Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Zarabi v. Zaman CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE FRANK ZARABI, B349929 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24NWCV02228) v. SAMAN ZAMAN et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Julian C. Recana, Judge. Affirmed. Rosen Saba, Ryan D. Saba, and Michael P. DiGiannantonio for Defendants and Appellants. Colleen O’Brien, California Anti-SLAPP Project, and Mark Goldowitz for Plaintiff and Respondent. __________________________________ Appellant Saman Zaman entered into a contract with non- party Mercedes-AMG to buy what he describes as “an ultra- exclusive luxury Mercedes-AMG car called the ‘Project One.’ ” Zaman and respondent Frank Zarabi subsequently entered into an agreement whereby Zaman would sell the Project One to Zarabi for whatever it cost Zaman to buy, plus a profit of $300,000. It is undisputed that Zaman’s agreement with Mercedes-AMG prohibited the agreement Zaman subsequently made with Zarabi. After several years, and after he had wired Zaman a total of $899,000, Zarabi began suspecting Zaman would not transfer the car to him once it was finally produced. On May 7, 2024, he informed Mercedes-AMG about his agreement with Zaman, ultimately resulting in Mercedes-AMG canceling its contract with Zaman, and—according to Zaman—banning him from buying future “ultra-luxury cars.” Zaman returned only $500,000 of the $899,000 Zarabi wired him. In July 2024, Zarabi filed suit for the remainder. In February 2025, Zaman and appellants Burton Way Investments, and Camzam Investments, Inc.1 cross-complained against Zarabi, bringing causes of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Zarabi filed a motion to strike the cross- complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti- SLAPP statute), which the trial court granted. 1 In a deposition, Zaman testified he was the managing member and CEO of Burton Way and the chief financial officer, chief executive officer, and sole director of Camzam. 2 On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred in granting Zarabi’s anti-SLAPP motion because the communications on which appellants’ cross-complaint were based did not constitute protected prelitigation communications under the anti-SLAPP statute, and because, even if they did, appellants demonstrated the minimal merit necessary to survive an anti- SLAPP motion.2 Zarabi disagrees and also asks us to award him the attorneys’ fees he incurred on appeal. We affirm and award Zarabi the requested fees. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Zarabi Files a Complaint Zarabi filed a complaint in July 2024, and a first amended complaint in October 2024. In January 2025, he filed his second amended complaint (SAC, the operative complaint) against Zaman, Burton Way, and Camzam. The SAC contained 11 causes of action and alleged, in pertinent part, that in March 2018, Zarabi and Zaman agreed via e-mail that Zarabi would buy from Zaman the “Project One,” a vehicle that Merecedes-AMG 2 Appellants also claim “the trial court erred in finding that Mercedes-AMG was an ‘interested party’ under [Code of Civil Procedure,] § 425.16(e)(2) where Zarabi’s communications with Mercedes-AMG on and around May 7, 2024, were aimed at influencing the manufacturer[’]s performance and termination decisions in a private commercial dispute.” Because appellants make no actual argument to support this contention, we find it forfeited. (See, e.g., Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 [“ ‘an appellate brief “should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration” ’ ”].) 3 would manufacture. The purchase price would be $300,000 plus whatever the car cost Zaman. The e-mail describing the agreement also implied Zarabi would reimburse Zaman for the deposits he would be required to pay for the vehicle.3 Zaman agreed that “in case this car gets cancelled by AMG for some reason[,] the money $300k and of course the deposit is due back to you.” In March 2018, Zarabi transferred $300,000 to Zaman. After the transfer, Zaman confirmed the parties had agreed to “$300k for the rights to Project one.” Zaman additionally informed Zarabi that: (1) “[t]he car can be canceled by AMG at any time,” and if AMG did cancel the car, “I will refund your 300k. (unless something you or Simon do to cancel the deal LOL) [sic]”; (2) the deal “has to be very private and can’t let AMG be notified of any ownership Change [sic]”; and (3) Zaman would let Zarabi “know when the seat fitting etc is.” Zarabi also transferred $200,000 to Zaman in May 2018, $100,000 in September 2018, and $299,000 in November 2018. Appellants never transferred the rights to the car to Zarabi and returned only $500,000 as of June 2024, leaving a balance of $399,000. Zarabi also alleged appellants had no intention of ever transferring the rights to him. Zarabi “did not reasonably discover, know of facts or suspect the wrongful acts or harm alleged in this Complaint until on or about January 23, 2024.” 