Marriage of Vasek CA4/3

Filed 11/10/26 Marriage of Vasek CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re the Marriage of NANCY WAHAMAKI and ANTHONY GABRIEL VASEK. NANCY WAHAMAKI VASEK, G064441 Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22D003831) v. OPINION ANTHONY GABRIEL VASEK, Appellant. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Yolanda V. Torres, Judge. Affirmed. Anthony Gabriel Vasek, in pro. per., for Appellant. Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica Barbero for Respondent. * * *  This is an appeal from an order granting respondent Nancy Wahamaki Vasek a permanent domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former spouse, Anthony Gabriel Vasek.1 Anthony, who has been declared a vexatious litigant, seeks to relitigate every prior determination of fact and decision of law made in this case. We decline the invitation to do so. Instead, we review solely to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent DVRO or by denying Anthony’s request for a fifth continuance of the DVRO hearing. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Historical Facts A complete statement of facts is in our prior opinion affirming the court’s order granting a one-year DVRO, Vasek v. Vasek (Apr. 19, 2024, G062023) [nonpub. opn.] (Vasek I). In brief, “[O]n March 4, 2022, Anthony woke Nancy up ‘in a fit of rage,’ blaming her for closing a window in their room. She tried to leave the room, but he continued to yell and call her names, and squeezed her body against the wall. ‘He was on my right and I put up my arm to protect myself to not be squeezed against the wall. I asked him to stop yelling, however, that only made him rage even more. [Anthony] then pushed me extremely hard and slammed the door shut of the room I fell into.’ While Nancy alleged Anthony had previously been verbally and emotionally abusive, this was the first time the abuse had been physical. When she told him the next morning that his behavior ‘“was horrific,”’ Anthony was not remorseful, blaming her for closing the window and telling him not to yell.” (Vasek I, supra, G062023.) 1 For convenience and consistency with our prior opinions in this matter, we refer to the parties by their first names. 2  The parties attempted marriage counseling and lived in the same house for a few more weeks. Nancy eventually left the home after another incident during which he raged at her and called her names. After she left, Anthony began to make changes to their finances, including removing her access to shared accounts. He denied her access to belongings such as her passport, birth certificate, and personal documents, including writings and artwork. (Vasek I, supra, G062023.) Anthony began communicating to friends and family about Nancy, asking them to intervene. He attached personal writings and an audio recording of her speaking to a therapist. “Nancy’s petition described herself as an artist, and stated her writings and artwork are her craft, yet Anthony distributed her writings, which dated back to 1988, attempting to ‘psychoanalyze my well[-]being’ in an effort to harass her. She was both embarrassed and distraught by this incident.” (Vasek I, supra, G062023.) A temporary DVRO order was granted on June 1 which prohibited Anthony from harassing, disturbing the peace, or exercising coercive control over Nancy. (Ibid.) A continued hearing on the temporary DVRO was held in September 2022. At its conclusion, the “court determined that Nancy’s testimony about her fear of Anthony after the March 2022 incident was credible. The court also found that Anthony’s dissemination of Nancy’s personal writings disturbed her mental health and calm and peace. The court found that if Anthony, as he claimed, was truly concerned about Nancy’s mental status, he would have reached out to her psychiatrist and/or counselor, not the other individuals Anthony contacted. His contact with her friends and family caused her embarrassment, humiliation, and disturbed her mental calm and was intended to do so. The court granted a one-year 3 restraining order.” (Vasek I, supra, G062023.) In addition to ordering no contact, Anthony was ordered to return all of Nancy’s belongings, which included her writings. We later affirmed the order. (Ibid.) In June 2023, Nancy filed a motion to deem Anthony a vexatious litigant, based on eight separate motions or papers that were meritless or used improper tactics. (Vasek v. Vasek (Mar. 28, 2025, G063342) [nonpub. opn.] (Vasek II).) The court granted the request and issued a prefiling order. We affirmed. (Ibid.) B. Nancy’s Request to Renew DVRO On September 1, 2023, Nancy filed a request to renew the DVRO. Nancy’s request stated that Anthony had violated the order by failing to return her writings. He had also filed a “meritless appeal” and a substantial number of pleadings, including a “frivolous motion requesting an evidentiary hearing regarding subornation of perjury.” Nancy stated that Anthony was using the court system “to continue his abuse by submitting continuous meritless legal filings containing disparaging comments about me and making other statements to