Andraos v. Hayrapetyan CA2/7

Filed 10/26/26 Andraos v. Hayrapetyan CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN GEORGE ANDRAOS et al., B346761 Plaintiffs and (Los Angeles County Respondents, Super. Ct. Nos. 23STCV23685; v. 23STCV26082) ARKADI HAYRAPETYAN et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Noel Weiss and Noel Weiss for Defendants and Appellants. AJK Law Firm and Ara Keropian for Plaintiffs and Respondents. ______________________________  INTRODUCTION Arkadi Hayrapetyan and Hollywood Entertainment Lounge, Inc. (collectively, Hayrapetyan)1 appeal from a trial court judgment in favor of commercial landlords George and Aftin Andraos (the Andraoses) in related unlawful detainer and breach of contract actions. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement and stipulation for entry of judgment in which the trial court retained jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6,2 the Andraoses filed a motion for entry of judgment seeking, among other things, an unpaid settlement payment and unpaid monthly rent for December 2024 through February 2025 under the terms of the settlement agreement. As relevant here, the court entered a judgment awarding the Andraoses both the settlement payment and the three months of unpaid rent. On appeal, Hayrapetyan disputes he owes the unpaid rent awarded by the court, which is $45,000 of the $110,000 judgment entered for the Andraoses. He argues the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction under section 664.6 and violated the California Constitution’s prohibition on predispute contractual jury trial waivers by entering judgment on the unpaid rent, which Hayrapetyan contends is governed by a new lease the parties entered into after executing the settlement agreement. We conclude Hayrapetyan has not met his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. Although we invited the parties 1 In a verified declaration attached to the November 27, 2023 answer in this matter, Hayrapetyan averred he is the president of Hollywood Entertainment Lounge, Inc. 2 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 to submit supplemental briefing on (1) whether we should augment the record to include the settlement agreement and the lease and (2) how these documents supported the parties’ arguments on appeal, Hayrapetyan advanced no arguments based on these documents. “We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 (Falcone).) Accordingly, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 A. The Complaints, the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, the Dismissal, and the New Lease In September 2023, the Andraoses filed a complaint against Hayrapetyan for unlawful detainer, alleging that Hayrapetyan had failed to pay 12 months of rent under a commercial lease the Andraoses had entered into with Hayrapetyan’s predecessor in interest. In October 2023, the Andraoses filed a second action against Hayrapetyan alleging breach of the lease. Hayrapetyan answered the unlawful detainer complaint, and the two cases were deemed related. In April 2024, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and stipulation for entry of judgment (settlement agreement). The settlement agreement required Hayrapetyan to pay the Andraoses $200,000 in installments over a four-month period, allowed Hayrapetyan to retain possession of the leased property, set out new rental payment terms for the property, and 3 We derive many of the relevant facts from the trial court’s March 20, 2025 order granting motion for entry of judgment. 3 included “default procedures.” The parties also agreed to enter into a new lease as part of the agreement. On April 22, 2024, the trial court dismissed the unlawful detainer action with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction “to make orders to enforce any and all terms of settlement, including judgment” pursuant to section 664.6. On May 24, 2024, the parties executed a new lease for the property. B. The Amendment to the Stipulation, the Notice of Default, and the Motion for Entry of Judgment After Hayrapetyan failed to make the agreed-upon installment payments, on August 26, 2024, the parties executed an amendment to stipulation for entry of judgment (amendment) which modified only the schedule for Hayrapetyan’s installment payments.4 On December 4, 2024, the Andraoses, through counsel, sent Hayrapetyan a letter titled “Notice and Opportunity to Cure Default” (notice of default).5 The notice of default informed 4 The amendment also included an attorney fee provision, which is not relevant to this appeal. 5 A significantly illegible version of this notice is included in the record on appeal as part of Hayrapetyan’s opposition to motion for entry of judgment. Hayrapetyan has attached what he describes as “a more readable copy” of the notice as exhibit A to his reply brief. Because Hayrapetyan is permitted to attach a combined total of 10 pages of exhibits in the appellate record to his brief (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d)), and because the Andraoses have not contested the attachment’s authenticity, we rely on the attachment to Hayrapetyan’s reply brief when referring to the notice of default. 