3 In one e-mail, Zaman informed Zarabi he “paid 500k Euros deposit as of now,” and in response, Zarabi stated: “My goal is to pay you the deposit 1st wk of April.” 4 B. Appellants Cross-Complain In February 2025, appellants filed a cross-complaint against Zarabi for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. In pertinent part, the cross-complaint alleged that, in June 2017, Burton Way entered into a contract with Mercedes- AMG “to purchase a unique special-order vehicle, a Mercedes- AMG Project One (‘Project One’) to be produced with anticipated delivery sometime in late 2021.” In March 2018, Zaman and Zarabi “had email discussions about a possible transfer of the vehicle to Cross-Defendant.” Zaman advised Zarabi that “any discussions about a potential agreement needed to be kept confidential” and that “Mercedes-AMG could cancel the Mercedes Contract with Burton Way if Cross-Defendant did anything to interfere with it.” In March 2018, Zarabi wired $300,000 to Burton Way; he wired an additional $599,000 “over the next few months.” In 2022, after production delays postponed the delivery date of the vehicle, one of Zarabi’s agents “contacted Mercedes- AMG directly asking about delivery,” and Zaman advised Zarabi “to not contact Mercedes-AMG as it would impact Zaman’s relationship with Mercedes-AMG.” In April 2024, Zaman told Zarabi it would likely take another year for Mercedes-AMG to complete production of the Project One. “Beginning in or around the beginning of 2024,” Zarabi “independently initiated direct communications with Mercedes- AMG regarding the Project One. During these communications, Cross-Defendant knowingly made false and misleading statements, deliberately attempting to portray Cross- 5 Complainants in a negative light. Specifically, it is alleged that Cross-Defendant falsely asserted that Cross-Complainants had entered into contract with Cross-Defendant to sell the Project One in violation of the Mercedes Contract, which expressly prohibits the transfer of rights to the vehicle for a certain time period after the delivery of the vehicle. Cross-Defendant Zarabi was fully aware that Cross-Complainant Burton Way had a valid and enforceable contract with Mercedes-AMG and knew based upon having access to the Mercedes Contract and based upon statements made by Zaman to Zarabi that his interference would cause Mercedes-AMG to cancel the Mercedes Contract and would extinguish the good relationship that Cross-Complainants enjoyed with Mercedes-AMG. Nevertheless, Cross-Defendant made these disparaging statements with the intent to interfere with Cross-Complainants’ contract and relationship with Mercedes-AMG and, upon information and belief, to position himself to acquire the Project One for his own benefit.” Due to Zarabi’s actions, Mercedes-AMG terminated its contract with Burton Way for the Project One and “severed its business relationship with” appellants. Appellants alleged that previously, they had been able to purchase from Mercedes-AMG “multiple high-end, custom, and limited-release vehicles” but due to Zarabi’s actions, it was “highly unlikely that Cross- Complainants will be afforded the opportunity to purchase such exclusive vehicles in the future,” thus causing appellants “substantial financial harm, including the loss of significant revenue and business opportunities that they otherwise would have realized through their ongoing relationship with Mercedes- AMG.” 6 C. Zarabi Moves to Strike the Cross-Complaint In April 2025, Zarabi moved to strike the cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. He contended the communications he had with Mercedes-AMG were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because they “were made while he was seriously considering litigation and had taken active steps to prosecute his case,” and appellants “cannot prevail on the merits of their claims as the communications fall under both the litigation and common interest privileges, were justified and not independently wrongful.” 1. Factual Background Zarabi explained that, after the parties made the agreement generally described in both complaints, he bought a Mercedes dealership in April 2018, and appellants “informed AMG that they were officially switching their designated U.S. delivery dealer from Mercedes of Beverly Hills to Zarabi’s dealership, Mercedes of Escondido.” Doing so “authorized Zarabi and his partner, Simon Sarriedine, to speak with AMG about the status of Project ONE as a designated dealer/agent.” In June 2022, appellants told Zarabi that Mercedes-AMG “had decided not to configure the car for use in the United States or Canada. Zarabi told Zaman that he would either (1) obtain a ‘show and display’ permit that would allow that car into the U.S. under a National Highway Transportation Safety Association exemption; or that (2) he would take delivery in Germany. At no time did he agree to take delivery in Dubai or agree to any destination country other than the U.S. or Germany.” “In January 2024, Zarabi began hearing from associates in different parts of the world that Project