harass me and disturb my peace. In nearly every pleading Tony has filed with this Court and at the appellate level, he claims that my attorney and I are guilty of subornation of perjury.” She alleged that Anthony was “intentional with his words and knows what he is writing will destroy my mental peace and calm.” As examples, Nancy pointed out that during his closing argument at the hearing on the one-year DVRO, Anthony had “disclosed that he had further disseminated my writings to medical professionals at UCI Behavioral Health division so that they could ‘analyze’ my writings ‘to assess the PTSD impact those writings’ allegedly had on [Anthony].” Thus, Nancy had learned for the first time that Anthony had disseminated her writings again 4 without her knowledge or consent. The court stated in its ruling granting the one-year DVRO that it was concerned about the dissemination of Nancy’s writings, and found that it caused her embarrassment, humiliation, and disturbed her mental calm. As for his continued possession of her writings, in a filing after the one-year DVRO had been entered, Anthony stated that he would continue to hold her writings “‘in safekeeping out of [Nancy’s] reach until the conclusion of the annulment/divorce proceedings to ensure that tampering with said writings by [Nancy] never occurs.’” Nancy averred that Anthony knew his possession of her writings caused her distress. In March 2023, Anthony wrote that he was aware of this: “‘While [Anthony] understands [Nancy’s] reactions to his insistence on retaining possession of her writings for the moment, there are good reasons for [Anthony] to retain such control . . . said writings constitute important and necessary evidence . . . . [T]here is the likelihood that additional legal actions may be taken, post, these family law proceedings, that will require the presentation of [Nancy’s] writings as evidence.’” Nancy also stated her belief that Anthony uses his pleadings to “communicate faux sentiments to me, knowing that I will read his pleadings.” She quoted a March 6, 2023 filing that stated: “‘[Anthony] continues to have great affection for [Nancy] and wishes that [Nancy] were more open to his efforts at helping her.’ . . . In that same declaration, he refers to the ‘sad deterioration of [Nancy’s] condition,’ which I don’t even know what that is supposed to mean other than his alluding that I suffer from mental health issues.” She also alleged that Anthony continued to include his own interpretation of her writings in his pleadings, which he knew would cause 5 her distress. She “believe[d] that without a renewal of the restraining order, [Anthony’s] conduct will only escalate, given his lack of restraint thus far.” Anthony filed an opposition to Nancy’s request to renew the DVRO. He offered no legal argument in opposition. He claimed, however, that he had not received a complete service packet, and that he was “completely surprised” by the request, despite the fact that the one-year DVRO was set to expire that same month. He had “made no advance accommodations to his schedule to deal with said surprise request.” He claimed he was completely immersed in writing a reply brief in what would become Vasek I. He asked the court to withhold a decision until he had been served with all pages of the motion and to excuse him from appearing at the hearing, set for September 25, 2023. On September 19, Anthony was granted an extension of time, to November 27, to file his reply brief in this court. On the same date, Nancy filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of her request to renew the DVRO. On September 21, Anthony filed a second opposition to the renewal of the DVRO. He stated that he had now received the complete service packet and requested “a reasonable amount of time to file” a substantive opposition. C. Hearing is Continued Four Times At the hearing on September 25, Anthony requested a continuance. Nancy gave a time estimate of one hour, and Anthony gave a time estimate of one to two days. The court granted the continuance and rescheduled the matter for November 3 (the first continuance). On October 18, Anthony filed a third opposition to the renewal of the DVRO. Among other things, he claimed he was the victim of Nancy’s 6 counsel, who had caused the court to violate his rights. He indicated his “intent[] to go public with his experiences at the hands of [Nancy], her attorneys, and the trial court. Indeed, because of the trial court’s egregious misconduct, Respondent also intends to campaign against [the judge presiding in the matter’s] future election as a Judge of the Orange County Superior Court. It is inevitable that [Nancy’s] writings will constitute a necessary and integral part of said public discourse, and [Anthony’s] use thereof will have the protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, notwithstanding [Nancy’s] claims of distress over the matter.” Anthony also stated he would, after the conclusion of the pending cases and appeals, “be finalizing his choice of law firm to pursue, on his behalf, lawsuits against” Nancy’s counsel, her therapist, “and possibly others who may have been