Li v. Jones CA5

Filed 11/6/26 Li v. Jones CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MARGARET LI, F090654 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 19CEFL05972) v. CHRISTOPHER JONES, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. THE COURT * APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Glenda S. Allen-Hill, Judge. Margaret Li, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Christopher Jones, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent. -ooOoo- * Before Hill, P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.  Appellant Margaret Li and respondent Christopher Jones are both proceeding in propria persona in this appeal from a stipulated domestic violence restraining order (restraining order). Appellant raises several challenges to the restraining order, alleging that the record does not support entering such an order and that appellant’s counsel committed misconduct. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The record submitted in this case contains the restraining order, a document titled family law findings and order after hearing, a notice of appeal, a designation of the record, and a register of actions. A court reporter was not present at the hearing and appellant has not filed an agreed statement or other similar document. The parties are part of an ongoing child custody and support matter that began in 2019. As part of those proceedings, the court heard a contested request for a restraining order beginning on October 15, 2025. Although the hearing had been set for three half- day sessions, on October 16, 2025, the parties appeared with an agreed solution. At this time both parties were represented by counsel. The record reflects that the parties stipulated that “a 3 year restraining order shall be issued” and that respondent “shall be the only protected party.” The court signed the restraining order that same day. As part of this stipulated agreement, the parties also resolved an unrelated custody issue regarding a passport for their minor child. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 29, 2025. In that notice, appellant alleged her counsel was negligent in failing to review evidence and informed her she would lose her child if she did not agree to the restraining order. Appellant further alleged respondent was using the restraining order to gain an unfair advantage in their custody dispute, that respondent’s counsel had written factually inaccurate statements on the subsequent order after hearing without obtaining appellant’s counsel’s consent, and that both parties’ counsel had informed appellant the restraining order would not result in a rebuttable presumption against her in the custody dispute. 2.  DISCUSSION In her opening brief, appellant raises eight issues with the restraining order. Five of the issues relate to procedural or evidentiary claims. Specifically, appellant contends: (1) the stipulation is not enforceable because it was not signed and there is no oral record of the agreement; (2) the restraining order is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) appellant’s due process rights were violated when no cross-examination or evidentiary hearing occurred and no rebuttal evidence was introduced; (4) that the allegations made in the request for the restraining order were false; and (5) that the order is prejudicial to her custody rights because it was entered without evidentiary foundation. Two relate to issues with counsel. Appellant alleges: (1) counsel’s threats deprived appellant of her ability to voluntarily consent to the agreement and (2) appellant’s counsel was deficient by not presenting evidence or objecting. The final issue alleges cumulative error requires reversing the order. These eight issues are raised over four pages, often in a bullet-point format, without meaningful discussion, and with only general citations to broadly applicable legal principles. Standard of Review and Applicable Law As a general rule, a party may not appeal from a consent judgment. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 400.) Where the parties intended a full and final settlement of their dispute, a stipulated judgment is not appealable. (Id. at p. 401.) Moreover, in all cases the “party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Failing to provide an adequate record means the appeal must be resolved against the challenging party. (Id. at p. 575; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296.) “ ‘We review the grant of a … restraining order for abuse of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or 3. uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116.) Appellant Has Failed to Demonstrate Error Appellant’s arguments all suffer from the same core problems. First, appellant is seeking review of a stipulated resolution that wholly resolves the restraining order dispute. Such stipulated orders are not appealable. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 401.) Second, even if this court were to find the stipulated order entered in this case appealable, the record submitted by appellant is insufficient to test any of the claims she has raised. The court lacks any underlying documents or evidence from the requested restraining orders and there is no record of or agreed statement related to the hearing. Further, appellant never requested the trial court set aside the order, meaning the record lacks any evidence related to the advice or threats appellant claims she received from counsel. All the court has is a statement that the parties entered a stipulation for a three- year restraining order against appellant and a restraining order consistent with that stipulation. There is simply nothing in the record implying the restraining order was improper. An inadequate record requires we reject appellant’s claims. (Ballard v. Uribe, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 575.) Finally, to the extent there is record evidence available to review, that evidence supports the trial court. The sole statement regarding the parties’ intent contained in the record states directly that appellant agreed to have a three-year restraining order entered against her. The court entered a three-year restraining order. The record shows no 4. conflict between the agreement and the order entered. We find no abuse of discretion under such limited and direct facts. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent. 5.