ONES were being delivered.” He asked Zaman when his Project One would be 7 delivered, and when the deadline to choose a color for the car was. Zaman told him that “delivery was anticipated in the first quarter of 2025,” causing Zarabi to suspect Zaman was lying about the status of the car, and would try to sell the car to someone else for a larger profit. Part of the evidence Zarabi submitted in support of his motion was an April 11, 2024 e-mail from Guillaume Chabin (a Mercedes-AMG representative) to Zaman, in which Chabin informed Zaman that his Project One “has entered the assembly facility in Coventry and is currently in station 5 out of 12 in total. I would therefore anticipate a possible delivery of your car to you in Affalterbach in June and kindly ask you to get prepared to receive an invoice from us asking for the payment of the remaining amount in May.”4 Zaman replied later that day, “Now that is some exciting news!!!!!!! I can’t believe it’s that time & looking forward to this. [¶] I will look out for that invoice and I will look for further instructions when we get closer to delivery time.” Five days later, in the morning of April 16, 2024, Zarabi texted Zaman to say that he had heard Mercedes was “pushing really hard to give them colors and final payment” and asked Zaman what he had heard. Despite having received and responded to Chabin’s e-mail informing him that Zarabi’s Project One had already “entered the assembly facility,” Zaman told 4 “Affalterbach is a municipality in the Ludwigsburg district in Baden-Württemberg, Germany.” (Wikipedia, Affalterbach <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affalterbach> [as of Nov. 18, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/8AQA-RJUZ>.) 8 Zarabi only that he would “get an update to see what number they are on” and implied Mercedes-AMG had yet to contact him.5 Also on April 16, Zarabi visited the Mercedes factory in Germany and asked about the status of his Project One vehicle. Chabin informed him the car would be ready “in six weeks, June 2024,” and that he had informed Zaman of this “last week.” Zarabi also learned Zaman had specified Dubai as the destination country for the vehicle, although Zarabi had made it clear that he wanted the car delivered in the United States or, if that were not possible, in Germany. Zarabi additionally learned Zaman had already selected a color for the vehicle. These revelations caused Zarabi to realize appellants had been lying to him and “he began to seriously contemplate suing them.” After hearing Zaman was offering to sell the car to other potential buyers, “in late April 2024, Zarabi made the decision to sue” appellants. On May 7, 2024, Zarabi spoke again with Chabin, who had asked to speak with Zarabi after he heard Zarabi was interested in buying a Project One. On this call, “[r]ather than discussing a new purchase contract,” Zarabi told Chabin about the agreement he and appellants had made in 2018 regarding the Project One car that Burton Way was under contract to buy from Mercedes- AMG, and asserted the car was actually his. Chabin stated he was not surprised at appellants’ “deception” and informed Zarabi of his belief that appellants intended to sell the Project One in Dubai for a profit, which they were not contractually permitted to do. Zarabi stated he would be suing Zaman for the enforcement of their agreement or the return of his money, and Chabin 5 In response to Zarabi’s question “They didn’t contact you?” Zaman said, “They said they would when we are close.” 9 responded that “AMG would most likely be cancelling” its agreement with Zaman, and that he (Chabin) “needed to speak with his legal department.” The two “agreed to cooperate and to share information with each other from that point forward to improve their chances of success in litigation.” Zarabi stated this conversation was the first communication he had with Mercedes- AMG “about Project ONE #247 being his car” or that appellants “sold him the rights [to the car] for $300,000 over cost.”6 In the afternoon of May 7, Zarabi and Zaman exchanged a series of texts, in which Zaman maintained that “Estimated delivery [for the car was] 1st quarter 2025” and that the deadline to “firm up” the color for the car was “1 month before production.” The next morning, Zarabi met with his attorney and handed her copies of the e-mails that were eventually attached to his operative complaint, from which she drafted a demand letter that she e-mailed to Zarabi that same afternoon. The demand letter stated Zarabi intended to sue Zaman if he failed to return the money Zarabi had sent him over the years. On May 16, 2024, Zarabi canceled his agreement with Zaman, and Zaman agreed to return Zarabi’s money. From May 22 to June 12, 2024, Zaman returned only $500,000. Zarabi’s attorney revised her demand letter and sent it to Zaman on June 6 Concurrently with his motion, Zarabi submitted excerpts from a deposition of Zaman. In those excerpts, Zaman stated he had no knowledge of when Zarabi told Chabin about the deal he had with Zaman to purchase the Project One but assumed it was before June or July 2024, when Chabin told Zaman it was terminating the contract to buy the Project One. Zaman also admitted he had no knowledge that Zarabi made any false statements to Chabin or, indeed, any knowledge of what Zarabi said to Chabin at all. 10 20, 2024, following up with filing a complaint when Zaman did not respond to the demand letter. 