complicit in imparting the constitutional and other injuries” he suffered during the proceedings. Nancy’s “writings, therefore, will constitute a critical and integral part of the evidence in the coming actions.” He argued, despite the extant order, that he should be allowed to keep Nancy’s writings for this future litigation, “notwithstanding [Nancy’s] distress over the matter.” He stated that there were unnamed “others” who “share [Anthony’s] views on the shameless conduct exhibited in the instant case by the trial court and opposing counsel.” One of these unnamed “others” was prepared to testify that he was “shocked by the trial court’s and opposing counsel’s display of courtroom conduct so lacking in U.S. values which he has literally fought to preserve.” Another unnamed person was “dismayed by the abysmal courtroom conduct, exhibited in the instant case by the trial court and opposing counsel, that mimics what he has too often observed in the less–than–democratic countries.” 7  Regardless of his opinion of the trial court, he was nonetheless prepared to seek relief from the same “shameless” and “abysmal” court when it suited him. His opposition also stated that a November 3 hearing date was “unworkable” due to witness availability, efforts to generate a stipulation to simplify the proceedings with (the also “shameless” and “abysmal”) opposing counsel, and the fact that this motion had “repeatedly interrupted” his work on an appellate brief. He demanded the court accept his “parameters” for rescheduling: availability of his witnesses, the upcoming fall holidays, and his health. On the November 3 hearing date, Anthony appeared and stated he was not ready. Nancy did not oppose, and the court continued the hearing to January 26, 2024 (the second continuance). The parties were advised to be ready on that date. On December 18, Anthony submitted three declarations from third parties in opposition the request for the renewal of the DVRO. He also filed a witness list. On January 11, 2024, on its own motion, the court continued the hearing to March 29, 2024 (the third continuance). At the same hearing, Anthony sought to have the three declarations of his witnesses admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony. Opposing counsel declined to stipulate, and the court informed Anthony that declarations were not sufficient. On March 27, the parties appeared at a hearing on the court’s own motion. The court noted that this court had heard argument on what would become Vasek I on the week prior. The court indicated it was inclined to wait for the opinion before proceeding on the hearing to renew the DVRO. Both parties agreed to continue the matter to May 28, 2024 (the fourth continuance). The court stated: “This will be set at 10:00 a.m. on May 28th, 8 2024.” By this point, the hearing had been continued for approximately eight months, from September 25, 2023 to May 28, 2024. The opinion in Vasek I was issued on April 19, 2024. (Vasek I, supra, G062023.) D. May 28, 2024 Hearing At the hearing on May 28, Nancy stated she was ready to proceed. Anthony stated he was not ready, because his attempt to file documents had been blocked by the vexatious litigant prefiling order. He stated that a request for a continuance was among the documents he attempted to file. The court asked what documents he wanted to file. Anthony stated: “Okay. So I would like to file—today I would just like the Court as a right . . . that the Court accept for filing the request to reschedule hearing, and that request contains the exhibits that I just mentioned . . . . [¶] It asks—the rationale or the reasons for good cause for continuance are stated in my request as the Court must—what I’m asking the Court to do, it must further direct the office of the clerk to refrain during the pendency of the instant case from applying any constraints on me based upon vexatious litigant statutes. And when that is done, then I will file more pleadings.” The court then attempted, several times, to ascertain what documents Anthony had tried to file that resulted in his request to continue. Anthony did not answer, instead making a statement about this court’s purported rationale for Vasek I and his failed attempt to augment the record with documents not before the trial court. The court nonetheless tried again. “I’m still trying to understand. [¶] Do you have the documents with you? Perhaps I could look at them.” Finally, Anthony admitted that he did not have the documents. When asked why not, he responded: “Because I needed 9 the continuance so that I could then present those documents.” He then attempted to explain, we believe, that he wished to file a petition to vacate the DVRO. He claimed he had e-mails and text messages showing that Nancy had given false testimony. He stated “there is adequate evidence to show that what [Nancy] had presented to the Court is really false testimony.” The court responded that it had made its findings, which had been affirmed by this court. The court indicated “that ship has sailed” and “that window is closed” for contesting the findings made in connection with the one-year DVRO. “So