Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. CA4/1

Filed 10/20/26 Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JULIO MAYEN, D085693 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023- 00043974-CU-OR-CTL) COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, James A. Mangione, Judge. Affirmed. Julio Mayen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Stinson, Jan T. Chilton and Maxwell Levins, for Defendant and Respondent Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Spencer Fane and Kirby McDonough; Akerman, Parisa Jassim and Jacqueline Foroutan for Defendants and Respondents Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., and The Bank of New York Mellon.  I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Julio Mayen sued to quiet title as against various entities associated with a loan he and his wife (Wife) took out to acquire a residence.1 The defendants demurred on the grounds that Mayen (1) failed to state a cause of action to quiet title because he did not allege that he tendered full repayment of the underlying debt (the tender rule); (2) failed to name Wife, who, as a co-borrower, was a necessary and indispensable party; and (3) was judicially estopped from suing the defendants because he did not list his claim against them as an asset in any of his three prior bankruptcy proceedings. Based largely on judicially noticed public records showing the chain of title to the lender’s security interest in the property, the trial court sustained the demurrer on the first two grounds (tender rule and necessary party) and did not reach the third (judicial estoppel). The trial court denied Mayen leave to amend because the court had previously sustained a demurrer on similar grounds, which Mayen failed to cure in his amended complaint. On appeal, Mayen contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the court improperly relied on unauthenticated records and presumed the existence of facts not in evidence. Without those records, Mayen contends, the court’s ruling is unsupported because there is no valid chain of title establishing the lender’s security interest in the underlying 1 The entities are Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS); and the Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for the CertificateHolders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-07, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-07 (BoNYM). 2 property. Mayen also argues the trial court’s handling of the demurrer proceedings denied him due process. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in taking judicial notice of publicly recorded real property records. Based on those records, the trial court properly sustained the defendants’ demurrer on tender rule grounds. Because Mayen’s pleading fails on this ground, we need not and do not reach the other grounds relied on by the trial court or raised by the defendants below or on appeal. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (Aubry) [“The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ”].) We further conclude the trial court’s handling of the demurrer proceedings afforded Mayen due process. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Title and Loan Documents On December 30, 2004, Mayen and Wife bought “an owner occupied residential property” in Jamul (the Property). The grant deed conveyed title to Mayen and Wife as “husband and wife, as community property.” 2 Because this appeal arises from the sustaining of a demurrer, we summarize the facts based on the allegations in Mayen’s pleadings and on matters of which we may take judicial notice. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 (Yvanova).) We grant BoNYM and MERS’s motion to augment the appellate record in this case to include the appellate record in Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et al., pending before this court under case No. D086004. We grant Mayen’s unopposed request for judicial notice of Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (2026) ___U.S.___ [146 S.Ct. 1532]. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a) [judicial notice of federal decisional law is mandatory].) 3  The same day they acquired the Property, Mayen and Wife also executed a deed of trust, which was recorded in the county recorder’s office. The deed of trust defines the “Borrower” as Mayen and Wife; the “Lender” as Countrywide; and “MERS” as “the beneficiary under” the deed of trust and “as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” The deed of trust defines the “Note” as the approximately $1 million “promissory note signed by Borrower,” and the “Loan” as “the debt evidenced by the Note.” The deed of trust defines itself as the “Security Instrument.” The deed of trust contemplates and authorizes changes in ownership of the underlying debt. One provision states: “The Note or a partial interest in the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.” On June 13, 2011, MERS assigned the deed of trust, “together with the note(s) and obligations therein described,” to BoNYM. The assignment was recorded with the county recorder’s office. In June 2023, BoNYM began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Property. Mayen asserts the Property sold at a trustee’s sale on October 20, 2023. B. Mayen’s Prior Bankruptcies Mayen filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on three separate occasions: in February 2013, August 2016, and November 2016. Each petition was ultimately discharged or dismissed. Mayen’s bankruptcy schedules did not list as assets any potential litigation claims against the defendants in this case. 4  C. Mayen’s Other Lawsuits Mayen has filed several other lawsuits in federal and state court regarding the Property and underlying loan. 1. Federal Court In 2013, Mayen filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings based on alleged fraud and violations of debt collection statutes. The