Frandsen v. National ACO, LLC CA2/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB352811
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Frandsen v. National ACO, LLC CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
RUSSELL M. FRANDSEN, B352811
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV14324)
v.
NATIONAL ACO, LLC,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Barbara A. Meiers, Judge. Affirmed.
The Business Legal Group and Russell M. Frandsen for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
FLP Law Group, Marc A. Lieberman and Alan W. Forsley
for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________________
Russell M. Frandsen appeals from a judgment in favor of
National ACO, LLC (NACO), on Frandsen’s first amended
complaint (FAC) for NACO’s involuntary dissolution pursuant to
Corporations Code section 17707.03.1 During a suspension of
NACO’s corporate powers (which have since been revived),
NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings and the trial court
granted that motion without leave to amend and entered the
judgment. Among other reasons for entering the judgment, the
trial court concluded the FAC is moot. The trial court
subsequently issued an order granting NACO’s postjudgment
motion for attorney fees, which order Frandsen did not
separately appeal.
We reject Frandsen’s argument that the judgment is void
or invalid as a result of NACO’s suspension. We conclude
Frandsen forfeited his other challenges to the judgment because
his appellate brief does not address the trial court’s conclusion
the FAC is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Although Frandsen also asserts error in the fee order, we lack
jurisdiction to review that order because Frandsen did not
separately appeal it.
BACKGROUND
In reviewing the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings,
we accept as true the factual allegations in Frandsen’s operative
FAC. (Bettencourt v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111 (Bettencourt).)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the
Corporations Code.
2
A. NACO retained Frandsen, a NACO member, to
pursue a claim against the federal government.
Years later, Frandsen filed a federal action on
NACO’s behalf. NACO’s managing member
instructed Frandsen to dismiss that action.
NACO is a limited liability company formed pursuant to
California law. Andre Berger is NACO’s managing member and
owns approximately 52.5 percent of NACO’s membership
interest. Frandsen owns approximately 42.8 percent of NACO’s
membership interest.
NACO contracted with the United States Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to care for certain
Medicare beneficiaries. The contract required NACO to pay
CMS up to 2 percent of a “benchmark” cost if the cost of NACO’s
care exceeded the benchmark. NACO posted a bond as collateral
for that obligation.
For the 2018 calendar year, CMS claimed that the cost of
NACO’s care exceeded the benchmark and that NACO incurred
a loss of over $2.9 million. CMS collected $2.9 million against
NACO’s bond. NACO allegedly has a claim against CMS for
that $2.9 million based on CMS’s alleged breach of contract in
calculating the benchmark and the loss.
In August 2020, NACO retained Frandsen on a
contingency basis to represent NACO in pursuing its claim
against CMS. In June 2024 (nearly four years later), on NACO’s
behalf, Frandsen filed an action against CMS in a federal
district court. On February 19, 2025, Frandsen notified Berger
3
(NACO’s managing member) by email that Frandsen had filed
the federal action.2
The next day, Berger emailed Frandsen questions about
the federal action, including about the costs and fees that NACO
might incur in prosecuting the federal action, NACO’s chances of
prevailing in that action, and NACO’s and its members’
potential liability for CMS’s fees or costs if NACO did not
prevail. Frandsen replied the same day.
On May 11, 2025, by email, Berger discharged Frandsen
as NACO’s counsel and instructed him to dismiss the federal
action against CMS. In response, Frandsen argued NACO and
its members had “only upside” from the federal action because
Frandsen allegedly had assumed all of the action’s financial
risks, and stated: “If NACO’s complaint is dismissed, then all of
this upside is lost. The statute [of] limitations has run on
contractual claims, so that if the complaint is dismissed, it
cannot be refiled.”3
2 Berger declared: “For four years and six months, from
August 10, 2020 to February 19, 2025, I heard not one word from
Frandsen regarding the status of the [federal] NACO
Complaint . . . .” “I understood we had decided not to pursue the
litigation, given Frandsen’s total lack of communication . . . .”
“Frandsen’s filing of the NACO Complaint . . . was
unauthorized.”
3 Frandsen subsequently argued the statute of limitations
for a new action based on NACO’s claim against CMS had not
expired and would expire on June 15, 2026. That date has since
passed.
4
B. Frandsen filed the instant action for NACO’s
dissolution to preserve and continue prosecuting
NACO’s claim against the federal government.