now we need to look going forward—and I’m trying to figure out what documents that you want to present to the Court with respect to the renewal that you were not able to file because I’m going to order you to get them during the lunch break and show them to counsel and see where we’re at, and perhaps the Court will entertain reviewing those as well and allowing you to present those documents.” The court again asked Anthony to specify the type of evidence he wanted to present, and Anthony again replied without specifics, indicating he wished to file a motion to vacate. Nancy’s counsel indicated her belief that the statutory time period for filing a motion to vacate was past. Counsel was opposed to a further continuance. At long last, Anthony gave a copy of his request to continue to the court. The court asked, before adjourning at noon, that Anthony show opposing counsel any documents he wanted her to see during the lunch hour. After the recess, the court indicated it had reviewed Anthony’s request to reschedule, noting it seemed that Anthony wanted to file an exhibit list. “I think it was submitted about [May 23], which is the request to continue. A request to reschedule, I should say. And I don’t even know what 10 the exhibits are at this juncture, but the Court’s not going to allow a continuance. This matter has been set several time[s].” Anthony again stated he wanted to file a request to vacate the DVRO. “In that motion, I will explain the difference between the fact that the Court of Appeal was considering the issue of the issuance of the DVRO, and I am bringing up a new issue, which is whether the DVRO should be vacated based on evidence that this Court had not seen before.” He claimed, without offering authority, that he had “a right to file that” motion before the court heard the request to renew the DVRO, because this “motion is connected.” The court stated it would address the renewal. The court again asked Anthony if he had brought the exhibits. Anthony stated he had not. The court noted it had advised him that he should retrieve whatever he wanted to file during the lunch hour. “During the break, the Court did take a look at your request to reschedule, and you said you wanted to file an exhibit list. If you have exhibits, I’d like to see what those exhibits are . . . .” Anthony attempted to interject, but the court was ready to move on, and asked the clerk to swear in the parties, stating it was going to get started on the request to review the DVRO. Anthony declined. “I do not intend to give any testimony today under these circumstances because you’re violating my right.” The court indicated Anthony had made his record and the hearing would proceed. Nancy was sworn in. The court gave Anthony two more chances to be sworn, but he rejected them, stating he did not bring his materials. He needed “four or five days” to cross-examine Nancy, which he claimed was in his request for a continuance. The court again indicated the matter had been pending for quite some time, with four previous continuances. He stated: “I 11 would like to state for the record that I have chosen not to be sworn in because I believe that these proceedings are improper.” The hearing proceeded with testimony from Nancy. Nancy testified she had moved out of the marital home in April 2022 due to Anthony’s physical abuse. She moved to New Mexico, where she was currently working full time. She would like to return to Orange County, but was afraid of Anthony hurting her if she did. Nancy had sought the one-year DVRO because of Anthony’s physical abuse and dissemination of her private writings. Anthony was still in possession of her writings, and she had never given him permission to distribute them. It made her feel violated, humiliated, and belittled that he continued to be in possession of her private writings, which were very important to her. Anthony had obtained her New Mexico address, which she never intended for him to have. In a motion he filed, referring to her as “‘the girl who cries wolf,’” Anthony said a moving company had given him the address at her direction. Nancy was “terrified” as a result. Every time she heard something outside, she was afraid it was Anthony. His reference to her “as the girl who cries wolf” made her feel sad, disgusted, and violated. In another pleading, Anthony said he would keep Nancy’s writings to prevent tampering. Nancy said this also made her feel violated. He had no right to her writings. Nancy also stated she was still afraid Anthony would appear at her home, and still “terrified” of him. “And I’m terrified not only because of the abuse—the emotional abuse, but because it’s being abused through the court. He writes all this stuff about me on a continuous basis for two years.” 