Zarabi v. Zaman CA2/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB349929
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Zarabi v. Zaman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
FRANK ZARABI, B349929
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24NWCV02228)
v.
SAMAN ZAMAN et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Julian C. Recana, Judge. Affirmed.
Rosen Saba, Ryan D. Saba, and Michael P. DiGiannantonio
for Defendants and Appellants.
Colleen O’Brien, California Anti-SLAPP Project, and Mark
Goldowitz for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Appellant Saman Zaman entered into a contract with non-
party Mercedes-AMG to buy what he describes as “an ultra-
exclusive luxury Mercedes-AMG car called the ‘Project One.’ ”
Zaman and respondent Frank Zarabi subsequently entered into
an agreement whereby Zaman would sell the Project One to
Zarabi for whatever it cost Zaman to buy, plus a profit of
$300,000. It is undisputed that Zaman’s agreement with
Mercedes-AMG prohibited the agreement Zaman subsequently
made with Zarabi.
After several years, and after he had wired Zaman a total
of $899,000, Zarabi began suspecting Zaman would not transfer
the car to him once it was finally produced. On May 7, 2024, he
informed Mercedes-AMG about his agreement with Zaman,
ultimately resulting in Mercedes-AMG canceling its contract with
Zaman, and—according to Zaman—banning him from buying
future “ultra-luxury cars.”
Zaman returned only $500,000 of the $899,000 Zarabi
wired him. In July 2024, Zarabi filed suit for the remainder. In
February 2025, Zaman and appellants Burton Way Investments,
and Camzam Investments, Inc.1 cross-complained against Zarabi,
bringing causes of action for intentional interference with
contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage. Zarabi filed a motion to strike the cross-
complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-
SLAPP statute), which the trial court granted.
1 In a deposition, Zaman testified he was the managing
member and CEO of Burton Way and the chief financial officer,
chief executive officer, and sole director of Camzam.
2
On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred in
granting Zarabi’s anti-SLAPP motion because the
communications on which appellants’ cross-complaint were based
did not constitute protected prelitigation communications under
the anti-SLAPP statute, and because, even if they did, appellants
demonstrated the minimal merit necessary to survive an anti-
SLAPP motion.2 Zarabi disagrees and also asks us to award him
the attorneys’ fees he incurred on appeal. We affirm and award
Zarabi the requested fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Zarabi Files a Complaint
Zarabi filed a complaint in July 2024, and a first amended
complaint in October 2024. In January 2025, he filed his second
amended complaint (SAC, the operative complaint) against
Zaman, Burton Way, and Camzam. The SAC contained 11
causes of action and alleged, in pertinent part, that in March
2018, Zarabi and Zaman agreed via e-mail that Zarabi would buy
from Zaman the “Project One,” a vehicle that Merecedes-AMG
2 Appellants also claim “the trial court erred in finding that
Mercedes-AMG was an ‘interested party’ under [Code of Civil
Procedure,] § 425.16(e)(2) where Zarabi’s communications with
Mercedes-AMG on and around May 7, 2024, were aimed at
influencing the manufacturer[’]s performance and termination
decisions in a private commercial dispute.” Because appellants
make no actual argument to support this contention, we find it
forfeited. (See, e.g., Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 539, 545 [“ ‘an appellate brief “should contain a legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none
is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration” ’ ”].)
3
would manufacture. The purchase price would be $300,000 plus
whatever the car cost Zaman. The e-mail describing the
agreement also implied Zarabi would reimburse Zaman for the
deposits he would be required to pay for the vehicle.3 Zaman
agreed that “in case this car gets cancelled by AMG for some
reason[,] the money $300k and of course the deposit is due back
to you.”
In March 2018, Zarabi transferred $300,000 to Zaman.
