Alameda County Taxpayers' Assn. v. City of Oakland

Filed 10/28/26 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ALAMEDA COUNTY TAXPAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., A172609 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Alameda County v. Super. Ct. No. 23CV028069) CITY OF OAKLAND, Defendant and Respondent; CONSERVATION SOCIETY OF CALIFORNIA, INC., Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Plaintiffs Alameda County Taxpayers’ Association and Marcus Crawley (collectively, the Association) filed this action seeking to invalidate an Oakland initiative measure (Measure Y) that provides funding for the Oakland Zoo. The zoo is owned by the City of Oakland (the City) and managed by the Conservation Society of California, Inc. (the Conservation Society) pursuant to a management agreement with the City. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II.A., II.C, and II.D. 1  The Association’s operative complaint names the City as defendant and the Conservation Society as real party in interest. The trial court entered judgment against the Association and later entered an order awarding (1) $27,625 in attorney fees to the Conservation Society under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,1 and (2) litigation costs to both the City and the Conservation Society. The Association filed separate appeals challenging the judgment and the order awarding fees and costs. In the appeal directed to the judgment (No. A171041), we concluded certain portions of Measure Y—specifically, three references to the Conservation Society—violated article II, section 12 of the California Constitution (article II, section 12) (a provision that states an initiative may not “name[] or identif[y] any private corporation to perform any function or to have any power or duty”), but we concluded those provisions could be severed. (Alameda County Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Oakland (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1264, 1268 (Alameda County I).) We held that, after severing these references, Measure Y remained valid. (Alameda County I, at p. 1268.) We also rejected the Association’s separate argument that Measure Y, which received 63.1 percent of the vote, required a two- thirds supermajority to pass. (Alameda County I, at p. 1268.) We affirmed the trial court’s judgment and directed that it be modified on remand to reflect our conclusion as to severance. (Ibid.) In the present appeal (No. A172609), the Association challenges the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs. In its opening appellate brief, the Association contends (1) the motion for attorney fees brought by the Conservation Society in the trial court was filed one day late and had to be rejected, (2) the trial court erred by concluding an award of fees to the 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Conservation Society was proper under section 1021.5, and (3) one item of costs claimed by the City should have been reduced by $390. In its appellate reply brief (which it filed after this court issued its opinion in Alameda County I), the Association reiterates these points and also asserts that the result in Alameda County I (affirming the judgment but holding certain provisions of Measure Y needed to be severed) requires reversal of the trial court’s fee and cost award. As we explain below, we reject the Association’s arguments and will affirm. Because the Association’s argument that the Conservation Society’s attorney fee motion was untimely filed raises an issue of first impression, we shall publish the portions of our opinion relevant to that issue. I. BACKGROUND A. Measure Y, the Trial Court’s Judgment, and Alameda County I We assume familiarity with the background of this litigation as summarized in our prior opinion in Alameda County I. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1268–1269.) Measure Y, which appeared on the ballot for Oakland voters for the November 2022 general election, “proposed a parcel tax of $68 per year for single-family parcels (with varying amounts for other parcels) for 20 years, beginning on July 1, 2023, to raise about $12 million per year to fund the operations of the Oakland Zoo.” (Alameda County I, at p. 1268.) “Under Measure Y, the amounts collected through the parcel tax are to be placed in a special fund in the City treasury and then distributed to the ‘Zoo Operator’ (i.e., the operator of the zoo, which the measure states is currently the Conservation Society) to be used for the authorized purposes listed in the measure.” (Id. at pp. 1268–1269.) Measure Y received 63.1 percent support at the November 2022 election. (Alameda County I, at p. 1269.) 3  The Association filed the present reverse validation action in February 2023, seeking to invalidate Measure Y and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1269.) In its operative second amended complaint, filed in October 2023, the Association asserts in part that (1) Measure Y is invalid because it violates article II, section 12, and (2) Measure Y was not validly enacted because it required approval by a two-thirds supermajority of voters. (Alameda County I, at p. 1269.) In ruling on defense demurrers and motions for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court concluded (1) Measure Y required only a simple majority to pass, and (2) Measure Y’s references to the Conservation Society did not violate article II, section 12, and even if they did, the references were severable and the rest of Measure Y would remain valid. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1269.) The court entered judgment, and the Association appealed. (Ibid.) In our March 2026 opinion in Alameda County I, we held Measure Y’s three references to the Conservation Society violated article II, section 12, but could be severed, and that after severance, Measure Y remained valid. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1270–1279.) We rejected the Association’s claim that severance was insufficient and that article II, section 12 required invalidation of Measure Y. (Alameda County I, at pp. 1276–1278.) We also rejected the Association’s argument that Measure Y required approval by a two-thirds supermajority. (Alameda County I, at pp. 1279–1287.) In our disposition in Alameda County I, we stated: “We affirm the judgment, except we conclude Measure Y’s three references to the Conservation Society (as specified in this opinion) violate article II, 4 section 12, and must be severed. On remand, the trial court shall enter a modified judgment reflecting this ruling. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.” (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.) B. Fees and Costs On July 5, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City and the Conservation Society and against the Association. On July 8, 2024, the City served, by electronic service, a notice of entry of judgment. The Conservation Society filed a memorandum of costs on July 11, 2024, and the City filed a memorandum of costs on July 23, 2024. On August 8, 2024, the Conservation Society filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees against the Association under sections 868 and 1021.5. The Conservation Society sought $79,932.81 in fees. The Association opposed the Conservation Society’s fee motion. The Association also filed motions to tax or strike the memoranda of costs filed by the City and by the Conservation Society. After a hearing, the trial court entered a written order on January 10, 2025, addressing the parties’ motions pertaining to fees and costs. The court granted in part the Conservation Society’s fee motion, finding fees were appropriate but in an amount lower than requested. As we discuss further below, the court first rejected the Association’s “primary” argument that the Conservation Society’s fee motion was untimely. Turning to the merits, the court found the Conservation Society had shown it was entitled to fees under section 1021.5. The court rejected the Conservation Society’s argument that it was also entitled to fees under a different provision, section 868 (although as discussed below, the court found that statute supported an award of costs), and the Conservation Society states it has abandoned that separate ground for claiming fees. 5  In ruling a fee award under section 1021.5 was appropriate, the court found in part that the Conservation Society was “a ‘successful party’ in this case” (quoting § 1021.5). The court noted, “Defendants’ demurrer and motion for judgment on the pleadings were successful and the court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments to invalidate Measure Y.” The court also found the Conservation Society had established the prerequisites for recovery under section 1021.5—“that ‘(1) the litigation resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of individuals, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders the award appropriate.’ ” (Quoting Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 154, 159 (Save Our Heritage).) As to the amount of fees, the court awarded $27,625 in fees to the Conservation Society (reduced from the requested amount of $79,932.81). The court found some time entries pertained to matters unrelated to the litigation, and it also “applie[d] a further discount on the hours, as the City of Oakland took the lead in defending Measure Y.” The court stated it had “reviewed the fee request to avoid awarding fees that would be entirely duplicative of the City’s own efforts.” The court found the Conservation Society reasonably incurred 65 hours of nonduplicative fees, and applied a “reasonable blended billing rate” of $425 per hour, resulting in an award of $27,625 in fees to the Conservation Society under section 1021.5. As to costs, the court denied in large part the Association’s motions to strike or tax the costs requested by the City and the Conservation Society, although it disallowed one item of costs claimed by the Conservation Society. The court found the awards of costs were appropriate under section 868, which applies in validation actions and states, “The costs of any proceeding or 6 action pursuant to this chapter may be allowed and apportioned between the parties or taxed to the losing party in the discretion of the court.” The court stated, “Plaintiffs [i.e., the Association] are the ‘losing party’ under section 868, the costs to Defendant were reasonable and necessary, the parties did not over-litigate the case (thereby potentially triggering excess or unreasonable costs), and the nature of the case is such that Defendants were protecting and vindicating the public interest by defending the case.” The Association filed a timely notice of appeal of the court’s order awarding fees and costs. II. DISCUSSION A. Alameda County I Does Not Require Reversal of the Fee Order The Association contends in its appellate reply brief that this court’s decision in Alameda County I should lead to a reversal of the trial court’s order awarding fees and costs. The City and the Conservation Society of course have not had an opportunity to respond to this argument. But in any event, we are not persuaded that our decision in Alameda County I provides a basis to reverse the fee and cost award. The Association argues reversal is appropriate because the fee award “ ‘falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.’ ” (California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 220; see Towns v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 958, 974 [cited by the Association; concluding cost awards should be reversed because appellate court’s decision would require entry of a modified judgment].) But as we explained in Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 290, 307, “where . . . there is a limited reversal, we remand for the trial court to consider anew the propriety of attorney fees unless we can say with certainty the court would have exercised its discretion the same way had the successful party not prevailed on the issue on which we reverse.” 7  Here, even though we disagreed with one aspect of the trial court’s reasoning, the disposition we reached cannot be characterized as a limited reversal, since we expressly stated we were affirming the trial court’s judgment, while directing that it be modified on remand. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.) But whether our conclusion as to severance in Alameda County I is viewed as a limited reversal or a modification, we see no likelihood the trial court would have reached a different decision as to fees if it had held in its merits ruling that Measure Y’s three references to the Conservation Society violated article II, section 12 but could be severed. Indeed, as we noted in Alameda County I, the trial court, in its merits ruling, made an alternative finding that severance would cure any article II, section 12 problem. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1269.) And, based on this merits ruling (i.e., that there was no basis to invalidate Measure Y, either because it did not violate article II, section 12, or because any problematic references could be severed), the trial court later found in its order awarding fees and costs that (for purposes of fees) the Conservation Society was a “successful party” under section 1021.5, and that (for purposes of costs) the Association was the “losing party” under section 868. We see no likelihood the court would have reached a different conclusion on fees and costs if it had held definitively in its merits order that severance was necessary (rather than only making an alternative finding on that point). In either case, the Association’s goal of invalidating Measure Y was not achieved. (See Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1269.) And we find no abuse of discretion as to the court’s prevailing-party determinations. We shall proceed to consider the Association’s other 8 challenges to the fee and cost awards. (Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 308.) B. Timeliness of the Conservation Society’s Fee Motion The Association contends the trial court should have rejected the Conservation Society’s fee motion as untimely because it was filed one day after the 30-day deadline applicable in a validation action. The court found a statutory two-day extension applied to make the filing timely, and the court stated alternatively that it would exercise its discretion to extend the time. We find no error. Under rule 3.1702(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court,2 the notice of a motion seeking attorney fees “for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court” “must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case . . . .” (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) This deadline is mandatory, but it is not jurisdictional, and it may be extended. (Rule 3.1702(d) [trial court may extend deadline for good cause]; see Wash v. Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561, 569 (Wash) [construing similar provision setting time to move for attorney fees incurred on appeal].) In this respect, the deadline to file a fee motion, although it is calculated based on the time to file a notice of appeal, differs from the notice of appeal deadline, which generally cannot be extended. (Rule 8.104(b) [with one exception, “no court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.”].) Applying rule 3.1702(b)(1) here, the deadline to file a fee motion was 30 days after notice of entry of judgment, derived as follows: Rule 3.1702(b)(1) states a fee motion must be filed within the time to file a notice of appeal 2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 9 under rules 8.104 and 8.108. Rule 8.104 states that, unless a statute or rule provides otherwise, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal ordinarily is 60 days after service of notice of entry of judgment, or 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. (Rule 