On May 15, 2025, Frandsen filed the instant action
against NACO for NACO’s involuntary dissolution pursuant to
section 17707.03. The next day, he filed the FAC. The FAC
alleges that “NACO has no assets” other than NACO’s claim (or
“lawsuit”) against CMS.
The FAC further alleges: “NACO has not been operating
for several years, but has been defending a lawsuit brought by
Alex Foxman in which both Berger and Frandsen are also
defendants.” At the time Frandsen filed the FAC, the Foxman
action had recently concluded in favor of NACO, Berger, and
Frandsen. A dispute had arisen between Berger and Frandsen
regarding Berger’s alleged responsibility to pay attorney fees
incurred in defending the Foxman action. Berger allegedly
sought to dismiss NACO’s federal action against CMS to exert
pressure on Frandsen in their dispute over attorney fees.
The FAC seeks a decree of dissolution pursuant to section
17707.03. It also seeks an order appointing a receiver to take
charge of NACO’s affairs (including prosecution of the federal
action) pending the outcome of the complaint for dissolution.
The FAC states: “Frandsen seeks the dissolution of NACO and
the appointment of a receiver to preserve the only valuable asset
of NACO, namely the claim against CMS, and to prevent Berger
from dissipating that asset to serve his own personal interests.”4
4 The trial court denied Frandsen’s ex parte application
and subsequent motion for appointment of a receiver.
5
C. NACO dismissed its federal action and moved for
judgment on the pleadings in the instant action.
The trial court granted the motion without leave to
amend and entered a judgment of dismissal because,
among other reasons, the federal action’s dismissal
rendered the FAC moot.
In July 2025 (about two months after Frandsen filed the
instant action), pursuant to NACO’s notice of dismissal, the
federal district court dismissed NACO’s federal action against
CMS without prejudice.5
In August 2025, NACO moved for judgment on the
pleadings in the instant action, arguing the FAC did not and
could not be amended to state a cause of action for dissolution
because, among other reasons, NACO’s dismissal of the federal
action rendered the FAC moot.6
In opposition, Frandsen argued the FAC alleged facts
supporting NACO’s dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03.
Frandsen did not respond to NACO’s argument that the FAC is
moot.
5 The trial court judicially noticed the district court’s
dismissal of the federal action.
6 “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(Ibid.)
6
The trial court granted NACO’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings without leave to amend. The court concluded that
the FAC did not allege facts supporting dissolution pursuant to
section 17707.03. As an independent ground for granting the
motion, the trial court agreed with NACO that the dismissal of
the federal action rendered the instant action for dissolution
moot.
On November 12, 2025, the trial court entered judgment
dismissing the action with prejudice.
D. The trial court struck Frandsen’s postjudgment
request for voluntary dismissal and granted NACO’s
postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Frandsen
appealed the judgment but not the fee order.
NACO filed a postjudgment motion for attorney fees.
On January 6, 2026, Frandsen filed a request for
voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice. The clerk
rejected the request, noting that the trial court had already
dismissed the action (with prejudice).
The same day, Frandsen moved to set aside the judgment
of dismissal. Frandsen requested judicial notice of a California
Secretary of State website indicating that on June 2, 2025
(before NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings), the
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) suspended NACO’s corporate
powers.7
7 “[T]he powers, rights, and privileges of a domestic
taxpayer may be suspended” if the taxpayer fails to timely pay a
tax. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301; see also id., § 23305.5, subd.
(a)(2) [“ ‘Taxpayer’ ” includes limited liability company].) “Any
7
Frandsen argued NACO’s suspension rendered NACO’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court’s order
granting that motion, and the judgment based on that order void
or invalid. In opposition, NACO submitted a certificate of
revivor that the FTB issued to NACO on January 7, 2026 (the
day after Frandsen first raised the issue of NACO’s suspension).8
The trial court issued an order striking Frandsen’s request
for voluntary dismissal as untimely and granting NACO’s
motion for attorney fees. Frandsen subsequently took his motion
to set aside the judgment off calendar.
Before the trial court issued its order granting NACO’s fee
motion, Frandsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment. Frandsen did not file a separate notice of appeal from
the fee order.
taxpayer which has suffered the suspension . . . provided for in
[Revenue and Taxation Code] Section 23301 . . . may be relieved
therefrom upon making application therefor in writing to the
Franchise Tax Board and upon . . . the payment of the . . .
amounts for nonpayment of which the suspension . . .
occurred, . . . and upon the issuance by the Franchise Tax Board
of a certificate of revivor.” (Id., § 23305.) “Upon the issuance of
the certificate by the Franchise Tax Board the taxpayer therein
named shall become reinstated but the reinstatement shall be
without prejudice to any action, defense, or right which has
accrued by reason of the original suspension . . . .” (Id.,
§ 23305a.)