After the transfer, Zaman confirmed the parties had agreed to
“$300k for the rights to Project one.” Zaman additionally
informed Zarabi that: (1) “[t]he car can be canceled by AMG at
any time,” and if AMG did cancel the car, “I will refund your
300k. (unless something you or Simon do to cancel the deal LOL)
[sic]”; (2) the deal “has to be very private and can’t let AMG be
notified of any ownership Change [sic]”; and (3) Zaman would let
Zarabi “know when the seat fitting etc is.” Zarabi also
transferred $200,000 to Zaman in May 2018, $100,000 in
September 2018, and $299,000 in November 2018.
Appellants never transferred the rights to the car to Zarabi
and returned only $500,000 as of June 2024, leaving a balance of
$399,000. Zarabi also alleged appellants had no intention of ever
transferring the rights to him. Zarabi “did not reasonably
discover, know of facts or suspect the wrongful acts or harm
alleged in this Complaint until on or about January 23, 2024.”
3 In one e-mail, Zaman informed Zarabi he “paid 500k
Euros deposit as of now,” and in response, Zarabi stated: “My
goal is to pay you the deposit 1st wk of April.”
4
B. Appellants Cross-Complain
In February 2025, appellants filed a cross-complaint
against Zarabi for intentional interference with contractual
relations, intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage, and negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage. In pertinent part, the cross-complaint alleged that, in
June 2017, Burton Way entered into a contract with Mercedes-
AMG “to purchase a unique special-order vehicle, a Mercedes-
AMG Project One (‘Project One’) to be produced with anticipated
delivery sometime in late 2021.” In March 2018, Zaman and
Zarabi “had email discussions about a possible transfer of the
vehicle to Cross-Defendant.” Zaman advised Zarabi that “any
discussions about a potential agreement needed to be kept
confidential” and that “Mercedes-AMG could cancel the Mercedes
Contract with Burton Way if Cross-Defendant did anything to
interfere with it.” In March 2018, Zarabi wired $300,000 to
Burton Way; he wired an additional $599,000 “over the next few
months.”
In 2022, after production delays postponed the delivery
date of the vehicle, one of Zarabi’s agents “contacted Mercedes-
AMG directly asking about delivery,” and Zaman advised Zarabi
“to not contact Mercedes-AMG as it would impact Zaman’s
relationship with Mercedes-AMG.” In April 2024, Zaman told
Zarabi it would likely take another year for Mercedes-AMG to
complete production of the Project One.
“Beginning in or around the beginning of 2024,” Zarabi
“independently initiated direct communications with Mercedes-
AMG regarding the Project One. During these communications,
Cross-Defendant knowingly made false and misleading
statements, deliberately attempting to portray Cross-
5
Complainants in a negative light. Specifically, it is alleged that
Cross-Defendant falsely asserted that Cross-Complainants had
entered into contract with Cross-Defendant to sell the Project
One in violation of the Mercedes Contract, which expressly
prohibits the transfer of rights to the vehicle for a certain time
period after the delivery of the vehicle. Cross-Defendant Zarabi
was fully aware that Cross-Complainant Burton Way had a valid
and enforceable contract with Mercedes-AMG and knew based
upon having access to the Mercedes Contract and based upon
statements made by Zaman to Zarabi that his interference would
cause Mercedes-AMG to cancel the Mercedes Contract and would
extinguish the good relationship that Cross-Complainants
enjoyed with Mercedes-AMG. Nevertheless, Cross-Defendant
made these disparaging statements with the intent to interfere
with Cross-Complainants’ contract and relationship with
Mercedes-AMG and, upon information and belief, to position
himself to acquire the Project One for his own benefit.”
Due to Zarabi’s actions, Mercedes-AMG terminated its
contract with Burton Way for the Project One and “severed its
business relationship with” appellants. Appellants alleged that
previously, they had been able to purchase from Mercedes-AMG
“multiple high-end, custom, and limited-release vehicles” but due
to Zarabi’s actions, it was “highly unlikely that Cross-
Complainants will be afforded the opportunity to purchase such
exclusive vehicles in the future,” thus causing appellants
“substantial financial harm, including the loss of significant
revenue and business opportunities that they otherwise would
have realized through their ongoing relationship with Mercedes-
AMG.”
