and that it is restrained by the language in the marital settlement agreement. Here, the trial court did not consider that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a modification of spousal support. Rather, the trial court properly determined it was restrained by the language in the MSA that the only modification was for upward modification, and that the parties agreed that Wife would receive a minimum of 14 years of spousal support. The trial court, in interpreting the MSA, had to consider the language 19 in the entire agreement in determining whether to modify or terminate spousal support. Nothing in Vomacka changes this interpretation or result. Finally, Husband argues the parties contemplated that the purpose of spousal support was that Wife become self-sufficient, and once she was self-sufficient, spousal support should be terminated. As previously noted, there is no provision in the MSA providing that Wife must become self-supporting. Moreover, the MSA provides that the amount paid to Wife for her education “shall not be considered additional ‘Spousal Support’ but is a reasonable repayment as the father received an MBA degree during the marriage that is valued at over $100,000.” The payment for Wife’s education was to equalize the amount spent on education during the marriage. Nothing in the MSA supports that termination of spousal support was required if Wife became self-supporting. Although not raised as an issue in this case, we note for any possible future disputes that the language of the MSA provides that before either party files a request for order, the party is to first seek mediation. The MSA provides that if either of the parties wishes to modify the MSA, they must first try to mediate the dispute by retaining the services of a third-party neutral mediator. If after three sessions, they do not come to an agreement, either party can file the appropriate motion or request for order to modify the MSA. “Failure to follow the terms to engage in meaningful mediation may result in the offending party having to pay attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in the future.” The trial court did not consider this provision when Husband filed the RFO, and Wife did not raise the issue in the trial court or in this court. This court merely points out 20 this language to assist the trial court and the parties should any further disputes arise requiring the filing of an RFO by either party. DISPOSITION The order of the trial court denying the RFO is affirmed. Wife is awarded her costs on appeal as the prevailing party. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. MILLER J. We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. CODRINGTON J. 21