2. Anti-SLAPP Analysis Zarabi argued that his discussion with Mercedes-AMG about his agreement with appellants constituted protected activity because when he “told AMG about his arrangement with Zaman, he already decided to sue Zaman for the return of his $900,000 investment plus interest.” He additionally argued both the litigation privilege and common interest privilege provided a defense to appellants’ claims, and that the actions appellants complained of were not independently wrongful. D. Appellants Oppose the Motion In July 2025, appellants opposed Zarabi’s motion, arguing that Zarabi’s statements to Mercedes-AMG were made “to procure the Project One, not prepare for litigation.” They contended Zarabi’s statements to Mercedes-AMG lacked a substantive connection to any contemplated litigation, and claimed the litigation was merely “hypothetical.” Appellants further argued their claims had merit because “Zarabi acted with clear malicious intent” when he “cast false light on Zaman by insinuating Zaman had an agreement with somebody else to sell the car” and “denigrated Zaman’s worthiness to own the Project One,” thus rendering the litigation privilege and common interest privileges inapplicable. Zarabi replied, refuting appellants’ points and reiterating his own. E. The Court Grants the Motion In late July 2025, the court granted Zarabi’s motion. It found the May 7, 2024 communications with Chabin “constituted 11 prelitigation communications for purposes of” the anti-SLAPP statute because Zarabi “began seriously considering litigation” in April 2024. The court concluded “ZARABI’s allegedly tortious communications [with Chabin] were for the purpose of 1) informing Mercedes-AMG as an interested party and 2) discussing with Mercedes-AMG a potential litigation strategy against ZAMAN.” As to the merits of the cross-complaint, the court ruled that “the litigation privilege applies to the communications, and Cross-Complainants will not be able to show a probability of success on the merits on their tortious interference claims.” The court also ruled Zarabi was entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. Appellants timely appealed. DISCUSSION The anti-SLAPP statute requires a two-step analysis: “At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. . . . If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) “ ‘In 1997, . . . the Legislature amended the measure to clarify its intent that the provisions of the statute are to be interpreted broadly.’ ” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 426.) “The grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788), and “ ‘our job is to review the trial court’s ruling, not its 12 reasoning’ ” (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1002). A. The Communications in Question Constitute Protected Activity “Although the [anti-SLAPP] statute refers to ongoing proceedings, as this court and many others have held, ‘[p]relitigation communications may qualify for this protection so long as they “ ‘concern[] the subject of the dispute’ and [are] made ‘in anticipation of litigation “contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” ’ ” ’ ” (Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1284.) Both parties agree “[t]he foundation of Zaman’s tortious interference claims were the May 7, 2024, conversation between Zarabi and Mercedes-AMG employee Guillaume Chabin, and several emails between the two around this time.” Thus, the first question we must answer is whether this conversation and these e-mails constitute prelitigation communications concerning the subject of Zarabi’s complaint against appellants made in anticipation of litigation that was contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. We conclude they were. 1. Litigation Was Seriously Contemplated in Good Faith Zarabi argues that, by late April 2024, he had decided he would sue appellants over their alleged deception regarding Zarabi and Zaman’s agreement regarding the Project One. The appellate record supports this contention. Zarabi averred that, in January 2024, he began hearing that Project Ones were being delivered. But when he asked Zaman when his Project One would be delivered, Zaman told him 13 the car would not be delivered until the first quarter of 2025, arousing Zarabi’s suspicions. In April 2024, when Zarabi again asked about the status of the Project One, Zaman stated he would ask Mercedes-AMG for an update. But when Zarabi visited the Mercedes factory in Germany later that day and asked about the status of his Project One, Chabin stated it would be ready in June 2024, and that he had informed Zaman “last week.” Zarabi