12  Nancy’s counsel asked her about the statements in Anthony’s pleadings about the “likelihood” of more legal actions after the family law proceedings were over, where he intended to present her writings as evidence. Nancy testified she believed he would “make up things in his own head and try to hurt me through the courts.” She felt terrified and tired. Anthony was given the opportunity to cross-examine Nancy. He asked the court to stay all proceedings until this court responded to a filing of his. Otherwise, he refused to participate. When asked for a final comment on the DVRO renewal, Anthony again refused to participate. He stated the DVRO should never have been granted, the vexatious litigant motion should never have been granted, and he intended to “get that squared away” in this court. Nancy’s counsel gave a brief closing argument and requested renewal of the DVRO for a “maximum amount of time the court deemed reasonable and necessary.” The court gave a ruling on the record, starting with the relevant legal standard. In sum, the court found Nancy’s testimony credible. The court found, after a review of the evidence, that Nancy had met her burden to extend the restraining order, and granted her request to renew it permanently. The court also ordered Anthony to return Nancy’s writings to her counsel’s office by the end of the current week, noting they should have been returned in September 2022. Anthony filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION I. MOTIONS A. Nancy’s Request for Judicial Notice Nancy requests we take judicial notice of our prior appellate opinions and orders in in this matter, specifically, the opinions in case Nos. 13 G062023 and G063342. She also requests we take judicial notice of the following orders: in case No. G062490, the order denying Anthony’s petition for a writ of mandate; in case No. G064744, the order dismissing the appeal; and in case No. G066069, the order dismissing the appeal. Judicial notice of prior opinions is proper under California law. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.2) The request is granted. B. Anthony’s Request for Judicial Notice In his opening brief, Anthony includes a request for judicial notice. This is improper. All requests for judicial notice must be filed separately. (Rule 8.252 (a)(1).) The party seeking judicial notice must state, among other things, why the matter to be noticed is relevant and whether the matter was presented to the trial court. (Rule 8.252 (a)(2).) Anthony has not complied with this rule. Accordingly, his request is denied. C. Anthony’s Motion to Augment One of Anthony’s arguments is that the trial court improperly excluded his exhibit list and binder of exhibits. He seeks to have the following documents included in the record: 1) A document that purports to be his three-ring binder’s first page; 2) a “collage of [Nancy’s] emails which had been previously presented to the trial court;” 3) text messages exchanged between the parties in 2021 and 2022; 4) evidence of the delivery of scanned copies of Nancy’s spiritual writings; and 5) evidence of the delivery of original hardcopies of Nancy’s spiritual writings. Augmentation lies within our discretion. As relevant here, augmentation is only proper when the document was “filed or lodged in the 2 Subsequent references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 14 case in superior court.” (Rule 8.155 (a)(1)(A).) There is no evidence the first three items (the binder page, e-mails, or text messages) were ever made part of the record. Anthony points to a comment about an “exhibit binder . . . lodged to the Court of Appeal” in a July 15, 2024 minute order, but this does not demonstrate a binder was lodged with the trial court, or that the binder lodged with this court was the same binder. Indeed, Anthony stated in court on May 28, 2024, at the hearing on renewal of the DVRO, that he had not brought his exhibits with him. Anthony has not provided any evidence these documents are eligible to be included in the appellate record. (Rule 8.155 (a)(1)(A); see rule 8.122 (b)(3)(A).) As for Nancy’s spiritual writings, Anthony seeks to augment the record with “evidence of delivery” of the scanned documents in an e-mail dated September 24, 2024 from Anthony to Nancy’s counsel stating that he would send electronic copies, and an e-mail on October 5, 2024, again from Anthony to Nancy’s counsel, stating he had sent “6 batches” of writings. The “evidence of delivery” of the original hard copies is a receipt dated July 18, 2025, for receipt of the documents by Nancy’s counsel. These documents were transmitted months after the disputed order was entered. Because augmentation is only proper for documents that were before the court at the time the disputed order was considered, these documents cannot be made part of the appellate record. (In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 455.) Anthony’s motion to augment is denied. D. Anthony’s Motion for Order Vacating Submission Following oral argument and submission of this matter, Anthony submitted a motion for an order vacating submission and seeking leave to file supplemental briefing. We ordered the clerk to file the request. Anthony has not shown good cause. The motion is denied. 