6
C. Zarabi Moves to Strike the Cross-Complaint
In April 2025, Zarabi moved to strike the cross-complaint
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. He contended the
communications he had with Mercedes-AMG were protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute because they “were made while he
was seriously considering litigation and had taken active steps to
prosecute his case,” and appellants “cannot prevail on the merits
of their claims as the communications fall under both the
litigation and common interest privileges, were justified and not
independently wrongful.”
1. Factual Background
Zarabi explained that, after the parties made the
agreement generally described in both complaints, he bought a
Mercedes dealership in April 2018, and appellants “informed
AMG that they were officially switching their designated U.S.
delivery dealer from Mercedes of Beverly Hills to Zarabi’s
dealership, Mercedes of Escondido.” Doing so “authorized Zarabi
and his partner, Simon Sarriedine, to speak with AMG about the
status of Project ONE as a designated dealer/agent.”
In June 2022, appellants told Zarabi that Mercedes-AMG
“had decided not to configure the car for use in the United States
or Canada. Zarabi told Zaman that he would either (1) obtain a
‘show and display’ permit that would allow that car into the U.S.
under a National Highway Transportation Safety Association
exemption; or that (2) he would take delivery in Germany. At no
time did he agree to take delivery in Dubai or agree to any
destination country other than the U.S. or Germany.”
“In January 2024, Zarabi began hearing from associates in
different parts of the world that Project ONES were being
delivered.” He asked Zaman when his Project One would be
7
delivered, and when the deadline to choose a color for the car
was. Zaman told him that “delivery was anticipated in the first
quarter of 2025,” causing Zarabi to suspect Zaman was lying
about the status of the car, and would try to sell the car to
someone else for a larger profit.
Part of the evidence Zarabi submitted in support of his
motion was an April 11, 2024 e-mail from Guillaume Chabin (a
Mercedes-AMG representative) to Zaman, in which Chabin
informed Zaman that his Project One “has entered the assembly
facility in Coventry and is currently in station 5 out of 12 in total.
I would therefore anticipate a possible delivery of your car to you
in Affalterbach in June and kindly ask you to get prepared to
receive an invoice from us asking for the payment of the
remaining amount in May.”4 Zaman replied later that day, “Now
that is some exciting news!!!!!!! I can’t believe it’s that time &
looking forward to this. [¶] I will look out for that invoice and I
will look for further instructions when we get closer to delivery
time.”
Five days later, in the morning of April 16, 2024, Zarabi
texted Zaman to say that he had heard Mercedes was “pushing
really hard to give them colors and final payment” and asked
Zaman what he had heard. Despite having received and
responded to Chabin’s e-mail informing him that Zarabi’s Project
One had already “entered the assembly facility,” Zaman told
4 “Affalterbach is a municipality in the Ludwigsburg
district in Baden-Württemberg, Germany.” (Wikipedia,
Affalterbach <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affalterbach> [as of
Nov. 18, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/8AQA-RJUZ>.)
8
Zarabi only that he would “get an update to see what number
they are on” and implied Mercedes-AMG had yet to contact him.5
Also on April 16, Zarabi visited the Mercedes factory in
Germany and asked about the status of his Project One vehicle.
Chabin informed him the car would be ready “in six weeks, June
2024,” and that he had informed Zaman of this “last week.”
Zarabi also learned Zaman had specified Dubai as the destination
country for the vehicle, although Zarabi had made it clear that he
wanted the car delivered in the United States or, if that were not
possible, in Germany. Zarabi additionally learned Zaman had
already selected a color for the vehicle. These revelations caused
Zarabi to realize appellants had been lying to him and “he began
to seriously contemplate suing them.” After hearing Zaman was
offering to sell the car to other potential buyers, “in late April
2024, Zarabi made the decision to sue” appellants.
