Uhrig v. Jones CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB346214
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Uhrig v. Jones CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THERESA UHRIG, B346214
Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STRO08627
CIERA JONES,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Cohen, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Ciera Jones, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Theresa Uhrig, in pro. per., for Respondent.
Appellant Ciera Jones appeals from a one-year civil
harassment restraining order issued against her and in favor of
respondent Theresa Uhrig under Code of Civil Procedure section
527.6 (section 527.6). The order has expired and the appeal is
moot, but we exercise our discretion to reach the merits. We hold
the trial court’s order is supported by substantial evidence and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jones and Uhrig live across the street from one another in
Santa Monica. Their conflict began in September 2022 over a cat
Uhrig had entrusted to Jones’s care and escalated over the
following two years.
Each neighbor sought a civil harassment restraining order
against the other. Uhrig petitioned first, and Jones’s petition
followed shortly thereafter. Two days before the hearing on her
petition, Uhrig filed a supplemental submission of exhibits and
third-party declarations corroborating her allegations about
Jones and detailing further harassment since the filing of the
initial petition. At the hearing, Jones objected that she had not
received the supplemental submission.
The trial court advanced and heard the two matters
together. Both parties appeared self-represented, were placed
under oath, testified, and verified their written submissions,
which the court received “as direct testimony.”
Uhrig’s supporting declaration set out a chronology of
conduct she attributed to Jones. Jones first allegedly repeatedly
called the police and animal-control officers, summoning them to
Uhrig’s door on complaints the responding officers treated as
unfounded, a pattern that recurred over roughly two years.
Uhrig then received an anonymous telephone call stating, “if you
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value your life, you’ll stay the fuck away from my cats,” which
she identified as Jones’s voice. After that, Jones struck Uhrig’s
shoulder as the two passed on a sidewalk. In the following weeks
Jones directed epithets at Uhrig and staged a horn-blaring drive-
by, and throughout she engaged in persistent close-range
videotaping. Jones later published a Nextdoor post that set out
Uhrig’s home address, license plate number, landlord’s name and
telephone number, and photographs of Uhrig and her residence.
In the following weeks, Jones published several other social
media posts and submitted several online reviews regarding
Uhrig and her business.
Resting on a credibility determination and viewing the
totality of the circumstances, the court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that each party had committed harassing
acts against the other, and granted each a one-year restraining
order. The court observed some of Jones’s social-media activity
might be protected by the First Amendment and some might not,
but left the distinction to be sorted out at the enforcement stage.
The court made no finding that any statement by Jones was false.
The order restraining Jones was entered on a Judicial Council
form CH-130, protected Uhrig, and by its terms was set to expire
one year later, on December 18, 2025.
Jones filed a timely notice of appeal on February 10, 2025.
Only the order on Uhrig’s petition is before us.
DISCUSSION
I. The Appeal Is Moot, but We Exercise Our Discretion to
Reach the Merits
“[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions
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have become moot by subsequent acts or events.” (9 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (6th ed. 2026) Appeal, § 777.) An appeal is therefore
moot when our ruling “can have no practical effect or cannot
provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place Tenants
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.)
An appeal from an expired restraining order ordinarily
meets that description, because a court can grant no effective
relief from an order that no longer restrains anyone. The order
Jones appeals expired on December 18, 2025. This appeal is
therefore moot.
To avoid this result, Jones identifies several “collateral
consequences” she argues keep the appeal alive. She contends
the order will remain accessible in the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System and may surface in
background checks affecting future employment, professional
licensing, and housing, and may be considered in future court
proceedings.
Jones invokes San Diego Police Department v. Geoffrey S.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550 (Geoffrey S). But Geoffrey S. does not
help her, because the court there declined to rest on collateral
consequences of the kind she asserts. There, the appellant
argued that his expired gun violence restraining order exposed
him to an actual bar investigation in another state and would
place him in a law-enforcement database. The court recited those
contentions, noting in some cases an appeal “is not moot if it
could have collateral consequences in future proceedings.” (Id. at
p. 564.) But it further relied on the fact that a one-year order
may evade review by expiring before an appeal can be heard, and
that the case raised a recurring question of public importance.