federal district court dismissed the case on the basis that “in California a plaintiff may not use the courts to test whether the entity initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure has the authority to do so.” In 2017, Mayen sued the loan servicer for alleged violations of debt collection laws. The federal court dismissed the case, finding Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims because he failed to list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules. Mayen appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. In 2023, Mayen sued the defendants in this case for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, “violation of SEC rules and regulations,” and “violation of federal consumer protection law.” In June 2024, the federal court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims because he failed to list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules. Mayen appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. 2. State Court In November 2023 (about one month after he filed his third federal lawsuit and about six months before that lawsuit was dismissed), Mayen filed a substantially similar lawsuit in state court against the same defendants and asserting the same claims. The defendants demurred on the grounds 5 that (1) another action was pending in federal court, (2) Mayen failed to include Wife as a necessary and indispensable party, (3) Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims because he did not list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules, and (4) each specific claim failed to state a cause of action. On November 8, 2024, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on necessary and indispensable party grounds. The court entered a judgment of dismissal on December 18, 2024. Mayen appealed and that case is pending before us in Case No. D086004. D. This Lawsuit 1. Mayen’s Original Complaint and Related Proceedings In October 2023 (shortly before he filed his third federal lawsuit and his other state court lawsuit), Mayen filed the underlying complaint in this case asserting a single cause of action to quiet title to the Property as against Countrywide, BoNYM, and MERS. The complaint did not join Wife as a party. Mayen alleged he has resided in the Property since 2004 and has paid all expenses and taxes for the Property since then. He asserted that the defendants “do not have a valid claim against [the Property]” because such a claim “could only be proved by a ‘certified’ copy of the ‘original unaltered’ Promissory Note naming Countrywide as the Real Party in Interest.” The complaint cited and attached the deed of trust. Mayen estimated the Property was worth $1.7 million to $2.1 million, and he “allege[d] that there are no known encumbrances to the Property.” Based on these allegations, Mayen asserted he “is entitled to a judicial declaration that [he] is the 100% owner of the . . . Property” and that the deed of trust “is an invalid defeasance” to his grant deed. 6  The defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds that Mayen (1) failed to state a cause of action for quiet title because he did not allege compliance with the tender rule; (2) failed to join Wife, who was a necessary and indispensable party; and (3) was judicially estopped from suing because he did not list the claim as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules.3 The trial court sustained the demurrer on tender rule and necessary party grounds.4 On the merits of the quiet title action, the court ruled that (1) “a failure to provide a certified copy of the Promissory Note is not a basis to support a quiet title action,” and (2) Mayen “failed to allege that he has paid, or is excused from paying,” the underlying debt. Additionally, the court found that Wife “is a necessary party,” and “[a]bsent a factual showing . . . that she does not have an interest in the property or the loan, ownership of the property cannot be adjudicated without her.” Although the court found it unnecessary to address the defendants’ judicial estoppel argument, the court noted in any event “that where a failure to list likely claims in a bankruptcy schedule resulted only in an automatic stay of collection proceedings, judicial estoppel is improper. (Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 144 (‘[T]he automatic benefit of a stay on collection action prior to dismissal of a bankruptcy case is not a benefit that 3 The demurrers are not in the appellate record but we can glean these arguments from Mayen’s opposition and the trial court’s ruling, which are in the appellate record. 4 As to MERS, the court additionally found that because the Property had been sold at a trustee’s sale, Mayen “cannot show that MERS has an adverse interest in the property.” 7 threatens judicial integrity in a way sufficient to provide a basis for judicial estoppel.’]).)” The court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to Countrywide and BoNYM, and without leave to amend as to MERS. 2. Mayen’s Amended Complaint and Related Proceedings a. The Amended Complaint On April 19, 2024, Mayen filed a first amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the Property as against Countrywide and BoNYM. The amended complaint elaborated on Mayen’s promissory note theory and explained why Wife was not a necessary party. Regarding the promissory note, Mayen alleged that under the deed of trust “only Countrywide . . . had the authority to foreclose on [the Property] provided that Countrywide . . . was in possession of the original promissory note and the loan file.” Mayen further alleged the deed of trust was invalidly assigned because it was “a so-called electronic securitization of a deed of trust” and because “a loan cannot be assigned without our express written consent.” As to Wife, Mayen alleged that he and his “former spouse . . . divorced” years earlier and that she “relinquished her