8.104(a)(1).) A statutory exception applies here—section 870, subdivision (b) provides an appeal in a validation action must be filed “within 30 days after the notice of entry of the judgment.” (§ 870, subd. (b).)3 In the present case, therefore, a motion for attorney fees had to be filed within 30 days of notice of entry of judgment. (Central Delta Water Agency v. Department of Water Resources (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 170, 213 (Central Delta) [30-day appeal deadline for validation judgment applies to motion for attorney fees].) Here, the trial court found that, because the notice of entry of judgment was served electronically, the 30-day deadline to file a fee motion was extended by two court days pursuant to section 1010.6. (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) [any time period to act “after the service of the document” “shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days,” with specified exceptions]; id., subd. (a)(3)(C) [“This extension applies in the absence of a specific exception provided by any other statute or rule of court.”].) The trial court entered judgment on July 5, 2024, and the City electronically served the notice of entry of judgment on July 8, 2024. The trial court found: “The Conservation Society therefore timely filed its fee 3 Section 870, subdivision (b) states in full: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law including, without limitation, Section 901 and any rule of court, no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment entered pursuant to this chapter unless a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days after the notice of entry of the judgment, or, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment if there is no answering party. If there is no answering party, only issues related to the jurisdiction of the court to enter a judgment in the action pursuant to this chapter may be raised on appeal.” 10 motion on August 8, 2024, which was 31 days after July 8 (the day before the 32-day deadline given the manner of service).” The trial court also stated that, even if the Conservation Society was mistaken as to the applicability of the two-court-day extension of time to file its motion, “then the court has made the same error and would exercise its discretion to hear and rule on the motion.” (See rule 3.1702(d) [trial court, for good cause, may extend time to file a motion for attorney fees].) The trial court did not err by rejecting the Association’s untimeliness argument. First, as the trial court found, section 1010.6 provides that most deadlines running from service of a document are extended by two court days if the document is electronically served. (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B)–(C); see § 1013, subds. (a), (c) [analogous extensions of differing lengths where the document was served by mail or by Express Mail or other overnight delivery method].) Section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B) states: “Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days, but the extension shall not apply to extend the time for filing any of the following: [¶] (i) A notice of intention to move for new trial. [¶] (ii) A notice of intention to move to vacate judgment under Section 663a. [¶] (iii) A notice of appeal.” (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Subdivision (a)(3)(C) of the statute specifies that: “This extension applies in the absence of a specific exception provided by any other statute or rule of court.” In our view, the two-court-day extension under section 1010.6 applies in this case. As an initial matter, the right of a party in a validation action to file a motion for attorney fees within 30 days “qualifies, for purposes of 11 subdivision (a)(3)(B) of section 1010.6, as a right to do an act within a time period prescribed” by a statute or rule of court. (See Wash, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 570 [discussing rules governing right of a party to claim costs awarded on appeal].) Section 1010.6’s two-court-day extension therefore will apply to the 30-day period in section 870, subdivision (b) if that period starts to run “after the service of the document” as that phrase is used in section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B). Section 870, subdivision (b) does not use the term “service,” but it does state that, in a contested validation action, a notice of appeal (and therefore also a fee motion (see rule 3.1702(b)(1)) must be filed “within 30 days after the notice of entry of the judgment . . . .” The time runs from the notice of entry, not from the entry itself. This provision thus differs from the rule at issue in Wash (a case cited by the Association), which required a prevailing party seeking costs incurred on appeal to file a memorandum of costs “ ‘[w]ithin 40 days after issuance of the remittitur.’ ” (Wash, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 570, quoting rule 8.278(c)(1).) The Wash court found the term “issuance” referred to the entry of the remittitur in the record, so the applicable timeline ran from the date of entry, rather than from service. (Wash, at pp. 570–573.) The two-court-day extension in section 1010.6 therefore did not apply. (Wash, at p. 573.) Here, in contrast, the 30-day period runs from “the notice of entry of the judgment” (§ 870, subd. (b)), and notice is provided by service of the document. In our view, this time period is one that starts to run “after the service of the document” as that phrase is used in section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B). The two-court-day extension in that statute therefore applies, unless the time period at issue here falls within an exception to the generally applicable extension. (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B)–(C).) 12  As noted, section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B) states the two-court-day extension for electronic service “shall not apply to extend the time for filing any of the following: (i) A notice of intention to move for new trial. [¶] (ii) A notice of intention to move to vacate judgment under Section 663a. [¶] (iii) A notice of appeal,” and section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(C) states the extension “applies in the absence of a specific exception provided by any other statute or rule of court.” The Association contends that one of the three exceptions in section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B) applies. Specifically, the Association argues that, because a motion for attorney fees must be filed within the time to file a notice of appeal (rule 3.1702(b)(1)), a motion for attorney fees is “implicitly included within the statutory exception for [a] ‘notice of appeal’ in Section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(iii).” We are not persuaded. Although rule 3.1702(b)(1) provides that the time to file a fee motion is based on the time to file a notice of appeal (e.g., in a validation action, the time period is 30 days from notice of entry of judgment, rather than the 60-day-period that often applies in general civil cases) (see rule 8.104(a)(1); § 870, subd. (b)), that does not mean a motion for attorney fees is itself a notice of appeal and is subject to the specific restrictions on extending the time to file a notice of appeal. As noted, a court generally may not extend the time to file a notice of appeal (rule 8.104(b)), but the time to file a fee motion may be extended, either by stipulation of the parties (rule 3.1702(b)(2)) or by the trial court for good cause (rule 3.1702(d)). As for the statutory extension at issue here, section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3) provides for a generally applicable two-court-day extension when an act must be taken within a period of time after service of a document, with an exception where the action to be taken is the filing of “[a] notice of appeal” (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B)(iii)). We decline to interpret “notice of appeal” in 13 this provision as precluding an extension of time to file an entirely different document (here a motion for attorney fees). The cases cited by the Association on this point—Central Delta, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 170, and Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1308—do not alter our conclusion. In Central Delta, the court stated that, in a validation action, the deadline to file a notice of appeal was 30 days after notice of entry of judgment, and the same deadline applied to an attorney fees motion. (Central Delta, at p. 213 [fee motion filed several months after notice of appeal deadline was untimely].) In Maldonado, the court similarly held that, under rule 3.1702, a fee motion must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal (there, the deadline was the usual 60 days after service of notice of entry of judgment under rule 8.104), and found the fee motion was timely filed within the 60-day period (after extension because the last day fell on a Sunday and was followed by a holiday). (Maldonado, at pp. 1337–1338.) Neither case considered or addressed any question as to whether the time to file a fee motion was extended due to the method of service of the notice of entry of judgment. The Association next argues section 1005, subdivision (b) establishes that no section 1010.6 extension applies here. We disagree. Section 1005, subdivision (b) states that certain motion papers must be served and filed at specified intervals prior to the hearing date. The provision then states: “Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section.” (§ 1005, subd. (b).) The Association suggests section 1005’s statement as to the inapplicability of the section 1013 extension (for time periods triggered by the service of documents 14 by mail or overnight delivery) should be read to encompass the section 1010.6 extension (for time periods triggered by electronic service). We need not consider the latter point, because section 1005 does not apply in this matter. Section 1005 only applies in a listed number of circumstances, the last of which is “[a]ny other proceeding under this code in which notice is required and no other time or method is prescribed by law or by court or judge.” (§ 1005, subd. (a)(13), italics added.) By its own terms, section 1005 does not apply to a motion for attorney fees because rule 3.1702 sets forth the time period in which a fee motion must be filed. In addition, section 1005 applies to the time between the filing of the notice and the date of the hearing, not the time between the notice of entry of judgment and the filing