On May 7, 2024, Zarabi spoke again with Chabin, who had
asked to speak with Zarabi after he heard Zarabi was interested
in buying a Project One. On this call, “[r]ather than discussing a
new purchase contract,” Zarabi told Chabin about the agreement
he and appellants had made in 2018 regarding the Project One
car that Burton Way was under contract to buy from Mercedes-
AMG, and asserted the car was actually his. Chabin stated he
was not surprised at appellants’ “deception” and informed Zarabi
of his belief that appellants intended to sell the Project One in
Dubai for a profit, which they were not contractually permitted to
do. Zarabi stated he would be suing Zaman for the enforcement
of their agreement or the return of his money, and Chabin
5 In response to Zarabi’s question “They didn’t contact you?”
Zaman said, “They said they would when we are close.”
9
responded that “AMG would most likely be cancelling” its
agreement with Zaman, and that he (Chabin) “needed to speak
with his legal department.” The two “agreed to cooperate and to
share information with each other from that point forward to
improve their chances of success in litigation.” Zarabi stated this
conversation was the first communication he had with Mercedes-
AMG “about Project ONE #247 being his car” or that appellants
“sold him the rights [to the car] for $300,000 over cost.”6 In the
afternoon of May 7, Zarabi and Zaman exchanged a series of
texts, in which Zaman maintained that “Estimated delivery [for
the car was] 1st quarter 2025” and that the deadline to “firm up”
the color for the car was “1 month before production.”
The next morning, Zarabi met with his attorney and
handed her copies of the e-mails that were eventually attached to
his operative complaint, from which she drafted a demand letter
that she e-mailed to Zarabi that same afternoon. The demand
letter stated Zarabi intended to sue Zaman if he failed to return
the money Zarabi had sent him over the years.
On May 16, 2024, Zarabi canceled his agreement with
Zaman, and Zaman agreed to return Zarabi’s money. From May
22 to June 12, 2024, Zaman returned only $500,000. Zarabi’s
attorney revised her demand letter and sent it to Zaman on June
6 Concurrently with his motion, Zarabi submitted excerpts
from a deposition of Zaman. In those excerpts, Zaman stated he
had no knowledge of when Zarabi told Chabin about the deal he
had with Zaman to purchase the Project One but assumed it was
before June or July 2024, when Chabin told Zaman it was
terminating the contract to buy the Project One. Zaman also
admitted he had no knowledge that Zarabi made any false
statements to Chabin or, indeed, any knowledge of what Zarabi
said to Chabin at all.
10
20, 2024, following up with filing a complaint when Zaman did
not respond to the demand letter.
2. Anti-SLAPP Analysis
Zarabi argued that his discussion with Mercedes-AMG
about his agreement with appellants constituted protected
activity because when he “told AMG about his arrangement with
Zaman, he already decided to sue Zaman for the return of his
$900,000 investment plus interest.” He additionally argued both
the litigation privilege and common interest privilege provided a
defense to appellants’ claims, and that the actions appellants
complained of were not independently wrongful.
D. Appellants Oppose the Motion
In July 2025, appellants opposed Zarabi’s motion, arguing
that Zarabi’s statements to Mercedes-AMG were made “to
procure the Project One, not prepare for litigation.” They
contended Zarabi’s statements to Mercedes-AMG lacked a
substantive connection to any contemplated litigation, and
claimed the litigation was merely “hypothetical.” Appellants
further argued their claims had merit because “Zarabi acted with
clear malicious intent” when he “cast false light on Zaman by
insinuating Zaman had an agreement with somebody else to sell
the car” and “denigrated Zaman’s worthiness to own the Project
One,” thus rendering the litigation privilege and common interest
privileges inapplicable. Zarabi replied, refuting appellants’
points and reiterating his own.