interest in the [Property].” b. The Demurrer Countrywide and BoNYM demurred to the amended complaint on the same grounds they demurred to the original complaint: failure to comply with the tender rule, failure to join Wife as a necessary party, and judicial 8 estoppel.5 These defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of certain publicly recorded documents (the deed of trust, the assignment of the deed of trust, and nonjudicial foreclosure records) and court filings in Mayen’s bankruptcy and federal cases. Mayen opposed the demurrer. He argued the tender rule did not apply “because the [amended complaint] disputes the legitimacy of the debt itself, including the standing of the defendants to enforce any such debt.” Mayen maintained that “the securitization process” invalidated the debt because the “transfer of the relevant loan from [Countrywide] to [BoNYM] . . . extinguished [Mayen]’s obligation to pay defendants any sum of money.” In support, Mayen cited and discussed a law review article regarding systemic irregularities in the mortgage-backed securities industry, including a case study involving Countrywide and BoNYM. Regarding his failure to join Wife as a party, Mayen asserted that his “divorce order explicitly states that [Wife] moved out and [Mayen] has temporary use of the property until it is sold or foreclosed,” which “limits her current interest and makes her non-essential to the quiet title action.” Mayen argued judicial estoppel did not apply because the doctrine would deny him due process and he did not obtain any benefit from omitting the present claim from his bankruptcy schedules beyond the automatic bankruptcy stay, which the trial court previously found was an insufficient benefit. 5 Again, the demurrers are not in the appellate record but we glean their contents from Mayen’s opposition and the trial court’s ruling, which are in the appellate record. 9  c. The Tentative Ruling On September 20, 2024, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the defendants’ request for judicial notice and sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend on “two independent bas[e]s.” The first basis was Mayen’s failure to allege compliance with the tender rule. The court explained that when it sustained the demurrer to Mayen’s original complaint, “the court noted that a failure to provide a certified copy of the Promissory Note is not a basis to support a quiet title action and that [Mayen] failed to allege that he has paid, or is excused from paying, tender on the mortgage. Despite this, the [first amended complaint] continues to assert a quiet title claim based on the purported failure to verify the Promissory Note and again fails to allege tender or excusal from tender.” Because Mayen “was unable to remedy these deficiencies following the initial demurrer,” the court denied him leave to amend. On the necessary party ground, the court was unpersuaded by Mayen’s claim that Wife had “ ‘relinquished her interest in the home property.’ ” The court reasoned that Mayen’s elaboration in his opposition that the divorce order grants him “ ‘temporary use of the property until it is sold or foreclosed’ . . . does not negate [Wife]’s ownership interest in the property or monetary interest in the loan.” About a week after the court issued its tentative ruling, Mayen filed a “notice to the court in opposition to the tentative ruling.” Mayen argued the tender rule “requires proof via authenticated evidence that Countrywide was a bona fide mortgagee along with an authenticated assignment to a new mortgagee.” He asserted that “courts have consistently upheld the requirement for a party claiming under an assignment to prove the fact of the 10 assignment, ensuring that the obligator is not subject to multiple claims by different parties.” Mayen argued the court could not establish these facts by taking judicial notice of “the truth of the matters asserted” in public records. Mayen asserted he had spoken to the county recorder’s office, which confirmed that “they do not certify the truth, accuracy and authenticity of the contents of [recorded] documents.” Mayen attached a printout from the recorder’s website warning about real estate fraud. Regarding Wife’s nonjoinder, Mayen argued that the defendants could establish her interest in the Property only by submitting authenticated copies of “the relevant loan application” and “commitment letter.” d. The Demurrer Hearing The trial court heard argument on the demurrer on October 9, 2024. Mayen began by asking the court whether it had read his objection to the tentative ruling. The court stated it had not because the court considered it untimely. Mayen wanted to read the document into the record but the court denied the request because the written objection was already in the record for appellate purposes. Mayen interrupted and objected to the trial court’s handling of the issue, asking the court to cite authority to support its position. The court attempted to redirect Mayen to the merits of the demurrer, but Mayen insisted the court answer his question. The court asked defense counsel if they had anything to add to the court’s tentative ruling. They did not. The court again invited Mayen to address the merits of the tentative ruling. Mayen repeatedly interrupted the court, which prompted the court to warn that one more interruption would terminate the hearing. Mayen eventually argued the merits of the quiet title issue. 11  The court invited defense counsel to address Mayen’s argument. Mayen objected that counsel “can’t respond” because “[t]hey are not a witness.” Counsel for BoNYM briefly addressed the court on the merits and asked the court to confirm the tentative ruling. The court gave Mayen the last word. He again objected that counsel “cannot testify” and that “[t]heir statements are hearsay” and lack “first-hand personal knowledge.” Mayen argued that the tentative ruling erred by taking judicial notice of the truth of matters asserted in publicly recorded documents, which violated the county recorder’s admonition as summarized in Mayen’s objection to the tentative ruling. After hearing argument, the court confirmed the tentative ruling and later entered a minute order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. 