Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Frandsen v. National ACO, LLC CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE RUSSELL M. FRANDSEN, B352811 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCV14324) v. NATIONAL ACO, LLC, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Barbara A. Meiers, Judge. Affirmed. The Business Legal Group and Russell M. Frandsen for Plaintiff and Appellant. FLP Law Group, Marc A. Lieberman and Alan W. Forsley for Defendant and Respondent. _______________________________ Russell M. Frandsen appeals from a judgment in favor of National ACO, LLC (NACO), on Frandsen’s first amended complaint (FAC) for NACO’s involuntary dissolution pursuant to Corporations Code section 17707.03.1 During a suspension of NACO’s corporate powers (which have since been revived), NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings and the trial court granted that motion without leave to amend and entered the judgment. Among other reasons for entering the judgment, the trial court concluded the FAC is moot. The trial court subsequently issued an order granting NACO’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees, which order Frandsen did not separately appeal. We reject Frandsen’s argument that the judgment is void or invalid as a result of NACO’s suspension. We conclude Frandsen forfeited his other challenges to the judgment because his appellate brief does not address the trial court’s conclusion the FAC is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Although Frandsen also asserts error in the fee order, we lack jurisdiction to review that order because Frandsen did not separately appeal it. BACKGROUND In reviewing the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true the factual allegations in Frandsen’s operative FAC. (Bettencourt v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111 (Bettencourt).) 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Corporations Code. 2 A. NACO retained Frandsen, a NACO member, to pursue a claim against the federal government. Years later, Frandsen filed a federal action on NACO’s behalf. NACO’s managing member instructed Frandsen to dismiss that action. NACO is a limited liability company formed pursuant to California law. Andre Berger is NACO’s managing member and owns approximately 52.5 percent of NACO’s membership interest. Frandsen owns approximately 42.8 percent of NACO’s membership interest. NACO contracted with the United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to care for certain Medicare beneficiaries. The contract required NACO to pay CMS up to 2 percent of a “benchmark” cost if the cost of NACO’s care exceeded the benchmark. NACO posted a bond as collateral for that obligation. For the 2018 calendar year, CMS claimed that the cost of NACO’s care exceeded the benchmark and that NACO incurred a loss of over $2.9 million. CMS collected $2.9 million against NACO’s bond. NACO allegedly has a claim against CMS for that $2.9 million based on CMS’s alleged breach of contract in calculating the benchmark and the loss. In August 2020, NACO retained Frandsen on a contingency basis to represent NACO in pursuing its claim against CMS. In June 2024 (nearly four years later), on NACO’s behalf, Frandsen filed an action against CMS in a federal district court. On February 19, 2025, Frandsen notified Berger 3 (NACO’s managing member) by email that Frandsen had filed the federal action.2 The next day, Berger emailed Frandsen questions about the federal action, including about the costs and fees that NACO might incur in prosecuting the federal action, NACO’s chances of prevailing in that action, and NACO’s and its members’ potential liability for CMS’s fees or costs if NACO did not prevail. Frandsen replied the same day. On May 11, 2025, by email, Berger discharged Frandsen as NACO’s counsel and instructed him to dismiss the federal action against CMS. In response, Frandsen argued NACO and its members had “only upside” from the federal action because Frandsen allegedly had assumed all of the action’s financial risks, and stated: “If NACO’s complaint is dismissed, then all of this upside is lost. The statute [of] limitations has run on contractual claims, so that if the complaint is dismissed, it cannot be refiled.”3 2 Berger declared: “For four years and six months, from August 10, 2020 to February 19, 2025, I heard not one word from Frandsen regarding the status of the [federal] NACO Complaint . . . .” “I understood we had decided not to pursue the litigation, given Frandsen’s total lack of communication . . . .” “Frandsen’s filing of the NACO Complaint . . . was unauthorized.” 3 Frandsen subsequently argued the statute of limitations for a new action based on NACO’s claim against CMS had not expired and would expire on June 15, 2026. That date has since passed. 