also learned that, despite telling Zaman that Zarabi wanted to take delivery of the Project One in the United States or Germany, Zaman had specified Dubai as the “Destination Country” for the vehicle. Additionally, although Zaman had continually told Zarabi there would be time to choose the color for the car, Zarabi learned from Chabin on his April 2024 visit that Zaman had already chosen a color for the vehicle. After hearing Zaman was offering to sell the car to other potential buyers, “in late April 2024, Zarabi made the decision to sue” appellants. On May 7, 2024, Zarabi and Zaman exchanged texts in which Zaman maintained the estimated delivery for the Project One was “1st quarter 2025” and that they could choose the color for the car “1 month before production.”7 Based on this evidence, and with no contrary evidence submitted by Zaman, we see no reason to discredit Zarabi’s assertion that, before he spoke with Chabin on May 7, 2024, and when he exchanged e-mails with him around that time, Zarabi was seriously considering litigation against appellants. 7 While Zaman claimed he never lied to Zarabi about the delivery date, he does not explain why, after he received an e-mail stating Mercedes-AMG anticipated delivering his Project One in June 2024, he nevertheless informed Zarabi the expected delivery date was in the first quarter of 2025. 14 Additionally, the subject of Zarabi’s conversation with Chabin related to the subject of the complaint he eventually filed against appellants—i.e., Zarabi and Zaman’s agreement regarding the latter’s sale of the Project One to the former. Thus, the May 7, 2024 conversation with Chabin constituted protected prelitigation communications under the anti-SLAPP statute. 2. Appellants’ Arguments to the Contrary Are Unpersuasive Appellants argue the trial court erred in finding the communications in question constituted protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute because: (a) Zarabi’s unilateral statements about when he began seriously contemplating litigation are unsupported by the record; (b) Zarabi’s communications with Chabin were intended to help him acquire the Project One, not further his litigation goals; and (c) because Zarabi did not send Zaman the May 8, 2024 demand letter his counsel drafted, litigation was only “theoretical,” and not seriously considered. We address each contention in turn. (a) Zarabi’s Statements About When He Began Seriously Contemplating Litigation Are Supported by the Record Appellants contend Zarabi’s statement that he had decided to sue Zaman in late April 2024 is not “conclusive proof” that he was seriously contemplating litigation at that time because he had yet to: confront Zaman about his suspicions, try to terminate or enforce their agreement, or request his money back, threaten Zaman with litigation, speak to an attorney about litigation, send a demand letter, or draft a complaint. But although such actions 15 would support a party’s claim that litigation was seriously contemplated, appellants cite no authority demonstrating these are necessary elements. As discussed above, Zarabi’s testimony of when he decided to sue Zaman was supported by the other evidence in the record regarding what Zarabi perceived as Zaman’s deception and apparent intent to sell the Project One to other potential buyers. (b) Zarabi’s Communications Related to the Subject of Litigation Appellants next argue Zarabi’s communications with Chabin were unprotected because they “focused on acquiring the Project One, with only incidental references to potential litigation.” Appellants also argue that “[a]cts done in furtherance of an economic advantage are not acts that are protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Appellants’ only support for this statement is Ericsson GE Mobile Communs., Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecom. Engin’s (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601, which held that “it is only in those cases where the party acted for the purpose of promoting or advancing his or her right to free speech, in contrast to one where the parties are performing or breaching their contractual obligations, that the right could be chilled by the specter of an unfounded lawsuit.” As appellants concede, Ericsson “has been subsequently disapproved of by subsequent decisions.” Appellants supply no other authority standing for the proposition that prelitigation communications qualify for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the moving party’s motives in making the communications at issue are solely for promoting or advancing the right to free speech. However, despite appellants’ lack of authority, the motivations of Zarabi’s communications may be 16 relevant. As our Supreme Court has explained: “In some cases . . . , whether the defendant’s act qualifies as one in furtherance of protected speech or petitioning will depend on whether the defendant took the action for speech-related reasons. Nothing in the statutory scheme prevents the defendant from introducing evidence establishing such reasons.