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(Ibid.) Accordingly, Geoffrey S. did not rest on any of these
“collateral consequences.”
Geoffrey S. drew the collateral-consequences rule from In re
Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 (Cassandra B.),
which illustrates its limits. There, an expired restraining order
issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 was not
moot—but for reasons Jones’s case does not share. The order
operated in ongoing dependency proceedings where the applicable
statute stated the earlier order “must be considered by the
juvenile court in any proceeding to issue another restraining
order.” (Cassandra B., at pp. 209–210.) Jones does not cite, and
we have not found, an analogous statute that requires the court
to consider the civil harassment restraining order issued against
Jones.
Jones’s claim that she will suffer collateral consequences—
the database entry and the possible effects on future
employment, licensing, and housing—are, on this record,
speculative. Jones offers no evidence that any of them has
materialized or is likely to materialize. She describes only what
the order’s existence might someday prompt.
We nonetheless exercise our discretion to address the
merits of Jones’s arguments. A reviewing court may exercise its
discretion to reach an otherwise moot appeal where there is a
likelihood that the controversy will recur between the same
parties. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495–
496 (Harris).) As the trial court observed, Jones and Uhrig are
neighbors who live very close to each other, and they had an
“ongoing conflict” for over two years until the mutual restraining
orders were issued. Jones believes that her constitutional rights
were violated by the order. And while the collateral
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consequences of the order are speculative, they are reasonably
possible. An adjudication on the merits serves the interest of
justice in this case.
II. The Order Withstands Jones’s Challenges to the Merits
A. Standard of Review
Whether the facts, construed most favorably to the
prevailing party, are legally sufficient to constitute civil
harassment, and whether a restraining order passes
constitutional muster, are questions of law we review de novo.
(R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188; accord, Harris,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) The trial court’s findings of
fact, by contrast, we review for substantial evidence, bearing in
mind that the finding was made under the clear-and-convincing
standard—we ask whether the record, viewed most favorably to
the prevailing party, contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have found harassment highly
probable. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.)
In conducting that review we accept the evidence supporting the
order, disregard evidence to the contrary, and draw every
reasonable inference in support of the findings. The credibility of
witnesses and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence are for
the trial court, and its determination of the controverted facts
will not be disturbed on appeal. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1131, 1138.) Jones also challenges several of the
trial court’s rulings on the conduct of the hearing, which we
review for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22
Cal.4th 690, 717–718.) In no event will we reverse for procedural
error unless it is reasonably probable Jones would have obtained
a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Cassim v.
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Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800–802 (Cassim); Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
B. The Order Rests on a Course of Unprotected
Conduct
Section 527.6 authorizes an order enjoining “harassment,”
defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and
that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A
“course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of
conduct.’ ” (Ibid.)
Much of the conduct by Jones detailed in Uhrig’s
declaration is speech, specifically social media posts and online
reviews. Speech of that kind is presumptively protected. (See
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163 [content-based
restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional].) It is
not stripped of protection merely because it is unwelcome or
offensive, and the only ground Uhrig offers for treating the posts
and reviews as unprotected is that they are defamatory. She
characterizes them in her sworn petition as “defamatory social
media posts” and “fabricated online reviews,” and argues on
appeal that “slanderous social media posts were not
constitutionally protected activity,” and that “slander is not a
legitimate exercise of free speech.” .
But falsity is an element of that theory. A statement is not
defamatory, and does not forfeit its constitutional protection as
defamation, unless it is found to be false. (Balboa Island Village
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Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1148 [an injunction
may prohibit repetition of statements determined at trial to be
defamatory, but a statement merely alleged to be defamatory
retains its protection]; Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
1157, 1167–1169 [injunction against “false and defamatory”
statements invalid where falsity had not been adjudicated at
trial].) The trial court made no finding that any of Jones’s
statements were false. Absent such a finding, the posts and
reviews remain constitutionally protected activity.
That conclusion controls how they figure into the course-of-
conduct analysis, because protected speech may not be counted
among the acts that make up a course of conduct. (§ 527.6, subd.
(b)(1).) The proper course, then, is to set the protected speech
aside and ask whether what remains is itself a course of conduct
sufficient to support the order. The same approach was taken in
Hansen v. Volkov: the court set aside the respondent’s
constitutionally protected e-mails and asked whether his single
unprotected office visit could sustain the order. (Hansen v.
Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 105 (Hansen) [“Because the e-
mails were constitutionally protected, it was error for the court to
conclude they were properly considered part of a course of
conduct of harassment”]; see Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 635, 663 [protected demonstration not part of a
“course of conduct” because it “constituted a form of protected
speech”].) We therefore set Jones’s constitutionally protected
speech aside and ask what the unprotected conduct alone
establishes. (Hansen, at pp. 105–107.)
Setting that speech aside entirely, the record still contains
a course of unprotected prohibited conduct, so the order does not
depend on Jones’s protected speech. The court made a credibility
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determination and found each party had proved the other’s
harassing conduct. We defer to that credibility determination,
accept the evidence supporting the order, and draw every
reasonable inference to uphold it. So viewed, the credited
conduct includes an anonymous telephone call warning Uhrig, “if
you value your life, you’ll stay the fuck away from my cats,” a
physical shoulder-strike as the parties passed on a public
sidewalk, and Jones’s persistent close-range recording of Uhrig—
following her, filming her from a few feet away and from
concealment over a period of years. None of these acts is
protected expression. The only activity anyone has suggested
was constitutionally protected is Jones’s online posts and
reviews, which the trial court itself observed might be protected.
Neither below nor on appeal has Jones claimed that the
threatening call, the shoulder-strike, or her videotaping of Uhrig
is activity the First Amendment protects. On appeal she asserts
protection only for her posts and reviews. The exclusion in
section 527.6, subdivision (b)(1), for constitutionally protected
activity therefore has no bearing on the acts on which we rest.
The conclusion holds in any event. The anonymous
warning was a true threat, which the First Amendment does not
protect. (Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66, 69; see
Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359–360.) The shoulder-
strike was not speech at all, and “a physical assault is not by any
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment.” (Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476,
484.) And the close-range recording of a private individual is
likewise harassing conduct, not protected expression. The First
Amendment interest courts have recognized in recording reaches
the gathering of information on matters of public concern—
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chiefly the conduct of government officials—not the surveillance
of a private neighbor. Filming a nonconsenting private person is
neither inherently expressive nor a means of facilitating
communication. (Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Irvine Co.,
LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 97, 114 [no all-encompassing right to
videotape; filming passersby is pure conduct]; see Fordyce v. City
of Seattle (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 436, 439 [recognizing First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest].)
These acts, directed at Uhrig over a course of years, are a
“series of acts over a period of time . . . evidencing a continuity of
purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) They are not a “single incident,”
and so do not run afoul of the rule that one episode cannot
constitute a course of conduct. (Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 1, 4.) This is where the case parts ways with Hansen.
There, subtracting the protected litigation activity left only a
single office visit, which could not by itself constitute a course of
conduct, and the order fell. (Hansen, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 106–107.) Here, subtracting the protected speech leaves a
substantial residue of unprotected, threatening, and targeted
conduct that independently constitutes a course of conduct.
Because that residue supports the trial court’s finding of
harassment by clear and convincing evidence, the order is
supported by substantial evidence. Jones’s shouted epithets, her
horn-blaring drive-by are further harassing conduct the court
credited, but the threat, the battery, and the surveillance suffice
by themselves, and we need not decide what those additional acts
add, and which might be protected speech. The order stands on
the acts we have identified alone.
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C. Any Procedural Irregularity at the Hearing Was
Harmless
Section 527.6 provides for an expedited proceeding where
the hearing is the only forum the respondent will have to present
his or her case. (Nora v. Kaddo (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1026,
1029.) An irregularity in the proceedings—a procedural error—is
grounds for reversal if, after examining the entire cause, the
court determines it was reasonably probable the error resulted in
a miscarriage of justice (prejudice). (Cassim, 33 Cal.4th at pp.
800–802; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
Jones argues the trial court denied her a fair hearing for
three reasons: (1) the court relied on an additional declaration
that had not been disclosed to her, (2) the court declined to
receive a voicemail she wished to play, and (3) the court
considered a supplemental filing that Uhrig served on her only at
the hearing itself. We take Jones’s contentions in turn.