4 B. Frandsen filed the instant action for NACO’s dissolution to preserve and continue prosecuting NACO’s claim against the federal government. On May 15, 2025, Frandsen filed the instant action against NACO for NACO’s involuntary dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. The next day, he filed the FAC. The FAC alleges that “NACO has no assets” other than NACO’s claim (or “lawsuit”) against CMS. The FAC further alleges: “NACO has not been operating for several years, but has been defending a lawsuit brought by Alex Foxman in which both Berger and Frandsen are also defendants.” At the time Frandsen filed the FAC, the Foxman action had recently concluded in favor of NACO, Berger, and Frandsen. A dispute had arisen between Berger and Frandsen regarding Berger’s alleged responsibility to pay attorney fees incurred in defending the Foxman action. Berger allegedly sought to dismiss NACO’s federal action against CMS to exert pressure on Frandsen in their dispute over attorney fees. The FAC seeks a decree of dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. It also seeks an order appointing a receiver to take charge of NACO’s affairs (including prosecution of the federal action) pending the outcome of the complaint for dissolution. The FAC states: “Frandsen seeks the dissolution of NACO and the appointment of a receiver to preserve the only valuable asset of NACO, namely the claim against CMS, and to prevent Berger from dissipating that asset to serve his own personal interests.”4 4 The trial court denied Frandsen’s ex parte application and subsequent motion for appointment of a receiver. 5 C. NACO dismissed its federal action and moved for judgment on the pleadings in the instant action. The trial court granted the motion without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal because, among other reasons, the federal action’s dismissal rendered the FAC moot. In July 2025 (about two months after Frandsen filed the instant action), pursuant to NACO’s notice of dismissal, the federal district court dismissed NACO’s federal action against CMS without prejudice.5 In August 2025, NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings in the instant action, arguing the FAC did not and could not be amended to state a cause of action for dissolution because, among other reasons, NACO’s dismissal of the federal action rendered the FAC moot.6 In opposition, Frandsen argued the FAC alleged facts supporting NACO’s dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. Frandsen did not respond to NACO’s argument that the FAC is moot. 5 The trial court judicially noticed the district court’s dismissal of the federal action. 6 “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) 6 The trial court granted NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. The court concluded that the FAC did not allege facts supporting dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. As an independent ground for granting the motion, the trial court agreed with NACO that the dismissal of the federal action rendered the instant action for dissolution moot. On November 12, 2025, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. D. The trial court struck Frandsen’s postjudgment request for voluntary dismissal and granted NACO’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Frandsen appealed the judgment but not the fee order. NACO filed a postjudgment motion for attorney fees. On January 6, 2026, Frandsen filed a request for voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice. The clerk rejected the request, noting that the trial court had already dismissed the action (with prejudice). The same day, Frandsen moved to set aside the judgment of dismissal. Frandsen requested judicial notice of a California Secretary of State website indicating that on June 2, 2025 (before NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings), the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) suspended NACO’s corporate powers.7 7 “[T]he powers, rights, and privileges of a domestic taxpayer may be suspended” if the taxpayer fails to timely pay a tax. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301; see also id., § 23305.5, subd. (a)(2) [“ ‘Taxpayer’ ” includes limited liability company].) “Any 7 Frandsen argued NACO’s suspension rendered NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court’s order granting that motion, and the judgment based on that order void or invalid. In opposition, NACO submitted a certificate of revivor that the FTB issued to NACO on January 7, 2026 (the day after Frandsen first raised the issue of NACO’s suspension).8 The trial court issued an order striking Frandsen’s request for voluntary dismissal as untimely and granting NACO’s motion for attorney fees. Frandsen subsequently took his motion to set aside the judgment off calendar. Before the trial court issued its order granting NACO’s fee motion, Frandsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. Frandsen did not file a separate notice of appeal from the fee order. taxpayer which has suffered the suspension . . . provided for in [Revenue and Taxation Code] Section 23301 . . . may be relieved therefrom upon making application therefor in writing to the Franchise Tax Board and upon . . . the payment of the . . . amounts for nonpayment of which the suspension . . . occurred, . . . and upon the issuance by the Franchise Tax Board of a certificate of revivor.” (Id., § 23305.) “Upon the issuance of the certificate by the Franchise Tax Board the taxpayer therein named shall become reinstated but the reinstatement shall be without prejudice to any action, defense, or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension . . . .” (Id., § 23305a.) 8 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of NACO’s certificate of revivor. (See Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483-1484 [trial court properly took judicial notice of corporation’s certificate of revivor], citing Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) 8 DISCUSSION A. The judgment is not void or invalid. Frandsen argues the judgment is void or invalid because NACO’s corporate powers were suspended when NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings and remained suspended when the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment. Because the argument presents a purely legal issue, our review is de novo. (Center for Self-Improvement & Community Development v. Lennar Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1550 (Center for Self-Improvement).) “In general, a ‘corporation may not prosecute or defend an action . . . while its corporate rights are suspended for failure to pay taxes.’ ” (Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 324 (Bourhis).) “Corporate incapacity is nothing more than a legal disability, depriving the party of the right to come into court and represent its own interests. As such, lack of capacity is not a jurisdictional defect . . . .” (Center for Self-Improvement, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552.) “Thus, the suspended status of corporate powers at the time of [a suspended corporation’s] filing suit does not impede the trial court’s jurisdiction to proceed, nor does a suspension after suit commences but before rendition of judgment deprive the court of jurisdiction or render the judgment void.” (Id. at p. 1553; accord, Tabarrejo v. Superior Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849, 863 (Tabarrejo).) Under the foregoing authority, NACO’s lack of capacity to defend the action during its suspension was not a jurisdictional defect and did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter the judgment. (See Tabarrejo, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 863- 867 [trial court had jurisdiction over suspended corporation’s 9 appeal from Labor Commissioner decision, notwithstanding suspended corporation’s failure to obtain certificate of revivor].) Thus, we conclude the judgment is not void.9 We further conclude the judgment is not invalid. Even assuming, arguendo, NACO’s suspension initially rendered the judgment invalid, NACO’s revivor retroactively validated the judgment. “ ‘In a number of situations the revival of corporate powers by the payment of delinquent taxes has been held to validate otherwise invalid prior action.’ ” (Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 324; see also, e.g., id. at pp. 324-329 [revivor validated corporation’s notices of appeal filed when corporation was suspended].) “Subsequent corporate revivor retroactively validates actions in the course of litigation such as . . . making and opposing of motions . . . .” (Center for Self-Improvement, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.) “[T]he revival of corporate powers enables the previously suspended party to proceed with the prosecution or defense of the action and validates a judgment obtained during suspension.” (Ibid.) Frandsen argues NACO’s revivor could not validate the judgment because NACO did not obtain its certificate of revivor until after Frandsen filed a request for voluntary dismissal. The trial court, however, properly struck Frandsen’s request for voluntary dismissal because the request was untimely. A plaintiff may request voluntary dismissal only “before the actual 9 Frandsen argues that under Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings during NACO’s suspension. That case, however, did not consider any suspension of a corporation’s powers. “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (Sonic- Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.) 10 commencement of trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1).) “As used in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 581, the phrase ‘commencement of trial’ has been interpreted to include pretrial rulings that ‘ “effectively dispose” ’ of the claim at issue.” (Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91, 98 (Maniago).) Thus, “a plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss a claim after a demurrer has been ‘sustained without leave to amend . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) Frandsen concedes the same rule would typically bar a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal where, as here, the trial court previously granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. (See People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777 [“ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer’ ”].) Frandsen argues the rule does not apply here because NACO’s suspension deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter judgment. As we have concluded, however, the suspension did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant the motion and to enter judgment. (See Center for Self-Improvement, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553; Tabarrejo, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 863-867.) Because Frandsen’s postjudgment request for voluntary dismissal followed the commencement of “trial,” it was untimely. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1); see also Maniago, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 98.) As Frandsen observes, Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a provides that a corporation’s reinstatement upon issuance of a certificate of revivor “shall be without prejudice to any action, defense, or right which has accrued by reason of the 11 original suspension . . . .” (Italics added.) Frandsen, however, had no right under Code of Civil Procedure section 581 or Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a to request voluntary dismissal after judgment. (Cf. Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 329 [corporation’s revivor after jurisdictional deadline to appeal retroactively validated notices of appeal filed within deadline, notwithstanding Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a; “being in a position to move to dismiss an untimely appeal is not a ‘right’ under that statute”]; ibid. [“This conclusion finds support in Schwartz v. Magyar House, Inc. (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 182, 190, . . . which held that being ‘in a position to file a default judgment’ against a suspended corporation ‘is not a “right” within the contemplation of’ [Revenue and Taxation Code] section 23305a”].) In short, we conclude the judgment is not void or invalid. B. Frandsen forfeited his other challenges to the judgment because his appellate brief did not address the trial court’s conclusion the FAC is moot. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analogous to a general demurrer. [Citation.] Like a general demurrer, it tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” (Bettencourt, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.) “The scope of our review of a judgment on the pleadings is de novo, and we determine whether the complaint states a valid cause of action.” (Ibid.) “[I]t is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error with respect to all of the bases upon which the trial court rendered its decision . . . .” (Fleming Distribution Co. v. Younan (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 73, 84, fn. 8, italics added (Fleming).) “ ‘[An appellant’s burden] requires more than simply stating a bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous and 12 leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment . . . .’ ” (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 (Lee).) “ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].” ’ ” (Ibid.) Here, Frandsen’s opening brief argues the trial court erred by granting NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because, in Frandsen’s view, the FAC alleges facts supporting NACO’s dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. The opening brief does not address the trial court’s other, independent reason for granting NACO’s motion, i.e., that NACO’s dismissal of its federal action rendered the FAC moot. NACO’s respondent’s brief argues the trial court correctly concluded the FAC is moot because the FAC’s purpose—i.e., to preserve and continue prosecuting NACO’s federal claim against CMS—cannot be achieved now that NACO has dismissed its federal action and the statute of limitations for filing a new action based on the same claim has expired. Frandsen did not file an appellate reply brief. We conclude that by failing to address the trial court’s conclusion the FAC is moot, Frandsen forfeited any challenge to that independent basis for the judgment, and therefore failed to meet his burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (See Fleming, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 84, fn. 8; Lee, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) We need not address the trial court’s other reasons for entering the judgment, or NACO’s argument that the judgment is correct for the additional reason that public policy bars the FAC. 13 C. We lack jurisdiction to review the attorney fee order. “An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an award of attorney fees made after entry of the judgment, unless the [fee] order is separately appealed.” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 (Allen); accord, Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 2:156.3, p. 107 [collecting cases].) Here, Frandsen argues the trial court erred by granting NACO’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Frandsen, however, did not separately appeal the order granting that motion. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review that order.10 (See Allen, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) 10 NACO requests, in its respondent’s brief, that we impose monetary sanctions against Frandsen for filing an allegedly frivolous appeal in violation of the California Rules of Court. We deny the request because NACO did not file a timely motion for sanctions and supporting declaration as rule 8.276(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court requires. (See Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1114 [“Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1), a request for sanctions on appeal must be raised in a separate motion; ‘[s]anctions cannot be sought in the respondent’s brief’ ”]; Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 837, 859 [denying request for sanctions made in respondent’s brief for noncompliance with rule 8.276(b)(1)].) We also deny NACO’s motion for judicial notice of federal court records from an action that Frandsen filed during the pendency of this appeal, because those records were not before the trial court when it entered the judgment and, in any event, are irrelevant to our disposition of the appeal. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice 14 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NACO is entitled to its costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED M. KIM, J. We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J. of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered’ ”]; Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418 [denying request for judicial notice of federal court records because records were irrelevant].) 15