In re M.B. CA2/4

Filed 11/4/26 In re M.B. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR In re M.B., a Person Coming B347395 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01945A) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. A.B., Defendant and Appellant; M.B., Respondent.  APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed. Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent. __________________________ A.B. (mother) is the adoptive mother of M.B., a dependent child removed from her care. She is also the adoptive mother of T.B. and A.B., who are in her care and not subject to these dependency proceedings. Over mother’s objection, the juvenile court ordered continued visitation between M.B. and her nondependent siblings. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.2, 388, 16002.)1 On appeal, mother contends the court unconstitutionally applied the nondependent sibling visitation statutes and abused its discretion by ordering continued visitation. We affirm. BACKGROUND M.B. was 15 years old and lived with mother and two siblings. Her siblings, T.B. and A.B., were 12 and 11 years old, respectively.2 Amidst allegations of ongoing abuse by mother, M.B. ran away from home. 1 Subsequent references to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 All three children were placed in mother’s care in prior dependency cases. M.B. was placed with mother in 2012 and legally adopted in 2017. 2  M.B. moved into a youth shelter. Shelter workers reported M.B. was engaged in therapy and “doing amazing” in school. Mother ignored M.B.’s calls and attempts at contact. M.B. wanted to see her adoptive siblings, whom she loved “very much.” The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition on M.B.’s behalf. The petition alleged that mother was no longer able or willing to provide for M.B. In June 2024, the juvenile court detained M.B. with mother’s consent and ordered DCFS to facilitate sibling visitation twice a month in mother’s home. Two months later, the court sustained the petition, denied mother reunification services pursuant to waiver, and continued the visitation order with T.B. and A.B. Mother denied M.B. sibling visitation from the time it was ordered until March 2025. During this time, mother accused M.B. of stealing, lying, and “influenc[ing]” her younger siblings into “misbehaviors.” Mother accused M.B. of introducing her siblings to pornography about four years earlier and sending T.B. inappropriate photographs of herself wearing makeup in September 2024. M.B. admitted stealing money from mother and tried to explain the 2020 pornography incident. She said a boy in her fifth-grade class told her to “Google” something that took her to a pornographic site. M.B. never went to the site again but found T.B. accessing it on her phone. Several social workers told mother the pictures of M.B. wearing makeup were not inappropriate and recommended monitored sibling visitation to maintain the children’s relationship. M.B. worried she would not be able to visit her adopted siblings. At several permanency review hearings between December 2024 and February 2025, mother’s counsel objected to the visitation order, arguing the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction 3 to issue it. The court overruled the objections and admonished mother for stonewalling visitation without seeking review by additional briefing, writ, or appeal. The court informed mother that M.B. did not “stop being siblings” with T.B. and A.B. despite her removal from mother’s care. (See § 16002, subd. (g); In re Miguel A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 389, 396.) In March 2025, mother permitted weekly telephone contact between M.B. and her siblings. Mother admitted these calls “went well.” At a June 2025 permanency planning hearing, mother’s counsel objected to the sibling visitation order. Notwithstanding various statutes authorizing nondependent sibling visitation, counsel argued the government “shall not interfere” with mother’s due process right to the care, custody, and control of her nondependent children. This right was “jurisdictional” and precluded “any court order or government involvement.” The court acknowledged issues with M.B.’s reported “behavior[s]” and found that “whether or not that’s influencing” T.B. or A.B. did not matter because they were “engaging in risky behavior.” The court overruled mother’s objection but directed her to “please take action” if the “children -- and I will reiterate children -- are interacting with each other” inappropriately. As before, the court invited additional argument and briefing on the matter. Mother declined this invitation and appealed. DISCUSSION A. Governing Law In 2015, the Legislature amended several statutes to authorize court ordered visitation between dependent children and their nondependent siblings. (In re L.M. (2025) 113 4 Cal.App.5th 364, 369–370 (L.M.), citing Stats. 