3. The Judgment The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal as to BoNYM on November 18, 2024, and as to Countrywide on December 18, 2024. III. DISCUSSION A. Demurrer Standard of Review In reviewing a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer, “ ‘we examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ ” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.) “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ’ ” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “We also consider matters that may be judicially noticed and facts appearing in any 12 exhibits attached to the complaint.” (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 400; see Evans, at p. 6; Code Civ. Proc.,6 § 430.30, subd. (a) [a demurrer lies “[w]hen any ground for objection to a complaint . . . appears . . . from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice”].) “[A] demurrer may be sustained where judicially noticeable facts render the pleading defective [citation], and allegations in the pleading may be disregarded if they are contrary to facts judicially noticed.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752 (Scott); see Evans, at p. 6 [“ ‘ “[A] complaint otherwise good on its face is subject to demurrer when facts judicially noticed render it defective.” ’ ”].) “In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.” (Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752; Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879–880 (Cantu).) “We will affirm the ruling if there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly sustained” (Scott, at p. 752), regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground or whether the defendant asserted it in the trial court (Cantu, at p. 880, fn. 10; see Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967). We review the trial court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. (See Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) “The onus is on the plaintiff to articulate the ‘specifi[c] ways’ to 6 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 13 cure the identified defect.” (Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145 (Shaeffer); Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) B. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Taking Judicial Notice of Publicly Recorded Documents Because judicially noticed facts frame our review of the sufficiency of Mayen’s pleading, we will begin by addressing Mayen’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling taking judicial notice of publicly recorded documents. “We review judicial notice rulings for abuse of discretion.” (Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175, 182.) There was no abuse of discretion here. Courts routinely take judicial notice of publicly recorded real property records because “[t]he official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorder’s office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264–265 (Fontenot); see Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) [authorizing judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of . . . any state”], (h) [authorizing judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy”]; Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 927 & 924, fn. 1 [concluding the trial court “properly noticed” the “existence and facial contents of” publicly recorded “deed of trust, assignment of the deed of trust, substitution of trustee, notices of default and of trustee’s sale, and trustee’s deed upon sale”].) 14  When a recorded document is judicially noticeable, “a court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265; see Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 166, 185 [“It is well accepted that when courts take judicial notice of the existence of court documents, the legal effect of the results reached in orders and judgments may be established.”].) However, it is “improper to take judicial notice of the truth of various factual representations made in [a] document[].” (Fontenot, at p. 265.) Under these principles, courts may take judicial notice of a publicly recorded real property record to establish a chain of title so long as each link in the chain is independently established by the operative provisions of that link. (See, e.g., Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 266 [trial court properly took judicial notice “that MERS was the beneficiary of [a] first deed of trust” because “MERS’s status as beneficiary was not the type of fact that is generally an improper subject of judicial notice . . . since its status was not a matter of fact existing apart from the document itself. Rather, MERS was the beneficiary under the deed of trust because, as a legally operative document, the deed of trust designated MERS as the beneficiary. Given this, MERS’s status was not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Italics added.)]; see ibid. [“The other matters noticed by the trial court similarly could be 15 inferred from the text or legal effect of the documents themselves, needing no outside confirmation.”].) On the other hand, courts may not use judicial notice to establish a chain of title where each link is not independently established, such as by relying on hearsay in a nonoperative provision (e.g., a recital) to establish the extrinsic facts about an earlier missing link. (See, e.g., Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117 [declining to take judicial notice of a recital in a substitution of trustee stating that a certain party “ ‘is the present holder of beneficial interest under [a] [d]eed of [t]rust’ ” where that fact was not established by the operative provisions of the substitution of trustee]; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1374–1375 [declining to take judicial notice of recitals stating that one bank “ ‘is the present beneficiary under’ ” a deed of trust and that another bank is “successor in interest to” another bank, where those facts were not established by the operative provisions of the relevant instruments]; Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [“Herrera did not hold that judicial notice cannot be taken of the legal effect of a legally operative document (like the assignment of the deed of trust . . . ); it simply held that it could not be done in that case, because the vitality of the assignment was reasonably subject to dispute without independent proof that the party assigning the interest had the authority to do so”].) Here, it was within the trial court’s discretion to conclude there was no genuine dispute regarding the authenticity of the judicially noticed documents. Indeed, Mayen attached the entire deed of trust to his original complaint and attached a portion of it to his amended complaint. And Mayen lodges no specific challenge to the authenticity of the assignment of deed of 16 trust. Accordingly, the trial court could properly take judicial notice of the legal effect of each document. Taking judicial notice of these publicly recorded instruments established each link in the chain of title to the security interest in the Property established by the deed of trust. The original grant deed conveyed an interest in the Property to Mayen and Wife. Through the deed of trust, Mayen and Wife conveyed a security interest in the Property to MERS as beneficiary and as Countrywide’s nominee. And the assignment of the deed of trust assigned MERS’s interest in the deed of trust and underlying loan to BoNYM. Each of these steps is established by the operative provisions of the records of which the trial court took judicial notice; none is established by hearsay references to extrinsic matters. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in taking judicial notice of these records to establish the chain of title to the parties’ respective interests in the Property. C. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer on Tender Rule Grounds 1. Relevant Legal Principles “The purpose of a quiet title action ‘is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he [or she] may be entitled to.’ ” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 524.) “The quiet title plaintiff must file a verified complaint including a description of the property, the basis for the plaintiff’s claim of title, the adverse claims the plaintiff seeks to adjudicate, the date as of which the 17 plaintiff seeks to adjudicate those claims, and a prayer for the determination of the plaintiff’s title against the adverse claims.” (Ibid., citing § 761.020.) “A borrower may not, however, quiet title against a secured lender without first paying the outstanding debt on which the mortgage or deed of trust is based.” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86 (Lueras); see Shimpones v. Stickney (1934) 219 Cal. 637, 649 [“It is settled in California that a mortgagor cannot quiet his title against the mortgagee without paying the debt secured”].) “This rule is based upon the equitable principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.” (Mix v. Sodd (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 386, 390 [applying the tender rule even though the underlying debt was time-barred]; cf. Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 112 [“Because the action is in equity, a defaulted borrower who seeks to set aside a trustee’s sale is required to do equity before the court will exercise its equitable powers.”].) However, “[f]ull tender of the indebtedness is not required if the borrower attacks the validity of the underlying debt.” (Lueras, at p. 87.) 2. Analysis As the trial court found, Mayen failed to state a valid cause of action for quiet title because he did not allege or otherwise establish that he paid the underlying debt secured by the Property. (See Lueras, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 86.) Mayen argues the tender rule does not apply here because (1) he “filed suit prior to the foreclosure sale” and case law “establish[es] that tender is not required when” the “foreclosure has not yet occurred” (see Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250 (Pfeiffer)); and (2) tender is not required when there is 18 significant lender misconduct or the debt is in dispute. Neither of these circumstances apply here. The timing of the foreclosure sale is irrelevant here because Mayen sought only to quiet title, not to set aside or prevent the foreclosure sale. (See Lueras, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 87 [finding Pfeiffer “inapplicable . . . because [the homeowner] has not sued to set aside or prevent a foreclosure sale,” but rather, “sought to quiet title to the property, which he cannot do without paying the outstanding indebtedness”].) Nor has Mayen adequately alleged the invalidity of the underlying debt. He maintains he satisfied this requirement by alleging “that [the defendants] lacked a valid enforceable interest in the property due to defects in the securitization process and chain of title.” We are not persuaded. Mayen bases his defective-securitization argument on a law review article that purported to “document[] systemic irregularities and misconduct in assignments and securitization practices involving [BoNYM] and Countrywide.” (Italics added.) But Mayen identifies no irregularities regarding the assignment of his indebtedness. Indeed, despite Mayen’s vague references to complex securitization practices, the chain of title here is simple and consists of only two links: the deed of trust and the assignment of deed of trust. As discussed