While Jones contends the trial court considered an
undisclosed additional declaration, the record shows the opposite.
When Uhrig referred to a further declaration, the court directed
her to “hold onto it until we get to the hearing.” The document
was never offered, received, or mentioned again. It is not in the
record on appeal, because it was never admitted at the hearing or
filed with the court. A declaration the court did not receive is not
a declaration the court considered, and Jones cannot have been
prejudiced by material that played no part in the ruling. There
was no error.
Jones next contends the court excluded a voicemail she
wished to play. The record shows no exclusion. The court asked
the date of the recording, Jones answered, and the colloquy
moved on; Jones was not cut off and went on to present her full
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case, including the testimony of a witness she called and
examined.
In any event, we need not decide whether the exchange
amounted to a ruling because the voicemail could not have
changed the result even if excluded. By Jones’s own offer of
proof, the voicemail showed that Uhrig had said she was “not
letting this matter go”—evidence of Uhrig’s state of mind, offered
to support Jones’s own cross-petition and her theory that Uhrig
was the aggressor. It had no bearing on whether Jones made the
threat, struck Uhrig on the sidewalk, or videotaped her at close
range over a period of years. Admitting the voicemail would not
have made those findings less probable.
That leaves the supplemental filing Uhrig served on Jones
at the hearing. Jones objected that she “didn’t get the
supplemental documents.” But the record shows the trial court
cured any unfairness in the timing of that service, and that Jones
proceeded without pressing the point. When Jones raised the
objection, the court directed Uhrig to hand the supplement to
Jones at once. Although the parties had no right to request a
continuance of the hearing (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 523, 529), the court confirmed that both parties were
ready to proceed, and then placed the matter on second call for
the express purpose of giving Jones “an opportunity to review . . .
what she just handed you.” After that recess, Jones proceeded to
the hearing without renewing her objection, requesting a
continuance, or asserting that the time to review had been
inadequate. Jones thus forfeited any argument that the hearing
was unfair because she was not served with the supplemental
documents until shortly before the parties testified.
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The alleged erroneous admission of the supplement was not
prejudicial in any event. This is because the late-served
supplement was not necessary to support the trial court’s
findings. The acts on which the order independently rests were
each set out in Uhrig’s verified petition and its attached
declaration, which were served on Jones more than two weeks
before the hearing.1 Those documents and Uhrig’s testimony at
the hearing constituted substantial evidence supporting Uhrig’s
allegations about Jones’s threat, battery, and harassing
surveillance.
Jones’s reliance on Yu v. Pozniak-Rice (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 1135 (Yu) is unpersuasive. Yu reversed a section
527.6 order because the record did not support the finding of a
diligent effort to accomplish personal service that subdivision
(m)(2) requires before a court may authorize service of the
petition, temporary restraining order, and notice of hearing by an
alternative method—leaving the respondent potentially without
notice of the proceeding at all. (Id. at pp. 1142–1145.) That is
not this case. Uhrig’s petition and its attached declaration of
harassment were personally served on Jones more than two
weeks before the hearing, Jones appeared and litigated their
1 Jones has moved for judicial notice of California Secretary of
State records reflecting that the corporate entity “Westside Whiskers”
has been suspended by the Franchise Tax Board since 2015. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.252.) The records are offered to impeach Uhrig’s
account of her business-related harm and to show prejudice from the
late-served supplement. Because we sustain the order on conduct
unrelated to Uhrig’s business, the records are not necessary to our
resolution of the appeal. We therefore deny the request. (Hayward
Area Planning Assn. v. City of Hayward (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 176,
182 [“Only relevant material is a proper subject of judicial notice”].)
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allegations, and her objection reached only the timing of a later
supplement the order does not rest upon. Yu addresses the
absence of notice of the action itself. It says nothing about the
late service of supplemental evidence where the initiating papers
were timely served and the respondent fully participated.
Because the acts sustaining the order were pleaded and
litigated, and because the material Jones did not timely receive
went only to allegations the order does not rest on, it is not
reasonably probable that Jones would have obtained a more
favorable result had the supplement been served earlier. The
asserted irregularity, assuming it was error, was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Uhrig shall recover her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
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