Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Uhrig v. Jones CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THERESA UHRIG, B346214 Respondent, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 24STRO08627 CIERA JONES, Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura Cohen, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed. Ciera Jones, in pro. per., for Appellant. Theresa Uhrig, in pro. per., for Respondent. Appellant Ciera Jones appeals from a one-year civil harassment restraining order issued against her and in favor of respondent Theresa Uhrig under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 (section 527.6). The order has expired and the appeal is moot, but we exercise our discretion to reach the merits. We hold the trial court’s order is supported by substantial evidence and affirm. BACKGROUND Jones and Uhrig live across the street from one another in Santa Monica. Their conflict began in September 2022 over a cat Uhrig had entrusted to Jones’s care and escalated over the following two years. Each neighbor sought a civil harassment restraining order against the other. Uhrig petitioned first, and Jones’s petition followed shortly thereafter. Two days before the hearing on her petition, Uhrig filed a supplemental submission of exhibits and third-party declarations corroborating her allegations about Jones and detailing further harassment since the filing of the initial petition. At the hearing, Jones objected that she had not received the supplemental submission. The trial court advanced and heard the two matters together. Both parties appeared self-represented, were placed under oath, testified, and verified their written submissions, which the court received “as direct testimony.” Uhrig’s supporting declaration set out a chronology of conduct she attributed to Jones. Jones first allegedly repeatedly called the police and animal-control officers, summoning them to Uhrig’s door on complaints the responding officers treated as unfounded, a pattern that recurred over roughly two years. Uhrig then received an anonymous telephone call stating, “if you 2 value your life, you’ll stay the fuck away from my cats,” which she identified as Jones’s voice. After that, Jones struck Uhrig’s shoulder as the two passed on a sidewalk. In the following weeks Jones directed epithets at Uhrig and staged a horn-blaring drive- by, and throughout she engaged in persistent close-range videotaping. Jones later published a Nextdoor post that set out Uhrig’s home address, license plate number, landlord’s name and telephone number, and photographs of Uhrig and her residence. In the following weeks, Jones published several other social media posts and submitted several online reviews regarding Uhrig and her business. Resting on a credibility determination and viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that each party had committed harassing acts against the other, and granted each a one-year restraining order. The court observed some of Jones’s social-media activity might be protected by the First Amendment and some might not, but left the distinction to be sorted out at the enforcement stage. The court made no finding that any statement by Jones was false. The order restraining Jones was entered on a Judicial Council form CH-130, protected Uhrig, and by its terms was set to expire one year later, on December 18, 2025. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal on February 10, 2025. Only the order on Uhrig’s petition is before us. DISCUSSION I. The Appeal Is Moot, but We Exercise Our Discretion to Reach the Merits “[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions 3 have become moot by subsequent acts or events.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2026) Appeal, § 777.) An appeal is therefore moot when our ruling “can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) An appeal from an expired restraining order ordinarily meets that description, because a court can grant no effective relief from an order that no longer restrains anyone. The order Jones appeals expired on December 18, 2025. This appeal is therefore moot. To avoid this result, Jones identifies several “collateral consequences” she argues keep the appeal alive. She contends the order will remain accessible in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and may surface in background checks affecting future employment, professional licensing, and housing, and may be considered in future court proceedings. Jones invokes San Diego Police Department v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550 (Geoffrey S). But Geoffrey S. does not help her, because the court there declined to rest on collateral consequences of the kind she asserts. There, the appellant argued that his expired gun violence restraining order exposed him to an actual bar investigation in another state and would place him in a law-enforcement database. The court recited those contentions, noting in some cases an appeal “is not moot if it could have collateral consequences in future proceedings.” (Id. at p. 564.) But it further relied on the fact that a one-year order may evade review by expiring before an appeal can be heard, and that the case raised a recurring question of public importance. 4 (Ibid.) Accordingly, Geoffrey S. did not rest on any of these “collateral consequences.” Geoffrey S. drew the collateral-consequences rule from In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 (Cassandra B.), which illustrates its limits. There, an expired restraining order issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 was not moot—but for reasons Jones’s case does not share. The order operated in ongoing dependency proceedings where the applicable statute stated the earlier order “must be considered by the juvenile court in any proceeding to issue another restraining order.” (Cassandra B., at pp. 209–210.) Jones does not cite, and we have not found, an analogous statute that requires the court to consider the civil harassment restraining order issued against Jones. Jones’s claim that she will suffer collateral consequences— the database entry and the possible effects on future employment, licensing, and housing—are, on this record, speculative. Jones offers no evidence that any of them has materialized or is likely to materialize. She describes only what the order’s existence might someday prompt. We nonetheless exercise our discretion to address the merits of Jones’s arguments. A reviewing court may exercise its discretion to reach an otherwise moot appeal where there is a likelihood that the controversy will recur between the same parties. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495– 496 (Harris).) As the trial court observed, Jones and Uhrig are neighbors who live very close to each other, and they had an “ongoing conflict” for over two years until the mutual restraining orders were issued. Jones believes that her constitutional rights were violated by the order. And while the collateral 5 consequences of the order are speculative, they are reasonably possible. An adjudication on the merits serves the interest of justice in this case. II. The Order Withstands Jones’s Challenges to the Merits A. Standard of Review Whether the facts, construed most favorably to the prevailing party, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment, and whether a restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law we review de novo. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188; accord, Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) The trial court’s findings of fact, by contrast, we review for substantial evidence, bearing in mind that the finding was made under the clear-and-convincing standard—we ask whether the record, viewed most favorably to the prevailing party, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found harassment highly probable. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) In conducting that review we accept the evidence supporting the order, disregard evidence to the contrary, and draw every reasonable inference in support of the findings. The credibility of witnesses and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court, and its determination of the controverted facts will not be disturbed on appeal. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1138.) Jones also challenges several of the trial court’s rulings on the conduct of the hearing, which we review for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717–718.) In no event will we reverse for procedural error unless it is reasonably probable Jones would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Cassim v. 6 Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800–802 (Cassim); Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) B. The Order Rests on a Course of Unprotected Conduct Section 527.6 authorizes an order enjoining “harassment,” defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (Ibid.) Much of the conduct by Jones detailed in Uhrig’s declaration is speech, specifically social media posts and online reviews. Speech of that kind is presumptively protected. (See Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163 [content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional].) It is not stripped of protection merely because it is unwelcome or offensive, and the only ground Uhrig offers for treating the posts and reviews as unprotected is that they are defamatory. She characterizes them in her sworn petition as “defamatory social media posts” and “fabricated online reviews,” and argues on appeal that “slanderous social media posts were not constitutionally protected activity,” and that “slander is not a legitimate exercise of free speech.” . But falsity is an element of that theory. A statement is not defamatory, and does not forfeit its constitutional protection as defamation, unless it is found to be false. (Balboa Island Village 7 Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1148 [an injunction may prohibit repetition of statements determined at trial to be defamatory, but a statement merely alleged to be defamatory retains its protection]; Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167–1169 [injunction against “false and defamatory” statements invalid where falsity had not been adjudicated at trial].) The trial court made no finding that any of Jones’s statements were false. Absent such a finding, the posts and reviews remain constitutionally protected activity. That conclusion controls how they figure into the course-of- conduct analysis, because protected speech may not be counted among the acts that make up a course of conduct. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) The proper course, then, is to set the protected speech aside and ask whether what remains is itself a course of conduct sufficient to support the order. The same approach was taken in Hansen v. Volkov: the court set aside the respondent’s constitutionally protected e-mails and asked whether his single unprotected office visit could sustain the order. (Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 105 (Hansen) [“Because the e- mails were constitutionally protected, it was error for the court to conclude they were properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment”]; see Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 663 [protected demonstration not part of a “course of conduct” because it “constituted a form of protected speech”].) We therefore set Jones’s constitutionally protected speech aside and ask what the unprotected conduct alone establishes. (Hansen, at pp. 105–107.) Setting that speech aside entirely, the record still contains a course of unprotected prohibited conduct, so the order does not depend on Jones’s protected speech. The court made a credibility 8 determination and found each party had proved the other’s harassing conduct. We defer to that credibility determination, accept the evidence supporting the order, and draw every reasonable inference to uphold it. So viewed, the credited conduct includes an anonymous telephone call warning Uhrig, “if you value your life, you’ll stay the fuck away from my cats,” a physical shoulder-strike as the parties passed on a public sidewalk, and Jones’s persistent close-range recording of Uhrig— following her, filming her from a few feet away and from concealment over a period of years. None of these acts is protected expression. The only activity anyone has suggested was constitutionally protected is Jones’s online posts and reviews, which the trial court itself observed might be protected. Neither below nor on appeal has Jones claimed that the threatening call, the shoulder-strike, or her videotaping of Uhrig is activity the First Amendment protects. On appeal she asserts protection only for her posts and reviews. The exclusion in section 527.6, subdivision (b)(1), for constitutionally protected activity therefore has no bearing on the acts on which we rest. The conclusion holds in any event. The anonymous warning was a true threat, which the First Amendment does not protect. (Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66, 69; see Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359–360.) The shoulder- strike was not speech at all, and “a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.” (Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 484.) And the close-range recording of a private individual is likewise harassing conduct, not protected expression. The First Amendment interest courts have recognized in recording reaches the gathering of information on matters of public concern— 9 chiefly the conduct of government officials—not the surveillance of a private neighbor. Filming a nonconsenting private person is neither inherently expressive nor a means of facilitating communication. (Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Irvine Co., LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 97, 114 [no all-encompassing right to videotape; filming passersby is pure conduct]; see Fordyce v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 436, 439 [recognizing First Amendment right to film matters of public interest].) These acts, directed at Uhrig over a course of years, are a “series of acts over a period of time . . . evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) They are not a “single incident,” and so do not run afoul of the rule that one episode cannot constitute a course of conduct. (Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4.) This is where the case parts ways with Hansen. There, subtracting the protected litigation activity left only a single office visit, which could not by itself constitute a course of conduct, and the order fell. (Hansen, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 106–107.) Here, subtracting the protected speech leaves a substantial residue of unprotected, threatening, and targeted conduct that independently constitutes a course of conduct. Because that residue supports the trial court’s finding of harassment by clear and convincing evidence, the order is supported by substantial evidence. Jones’s shouted epithets, her horn-blaring drive-by are further harassing conduct the court credited, but the threat, the battery, and the surveillance suffice by themselves, and we need not decide what those additional acts add, and which might be protected speech. The order stands on the acts we have identified alone. 