E. The Court Grants the Motion
In late July 2025, the court granted Zarabi’s motion. It
found the May 7, 2024 communications with Chabin “constituted
11
prelitigation communications for purposes of” the anti-SLAPP
statute because Zarabi “began seriously considering litigation” in
April 2024. The court concluded “ZARABI’s allegedly tortious
communications [with Chabin] were for the purpose of 1)
informing Mercedes-AMG as an interested party and 2)
discussing with Mercedes-AMG a potential litigation strategy
against ZAMAN.” As to the merits of the cross-complaint, the
court ruled that “the litigation privilege applies to the
communications, and Cross-Complainants will not be able to
show a probability of success on the merits on their tortious
interference claims.” The court also ruled Zarabi was entitled to
attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party.
Appellants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The anti-SLAPP statute requires a two-step analysis: “At
the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of
identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for
relief supported by them. . . . If the court determines that relief
is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by
the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based
on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually
substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) “ ‘In
1997, . . . the Legislature amended the measure to clarify its
intent that the provisions of the statute are to be interpreted
broadly.’ ” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409,
426.)
“The grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed
de novo” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
788), and “ ‘our job is to review the trial court’s ruling, not its
12
reasoning’ ” (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor
Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1002).
A. The Communications in Question Constitute
Protected Activity
“Although the [anti-SLAPP] statute refers to ongoing
proceedings, as this court and many others have held,
‘[p]relitigation communications may qualify for this protection so
long as they “ ‘concern[] the subject of the dispute’ and [are] made
‘in anticipation of litigation “contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration.” ’ ” ’ ” (Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb
& Loeb LLP (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1284.)
Both parties agree “[t]he foundation of Zaman’s tortious
interference claims were the May 7, 2024, conversation between
Zarabi and Mercedes-AMG employee Guillaume Chabin, and
several emails between the two around this time.” Thus, the first
question we must answer is whether this conversation and these
e-mails constitute prelitigation communications concerning the
subject of Zarabi’s complaint against appellants made in
anticipation of litigation that was contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration. We conclude they were.
1. Litigation Was Seriously Contemplated in
Good Faith
Zarabi argues that, by late April 2024, he had decided he
would sue appellants over their alleged deception regarding
Zarabi and Zaman’s agreement regarding the Project One. The
appellate record supports this contention.
Zarabi averred that, in January 2024, he began hearing
that Project Ones were being delivered. But when he asked
Zaman when his Project One would be delivered, Zaman told him
13
the car would not be delivered until the first quarter of 2025,
arousing Zarabi’s suspicions.
In April 2024, when Zarabi again asked about the status of
the Project One, Zaman stated he would ask Mercedes-AMG for
an update. But when Zarabi visited the Mercedes factory in
Germany later that day and asked about the status of his Project
One, Chabin stated it would be ready in June 2024, and that he
had informed Zaman “last week.” Zarabi also learned that,
despite telling Zaman that Zarabi wanted to take delivery of the
Project One in the United States or Germany, Zaman had
specified Dubai as the “Destination Country” for the vehicle.
Additionally, although Zaman had continually told Zarabi there
would be time to choose the color for the car, Zarabi learned from
Chabin on his April 2024 visit that Zaman had already chosen a
color for the vehicle. After hearing Zaman was offering to sell the
car to other potential buyers, “in late April 2024, Zarabi made the
decision to sue” appellants. On May 7, 2024, Zarabi and Zaman
exchanged texts in which Zaman maintained the estimated
delivery for the Project One was “1st quarter 2025” and that they
could choose the color for the car “1 month before production.”7
Based on this evidence, and with no contrary evidence
submitted by Zaman, we see no reason to discredit Zarabi’s
assertion that, before he spoke with Chabin on May 7, 2024, and
when he exchanged e-mails with him around that time, Zarabi
was seriously considering litigation against appellants.
7 While Zaman claimed he never lied to Zarabi about the
delivery date, he does not explain why, after he received an
e-mail stating Mercedes-AMG anticipated delivering his Project
One in June 2024, he nevertheless informed Zarabi the expected
delivery date was in the first quarter of 2025.