4 Hayrapetyan that he was in default of the April 2024 settlement agreement because the Andraoses had not received a settlement payment of $65,000 by the deadline stated in the August 2024 amendment. The notice also informed Hayrapetyan that he was in default of the May 2024 lease because he had failed to pay $15,000 in base rent due December 1, 2024, and a $2,005.70 monthly obligation under an August 25, 2024 addendum to the lease. Citing the settlement agreement, the notice gave Hayrapetyan seven days to “cure the defaults” and stated that the Andraoses would “enforce the Judgment pursuant to the Settlement Agreement & Stipulation for Entry of Judgment” if Hayrapetyan failed to do so. On February 20, 2025, the Andraoses filed a motion for entry of judgment seeking forfeiture of the lease, possession of the leased property, damages, and attorney fees and costs.6 The motion sought damages for the unpaid $65,000 installment payment and unpaid monthly rent of $15,000 per month for 6 The motion for entry of judgment and its attached declaration and exhibits were not included in the record on appeal. Hayrapetyan designated the motion for inclusion in the clerk’s transcript, but on August 14, 2025, the superior court clerk certified that the motion was missing from the court file and that Hayrapetyan had not supplied a copy of the motion upon further request. Hayrapetyan has not sought to correct or augment the record to include the motion or its attachments. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a) & (b).) As discussed further below, we augment the record on our own motion to include the Andraoses’ motion and exhibits. 5 December 2024 through February 2025, including “triple net”7 amounts of $2,005.70 per month for those three months. Hayrapetyan opposed the motion on March 5, 2025. He argued, among other things, that the Andraoses could not enforce the settlement agreement to seek unpaid rent for December 2024 through February 2025 because the May 2024 lease governed those payments and had not been included in the scope of the agreement. He further argued the Andraoses’ notice of default was defective because it sought past due rent for December 2024 (which was purportedly governed by the May 2024 lease) and did not address the rent payments for January and February 2025. Additionally, he argued judgment in favor of the Andraoses on outstanding rent payments would constitute an unconstitutional predispute contractual jury trial waiver as to any dispute on those payments. In their reply, the Andraoses argued the settlement agreement specifically allowed them to seek entry of judgment to recover rent through February 2025 if any payments were not made following a notice of default and cure period. In support of their argument, the Andraoses quoted paragraph 1(e) of the settlement agreement: “ ‘Commencing with the monthly rental payment due November 1, 2024, the monthly rent shall increase to $15,000.00 plus the adjusted triple net payments described in Paragraph 2(d) . . . Defendant Hayrapetyan will personally guarantee these payments.’ ” The Andraoses further quoted 7 A “triple net” lease is one in which the “ ‘lessee pays a property’s operation and maintenance costs including taxes, utilities, and insurance.’ ” (RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1061, fn. 6.) 6 paragraph 5 of the agreement: “ ‘In the event Defendants fail to timely make any Settlement Payments due under ⁋ 1(a) or the rental payments due under ⁋ 1(d)-(g), Plaintiffs may thereafter seek to have Judgment entered pursuant to this Stipulation by providing defendants with seven (7) days written notice of the factual basis of the default, the date of the Court hearing at which plaintiffs will seek enforcement of the same, and the factual and legal basis upon which entry of Judgment pursuant to the Stipulation is sought . . . .’ ” (Italics and boldface omitted.) The Andraoses also contested that the trial court’s judgment constituted a predispute jury trial waiver. C. The Trial Court’s Order and Judgment On March 20, 2025, the trial court granted the motion for entry of judgment.8 The court concluded that the “[settlement agreement] and Amendment evidence the parties’ mutual intention to compromise their ongoing dispute.” Hayrapetyan had “agreed to pay $200,000 for past rent due and owing,” and the parties had “also agreed that [Hayrapetyan] could remain as tenant[] and pay $12,000 monthly rent for six months, followed by $15,000 per month rent, commencing November 1, 2024.” Hayrapetyan did not “dispute that [he] failed to pay $65,000 for 8 The court observed Hayrapetyan’s motion failed to comply with the California Rules of Court and that “it is not the duty of the trial judge to rummage through the papers to construct or resuscitate a party’s case. Collins v. Hertz Corp., 144 Cal. App. 4th 64, 75 (2006). See also Singman v. IMDB.COM, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 1151 (2021) (judges cannot be expected to become a party’s lawyer).” The court, however, considered the opposition on the merits. 