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 889.) Thus, we examine whether Zarabi’s May 7, 2024 communication with Chabin, and the e-mails between the two around May 7, 2024, were for “speech-related reasons.” (i) The May 7, 2024 Conversation The only evidence of what transpired in the May 7, 2024 conversation between Zarabi and Chabin comes from Zarabi’s declaration, as Zaman admitted in deposition that he had no knowledge of what was said in that conversation. Zarabi stated that when he spoke with Chabin on May 7, he understood Chabin wanted to speak with him because Chabin had heard Zarabi was interested in buying a Project One. However, Zarabi declared that “[r]ather than discussing a new purchase contract,” he told Chabin about his agreement with Zaman, about the money he paid Zaman, and about Zarabi’s insistence that the destination country for the car would be the United States or Germany, not Dubai. Zarabi also informed Chabin that he would be suing Zaman “for the enforcement of our agreement and/or the return of my money.” Both Chabin and Zarabi “discussed engaging our legal teams in preparation for litigation with” appellants, and “agreed to cooperate and to share information with each other from that point forward in order to improve our chances of success in litigation.” In other words, the conversation was expressly not about how Mercedes-AMG and Zarabi could enter 17 into a new contract for Zarabi to purchase the Project One, but about Zaman and Zarabi’s agreement that Zaman would supply Zarabi with a Project One that Zaman was to purchase from Mercedes-AMG, and the litigation Zarabi intended to pursue against Zaman concerning that agreement. (ii) Subsequent E-mails On May 9, 2024, Zarabi informed Chabin via e-mail that Zaman was in Dubai and was probably reselling the Project One “as he told me yesterday the car won’t be ready until 1st quarter of 2025.” Zarabi asked Chabin not to “alert” Zaman of the order cancellation yet, opining that perhaps Zaman would refund the money first. Zarabi also asked to be kept in the “loop of legal dept review.” Chabin agreed. One week later, Zarabi sent Chabin another e-mail stating he had met with Zaman, who had given him a check but asked him not to deposit it for a week. Zarabi requested Chabin not do anything until the end of the month and also asked Chabin when “the car would be ready” and about the accompanying paperwork. On May 21, 2024, Zarabi sent another e-mail updating Chabin about the status of returned funds and asking whether he should make arrangements to take delivery of the car. On June 3, 2024, Zarabi informed Chabin via e-mail that Zaman had promised to have his money in the form of a check that would hopefully be deposited in the next three to four days. He also asked about some logistics regarding taking delivery of the Project One. Chabin responded by asking Zarabi to fill out a form regarding the Project One and further discussing some of the logistics. Finally, on July 1, 2024, Zarabi sent Chabin the contract for the Project One and asked Chabin to “[l]et me know when you 18 tell Sam he is not getting the car. So I can proceed with getting the rest of my money back. (Sic.)” Appellants contend that Zarabi’s May 7, 2024 call with Chabin and these subsequent e-mails “focused on acquiring the Project One, with only incidental references to potential litigation.” We disagree. The only evidence of the discussion between Zarabi and Chabin on the May 7 call demonstrates it expressly was not about entering a new contract for Zarabi to acquire the Project One. And although the subsequent e-mails contained discussions regarding a new agreement for Zarabi to acquire the Project One, each e-mail also updated Chabin on the status of Zarabi getting his money back from Zaman and was often accompanied by a request that Chabin not tell Zaman about the cancellation in order to improve Zarabi’s litigation position. Indeed, the final e-mail asked Chabin to inform Zarabi when Zaman was told about the order cancellation so that Zarabi could “proceed with getting the rest of my money back.” We conclude that Zarabi’s conversation and e-mails with Chabin sufficiently relate to the complaint he would ultimately file against Zaman to meet the requirements of the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test. (c) Unsent Demand Letter After citing case law that the anti-SLAPP statute “protects prelitigation communications made in genuine contemplation of litigation while excluding from protection communications made when litigation is ‘just a negotiating tactic or a hypothetical possibility’ ” (Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1285–1286), appellants claim the draft demand letter “makes it clear that [when it was written] litigation was not yet imminent, but simply being threatened as a 19 means to get what Zarabi wanted – his money back, or what was really his goal all along, the Project One.” To the extent appellants claim that any demand letter threatening litigation should