14
Additionally, the subject of Zarabi’s conversation with Chabin
related to the subject of the complaint he eventually filed against
appellants—i.e., Zarabi and Zaman’s agreement regarding the
latter’s sale of the Project One to the former. Thus, the May 7,
2024 conversation with Chabin constituted protected
prelitigation communications under the anti-SLAPP statute.
2. Appellants’ Arguments to the Contrary
Are Unpersuasive
Appellants argue the trial court erred in finding the
communications in question constituted protected speech under
the anti-SLAPP statute because: (a) Zarabi’s unilateral
statements about when he began seriously contemplating
litigation are unsupported by the record; (b) Zarabi’s
communications with Chabin were intended to help him acquire
the Project One, not further his litigation goals; and (c) because
Zarabi did not send Zaman the May 8, 2024 demand letter his
counsel drafted, litigation was only “theoretical,” and not
seriously considered. We address each contention in turn.
(a) Zarabi’s Statements About When He
Began Seriously Contemplating
Litigation Are Supported by the
Record
Appellants contend Zarabi’s statement that he had decided
to sue Zaman in late April 2024 is not “conclusive proof” that he
was seriously contemplating litigation at that time because he
had yet to: confront Zaman about his suspicions, try to terminate
or enforce their agreement, or request his money back, threaten
Zaman with litigation, speak to an attorney about litigation, send
a demand letter, or draft a complaint. But although such actions
15
would support a party’s claim that litigation was seriously
contemplated, appellants cite no authority demonstrating these
are necessary elements. As discussed above, Zarabi’s testimony
of when he decided to sue Zaman was supported by the other
evidence in the record regarding what Zarabi perceived as
Zaman’s deception and apparent intent to sell the Project One to
other potential buyers.
(b) Zarabi’s Communications Related to
the Subject of Litigation
Appellants next argue Zarabi’s communications with
Chabin were unprotected because they “focused on acquiring the
Project One, with only incidental references to potential
litigation.” Appellants also argue that “[a]cts done in furtherance
of an economic advantage are not acts that are protected” under
the anti-SLAPP statute. Appellants’ only support for this
statement is Ericsson GE Mobile Communs., Inc. v. C.S.I.
Telecom. Engin’s (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601, which held
that “it is only in those cases where the party acted for the
purpose of promoting or advancing his or her right to free speech,
in contrast to one where the parties are performing or breaching
their contractual obligations, that the right could be chilled by
the specter of an unfounded lawsuit.”
As appellants concede, Ericsson “has been subsequently
disapproved of by subsequent decisions.” Appellants supply no
other authority standing for the proposition that prelitigation
communications qualify for protection under the anti-SLAPP
statute only if the moving party’s motives in making the
communications at issue are solely for promoting or advancing
the right to free speech. However, despite appellants’ lack of
authority, the motivations of Zarabi’s communications may be
16
relevant. As our Supreme Court has explained: “In some
cases . . . , whether the defendant’s act qualifies as one in
furtherance of protected speech or petitioning will depend on
whether the defendant took the action for speech-related reasons.
Nothing in the statutory scheme prevents the defendant from
introducing evidence establishing such reasons.” (Wilson v. Cable
News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 889.) Thus, we examine
whether Zarabi’s May 7, 2024 communication with Chabin, and
the e-mails between the two around May 7, 2024, were for
“speech-related reasons.”