15  II. SCOPE OF THIS APPEAL The only issues in this appeal are whether the court erred by denying Anthony’s request for a fifth continuance of the permanent DVRO hearing and whether the court’s order granting Nancy a permanent DVRO was legally sound. We are not revisiting past decisions, including the truth of the evidence or the court’s findings underlying the initial order, or the designation of Anthony as a vexatious litigant. We disregard those portions of Anthony’s briefs that attempt to relitigate matters that are now final. III. DENIAL OF A FIFTH CONTINUANCE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION We review the grant or denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. (J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1139.) When “[a] motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” we reverse if denial of a continuance denied the applicant a fair hearing. (Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395.) A continuance of a DVRO hearing shall only be granted on a showing of good cause. (Fam. Code, § 245, subd. (b).) This motion, as we discussed above, was continued four times. Nancy’s request to renew the DVRO was filed on September 1, 2023, and the continued hearing was eventually set for May 28, 2024. In November 2023, the parties were advised to be ready to proceed on the next hearing date, which at that time was scheduled for January 2024. At no point did Anthony indicate he could not be ready by January 2024. In December 2023, Anthony filed a witness list, and in March, he filed an exhibit list. In the stretch of time between December and May, when the hearing was actually held, Anthony did not indicate to the court that he was not ready to proceed. He raised this for the first time 16 when he stated he presented a request for a rescheduled hearing for filing shortly before the hearing. Anthony attempts to use the alleged difficulties he had filing documents shortly before the hearing to justify his need for a continuance. But he was apparently attempting to file the continuance request when he ran into those difficulties. Assuming we are reviewing his oral request to continue at the hearing, we find no abuse of discretion. While it is unfortunate that Anthony purportedly had difficulties filing documents as a vexatious litigant, it does not justify his request for a continuance or his subsequent conduct. Rather than bringing the documents he allegedly could not file to court and requesting the court file them, he simply chose not to bring them, or even to identify them to the court with any specificity. The court gave him the opportunity to retrieve the documents during the 90-minute lunch break. According to Anthony, he was unable to “deliver on that request because it posed an unreasonable hardship bordering on potential harm. Anthony had not yet eaten anything that day, and the drive time alone would have consumed the entire lunch break. Going without food would have been an unnecessarily risky undertaking, given Anthony’s advanced age.” Anthony never asked the court for additional time or advised the court that he needed a longer break, and therefore this post-hoc justification for Anthony’s refusal to obtain the documents appears nowhere in the record and warrants no further consideration.3 3 At oral argument, for the first time, Anthony argued that the five copies of the binder he would have needed to bring to court were voluminous and would require a “suitcase.” Anthony did not indicate that he needed accommodation for assistance to transmit his exhibits from his car, nor did he request one. The voluminous nature of his exhibit binders was not a reason to 17  After the lunch break, Anthony, who repeatedly mentioned his desire to bring a “motion to vacate,” as the reason for a continuance, simply refused to participate in the hearing. He declined to be sworn as a witness or to cross-examine Nancy, although he was given multiple opportunities to do both. Anthony was not denied a hearing or due process. He chose not to participate. The court gave both parties clear notice about being ready to proceed as early as January, yet Anthony appeared at the May hearing with yet another new argument and demanded more time. The court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing. IV. NO ERROR IN RENEWING DVRO Renewals of DVROs are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Fam. Code, § 6345.) When reviewing for abuse of discretion, “The appropriate test . . . is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Ca1.3d 474, 478–479.) Any question as to the application of the correct legal standard is an issue of law that we review de novo. (Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560.) “The Domestic Violence Prevention Act” (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) “‘was created to protect people . . . who have legitimate fears of physical harm from a domestic partner.’” (Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Ca1.App.5th 844, 852.) A DVRO “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the ignore the court’s direction to use the lunch break to retrieve them, or an excuse for not bringing them in the first place. 