2014, ch. 772, § 17; Stats 2014, ch. 773, §§ 7, 10.5.) Such visitation provides “ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings,” furthering the Legislature’s intent to “preserve and strengthen” sibling relationships. (§ 16002, subds. (a)(2), (b).) Dependent children may petition the court or request visitation with nondependent sibling in parental custody. (§ 388, subd. (b)(2).) These requests “may be granted unless it is determined by the court that sibling visitation is contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings.” (§ 388, subd. (b)(3).) Whenever “placement of siblings together in the same home is not possible, a diligent effort shall be made, . . . to provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings until family reunification is achieved or, if parental rights are terminated, as part of developing the permanent plan for the child.” (§ 16002, subd. (b); see also § 361.2, subd. (j).) B. Mother Waived and Forfeited Her As-Applied Challenge Mother does not challenge the facial validity of the sibling visitation statutes. Rather, she contends the juvenile court applied them unconstitutionally in this case. M.B contends mother waived this contention. We agree. Mother could have challenged the underlying visitation order long ago. She could have taken a writ from the initial order in June 2024. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Service v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1413–1414 [writ review of order dismissing dependency petition].) She could have appealed the disposition and permanency review orders in August 2024 and 5 February 2025. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).) Mother did not do so, did not file a modification petition (§ 388), and did not heed the court’s direction to file supplemental briefing during the year-long period in which sibling visitation was ordered. Having foregone these paths for review, mother has waived her claim of error. (See, e.g., Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018; In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355 [declining challenge to “‘most recent’” dependency order prevents late-stage sabotage].) Mother has also forfeited her constitutional challenge. Generally, “‘[a]n as-applied constitutional challenge is forfeited unless previously raised.’ [Citation.]” (In re E.J. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 727, 737.) Such challenges may not be forfeited only if: (1) they require “‘no trial court action’” to preserve, or (2) they do “not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, . . . ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129, 182, fn. 12.) Mother does not contend the first exception to forfeiture applies and does not show she meets the requirements of the second. Mother faults the juvenile court for failing to apply a constitutional standard governing her interest in the care, custody, and control of her children. (Citing Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 70.) Under this standard, “in deciding whether to order sibling visitation, the court must consider and respect the decision of a parent who is presumed fit, even if the court ultimately overrules a parental objection.” (L.M., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.) Whether the visitation statutes were applied constitutionally, mother argues, “depends on the weight 6 the juvenile court gave to [her] concerns about the visitation between [M.B.] and her nondependent siblings.” As mother argues, it is difficult to determine “from the court’s statements[s], the weight” it attributed to her right to parent. But mother did not ask the court to weigh her rights against other factors as she does on appeal. Instead, she argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to make a sibling visitation order. In other words, mother did not invoke the legal standard she seeks to apply in this appeal. In a similarly positioned case, the court in L.M. declined to consider the same as-applied challenge mother makes here because the record did “not indicate, one way or the other, what weight the juvenile court gave to Mother’s concerns about visitation between Minor and Sister.” (L.M., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) Much like in L.M., this court is left with “nothing that allows us to conclude whether, in this case, the juvenile court applied constitutional standards correctly.” (Ibid.) Consequently, mother has forfeited her argument on appeal. C. No Error Ordering Continued Sibling Visitation Mother also challenges the court’s exercise of discretion when ordering continued sibling visitation for M.B. A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Alexandria M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095–1096.) Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering visitation between M.B. and her siblings because it was contrary to the siblings’ safety and well-being. She argues the court undervalued her evidence of M.B.’s improper influence. We may not reweigh the evidence in the manner mother suggests. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) 7 “‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 319.) Here, mother portrayed M.B.’s actions one way, and M.B. and social workers accounted for them differently. For example, mother stated that M.B. stole, and approximately four years earlier, introduced her sibling(s) to pornography. M.B. provided context for these actions and took some responsibility. Mother stated that a photo of M.B. wearing makeup was inappropriate, but social workers disagreed. The juvenile court expressly considered mother’s concerns, upheld visitation, and advised her to “take action” if any problems arose in the future. The order sought to “preserve and strengthen” M.B.’s relationships with known and legally recognized siblings. (§ 16002, subds. (a)(2), (g).) We discern no abuse of discretion in this ruling. 8  DISPOSITION The order continuing sibling visitation is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORI, Acting P. J. We concur: TAMZARIAN, J. DAUM, J. 9