8 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of NACO’s
certificate of revivor. (See Friends of Shingle Springs
Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1470, 1483-1484 [trial court properly took judicial notice of
corporation’s certificate of revivor], citing Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (c).)
8
DISCUSSION
A. The judgment is not void or invalid.
Frandsen argues the judgment is void or invalid because
NACO’s corporate powers were suspended when NACO moved
for judgment on the pleadings and remained suspended when
the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment.
Because the argument presents a purely legal issue, our review
is de novo. (Center for Self-Improvement & Community
Development v. Lennar Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1550
(Center for Self-Improvement).)
“In general, a ‘corporation may not prosecute or defend an
action . . . while its corporate rights are suspended for failure to
pay taxes.’ ” (Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 324
(Bourhis).) “Corporate incapacity is nothing more than a legal
disability, depriving the party of the right to come into court and
represent its own interests. As such, lack of capacity is not a
jurisdictional defect . . . .” (Center for Self-Improvement, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552.) “Thus, the suspended status of
corporate powers at the time of [a suspended corporation’s] filing
suit does not impede the trial court’s jurisdiction to proceed, nor
does a suspension after suit commences but before rendition of
judgment deprive the court of jurisdiction or render the
judgment void.” (Id. at p. 1553; accord, Tabarrejo v. Superior
Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849, 863 (Tabarrejo).)
Under the foregoing authority, NACO’s lack of capacity to
defend the action during its suspension was not a jurisdictional
defect and did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant
NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter the
judgment. (See Tabarrejo, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 863-
867 [trial court had jurisdiction over suspended corporation’s
9
appeal from Labor Commissioner decision, notwithstanding
suspended corporation’s failure to obtain certificate of revivor].)
Thus, we conclude the judgment is not void.9
We further conclude the judgment is not invalid. Even
assuming, arguendo, NACO’s suspension initially rendered the
judgment invalid, NACO’s revivor retroactively validated the
judgment. “ ‘In a number of situations the revival of corporate
powers by the payment of delinquent taxes has been held to
validate otherwise invalid prior action.’ ” (Bourhis, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 324; see also, e.g., id. at pp. 324-329 [revivor
validated corporation’s notices of appeal filed when corporation
was suspended].) “Subsequent corporate revivor retroactively
validates actions in the course of litigation such as . . . making
and opposing of motions . . . .” (Center for Self-Improvement,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.) “[T]he revival of corporate
powers enables the previously suspended party to proceed with
the prosecution or defense of the action and validates a judgment
obtained during suspension.” (Ibid.)
Frandsen argues NACO’s revivor could not validate the
judgment because NACO did not obtain its certificate of revivor
until after Frandsen filed a request for voluntary dismissal. The
trial court, however, properly struck Frandsen’s request for
voluntary dismissal because the request was untimely. A
plaintiff may request voluntary dismissal only “before the actual
9 Frandsen argues that under Abelleira v. District Court of
Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant NACO’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings during NACO’s suspension. That case, however, did
not consider any suspension of a corporation’s powers. “[C]ases
are not authority for propositions not considered.” (Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.)
10
commencement of trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1).)
“As used in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 581, the phrase
‘commencement of trial’ has been interpreted to include pretrial
rulings that ‘ “effectively dispose” ’ of the claim at issue.”
(Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc.
(2026) 20 Cal.5th 91, 98 (Maniago).) Thus, “a plaintiff cannot
voluntarily dismiss a claim after a demurrer has been ‘sustained
without leave to amend . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
Frandsen concedes the same rule would typically bar a
plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal where, as here, the trial court
previously granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings
without leave to amend. (See People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777 [“ ‘A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer’ ”].)
Frandsen argues the rule does not apply here because NACO’s
suspension deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant
NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter
judgment.
As we have concluded, however, the suspension did not
affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant the motion and to
enter judgment. (See Center for Self-Improvement, supra, 173
Cal.App.4th at p. 1553; Tabarrejo, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 863-867.) Because Frandsen’s postjudgment request for
voluntary dismissal followed the commencement of “trial,” it was
untimely. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1); see also Maniago,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 98.)