10 C. Any Procedural Irregularity at the Hearing Was Harmless Section 527.6 provides for an expedited proceeding where the hearing is the only forum the respondent will have to present his or her case. (Nora v. Kaddo (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1029.) An irregularity in the proceedings—a procedural error—is grounds for reversal if, after examining the entire cause, the court determines it was reasonably probable the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice (prejudice). (Cassim, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 800–802; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Jones argues the trial court denied her a fair hearing for three reasons: (1) the court relied on an additional declaration that had not been disclosed to her, (2) the court declined to receive a voicemail she wished to play, and (3) the court considered a supplemental filing that Uhrig served on her only at the hearing itself. We take Jones’s contentions in turn. While Jones contends the trial court considered an undisclosed additional declaration, the record shows the opposite. When Uhrig referred to a further declaration, the court directed her to “hold onto it until we get to the hearing.” The document was never offered, received, or mentioned again. It is not in the record on appeal, because it was never admitted at the hearing or filed with the court. A declaration the court did not receive is not a declaration the court considered, and Jones cannot have been prejudiced by material that played no part in the ruling. There was no error. Jones next contends the court excluded a voicemail she wished to play. The record shows no exclusion. The court asked the date of the recording, Jones answered, and the colloquy moved on; Jones was not cut off and went on to present her full 11 case, including the testimony of a witness she called and examined. In any event, we need not decide whether the exchange amounted to a ruling because the voicemail could not have changed the result even if excluded. By Jones’s own offer of proof, the voicemail showed that Uhrig had said she was “not letting this matter go”—evidence of Uhrig’s state of mind, offered to support Jones’s own cross-petition and her theory that Uhrig was the aggressor. It had no bearing on whether Jones made the threat, struck Uhrig on the sidewalk, or videotaped her at close range over a period of years. Admitting the voicemail would not have made those findings less probable. That leaves the supplemental filing Uhrig served on Jones at the hearing. Jones objected that she “didn’t get the supplemental documents.” But the record shows the trial court cured any unfairness in the timing of that service, and that Jones proceeded without pressing the point. When Jones raised the objection, the court directed Uhrig to hand the supplement to Jones at once. Although the parties had no right to request a continuance of the hearing (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 529), the court confirmed that both parties were ready to proceed, and then placed the matter on second call for the express purpose of giving Jones “an opportunity to review . . . what she just handed you.” After that recess, Jones proceeded to the hearing without renewing her objection, requesting a continuance, or asserting that the time to review had been inadequate. Jones thus forfeited any argument that the hearing was unfair because she was not served with the supplemental documents until shortly before the parties testified. 12 The alleged erroneous admission of the supplement was not prejudicial in any event. This is because the late-served supplement was not necessary to support the trial court’s findings. The acts on which the order independently rests were each set out in Uhrig’s verified petition and its attached declaration, which were served on Jones more than two weeks before the hearing.1 Those documents and Uhrig’s testimony at the hearing constituted substantial evidence supporting Uhrig’s allegations about Jones’s threat, battery, and harassing surveillance. Jones’s reliance on Yu v. Pozniak-Rice (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1135 (Yu) is unpersuasive. Yu reversed a section 527.6 order because the record did not support the finding of a diligent effort to accomplish personal service that subdivision (m)(2) requires before a court may authorize service of the petition, temporary restraining order, and notice of hearing by an alternative method—leaving the respondent potentially without notice of the proceeding at all. (Id. at pp. 1142–1145.) That is not this case. Uhrig’s petition and its attached declaration of harassment were personally served on Jones more than two weeks before the hearing, Jones appeared and litigated their 1 Jones has moved for judicial notice of California Secretary of State records reflecting that the corporate entity “Westside Whiskers” has been suspended by the Franchise Tax Board since 2015. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.) The records are offered to impeach Uhrig’s account of her business-related harm and to show prejudice from the late-served supplement. Because we sustain the order on conduct unrelated to Uhrig’s business, the records are not necessary to our resolution of the appeal. We therefore deny the request. (Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. City of Hayward (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 176, 182 [“Only relevant material is a proper subject of judicial notice”].) 13 allegations, and her objection reached only the timing of a later supplement the order does not rest upon. Yu addresses the absence of notice of the action itself. It says nothing about the late service of supplemental evidence where the initiating papers were timely served and the respondent fully participated. Because the acts sustaining the order were pleaded and litigated, and because the material Jones did not timely receive went only to allegations the order does not rest on, it is not reasonably probable that Jones would have obtained a more favorable result had the supplement been served earlier. The asserted irregularity, assuming it was error, was harmless. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Uhrig shall recover her costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS TAMZARIAN, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. DAUM, J. 14