of a motion for attorney fees. We are not persuaded by the Association’s suggestion that section 1005 should be construed as an exception to the section 1010.6 extension of time periods triggered by electronic service. (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(C) [extension “applies in the absence of a specific exception provided by any other statute or rule of court”].) Finally, even if the section 1010.6 extension did not apply, the trial court had authority under rule 3.1702(d) to extend the fee motion deadline. As noted, rule 3.1702(d) states: “For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.” Here, after finding that the Conservation Society’s fee motion was timely pursuant to section 1010.6’s two-court-day extension, the trial court stated alternatively that, if that extension did not apply, the court would “exercise its discretion to hear and rule on the motion.” Although the court did not expressly refer to rule 3.1702(d), we interpret the court’s statement as an exercise of its authority under that rule. 15  The Association has not shown the trial court erred by granting the short extension at issue here. The Association states the Conservation Society did not ask the trial court to extend the time for it to file its fee motion. But a trial court may grant an extension on its own motion. (Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 155 [extension of time to file cost memorandum under rule 3.1700].) The Association also asserts the Conservation Society did not demonstrate good cause for an extension, because the Association had mentioned the 30-day filing deadline in a brief relating to its motion to strike or tax costs. Again, we disagree. As we explained in Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304: “ ‘Rule 3.1702(d) is “remedial” and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation.’ ” (Id. at p. 326.) An attorney’s “ ‘honest mistake of law’ ”—a category that in our view would encompass any mistake by the Conservation Society as to the applicability of the section 1010.6 extension—may constitute good cause under rule 3.1702(d). (Robinson, at p. 327.) The Association has not shown it was prejudiced by the short extension; the Association had, and exercised, a full and fair opportunity to oppose the Conservation Society’s fee motion on its merits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an extension here. (Ibid. [review is for abuse of discretion].) C. The Propriety of a Fee Award Under Section 1021.5 The Association contends the trial court erred by concluding the Conservation Society was entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5. We see no error. Under section 1021.5, a court may award attorney fees “to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a 16 significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” A “successful party” entitled to fees need not be a plaintiff; under proper circumstances, fees may be awarded to a successful defendant or real party in interest. (Save Our Heritage, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s finding that the Conservation Society met the requirements for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578; Coalition of Pacificans for an Updated Plan v. City Council of Pacifica (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 647, 659.) In general, an abuse of discretion is found when a trial court’s ruling “ ‘ “exceeded ‘ “the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) The trial court found the Conservation Society had established the prerequisites for recovery under section 1021.5—“that ‘(1) the litigation resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of individuals, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders the award appropriate.’ ” (Quoting Save Our Heritage, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) The court stated: “The Conservation Society explains that it is a non-profit corporation whose funds are used to operate the Oakland Zoo, not for profit or personal gain. 17 Plaintiffs sought to constrain the initiative power of the voters of the City of Oakland, and the City and Conservation Society conferred a significant benefit on the voters in at least two ways—by upholding the vote to enact Measure Y and by maintaining the funding made available under Measure Y so the public can continue to enjoy the extraordinary benefits of the Oakland Zoo. The financial burden of private enforcements renders a fee award appropriate.” In challenging the trial court’s conclusion on these points, the Association asserts repeatedly that the Conservation Society will benefit financially from the disbursement of Measure Y funds, and that as a result, several of the prerequisites to recovery under section 1021.5 were not met. Specifically, the Association argues (1) the litigation was in the Conservation Society’s own interest (rather than the public interest), (2) the defense against the Association’s lawsuit did not benefit the general public, but only enriched the Conservation Society, and (3) the prospect of obtaining the Measure Y funds gave the Conservation Society a pecuniary interest that outweighed any financial burden imposed by the litigation. It is true that “ ‘[t]he private attorney general doctrine . . . was not intended to reward litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest.’ ” (Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1352.) But here, the trial court was not required to adopt the Association’s view (underlying its arguments on all these points) that the Measure Y funds will enrich the Conservation Society. And in any event, the suggestion of self-interest on the part of the Conservation Society is overblown. As the trial court noted, and as Measure Y specifies, the funds generated by the parcel tax are to be used to fund the operations of the Oakland Zoo, specifically for authorized uses listed 18 in the measure. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1268– 1269.) As the zoo operator, the Conservation Society may have some discretion as to how the funds will be allocated among the measure’s authorized uses, but this fact did not require the trial court to agree with the Association that Measure Y provides a financial benefit to the Conservation Society that undercuts its entitlement to fees under section 1021.5. The Association next contends the trial court had to find that a narrow exception to the availability of section 1021.5 fees applied here. When the usual prerequisites for a section 1021.5 award are satisfied, an exception may still apply if “ ‘the party from whom fees are sought “is not the type of party on whom private attorney general fees were intended to be imposed.” ’ ” (Save Our Heritage, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160–161.) “Under this exception, ‘a section 1021.5 fee award may not be imposed on a litigant who did nothing to adversely affect the public interest.’ ” (Save Our Heritage, at p. 161; see Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 953, 966 [stating this is a “narrow exception”].) The trial court did not err by holding this exception did not apply here. As the trial court noted, Save Our Heritage (the case on which the Association principally relies) involved a plaintiff public interest group that sought to correct what it “perceived to be violations of state and local environmental, historic preservation, and land use laws by the City.” (Save Our Heritage, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.) Although the plaintiff’s lawsuit was unsuccessful, “the litigation was precisely the type of enforcement action section 1021.5 was enacted to promote.” (Ibid.) The appellate court in Save Our Heritage concluded the plaintiff “did nothing to compromise public rights” (id. at p. 158) and therefore affirmed a trial court order declining to award fees against the plaintiff organization (id. at pp. 157–158). 19  In this case, by contrast, as the trial court noted, the Association “sought to curtail the public’s right to use the initiative power,” including by aggressively pursuing its claim that Measure Y required supermajority approval, an argument that the trial court found “flew in the face of recent precedent.” The Association was aware of the weakness of its position, because a recent appellate decision had addressed substantially similar arguments “in a case in which the organizational Petitioner itself was a party.” (See County of Alameda v. Alameda County Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 226, 236.) In its appellate reply brief, the Association suggests this court’s ruling in Alameda County I should alter the analysis on this point. The Association is of course correct that in Alameda County I we agreed in part with one of the arguments the Association pursued in this litigation. We found Measure Y’s three references to the Conservation Society violated article II, section 12 and needed to be severed. (Alameda County I, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1271–1275.) But even with respect to the article II, section 12 issue, we rejected the Association’s claims that (1) other language in the measure was problematic (such as references to the “Oakland Zoo,” which the Association insisted had to be interpreted as references to the Conservation Society, rather than to the physical zoo), (2) severance was insufficient, and (3) article II, section 12 required invalidation of Measure Y. (Alameda County I, at pp. 1276–1278.) And we rejected all the Association’s arguments as to the supposed requirement that Measure Y obtain two-thirds majority approval. (Alameda County I, at pp. 1279–1287.) In our view, this remains a case in which the Association sought to constrain the public’s initiative rights, employed strained arguments in seeking the invalidation of Measure Y, and was largely unsuccessful in the litigation. The trial court did 20 not err in finding the Association was not exempt from liability for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. In a final set of arguments, the Association asserts that, because the City took the lead in defending Measure Y, the Conservation Society should not have been awarded fees under section 1021.5. The Association relies on Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust v. City Council of San Marcos (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 614, 623, where the court, addressing whether there was a “necessity” for private enforcement under section 1021.5, stated: “An important question in determining whether the services of the private party were necessary is, ‘Did the private party advance significant factual or legal