As Frandsen observes, Revenue and Taxation Code section
23305a provides that a corporation’s reinstatement upon
issuance of a certificate of revivor “shall be without prejudice to
any action, defense, or right which has accrued by reason of the
11
original suspension . . . .” (Italics added.) Frandsen, however,
had no right under Code of Civil Procedure section 581 or
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a to request voluntary
dismissal after judgment. (Cf. Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 329 [corporation’s revivor after jurisdictional deadline to
appeal retroactively validated notices of appeal filed within
deadline, notwithstanding Revenue and Taxation Code section
23305a; “being in a position to move to dismiss an untimely
appeal is not a ‘right’ under that statute”]; ibid. [“This conclusion
finds support in Schwartz v. Magyar House, Inc. (1959) 168
Cal.App.2d 182, 190, . . . which held that being ‘in a position to
file a default judgment’ against a suspended corporation ‘is not a
“right” within the contemplation of’ [Revenue and Taxation
Code] section 23305a”].)
In short, we conclude the judgment is not void or invalid.
B. Frandsen forfeited his other challenges to the
judgment because his appellate brief did not
address the trial court’s conclusion the FAC is moot.
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analogous to a
general demurrer. [Citation.] Like a general demurrer, it tests
the sufficiency of the complaint.” (Bettencourt, supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.) “The scope of our review of a judgment
on the pleadings is de novo, and we determine whether the
complaint states a valid cause of action.” (Ibid.)
“[I]t is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error with respect to all of the bases upon which the trial court
rendered its decision . . . .” (Fleming Distribution Co. v. Younan
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 73, 84, fn. 8, italics added (Fleming).)
“ ‘[An appellant’s burden] requires more than simply stating a
bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous and
12
leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the
appellate court’s role to construct theories or arguments that
would undermine the judgment . . . .’ ” (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 705, 721 (Lee).) “ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise
a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
[forfeited].” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, Frandsen’s opening brief argues the trial court erred
by granting NACO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
because, in Frandsen’s view, the FAC alleges facts supporting
NACO’s dissolution pursuant to section 17707.03. The opening
brief does not address the trial court’s other, independent reason
for granting NACO’s motion, i.e., that NACO’s dismissal of its
federal action rendered the FAC moot.
NACO’s respondent’s brief argues the trial court correctly
concluded the FAC is moot because the FAC’s purpose—i.e., to
preserve and continue prosecuting NACO’s federal claim against
CMS—cannot be achieved now that NACO has dismissed its
federal action and the statute of limitations for filing a new
action based on the same claim has expired. Frandsen did not
file an appellate reply brief.
We conclude that by failing to address the trial court’s
conclusion the FAC is moot, Frandsen forfeited any challenge to
that independent basis for the judgment, and therefore failed to
meet his burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (See
Fleming, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 84, fn. 8; Lee, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) We need not address the trial court’s
other reasons for entering the judgment, or NACO’s argument
that the judgment is correct for the additional reason that public
policy bars the FAC.
13
C. We lack jurisdiction to review the attorney fee
order.
“An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an award
of attorney fees made after entry of the judgment, unless the
[fee] order is separately appealed.” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94
Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 (Allen); accord, Eisenberg et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2025)
¶ 2:156.3, p. 107 [collecting cases].)
Here, Frandsen argues the trial court erred by granting
NACO’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Frandsen,
however, did not separately appeal the order granting that
motion. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review that order.10
(See Allen, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.)
10 NACO requests, in its respondent’s brief, that we impose
monetary sanctions against Frandsen for filing an allegedly
frivolous appeal in violation of the California Rules of Court. We
deny the request because NACO did not file a timely motion for
sanctions and supporting declaration as rule 8.276(b)(1) of the
California Rules of Court requires. (See Symmonds v. Mahoney
(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1114 [“Under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.276(b)(1), a request for sanctions on appeal must be
raised in a separate motion; ‘[s]anctions cannot be sought in the
respondent’s brief’ ”]; Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 837, 859 [denying request for sanctions made in
respondent’s brief for noncompliance with rule 8.276(b)(1)].)
We also deny NACO’s motion for judicial notice of federal
court records from an action that Frandsen filed during the
pendency of this appeal, because those records were not before
the trial court when it entered the judgment and, in any event,
are irrelevant to our disposition of the appeal. (See Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434,
444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. NACO is entitled to its costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally
‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an
appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the
record at the time the judgment was entered’ ”]; Deveny v.
Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418 [denying request
for judicial notice of federal court records because records were
irrelevant].)
15