above, each of these links in the chain of title was adequately established by judicially noticed and publicly recorded real property records. (See Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 924, fn. 1.) Mayen’s more general attacks on the validity of the chain of title also fail. Mayen alleged in his amended complaint that the deed of trust was invalidly assigned because his “loan cannot be assigned without [his] express written consent.” As a general matter, however, “[a] deed of trust may . . . be assigned one or multiple times over the life of the loan it secures” and the 19 “borrower can generally raise no objection to assignment of the note and deed of trust.” (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 927.) More importantly, the deed of trust here expressly provided that the “Note . . . (together with [the deed of trust]) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.” This judicially noticed operative provision of the deed of trust prevails over Mayen’s conflicting allegation. (See Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 751–752.) Mayen also asserts that by “identif[ying] himself as the legal and equitable owner” of the Property, he established his entitlement to the presumption under Evidence Code section 662 that “[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title” unless “rebutted . . . by clear and convincing proof.” But that presumption is rebutted here by the chain of title showing Mayen and Wife conveyed a security interest in the Property. For these reasons, Mayen failed to state a valid claim for quiet title. Because Mayen does not argue that he can cure his pleading defect regarding the tender rule by further amending his complaint, he has not met his burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. (See Shaeffer, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145; Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) Because we conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrer on tender rule grounds, we do not reach the other grounds relied on by the trial court or raised by the defendants below or on appeal. (See Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967; Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) 20  D. Mayen Received Due Process Mayen contends the trial court’s handling of the demurrer proceedings denied him due process in a variety of ways. We disagree. Mayen faults the trial court for not considering his written objection to the tentative ruling. He maintains the filing was timely and that California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308, “imposed a ministerial duty on the court to consider any written opposition to a tentative ruling.” This rule, however, addresses the procedure by which a court-wide tentative ruling policy must address requests for argument; it does not require courts to receive or consider written objections to tentative rulings. Relatedly, Mayen argues the court erred by not allowing him to read his objection into the record. But as the trial court pointed out, the objection is in the appellate record. More importantly, we have reviewed the objection and find it unpersuasive — it relates largely to the judicial notice challenges we have already rejected and to the necessary party finding that we do not address. Next, Mayen contends the trial court erred by not considering the law review article he cited regarding irregularities in loan securitization. He cites no authority, however, to support his implicit contention that the trial court was required to rely on this abstract literature instead of on the judicially noticed public records regarding Mayen’s own debt. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.”].) As noted, the judicially noticed public records establish a clear chain of title to the security interest in the Property. Mayen also complains that the trial court “curtailed [his] presentation of argument” at the demurrer hearing. As noted, however, Mayen repeatedly 21 interrupted the trial court. It was within the trial court’s statutory and inherent authority to regulate the proceedings before it. (See § 128, subd. (a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to . . .[¶] . . . [¶] . . . provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it”]; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them”]; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 415 [trial court has “inherent power to establish order in its courtroom”].) And, in any event, the trial court repeatedly invited and allowed Mayen to address the merits of the demurrer. Mayen also accuses the trial court of exhibiting bias by “selective[ly]” declining to consider his supporting materials while improperly considering the truth of the defendants’ “unauthenticated and disputed instruments.” This is simply a repackaging of Mayen’s other attacks regarding his own materials and the public records of which the trial court properly took judicial notice. Similarly, Mayen argues the trial court’s ruling was self-contradictory because, on one hand, the court concluded the defendants did not need to produce the underlying promissory note to defeat Mayen’s quiet title claim, while, on the other hand, the court appeared to rely on the promissory note (which was not before the court) to find Wife was a necessary party. We see no contradiction. The trial court correctly determined the defendants did not need to produce the promissory note to establish that Mayen and Wife conveyed a security interest in the Property — this fact was established by the judicially noticed deed of trust. (Cf. Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 440 [“We . . . see nothing in the applicable statutes that precludes foreclosure when the foreclosing party 22 does not possess the original promissory note.”].) And, in any event, because the trial court properly sustained the defendants’ demurrer on tender rule grounds, we ne