7 past rent” nor that he “stopped making monthly rent payments as of November 2024 but remain[ed] in possession.” The court awarded the Andraoses forfeiture of the May 2024 lease and possession of the property; “$65,000 for [Hayrapetyan]’s failure to make the final installment payment per the [settlement agreement], par. 1(a)(iii)”; “$45,000 for [Hayrapetyan]’s failure to pay the agreed-upon rent for the months of December 2024 and January and February 2025, per the [settlement agreement], par. 1(e)”; and attorney fees and costs totaling $9,378.16. The court entered judgment on April 2, 2025. Hayrapetyan timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Hayrapetyan Fails To Meet His Burden on Appeal of Demonstrating Error We ordinarily review whether a trial court’s judgment complies with section 664.6 de novo (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1321; J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984), whereas a “ ‘trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a settlement pursuant to section 664.6 are subject to limited appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Greisman, at p. 1321; see Eagle Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 470; Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 790.) Further, whether the court deprived Hayrapetyan of the right to a jury trial in violation of the California Constitution and applicable statutes is a legal question we review de novo. (Brown v. Mortensen (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 931, 938 [“ ‘[W]hether [a party is] constitutionally 8 entitled to a jury trial . . . is a pure question of law that we review de novo’ ”].) These standards, however, do not relieve an appellant of the obligation to provide a record adequate for meaningful review or to advance legal arguments supported by citation to the record. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson); see also Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a).) Accordingly, “ ‘[i]n the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court,’ ” and “ ‘ “[i]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.) Specifically, unless the record demonstrates otherwise, “ ‘a reviewing court must presume that the record contains evidence to support every finding of fact.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.) And “ ‘ “if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.) 1. The Court Enforced the Parties’ Settlement Agreement and Not Their Subsequent Lease As stated, we invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing on (1) whether we should augment the record to include 9 the settlement agreement and the lease and (2) how these documents supported the parties’ arguments on appeal. We augment the record on our own motion with the Andraoses’ motion and the exhibits thereto, including the settlement agreement and the lease. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) Hayrapetyan, however, advanced no legal arguments based on the text of the settlement agreement or the lease other than noting the lease was executed after the settlement agreement and that the notice of default did not cover the January and February 2024 lease payments.9 We will address Hayrapetyan’s arguments on the merits, as best we can. Hayrapetyan challenges only the $45,000 award for the outstanding rental payments. First, according to Hayrapetyan the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction under section 664.6 because the parties never asked the court to take jurisdiction over the May 2024 lease. The underlying premise of Hayrapetyan’s argument is that the outstanding rent payments (for December 2024 through February 2025) were governed by the May 2024 lease rather than the April 2024 settlement agreement. But the trial court’s order enforced the parties’ settlement agreement, and there is no dispute the parties asked the court to retain jurisdiction over the settlement. Further, the trial court expressly rejected Hayrapetyan’s argument the lease excused him from complying with his obligations under the 9 Although Hayrapetyan’s counsel asserts he was unable to retrieve a copy of these documents from his files, he does not explain why he did not attempt to obtain a copy of the settlement agreement and the lease from the superior court clerk or from the Andraoses, or why he did not respond to the superior court clerk’s request for the documents. 