18 court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order. Renewals and subsequent renewals shall be subject to termination, modification, or subsequent renewal by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party.” (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) “A trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse. So there should be no misunderstanding, this does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.) “In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse, ‘the existence of the initial order certainly is relevant and the underlying findings and facts supporting that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test.’ [Citation.] ‘Also potentially relevant are any significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order. For instance, have the restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order?’ [Citation.] Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job opportunities.” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) “[T]he physical security of the protected party trumps all of these burdens the 19 original or renewed protective order may impose on the restrained party. Thus, where the protected party has a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future physical abuse if the current protective order expires, that order should be renewed despite any burdens this inflicts on the restrained party. The Legislature has left little doubt about this balancing of risks and burdens in its domestic violence legislation.” (Ritchie v. Konrad, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) In our review of a renewal order, the restrained party is not permitted to relitigate or otherwise “‘“challenge the truth of the evidence and findings underlying the initial order.’”” (In re Marriage of Brubaker and Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 537.) Further, the court should not ordinarily consider new evidence regarding the events that led to the DVRO. In renewal proceedings, the issue is the reasonable apprehension of further abuse. (In re Marriage of Martindale & Ochoa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 54, 60.) By the time of the DVRO hearing, substantial time had passed since the entry of the one-year DVRO. During that period, Anthony had refused to return Nancy’s writings to her, despite the court’s order to return Nancy’s belongings. Despite Anthony’s attempts to characterize this order as unclear, there is no definition of one’s “belongings” that does not include one’s private writings. Anthony violated this order. Anthony also learned Nancy’s New Mexico address, and let her know that he had this information through a court pleading. Anthony claimed the address, which was included on a receipt given to him by Nancy’s movers, was information she “was comfortable” with him possessing. He felt it necessary to include the statement that even though he “now knows where [Nancy] lives, he assures everyone that he has no intention of violating the order.” Given the history of this case, no reasonable person would believe that 20 Nancy “was comfortable” with Anthony’s knowledge of her current address. Rather, this appears to be Anthony’s modus operandi—using court pleadings, almost always unsuccessful and meritless ones—to communicate with Nancy and cause her as much distress as possible. In addition to communicating that he knew her address, Anthony has also used pleadings to inform Nancy that their marital dissolution case will not be the end of litigation involving her and her personal writings. “‘[T]here is the likelihood that additional legal actions may be taken, post, these family law proceedings, that will require the presentation of [Nancy’s] writings as evidence.’” While Anthony assures us that due to his vexatious litigant status, he could never file a frivolous lawsuit to harass her further, that has not stopped him from using pleadings in the instant family law litigation to disseminate her writings, question her sanity, and communicate with her. Indeed, his brief indicates he plans to bring future lawsuits against Nancy’s psychiatrist and attorneys. “Nancy’s writings, therefore, would constitute a critical and integral part of the evidence in such actions, and Anthony’s use thereof would have the protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments, irrespective of Nancy’s claims of distress over the matter.” Nancy testified that Anthony’s actions have made her feel violated and terrified. She believed that without the DVRO, Anthony’s actions would escalate. She felt violated by his actions and continued attempts to cause her distress by publicly disseminating her private writings. Given the findings in the initial hearing and the undisputed evidence of Anthony’s actions since, Nancy’s fear of future physical abuse was objectively reasonable. Anthony’s actions do not indicate a litigant who has moved on and poses no future threat. He continues to take every opportunity to harass 21 Nancy through the court system and to cause her distress. His retention of her writings was not a legitimate attempt to prevent evidence tampering, but to maintain coercive control over Nancy by refusing to return things of importance to her, in violation of a court order. “We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses. (Rufo v. Simpson (