(i) The May 7, 2024 Conversation
The only evidence of what transpired in the May 7, 2024
conversation between Zarabi and Chabin comes from Zarabi’s
declaration, as Zaman admitted in deposition that he had no
knowledge of what was said in that conversation. Zarabi stated
that when he spoke with Chabin on May 7, he understood Chabin
wanted to speak with him because Chabin had heard Zarabi was
interested in buying a Project One. However, Zarabi declared
that “[r]ather than discussing a new purchase contract,” he told
Chabin about his agreement with Zaman, about the money he
paid Zaman, and about Zarabi’s insistence that the destination
country for the car would be the United States or Germany, not
Dubai. Zarabi also informed Chabin that he would be suing
Zaman “for the enforcement of our agreement and/or the return
of my money.” Both Chabin and Zarabi “discussed engaging our
legal teams in preparation for litigation with” appellants, and
“agreed to cooperate and to share information with each other
from that point forward in order to improve our chances of
success in litigation.” In other words, the conversation was
expressly not about how Mercedes-AMG and Zarabi could enter
17
into a new contract for Zarabi to purchase the Project One, but
about Zaman and Zarabi’s agreement that Zaman would supply
Zarabi with a Project One that Zaman was to purchase from
Mercedes-AMG, and the litigation Zarabi intended to pursue
against Zaman concerning that agreement.
(ii) Subsequent E-mails
On May 9, 2024, Zarabi informed Chabin via e-mail that
Zaman was in Dubai and was probably reselling the Project One
“as he told me yesterday the car won’t be ready until 1st quarter
of 2025.” Zarabi asked Chabin not to “alert” Zaman of the order
cancellation yet, opining that perhaps Zaman would refund the
money first. Zarabi also asked to be kept in the “loop of legal
dept review.” Chabin agreed.
One week later, Zarabi sent Chabin another e-mail stating
he had met with Zaman, who had given him a check but asked
him not to deposit it for a week. Zarabi requested Chabin not do
anything until the end of the month and also asked Chabin when
“the car would be ready” and about the accompanying paperwork.
On May 21, 2024, Zarabi sent another e-mail updating
Chabin about the status of returned funds and asking whether he
should make arrangements to take delivery of the car.
On June 3, 2024, Zarabi informed Chabin via e-mail that
Zaman had promised to have his money in the form of a check
that would hopefully be deposited in the next three to four days.
He also asked about some logistics regarding taking delivery of
the Project One. Chabin responded by asking Zarabi to fill out a
form regarding the Project One and further discussing some of
the logistics.
Finally, on July 1, 2024, Zarabi sent Chabin the contract
for the Project One and asked Chabin to “[l]et me know when you
18
tell Sam he is not getting the car. So I can proceed with getting
the rest of my money back. (Sic.)”
Appellants contend that Zarabi’s May 7, 2024 call with
Chabin and these subsequent e-mails “focused on acquiring the
Project One, with only incidental references to potential
litigation.” We disagree.
The only evidence of the discussion between Zarabi and
Chabin on the May 7 call demonstrates it expressly was not about
entering a new contract for Zarabi to acquire the Project One.
And although the subsequent e-mails contained discussions
regarding a new agreement for Zarabi to acquire the Project One,
each e-mail also updated Chabin on the status of Zarabi getting
his money back from Zaman and was often accompanied by a
request that Chabin not tell Zaman about the cancellation in
order to improve Zarabi’s litigation position. Indeed, the final
e-mail asked Chabin to inform Zarabi when Zaman was told
about the order cancellation so that Zarabi could “proceed with
getting the rest of my money back.” We conclude that Zarabi’s
conversation and e-mails with Chabin sufficiently relate to the
complaint he would ultimately file against Zaman to meet the
requirements of the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test.
(c) Unsent Demand Letter
After citing case law that the anti-SLAPP statute “protects
prelitigation communications made in genuine contemplation of
litigation while excluding from protection communications made
when litigation is ‘just a negotiating tactic or a hypothetical
possibility’ ” (Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1285–1286), appellants claim the draft
demand letter “makes it clear that [when it was written]
litigation was not yet imminent, but simply being threatened as a
19
means to get what Zarabi wanted – his money back, or what was
really his goal all along, the Project One.”