the recipient fail to accede to the writer’s requests cannot constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because the letter offers a path to avoid litigation, we disagree. “The very function of a demand letter is to notify the other party that litigation is imminent unless certain steps are taken.” (Aronson v. Kinsella (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 254, 268; see also Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 910, 918 [although defendant’s demand letters sought “cooperation of the letters’ recipients to stop the pirating” and “provided the recipients with an opportunity to resolve the matter by way of settlement before commencement of suit,” “plaintiffs cannot successfully argue that their complaint does not arise from DIRECTV’s constitutionally protected right to petition for redress of grievances. The entire lawsuit is premised on DIRECTV’s demand letter, sent in advance of, or to avoid, litigation to vindicate its right not to have its programming pirated”].) To the extent appellants contend an unsent demand letter necessitates a finding that litigation is not seriously contemplated, we also disagree. Appellants provide no authority so holding, and our independent research has revealed none. While an unsent demand letter may support a conclusion that a defendant was not yet seriously contemplating litigation, it may also support the opposite conclusion; it compels neither conclusion. In this instance, when viewed in light of the other evidence discussed above, we conclude that it supports Zarabi’s claim that he was seriously contemplating litigation by late April. 20 That Zarabi was trying to get as much money back from Zaman as possible before filing a lawsuit does not negate this conclusion. Indeed, if Zarabi were not yet seriously considering suing Zaman on May 8, 2024, it would make no sense for him to request his counsel draft the demand letter. We conclude the evidence in the record demonstrates the communications in question concern the subject of the dispute Zarabi had with Zaman and were made in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. They therefore constitute protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. B. Appellants Fail to Demonstrate Minimal Merit Because we determine the relief appellants seek is based on allegations arising from protected activity, the burden shifts to appellants to demonstrate their claims are legally sufficient and factually substantiated. (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) Like the trial court, we conclude appellants cannot make such a showing because their claims are barred by the litigation privilege. The litigation privilege is “ ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.’ ” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) “The litigation privilege is . . . relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Id. at p. 323.) “The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged. This privilege is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of 21 their maliciousness.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) “ ‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ” (Ibid.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Ibid.) “A prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Id. at p. 1251.) As discussed above, we conclude the communications at the heart of appellants’ cross-complaint related to litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. It follows that the litigation privilege would bar appellants’ claims. Appellants’ only argument to the contrary is that “Zarabi’s May 7, 2024, communications with Mercedes-AMG were not protected prelitigation dialogue, but discussions made prior to him have any substantial contemplation of litigation,” an argument we rejected above. Because the litigation privilege bars appellants’ claims, appellants cannot demonstrate the minimal merit necessary to survive the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test. C. Zarabi Is Entitled to His Attorneys’ Fees Zarabi requests we award him the attorneys’ fees he incurred on this appeal. Such fees are recoverable. (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785 [“ ‘A statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise.’ [Citation.] Since section 425.16, 22 subdivision (c) provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike, and does not preclude recovery of appellate attorney fees by a prevailing defendant-respondent, those fees are recoverable”].) Appellants’ only argument that Zarabi should not be awarded the requested fees is that we “should reverse the trial court’s decision.” As we decline to do so, we conclude Zarabi is entitled to his attorneys’ fees on appeal. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed. Zarabi shall recover his costs and attorneys’ fees on appeal, the amount of which will be determined by the trial court. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED M. KIM, J. We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J. 23