10 settlement: “The Court is not persuaded by defendants’ convoluted argument that the new lease somehow excuses their obligation to be bound by the terms of the [settlement agreement]. Nothing in the new lease so states.” Hayrapetyan does not point to anything in the settlement agreement or the lease supporting his argument the court misinterpreted these documents.10 Nor does he explain, with any analysis or citation to legal authority, how or why the April 2024 settlement agreement was “overridden and superseded” by the May 2025 lease.11 Second, Hayrapetyan argues the trial court purportedly recognized it had no jurisdiction to enforce the lease because it refused to enforce its triple net provisions. Hayrapetyan misreads the court’s ruling. The court stated that “the [settlement agreement] does not provide a clear amount or a formula for ‘triple net.’ Paragraph 1(e) states that defendants shall pay ‘the adjusted triple net payments described in paragraph 2(d) herein.’ But there is no paragraph 2(d) and paragraph 2 says nothing about ‘triple net.’ The Court will not speculate that some other paragraph of the [settlement agreement] reflects the parties’ mutual intention as to a calculation of monthly ‘triple net.’ ” The trial court’s decision to 10 Hayrapetyan also relies on Mesa RHF Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913 for the proposition that a court must strictly comply with the requirements for retaining jurisdiction under section 664.6 and that those requirements were not met as to the lease. But here the court was enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement and not the lease. 11 For example, Hayrapetyan does not cite or analyze the language of the two integration clauses in the lease. 11 reject the Andraoses’ request for the triple net was because the settlement agreement did not contain a method to calculate it and had nothing to do with the lease. Third, Hayrapetyan forfeited the argument the trial court erred in awarding rent for January and February 2025 because the Andraoses did not include those months in the notice of default. Hayrapetyan is correct the December 4, 2024 notice of default did not include rent for those two months, and indeed could not have included rent for those months because it was not due yet. But Hayrapetyan does not explain, with analysis and citation to authority, why under the settlement agreement the Andraoses are limited to recovering the amount listed in the notice of default. In particular, Hayrapetyan does not analyze the language of paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement and show why a judgment under section 664.6 could not include those amounts. Finally, although we have reviewed paragraph 5 in its entirety, without legal argument from Hayrapetyan grounded in the record, we cannot determine whether the December 4, 2024 default notice was the only writing capable of satisfying that procedure. And we decline to scour the record to determine what other notice or evidence may have accompanied the Andraoses’ motion supporting their request for the January and February 2025 rent payments. (See Wind Dancer Production Group v. Walt Disney Pictures (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 56, 69 [“ ‘We consider the contract as a whole and interpret its language in context so as to give effect to each provision, rather than interpret contractual language in isolation.’ ”]; see also Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [“ ‘ “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have 12 authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ ”].) 2. Hayrapetyan Does Not Demonstrate There Was Any Predispute Jury Trial Waiver Hayrapetyan’s failure to advance any argument based on the settlement agreement and the lease also prevents us from evaluating his contention the trial court’s ruling violated the California Constitution’s prohibition on predispute contractual jury trial waivers. Hayrapetyan argues the lease superseded the settlement agreement’s rent payment provisions regarding the December 2024 to February 2025 rent and, thus, the court’s entry of judgment denied him the right to a jury trial on issues relating to the May 2024 lease. But the court expressly found the parties agreed in the settlement agreement to monthly rent payments of $15,000 starting on November 1, 2024, and that the lease did not excuse Hayrapetyan from the terms of the settlement. Hayrapetyan’s failure to advance any argument based on the text of the settlement agreement or the lease supporting his argument the latter superseded the former means we presume the court’s findings were correct. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)12 12 We deny Hayrapetyan’s request, presented in his reply brief rather than by noticed motion, to strike the respondents’ brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54.) 13  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The Andraoses may recover their costs on appeal. MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur: SEGAL, J. FEUER, J. 14