To the extent appellants claim that any demand letter
threatening litigation should the recipient fail to accede to the
writer’s requests cannot constitute protected activity under the
anti-SLAPP statute because the letter offers a path to avoid
litigation, we disagree. “The very function of a demand letter is
to notify the other party that litigation is imminent unless
certain steps are taken.” (Aronson v. Kinsella (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 254, 268; see also Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc.
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 910, 918 [although defendant’s
demand letters sought “cooperation of the letters’ recipients to
stop the pirating” and “provided the recipients with an
opportunity to resolve the matter by way of settlement before
commencement of suit,” “plaintiffs cannot successfully argue that
their complaint does not arise from DIRECTV’s constitutionally
protected right to petition for redress of grievances. The entire
lawsuit is premised on DIRECTV’s demand letter, sent in
advance of, or to avoid, litigation to vindicate its right not to have
its programming pirated”].)
To the extent appellants contend an unsent demand letter
necessitates a finding that litigation is not seriously
contemplated, we also disagree. Appellants provide no authority
so holding, and our independent research has revealed none.
While an unsent demand letter may support a conclusion that a
defendant was not yet seriously contemplating litigation, it may
also support the opposite conclusion; it compels neither
conclusion. In this instance, when viewed in light of the other
evidence discussed above, we conclude that it supports Zarabi’s
claim that he was seriously contemplating litigation by late April.
20
That Zarabi was trying to get as much money back from Zaman
as possible before filing a lawsuit does not negate this conclusion.
Indeed, if Zarabi were not yet seriously considering suing Zaman
on May 8, 2024, it would make no sense for him to request his
counsel draft the demand letter.
We conclude the evidence in the record demonstrates the
communications in question concern the subject of the dispute
Zarabi had with Zaman and were made in anticipation of
litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration. They therefore constitute protected speech under
the anti-SLAPP statute.
B. Appellants Fail to Demonstrate Minimal Merit
Because we determine the relief appellants seek is based on
allegations arising from protected activity, the burden shifts to
appellants to demonstrate their claims are legally sufficient and
factually substantiated. (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p.
396.) Like the trial court, we conclude appellants cannot make
such a showing because their claims are barred by the litigation
privilege.
The litigation privilege is “ ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it
bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious
prosecution.’ ” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.)
“The litigation privilege is . . . relevant to the second step in the
anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense
a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing.” (Id. at p. 323.)
“The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as
part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged. This privilege is
absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of
21
their maliciousness.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of
Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) “ ‘The usual
formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1)
made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or
other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of
the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical
relation to the action.’ ” (Ibid.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to
statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may
extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Ibid.) “A
prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to
litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration.” (Id. at p. 1251.)
As discussed above, we conclude the communications at the
heart of appellants’ cross-complaint related to litigation
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. It
follows that the litigation privilege would bar appellants’ claims.
Appellants’ only argument to the contrary is that “Zarabi’s May
7, 2024, communications with Mercedes-AMG were not protected
prelitigation dialogue, but discussions made prior to him have
any substantial contemplation of litigation,” an argument we
rejected above. Because the litigation privilege bars appellants’
claims, appellants cannot demonstrate the minimal merit
necessary to survive the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test.
C. Zarabi Is Entitled to His Attorneys’ Fees
Zarabi requests we award him the attorneys’ fees he
incurred on this appeal. Such fees are recoverable. (Dove Audio,
Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777,
785 [“ ‘A statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial
court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute
specifically provides otherwise.’ [Citation.] Since section 425.16,
22
subdivision (c) provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to
a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike, and does not
preclude recovery of appellate attorney fees by a prevailing
defendant-respondent, those fees are recoverable”].) Appellants’
only argument that Zarabi should not be awarded the requested
fees is that we “should reverse the trial court’s decision.” As we
decline to do so, we conclude Zarabi is entitled to his attorneys’
fees on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Zarabi shall recover his
costs and attorneys’ fees on appeal, the amount of which will be
determined by the trial court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
23